Indian Council of World Affairs

On 23 July 2023, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a landmark advisory opinion titled “Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change”[i]. The proceedings were initiated by a group of students from Pacific Island countries and headed by the small island state of Vanuatu. It highlighted the obligations of all states to protect the environment. It stressed the urgent need for stronger accountability frameworks and more equitable arrangements.[ii] 

The ICJ’s advisory opinion, although not binding, powerfully reaffirms the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) and recognises small island nations as vital stakeholders in climate negotiations. It further foregrounded the ethical question concerning the inequitable burden borne by those who are least responsible for the impacts of climate change. 

However, major challenges do persist. The inherent inequality within the climate governance architecture continues to present multifarious challenges to the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Despite the call for climate action and growing diplomatic visibility, the SIDS are confronted with a deeply inequitable climate architecture. Wealthier nations, historically responsible for the majority of the global emissions, often dictate the pace and priorities of international climate negotiations, while the SIDS are relegated to the sidelines. Dealing with this context, the SIDS have become remarkably innovative and proactive, launching their diplomatic initiatives and forging regional and local solutions in adaptation and mitigation. 

Limitations of Institutional Mechanisms 

The United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment, also known as the Stockholm Conference, first held in 1972, marked a turning point with the active inclusion of developing countries in climate change negotiations.[iii] In the following decades, two pivotal reports were released that would shape the future global discourse on climate change. The first was the Brandt Report, released in 1980 by the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, which emphasised the widening chasm between the Global North and South caused by the exploitative policies of the richer countries. It highlighted the environmental and developmental challenges arising from these disparities and called for promoting North-South co-operation to rectify the same.[iv] The second report was the Brundtland Report of 1987, titled “Our Common Future”, which was instrumental in introducing the concept of sustainable development, defined as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the abilities of future generations”.[v] Consequently, the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 produced landmark agreements on sustainable development, namely Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development.[vi] The declarations provided a non-binding action plan, recognising the interconnectedness of social, economic, and environmental issues, the three fundamental pillars of the concept. While the earlier summits were largely non-binding, later global climate negotiations under the UN framework, such as the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015), introduced mechanisms aimed at limiting global emissions and mitigating climate change. 

However, existing institutional mechanisms present a variety of shortcomings. The Paris Agreement, which is a legally binding treaty, aims to limit global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels (1850–1900), with an ambitious effort to limit it to 1.5°C.[vii] Nonetheless, in September 2023, it was noted that the “world is not on track to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement”, cautioning against the slow progress in fulfilling the targets.[viii] A significant weakness of the agreement lies in its framework, which merely obliges states to formulate and submit Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). This voluntary nature has led to uneven burden-sharing among states. The NDCs, enshrined in Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, represent each country’s climate action plans that are framed in line with their domestic circumstances and aimed at reducing emissions through specific measures and policies. The agreement requires the countries “to prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs that they intend to achieve” every five years and submit them to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat. As of October this year, only 59 signatories to the Paris Agreement have submitted their updated 2035 NDCs, as shown in Figure 1.[ix]

Figure 1: The status of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)

[Source- Climate Action Tracker, independent scientific project tracking government climate action against Paris Agreement Goals] 

At the UN Conference of Parties (COP) 29 held in Baku in 2024, the countries agreed on a collective commitment to mobilise $300 billion annually towards climate finance called the “New Collective Quantified Goal”. Although the new goal was seen as an upgrade from the earlier pledge of $100 billion, which was first discussed during the 2015 Paris deliberations, it is still widely viewed as inadequate especially as key questions remain unresolved, such as who contributes for what, where, how much and through which mechanism.[x] Additionally, the “Baku to Belém Roadmap”, a major agenda in the COP30, sets a long-term ambition of achieving $1.3 trillion in climate finance annually by 2035. It is noteworthy that the climate finance surpassed the $100 billion mark only once in 2022[xi] as demonstrated in Figure 2, showcasing that a widening global finance gap continues to persist. 

Figure 2: Climate Finance mobilised by developed countries (billion USD)

[Source- OECD] 

Apart from the faltering trust in multilateral climate negotiations, the major powers have also displayed a lack of seriousness towards combating this global threat. As the second-largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the United States’ recent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement under the Trump Administration in January 2025 was a glaring reminder of the same. The President of the United States, Donald Trump, referred to climate change as the “greatest con job perpetrated on the world” [xii] in his UNGA speech in September 2025, amplifying the global climate change denialist sentiment held by the developed countries, undermining the gravity of the threat. While the impact of this decision yet remains to be seen, it has solidified the sentiment of “self-help” within the international system, weakening trust in meaningful co-operation and partnership, especially for the SIDS. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), approximately two-thirds of SIDS’ ocean-related NDCs still depend on external financial and technical support.[xiii] The outcome of the upcoming COP30 and the collective political will of the developed nations to deliver meaningful assistance would determine the destiny of climate co-operation.

From Vulnerability to Opportunities

Historically, SIDS have held a meagre share in the global emission basket, contributing less than 1% to the global greenhouse gas emissions (Figure 3).[xiv] Yet, despite their negligible role as emitters, the SIDS stand at the cusp of severe climate consequences, riddled with the looming threat of rising sea levels, shifting ecological patterns and extreme weather events. Resultantly, the SIDS have reportedly lost $153 billion between 1970 and 2020, while their average GDP stands at $13.7 billion with a population of over 65 million.[xv] Major sectors like tourism, which contribute approximately 30% towards their GDP, are expected to be hit.[xvi] For instance, ecosystems like coral reefs that support tourism activities are under grave threat from ocean acidification. Moreover, impacts on areas like fisheries may exacerbate problems of food insecurity and coastal community livelihoods. It is estimated that around nine Pacific Island states are expected to lose around 50% of their catch yield by 2100.[xvii] 

Figure 3: Top CO₂ Emitting Countries, 1750-2021

^{[Graph made using data from the Global Carbon Project, a research project of Future Earth and the World Climate Research Programme]}

The SIDS have undertaken several symbolic, as well as substantive efforts in the arena of climate diplomacy, initiated by their leaders. In 2009, the President of Maldives, Mohammed Nasheed, held the world’s first underwater cabinet meeting to raise awareness about the existential threat of rising sea levels to the low-lying island nation.[xviii] The Prime Minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, was honoured with the UN Environment Programme’s (UNEP) Champions of the Earth Award in 2021, recognising her as a global climate leader. She successfully pioneered the world’s first debt-for-climate-resilience swap and the Bridgetown Initiative (2022), which aims to reform the global financial system and unlock funds for climate finance.[xix] The Prime Minister of Fiji, Sitiveni Rabuka, has also been promoting their “Ocean of Peace” initiative, first proposed in 2023, which aims to establish the Pacific as a “zone of peace” and address challenges like climate change through cooperation.[xx]

The SIDS have also consistently played a leading role in global climate diplomacy, actively participating at the United Nations and key multilateral platforms like the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).[xxi] In 2017, Fiji presided over the UN Conference of Parties (COP23), making it the first small island nation to lead the negotiations. The conference produced the “Fiji Momentum for Implementation” and launched the Talanoa Dialogue, designed to support countries in implementing their NDCs by 2020.[xxii] Tuvalu’s Foreign Minister’s speech at the UN Conference of Parties (COP26) in 2021 while standing knee-deep in seawater and proclaiming, “We are sinking,” powerfully captured the global attention and underscored the urgency of SIDS’ climate concern in climate diplomacy.[xxiii] Similarly, in March 2025, Seychelles became the first SIDS to endorse the “International Platform for Ocean Sustainability”, a consortium of scientists and ocean stakeholders, marking a significant step in advancing ocean-focused climate diplomacy.[xxiv]

Spanning a wide geographical extent, the SIDS have pursued institutionalisation and collaboration through regional mechanisms. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), an intergovernmental organisation established in 1990, currently comprises 44 member states from all major ocean geographies. Its core mission is to “give voice to the vulnerable” and “draw the attention of the world to the moral imperative of climate action” that serves not only the most powerful countries, but all people, and especially those facing the greatest risk’.[xxv] Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change, a consortium of 14 Pacific Island countries established in 2009, has facilitated the exchange of best-practice adaptation in three key areas, namely, climate-sensitive areas, coastal zone management and food security and food production. Similarly, the Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) pathway, adopted in 2014, offers a framework for SIDS to advance the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the domestic context, furthering the goals of climate mitigation through SDG 14, “Life below Water”.

Localised Efforts at Adaptation and Mitigation

Beyond global climate diplomacy and regional mechanisms, island nations have placed increased emphasis on domestic adaptation and mitigation policies instead of adhering to a “one-size-fits-all” approach.[xxvi] There has been a marked shift with the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, towards the protection of the lives and cultures of indigenous people.[xxvii] The principle of self-determination has been touted as the “heart of the declaration”, recognising them as significant political players. The inclusion of the community as significant local agents, as seen in Comoros with the “One Comorian, One Tree” campaign, has helped facilitate a “bottom-up” approach to conservation.[xxviii] Moreover, Mauritius has focused on community livelihoods through the Eco-Fish initiative, pushing for ecologically viable coastal fishing strategies while simultaneously enhancing “blue governance”.[xxix] 

Seychelles has placed approximately 30% of its Exclusive Economic Zone under legal protection, reflecting its commitment to striking a delicate balance between sustainability and long-term developmental needs.[xxx] Integration of technology, like the use of drones and AI in Barbados to monitor seaweed cultivation, highlights how traditional aquaculture systems can be strengthened through modern technology.[xxxi] Seaweed and kelp varieties possess medicinal benefits, contribute to carbon sequestration and play a crucial role in maintaining  the overall health of marine ecology, a key contributor to SIDS’ security and economy. Under the Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project completed in October 2025, eight hectares of elevated land were created on the islet of Fogafale. The reclaimed land is projected to withstand the rising sea levels, mitigating against the severe consequence of probable landlessness.[xxxii] As the lowest-lying island nation, Maldives is the most susceptible to the impact of rising sea levels. The Maldives Floating City, being designed in collaboration with the Netherlands-based Dutch Docklands, offers a resilient residential complex across a 200-hectare lagoon.[xxxiii] It is significant to note that, as demonstrated above, SIDS offers an alternate model of development through these practices, showcasing how development is as much a social process as a technical one.

Conclusion

The evolving discourse on climate change reveals a widening disconnect between responsibility and vulnerability. While the global climate regime continues to be shaped by the imperatives of major emitters, the SIDS have reshaped the narrative through sustained advocacy, moral leadership and innovative adaptation solutions. Their efforts, whether through localised sustainability models, regional cooperation or legal recourse, illustrate that climate diplomacy needs no longer be the exclusive domain of powerful states; the most vulnerable can also lead by example.

Yet, the persistence of asymmetries in institutional representation, mitigation commitments and financing highlights the enduring inequities of the global system. Reframing climate solidarity, thus, requires moving beyond rhetorical commitments towards an architecture grounded in justice, accountability and collective resilience. The experience of SIDS makes it clear that genuine climate action must address not only reducing emissions, but also restructuring the global climate architecture that has long marginalised the communities most affected by its consequences.

***** 

*Anoushka Singh, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i] “Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change.” 2025. Icj-Cij.org. 2025. http://www.icj-cij.org/case/187.

[ii] “Climate Crisis: Small Island States Take Landmark Case to the ICJ.” 2025. Ibanet.org. 2025. https://www.ibanet.org/Small-Island-States-take-landmark-case-to-the-ICJ.

[iii] “United Nations Conference on the Environment, Stockholm 1972.” United Nations, 16 June 1972, www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/stockholm1972.

[iv] “The Brandt Report: A Summary – Share the Worlds Resources.” Share the Worlds Resources, 31 Jan. 2006, sharing.org/information-centre/reports/brandt-report-summary/.

[v] Brundtland, Gro Harlem. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future. United Nations, 20 Mar. 1987.

[vi]  “United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3-14 June 1992.” United Nations, 1992, www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/rio1992.

[vii] UNFCCC. “The Paris Agreement.” United Nations Climate Change, 2025, unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement.

[viii] “Global Stocktake Reports Highlight Urgent Need for Accelerated Action to Reach Climate Goals.” United Nations, www.un.org/en/climatechange/global-stocktake-reports-highlight-urgent-need-for-accelerated-action-to-reach-climate-goals.

[ix] “CAT 2035 Climate Target Update Tracker.” Climateactiontracker.org, 2024, climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-update-tracker-2035/.

[x] “Why the ‘Finance COP’ in Baku Missed the Mark.” 2024. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/01/cop29-climate-finance-scale-logistics?lang=en.

[xi] OECD. “Climate Finance and the USD 100 Billion Goal.” OECD, 2022, www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/climate-finance-and-the-usd-100-billion-goal.html.

[xii] “US President Trump Criticizes UN, NATO and Climate ‘Hoax.’” 2025. UN News. September 23, 2025. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165924.

[xiii] “Small Island Nations: How Oceans Offer Solutions to Climate Change.” 2025. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). January 2, 2025. https://unctad.org/news/small-island-nations-how-oceans-offer-solutions-climate-change.

[xiv] United Nations. 2024. “About Small Island Developing States (SIDS) | Department of Economic and Social Affairs.” Sdgs.un.org. 2024. https://sdgs.un.org/smallislands/about-small-island-developing-states.

[xv] “Snapshot: Small Island Developing States.” 2023a. UNDP Climate Promise. January 16, 2023.https://climatepromise.undp.org/research-and-reports/snapshot-small-island-developing-states.

[xvi] GOAP Secretariat. “Understanding the Impact: Using Ocean Accounts to Support Sustainable Coastal Tourism.” The Global Ocean Accounts Partnership, September 27, 2024, www.oceanaccounts.org/understanding-the-impact-using-ocean-accounts-to-support-sustainable-coastal-tourism/.

[xvii] Lazzari, Kiara. “Adaptation Solutions for Fisheries in Small Island Developing States  -

Global Center on Adaptation.” Global Center on Adaptation, 15 Oct. 2025,

gca.org/how-can-sids-fisheries-cope-with-and-adapt-to-climate-change/. Accessed

November 7, 2025.

[xviii] “Maldives Holds World’s First Underwater Cabinet Meeting.” The President’s Office, 2020, presidency.gov.mv/Press/Article/633.

[xix] “Mia Mottley Prepares for Center Stage at COP30.” Americas Quarterly, October 20, 2025, www.americasquarterly.org/article/mia-mottley-prepares-for-center-stage-at-cop30/.

[xx] “Oceans of Peace - Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” 2024. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. August 8, 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.gov.fj/oceans-of-peace/.

[xxi] “COP 23 | Partnership for Observation of the Global Ocean.” 2023. Partnership for Observation of the Global Ocean. November 8, 2023. https://pogo-ocean.org/outreach-and-advocacy/outreach-events-and-projects/cop-23/.

[xxii] “COP 23 | Partnership for Observation of the Global Ocean.” 2023. Partnership for Observation of the Global Ocean. November 8, 2023. https://pogo-ocean.org/outreach-and-advocacy/outreach-events-and-projects/cop-23/.

[xxiii] Packham, Colin. 2021. “COP26: Tuvalu Minister Delivers COP26 Plea from the Sea.” World Economic Forum. November 11, 2021. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2021/11/tuvalu-minister-stands-in-sea-to-film-cop26-speech-to-show-climate-change/.

[xxiv] “Seychelles Becomes the First Small Island Developing State to Support the International Platform for Ocean Sustainability (IPOS) - Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy.” Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy. March 28, 2025. https://mofbe.gov.sc/seychelles-becomes-the-first-small-island-developing-state-to-support-the-international-platform-for-ocean-sustainability-ipos/.

[xxv] AOSIS. “Why Is AOSIS Important?” AOSIS, July 10, 2019, www.aosis.org/with-caribbean-island-life-under-threat-un-chief-pushes-to-face-headwinds-together/.

[xxvi] Feffer, John. 2025. “Small Island States Are Leading the Fight against Climate Change - FPIF.” Foreign Policy in Focus. April 17, 2025. https://fpif.org/small-island-states-are-leading-the-fight-against-climate-change/.

[xxvii] United Nations. 2007. “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2011.0040.

[xxviii] “One Comorian, One Tree | UNDP Climate Change Adaptation.” 2022. Adaptation-Undp.org. February 10, 2022. https://www.adaptation-undp.org/one-comorian-one-tree.

[xxix] “Empowering Artisanal Fishers in the Republic of Mauritius: Terminal Steering Committee of the Mauritius E€OFISH Project.” 2024. UNDP. 2024. https://www.undp.org/mauritius-seychelles/press-releases/empowering-artisanal-fishers-republic-mauritius-terminal-steering-committee-mauritius-eeuofish-project

[xxx] “Protect 30% of Seychelles Marine and Coastal Waters More than 400,000 Square Kilometers of Improved Protection and Ocean Management. | Department of Economic and Social Affairs.” 2018. Un.org. December 2018. https://sdgs.un.org/partnerships/protect-30-seychelles-marine-and-coastal-waters-more-400000-square-kilometers-improved.

[xxxi] Buckholtz, Alison. 2023. “Barbados Is Using Data and Tech to Build Climate Resilience.” World Economic Forum. June 21, 2023. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/06/barbados-climate-resilience-data-technology/.

[xxxii] “Tuvalu and Partners Deliver Landmark Coastal Adaptation Project Creating New Land for the Future.” UNDP, 2025, www.undp.org/pacific/press-releases/tuvalu-and-partners-deliver-landmark-coastal-adaptation-project-creating-new-land-future. Accessed October 23, 2025.

[xxxiii] Marchant, Natalie. “Maldives Plans a “Floating City” as Sea Levels Rise.” World Economic Forum, May 19, 2021, www.weforum.org/stories/2021/05/maldives-floating-city-climate-change/.