Indian Council of World Affairs

Mukesh Kumar:  Good afternoon, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure to welcome you all to the Indian Council of World Affairs for this panel discussion on the theme, The Nuclear Flux, Changing Dynamics of Global Politics. May I request you to kindly keep your phones on silent mode. Thank you. We will start today's program with Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General and Additional Secretary, ICWA, delivering her welcome remarks. The panel discussion will be chaired by Ambassador Rakesh Sood, former Permanent Representative of India, to the Conference on Disarmament. Besides, we have three esteemed panelists today. Our first panelist is Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan, Professor, Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University, followed by Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research Associate, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis. And our final speaker is Prof. Reshmi Kazi, Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. The discussion will be followed by a brief Q&A session, moderated by the Chair. With this, may I now request Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting DG, ICWA, to kindly give her welcome remarks. 

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar:  Ambassador Sood, distinguished experts, students, and friends, nuclear weapons have been a key and critical element of the global security architecture in the post-World War II world. Since 1945, narratives and doctrines around nuclear weapons have emphasized the paradox between deterrence, that is, nuclear weapons not as weapons to be ‘used’ in war, but as weapons to ‘deter’ war by the ‘threat of their use’; and their accidental or deliberate use. While acknowledging the catastrophic consequences, these narratives and doctrines have rested on the perverse belief that nuclear weapons can be a stabilizer. The present geopolitical turbulence of global scale is now putting these narratives and doctrines to test, as nuclear rhetoric becomes shriller, and as grand deals that constituted the global non-proliferation and arms control frameworks fall apart, and as security postures are revised. 

The discriminatory Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, which India refused to sign, sought to divide the world into nuclear haves and have-nots. It stands severely challenged today. Initially limited to the P5, the nuclear club expanded over the decades as security dilemmas intensified. Due to its complex security environment, characterized by the hostile Sino-Pak nexus, India developed nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. Pakistan pursued nuclear weapons out of desire for parity with India. Pakistan simply kept copying our steps, following us sometimes, checkmating at others. Israel was pursued by the inverted logic of increased acceptance on the basis of acquisition of nuclear weapons as currency of power. While an insecure DPRK's actions were read sometimes as ambition, at other times as erratic behaviour. Complex dynamics of the Islamic world, its interface with the Christian world, led to an Iran which couldn't make up its mind on which side of the fence it wanted to be. 

Recent conflicts have witnessed sharp nuclear rhetoric. Russia's invasion of Ukraine revived discussions on nuclear threats, while Iran-Israel confrontation, North Korea's nuclear ambitions, and Pakistan's promotion and nurture of terrorism behind the nuclear shield remind us of risks associated with such rhetoric. The collapse of INF and the uncertainty around the New START treaty revealed the fragility of arms control in an era of acute distrust among great powers. 

Friends, in short, nuclear weapons are once again prominent in both strategy and political signalling. And global nuclear politics has become more volatile, with rising concerns over strategic stability and growing risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation. Nuclear doctrines of major powers like the US and Russia have shifted over the last decade to greater emphasis on the potential use of nuclear weapons in regional or conventional conflicts. The US Nuclear Posture Review 2010-18-22 expanded the role of nuclear weapons to include extended deterrence, while Russia's military doctrine has increasingly blurred the lines between nuclear and conventional warfare. These shifts, friends, have lowered the threshold for nuclear use, increased mistrust, and potential renewal of global nuclear arms race. 

Today, the classical model of deterrence, which relied on credible second-strike capability, is less stable and under severe strain as states explore coercion, brinkmanship, and tactical nuclear options rather than purely defensive postures. The non-state actors, military and authoritarian leadership styles complicate assumptions of deterrence. Further, tactical nuclear weapons, as I just mentioned, have blurred the distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare. Their potential use on battlefields lowers the threshold for nuclear escalation and complicates crisis management. This ambiguity could lead to limited wars being riskier and more destructive than before. Above all, the threat of nuclear materials or tactical nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists is real, especially in fragile states. 

The global nuclear non-proliferation architecture fundamentally rests on the foundation of “security guarantees”. Arms control treaties, many of which are now eroding, as I said, have historically been underpinned by “assurances”. 

Similarly, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones derive their legitimacy and effectiveness from the “security guarantees” extended to participating countries. At the core of the NPT lies a grand bargain, an implicit understanding that nuclear weapon states will ensure the security of non-nuclear weapon states, provided the latter are not seen as deviant by them in their behaviour. However, in today's world, marked by deep uncertainties, resurgent nuclear rhetoric, disturbing normalization of nuclear weapons as instruments of war, coercion and fear, and with key global leaders beginning to speak openly about World War III, who or what will provide the “security guarantee”? And more importantly, a critical question that arises is what constitutes a meaningful security guarantee in an international environment where old norms are disintegrating and deterrence-based stability is under immense strain. 

Finally, may I say that if there is going to be a nuclear weapon which is the “ultimate security guarantee” and “currency of power”, how can anyone be excluded from wanting to possess it? Unless, of course, the world arrives at a global security compact that delegitimizes them as a source of power whatsoever. For a world that is armed to its teeth with the most lethal, precise as well as mass weapons, that is more attuned to hate than accommodation, where wisdom does not always get to lead, and which is going through tectonic shifts, what is more of a realistic scenario? A World War III with failed deterrence and nuclear weapons as weapons of war. A World War III where deterrence somehow holds. A new-age global security compact with no World War III or a new-age global security compact preceded by the mother of all wars, the World War III. So the key question that remains is how do we emerge from the present nuclear flux to restore order as some may see it, or to create a new world order as others may see it? May I also mention here the AI factor which introduces new instability risks and say in a lighter vein that a world system constructed to hurt and harm each other has become corrupted, and that the programming of the human race itself needs a fundamental reset. I look forward to thoughtful discussions, and I wish the panelists all the best. 

Mukesh Kumar:  Thank you, ma'am. May I now request Ambassador Rakesh Sood to give his remarks and conduct the proceedings. 

Rakesh Sood:  Thank you. Thank you, Mukesh. And let me thank ICWA for inviting me to chair this session, and especially Ms. Nutan Mahawar for very thoughtful… setting the stage of where we see the nuclear order. You know, in some ways, the title of the program today about the flux and then the changing dynamics points to the core issue, because if you look at the existing order, one could say that it has been an extremely successful order, extremely successful. The system of arms control and things like that, if you look at it from a high of something like 65,000 nuclear bombs in the world, or just between US and Soviet Union at that time, because they accounted for the vast majority of the nuclear arsenals. From there, we have today come down to a total of something like 15,000, 16,000 among all the nuclear weapon states put together, which is quite a remarkable reduction. I mean, 75 percent of the nuclear bombs today are either in storage or have been dismantled. If we look at the NPT, which was referred to when it began, when it was first opened for signature in 1970… 1968, sorry, there were just about 45, 50 countries that signed on to it. Today, all countries are party to it, 190 plus, except for four countries that are outside it, namely India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Other than that, everybody is a party. So that's enormous success. When it entered into force in 1970, it was a treaty that was supposed to be there for, well, 25 years, and after that, a decision about its future would be taken. In 1995, we saw it had been extended into perpetuity. Great achievement. In 1945, or even in 60s, when NPT was being negotiated, if somebody had said that, okay, in the next 50 years, nuclear weapons will not be used, I don't think people would have believed that. But the fact is that since 1945, we have seen that nuclear weapons have not been used. Well, that's again a remarkable achievement, which nobody could have predicted. So from all that, we should all be feeling very satisfied and happy that the nuclear arms control order, or the nuclear non-proliferation order, all of that has been so enormously successful. Yet the fact is that that is not the case. In fact, more and more commentators, analysts, political leaders, strategic analysts are talking about the fact that there are growing risks, I think, which was amply brought out by the acting director general. And the reason is that the underlying politics that frame the nuclear order, that has collapsed. That bipolar world, US-Soviet Union, two nuclear superpowers, I mean, essentially, that was the order that shaped the world of the non-proliferation regime, of the arms control order, and so on. And because that order has collapsed, and we don't really know what the new geopolitical order is, and hence the word flux. So therefore, the old order, nuclear order included, appears to be under strain. And we find that to add to that, there have also been a series of technological developments which have changed the role of nuclear weapons. It is up to us, up to the panelists and you to question, has it changed? And if so, in what manner? Are nuclear weapons still as uniquely destructive? Because today, countries are exploring more and more usable nuclear weapons. And there are developments in the field of missile defences. There are developments in the field of low-yield nuclear weapons, developments in the field of hypersonic weapons, and so on. So conventional precision global strike capabilities, do these undermine deterrence? Do these strengthen nuclear deterrence? Do they make nuclear weapons more usable, less usable, redundant? Frankly, nobody knows. But the other thing is also that with this, there is a growing kind of concern that perhaps if we've not seen the use of nuclear weapons since 1945, which is 80 years, can we be certain that the next 80 years also, we won't see the use of nuclear weapons? I know I won't be around for the next 80 years. But I'm sure there are plenty of young people here who will be. And I hope for their sake that we can maintain that taboo. Unfortunately, the taboo is the weakest legal part of the nuclear order. Because while the non-proliferation regime delegitimized proliferation of nuclear weapons, it did not delegitimize nuclear weapons, per se. So there is no international treaty other than the ban treaty which actually delegitimizes nuclear weapons. But the irony is that the ban treaty, which came into being in 2017, is not subscribed to by any country that has nuclear weapons or that relies on nuclear weapons for its security. Nonetheless, it does create a normative framework. Whether it will carry weight in terms of international law or not remains to be seen. So with that, let me invite the panelists to make their opening comments. We'll start with Professor Rajagopalan, followed by Dr. Nayan, followed by Professor Reshmi Kazi. Eight to 10 minutes each. 

Rajesh Rajagopalan:  Thank you, thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Ambassador Sood, and thank you to ICW and Mrs. Mahawar for inviting us. It's quite nice to be on a panel with Reshmi and Rajiv because we are the original, not original, but we were all part of the nuclear gang at IDSA. And especially this venue, because IDSA used to be here. I mean, I was telling one of my students who was taking a ride with me that IDSA used to be just on the other side of this building so, you know, in the annex. Dirty, disgusting, but we had fun. So nevertheless, I mean, thank you so much for inviting us. It brings back a lot of old memories, but unfortunately also told you how old I am, but, you know, it's okay. But so, you know, looking at nuclear weapons and global politics, I think I like the title that Changing Dynamics of Global Politics, the subtitle at least, because obviously you can't look at nuclear weapons in isolation, you have to also look at nuclear weapons within the context of politics. So as Ambassador Sood mentioned, we don't really know very much about how these things will pan out in the future, but I just want to make sort of four quick points about where I see at least some of these developments, you know, in the coming decades. First is that obviously we are witnessing a very different global order emerging from the one that we have known for the last 30 odd years. We are moving from a post-bipolar, post-unipolar world into another bipolar era. I know that we, in Delhi at least, like to think that the emerging order is going to be a multipolar order. I'm deeply sceptical about the possibility that it's going to be a multipolar order. It's going to be a bipolar order for the simple reason that, you know, I mean, polarity is measured in terms of power, and there are only two countries that stand head and shoulders above everybody else. Wealth is a measure of power, US GDP is around 30 trillion, Chinese is about 20 trillion, and we are about, I don't know, 4 trillion. So there is no, and Russia is less than 2 trillion, so we are, I mean, when you measure polarity, you measure not only in terms of power, but also how the gap, what the gap is, and so the gap is so huge that I do not see a multipolarity emerging anytime soon. So, essentially we are talking about a bipolar world, and that bipolar world, in many ways, is going to be very similar to the bipolar world that we had in the 1945-1991 period, which is basically that these two powers, United States and China, are going to be competing very intensely, and they're going to be competing all across the world, assuming that they both have that kind of power, but also that there will be some element of ideological aspect of it, even though it could be simply West versus East, I mean, it doesn't necessarily have to be communism versus capitalism, and of course, there are dissimilarities with the last bipolar order, in the sense that the current bipolar order, the two polar powers are deeply integrated economically, which is obviously not the case in the last one. So some specifics will be different, but that doesn't mean that competition will not exist, because obviously, great powers competed before the bipolar period emerged, and before 1945, and in those cases also, they were, in many cases, deeply integrated economically, but nevertheless, still competed. But it's also that another important way that it is going to be different is that China is far more, far wealthier, and far more powerful than the Soviet Union ever was in relation to the United States. China's GDP is about two-thirds or three-fourths of the United States, whereas, even, forget purchasing power parity, even in exchange rate terms, whereas the Soviet Union never crossed 50% of the United States, and so in that sense, China is a far more powerful, far more capable adversary to the United States than the Soviet Union ever was, and so that, so far, that hasn't been fully converted into military terms, but that is being converted, because we see, just this last six months, the number of new fighter planes, and the number of new technologies that China is bringing forth, the only country other than the United States that has two fifth-generation fighter planes flying. The only country other than the United States that has a fifth-generation bomber flying, which came as quite a surprise. And of course, they are increasing their nuclear arsenal massively for no reason other than, I think, parity with the United States. And so different groups of people in different parts of the world think that they will stop at about 1,000, which I am deeply sceptical of, because I think they will match the numbers that Ambassador Sood was mentioning earlier, which is about 3,500, 4,000, which is where the United States and Russia are at. So I think the primary purpose of this is parity with the United States. And that would mean having such a large nuclear force. So it's going to be a much more capable military power than the Soviet Union ever was. And all of that does mean that the competition is going to be probably more intense than the US-Soviet competition, US-Soviet bipolar period was. But in terms of talking about some of the distinctions, I mean, these eras are not exactly duplicates of each other, obviously. In addition to the common market or the fact that they're both part of a global international trading system, the other distinction, I think, with the last Cold War period is that China doesn't seem interested in alliances, at least formal alliances. I mean, it does have clearly security cooperation with countries like Pakistan and North Korea and so on and so forth, but doesn't seem to have formal alliances. Maybe that will change. We don't know. But as of now, at least, that formal alliance structure doesn't exist. And similarly, the United States seem very reluctant to have formal alliances. We haven't had, actually, new military alliances in a long time, until this last week or so, whenever Saudi Arabia and Pakistan decided that they will have a military alliance. But one of the oddest part of that is that, that is so unusual these days to have formal military alliances. So in that sense, the world order itself is somewhat different, but has similarities with the last bipolar order. 

The second point I would make is that what's the role that nuclear weapons play in this kind of a bipolar order? I mean, I think, obviously, as I was saying earlier, nuclear parity is quite likely. But nuclear parity also would lead to a somewhat odd situation, which is you are not going to have nuclear bipolarity, but nuclear tripolarity. Because obviously, Russia, the only reason Russia is a great power is because it has nuclear weapons. And so they are not going to give up nuclear weapons. I think one of the reasons why Putin yesterday, therefore, suggested extending the current START treaty was because he recognizes that, if the United States and China move on into an arms race that Russia might possibly not be able to compete. And so I think they are, Russia might become a little bit more open to the possibility or open to having a nuclear arms control agreement because that would ensure that everybody stays on the same sort of space. But I think China is a problem there because I don't think China's going to sort of allow, permit that kind of a nuclear agreement until it has sufficient weapons, sufficient nuclear weapons. But that also, another reason could be also that the whole Golden Dome business that Trump is talking about, I'm doubtful that any kind of a global, any kind of a comprehensive or a nationwide missile defence program is possible, but that is something that I don't think Putin wants to find out whether it's possible or not. A third point that I would make is about what does all this mean for stability? One of the points that both ambassadors made in their early presentations. Will it continue to prevent nuclear escalation? Will nuclear weapons continue to prevent nuclear escalation? Obviously, I think that remains a hope and I'm not, obviously, the two key crises, Ukraine is one, but obviously Taiwan is another important crisis that is going to emerge. Who will deter whom in Taiwan remains to be seen because Taiwan is not an easy nut to crack, even in a conventional sense. Amphibious operations are the most difficult military operation that any country can undertake, any military can undertake. And Taiwan's terrain is not amenable to easy invasion. All of that should make, all of that should be sufficient deterrence to China to attempt a formal invasion, but we never know. But if an invasion does take place, then how that gets resolved, because whether United States gets involved or not, and whether China is able to deter the United States remains a question, because Chinese deterrence is not just nuclear, it's also conventional because of their anti-ship ballistic missiles and so on and so forth. So that raises a larger question of whether nuclear deterrence can hold in regional that, I mean, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, all of those cases, including potentially in Europe. Small nuclear forces tend to be somewhat more stabilizing than large nuclear forces, the kind that was built during the Cold War period by the United States Soviet Union, simply because of the fact that they are easier to, they don't need the same kind of very risky command and control structures with small nuclear forces. You can take your time and you can have greater, much looser command and control systems, or at least not looser, but at least more relaxed command and control systems. And that would ensure greater stability. But that doesn't necessarily mean that ultimately that nuclear weapons would ensure stability. So that remains a question that we have to wait and see. I tend to be optimistic when it comes to nuclear deterrence, because I do tend to think that countries, leaders in particular, are much more responsible than we tend to think, and therefore nuclear deterrence will hold. But I hope I'm not too wrong on that. A final point on what does all of this mean for proliferation? I think one of the possibility is obviously that proliferation gets more encouraged because the whole nuclear non-proliferation regime that both ambassadors talked about could get diluted over a period of time. China has no real stake in it. But one could also argue that China has a stake in it because China doesn't want more and more nuclear powers around its periphery. So that is, there may be, but a lot would depend on China's attitude. So far, they have been kind of wishy-washy on the whole issue. They originally did not support the NPT, as Ambassador Sood mentioned, that very few countries originally supported the NPT regime. China definitely did not. China, it was until, what, 1992? When they finally acceded to the NPT. France did not, originally. Also, 1992. And so France and China took the view that proliferation is actually a good thing. But then China has also had a hand in Pakistan's nuclear developments, developing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, all of that. So they have been kind of wishy-washy, but it may be that they will see some value in preventing nuclear proliferation because it isn't there, they have a stake in it. But the other aspect of nuclear proliferation that I should mention is also that what happens to US commitments, right? I mean, part of the reason why many countries haven't gone nuclear, who could go nuclear, is because the United States protected them. US extended deterrence protected them. If the US, as we're seeing with Trump, and maybe this will become a feature of American foreign policy, if the United States is no longer committed to its allies, then its allies will have to look out for themselves, which means basically that countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, a lot of others could start building nuclear weapons. And, you know, they're already talking about it. And there's a lot more – a lot more disperse about nuclear weapons in these countries than one could have thought of a few years back. So let me conclude with one final problem that could potentially come up, which is to go back to the golden dome business. But one of the dangers of nuclear deterrence is that somebody might come up with a – come up with a missile defence system, because a missile defence system would fundamentally undermine any kind of deterrence system. We do not know. I am – like I said, I am doubtful that a missile defence system, especially for large countries – it's okay to protect – you can have missile defence system protecting small territories like Israel, maybe even Taiwan, or Japan is a little bit bigger, but even then. But large countries like China, India, US, Russia, these are not easy to protect with missile defences. The coverage is just too great. But again, technology changes. We are just seeing the beginnings of a laser-based defence system that Israelis are developing, and so who knows where technology goes. But that would really be the danger signal, I think, over the next few decades if a missile defence system does become feasible for large countries, then deterrence, as we know, would be over. And then that would be really bad. Let me stop there. Thank you, sir. 

Rajiv Nayan:  Thank you. Thank you very much, sir. And I would like to thank Ambassador Nutan Kapoor Mahawar. I think I am meeting her after about 20 years, and she was at DISA. I was briefed ON the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, and she was in charge. So thank you very much for inviting me. I'm also thankful to her team, Dr. Nivedita Ray, Dr. Sanjeev Kumar, and Dr. Mukesh Kumar, all just got me here. The question Ambassador Kapoor raised, is this order, nuclear order, in flux? My argument is yes, it has always been in flux. First it was only dominated by United States, it was fine, then Soviet Union came, then other European countries came, and then China. When China came, then suddenly the world started talking about the nuclear order has become from multilateral to multipolar. The word pole was used at that time. This polarization, this has started taking place, but interestingly, the pole, the country that created the multipolar nuclear order, finally joined or started hobnobbing with another pole, that is, Western world. So that is very complicated, complex nuclear world order we have been witnessing. Thereafter, many countries joined in. Israel, don't ask type, and it will not tell. So it is a very unique status. So it doesn't reveal, it did not test. Then we joined in, two of us, and then North Korea in a unique way. After withdrawing from the treaty. So it has always been a bit dynamic. The nuclear world order has been dynamic, and actors, weapons, doctrines, all have been contributing to this dynamism, or you can say the moving dynamic system of nuclear world. So what is current status? Is it bad, good, ugly? This is the question we need to ask. My point is, it is a status quo. It is neither good, nor bad, nor ugly. It is conservative. And it has been existing. This is a status quo nuclear world order, despite all the provocations. Provocations in what way? Coming and then I say, okay, you can argue. New forces structure, modernization is taking place. So that is another way. Is it affecting? I don't think so. It is still contributing to the existing deterrence structure. So it is just refurbishing itself. Is it something new? My argument is no. Even during the Cold War, arms control basically strengthened the deterrence structure. Redundant weapons were thrown out. And the new system, the new weapon systems, strengthen existing deterrence structure. So this is the reality. So even if we are, many are talking about, oh, now they are modernizing warheads, new hypersonic weapons, supersonic weapons, subsonic weapons are coming, they will affect the structure. My argument is weapon structure, delivery vehicles were getting refined, even during the Cold War. But somehow all realize the importance of how to maintain, it is a subjective term, but it explains a lot, that is strategic stability. How to define it? Is there any precise definition of it? The answer is no. RAND had a study. And it put some 11, 12 parameters to judge the system, stable or unstable, nuclear order. And many of them got disturbed, still the system was stable. Still we did not find any disturbances taking place in the system. So this is the reality. 

Now Rajesh talked about new technologies coming and when I received the letter it was there also that are these new emerging technologies affecting the strategic stability, world order, nuclear flux, is it being pushed? Again my argument, I don't care. What is happening? First of all it is very difficult to define this advanced technology, new technology. As I told, weapons are modernized, they are refined and old systems are discarded. Once you find that it is not useful, you dump it. Why will you keep it? So now what is happening? Now there are six, seven weapons or technologies which are dubbed as emerging and which could be relevant for nuclear order or nuclear systems. So what are they? One is artificial intelligence is generally talked about, computing power. So is it bad? I think it is generally one question that immediately comes up and many articles, writings have come. It will start selecting its own targets as if human element will be disappearing from it. Human element will be there. So I don't think it is very much a cause for worry for us. So there will be refinement. In fact, if you use it properly, it will help your deterrence structure. This is one point which I would like to mention. Then comes the question, sensors, precision, it will increase the precision of the system. What is the precision of the system? Is it very relevant for dropping of nuclear weapons? All missiles, generally all are having very nice circular error probability. All are improving, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, even 0.05 you take, what does it matter? It may matter for conventional arms but it will not matter for nuclear weapons once there is any nuclear attack. Third is speed, hypersonic. Hypersonic will beat the BMD system and then you will enter into any territory and then deterrence will just collapse. Again this is another bogus argument which I find being peddled across the world. Speed, anyway there is speed. Once you want to intend, as Rajesh rightly pointed out, how many WMD system is really very effective? Claims, counterclaims during conflict times are made but in reality you will not find it really working. Even Raytheon, many of these companies, defence companies claim 92% effectiveness, best, best. So again 8% vulnerability is very much there. So that is there. So again, here also I don't see. In fact, what I generally my argument has been, if you use it properly, there could be better verification structure, you can verify all your agreements, your command and control structure will improve, and you will have better information, better exchange of information. Many of the, say, when misconception or wrong information, if they are coming, you can verify it through this technology from space. You can manage, okay, this is happening there, so it is nothing to worry or to worry, or if there is something to worry, and if I have to take any preemptive strike, I will do that. So that part is very much there. So I think all these technologies are quite helpful, and I think we should work for that. Now the question is, is it still credible? I think by and large, it is credible. So by and large, it is credible. What will be the future? I think straightaway I come to that. Future is a status quo. There is nothing much going to change. Obama got Nobel Prize and he is happy. Thereafter, Trump is asking for different reasons. I think I see hope in Trump. He is one great maniac who can do anything. So he – and if he calculates the cost of nuclear weapons, I think he will go for nuclear disarmament. What are you going to do with nuclear weapons if you are not going to use it anywhere? What will you do? I think if – we have calculated and Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has calculated per minute cost of – per minute cost of nuclear weapons. If he really – this report is shown to him, I think he may do something good. He is doing – this is irrationality of rationality. We should think about that. So this is there. No hope for nuclear disarmament otherwise, but if everything goes all right, arms control is in disarray, we all are knowing. China is – all depends on China, how China is emerging as a power. If it declines, then there could be different, say, dynamics to the world order, flux. We will see a different flux happening and we will be happy. NPT is going to stay as the main – will be the main history of the nuclear order, like it or not. All these countries, member countries, they just make noise. No one came out of this treaty. All are happy with this frozen nuclear order. I did not see. All make noises. Did you find any NPT member countries coming out of NPT after RevCon. No, they are happy. Even non-NPT countries are happy. They just make usual routine noises during PrepCon, RevCon, so we'll continue to see some noises made by Egypt and other countries during the RevCon. Nothing more than that. So this is what is going to happen. So we have to just manage the order. And India, I did not talk about India. Once you ask the question, I will talk about India and Pakistan. I have been following it and what is happening inside Pakistan after our Operation Sindoor. I will say about that, how changes have taken place. Thank you very much, sir. 

Reshmi Kazi:  Thank you, sir. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you, ICWA. Thank you, Srimati Mahawar, for having me here. Thank you, everybody. We are talking about nuclear issues on an afternoon like this. And being the last speaker is fortunate in some sense because there's not much to say. My co-panelists are brilliant. And as they say, nuclear, we were the gang out there. They have covered it so well. Dr. Nayan happened to be my coordinator, so I worked under him. And Rajesh has been always my favourite. So thank you so much. Being the last person, as I said, there's not much to say, so I'm going to take a very clinical approach out here. Talking about nuclear flux, a lot of people are talking about it. So what is nuclear flux? Basically, it refers to a rapid, messy change in the global nuclear landscape. We have numbers here. We have doctrines here. We have technologies. My co-panelists talked about it. We have treaties and political behaviour. And everything seems to be so much in a flux there. So all this is making nuclear politics less stable, less predictable than it was a few years ago. So what's changing? What are the drivers? As I said, it's a clinical approach. So as I see, arsenals are shifting. Some states are rapidly expanding. Some are modernizing their nuclear forces, China being one of them. It has accelerated its build-up. Then you have doctrines and rhetoric. That's also changing. Nuclear-armed states are adjusting when and how they might say they want to use the nukes. So you have a nuclear-weapon state attacking a non-nuclear-weapon state like Russia and Ukraine, the crisis which is still ongoing. Then you have two nuclear-weapon states. Israel has not yet declared, but we all know it has its advanced nuclear capability. So you have two nuclear-weapon states attacking, again, a non-nuclear-weapon state or maybe a threshold nuclear-weapon state, that's Iran. That's US and Israel attacking Iran. Then you have arms control framework. Again, they are freeing. You have key treaties, verification habits, which are under strain. The fate of New START, we are optimistic about it, but now that Russia has shown some optimism there but we are not very sure about Trump, so that again is a major concern. You again have new military technologies that are seriously complicating stability. You have hypersonic missiles, advances in missile defence systems, cyber operations make warning attribution and again decision-making quite harder. Along with that, you have proliferation pressures and regional crisis, so there's tension over Iran, there's tension over the ongoing DPRK developments. They raise regional risk and diplomatic friction as well. So what this has done to global politics, again a very, very clinical approach there. There's a higher crisis instability, faster weapons, shakier command and control, ambiguous doctrines, all this increases the danger that crisis escalate unintentionally at times. There's more coercion, there's more signalling, states use threats, nuclear threats as political leverage, deterrents sliding towards coercion. You also have regional arms races, then there is erosion of arms control institutions, without treaties and verifications there is a lot of ambiguity on the rise, there is transparency, lack of transparency, making diplomacy quite harder. And then alliances and extended deterrents, that's also getting tested. So US allies and other partners, they must rethink reliance on nuclear umbrellas and conventional forces as such. Some concrete examples, quick hits out there, US and independent analysts say China's warhead stockpile has grown significantly. Estimates put it past several hundred warheads by 2035, 1,000 as the figures indicate. Russia has already signalled doctrinal changes and used more nuclear signalling in the Ukraine context with increasing Western concern about escalation dynamics. The New START treaty is the last major US-Russia arms control anchor, but there is a lot of uncertainty there, and it's a central instability factor. Hypersonic and other new delivery systems are on the rise, they are complicating detection and response timelines, reducing decision time in a crisis. Iran still remains a flashpoint, diplomatic breakdowns and IAEA concerns to make Middle East a potential proliferation hotspot. So what is the bottom line out here? Nuclear flux means the nuclear order is in motion. More weapons in some place, weaker arms control architecture, shifting doctrines, and disruptive technologies. If you use an input-output model of David Easton, there are demands, the demands which are being imposed on this structure, whether in the form of treaties, whether in the form of more and more new states or latent states seeking nuclear capability. So these are the demands. Are these demands having support? Are these demands getting the kind of traction they should receive? No. So what is the outcome? There is combination of the chance of miscalculation, making diplomacy harder, stability, predictability. There is a lot of uncertainty. These are forcing states and alliances to adapt rapidly. So in short, the predictability that underpinned Cold War, post-Cold War nuclear stability is gradually eroding, and geopolitics needs to adjust to that. So exactly what underpinned global nuclear stability and in what way are these changing? What used to underpin global stability was, I have made a list out here, so pillar one, mutual vulnerability, survivable second strike forces. Why it mattered? Because my capability can neutralize your first strike. And if your first strike is neutralized, then it rests on the logic that mutually assured destruction each major power had robust survivable forces, which includes ICBM, submarines, hardened silos. So nobody could expect a disarming first strike to remove the other side's ability to retaliate. Are we still having it now? States are modernizing, they are diversifying delivery systems, and some are building on very large arsenals again. So making parity and the calculations of who can absorb a first strike less stable, less uncertain. China's rapid silo construction and stockpile growth they are a clear example of this. Formal arms control treaty, pillar number two, their verification transparency at one point earlier, that is before the Cold War, or rather during the Cold War era. Treaties, limited deployed numbers, placed verification tools in place, it created predictable rules. How's that changing? Key pacts are weakened or has been suspended. New START, there is a lot of uncertainty still, like it's visible there. So less treaty-based verification raises ambiguity and arms race incentives. Pillar number three, stable doctrines and restrained signalling. These are predictable red lines. And these existed some time back. How is it changing? Some states have blurred thresholds or they are using coercive nuclear rhetoric. So there is more explicit escalation language, particularly when we saw around the Russia-Ukraine crisis. So that ambiguity increases crisis instability because adversaries can't be sure which actions will trigger nuclear responses. Pillar number four, a credible extended deterrence and alliance structure. That mattered. Why? Because US nuclear umbrella, it discouraged allies from developing independent nuclear forces and stabilized regional balances. But that's changing now. How? We don't have perceived doubts about alliance commitments. We just saw what happened in Al-Udeid base in Qatar, and that has raised, again, a lot of apprehension, a lot of doubts. Pillar number five, international norms, non-proliferation regimes, and institutions. That mattered. NPT, IAEA, export controls, political stigma, nuclear taboo. It raised a lot of diplomatic and material cost for proliferation, it helped detected covert programs, provided outlets for dispute resolution, but that's again changing. Strains in diplomacy, deadlocked NPT review conferences in some years, for the past few years, review conferences, in fact. IAEA access, verification challenges, regional crisis, whether be it Iran, whether be it North Korea, they are stressing the non-proliferation architecture and eroding confidence that rules and inspections can reliably prevent or resolve proliferation risks. So there is a bit of entropy there, nuclear entropy. Pillar number six, stable crisis management practices and nuclear risk reduction measures. That mattered a lot. Hotlines, incident at sea agreements, rules of engagement, habitual military-to-military communications, reduce the chances of accidents, misread manoeuvres, cyberspace incidents escalate into a nuclear crisis. That again is changing. How? Military competition, suspension of regular exchanges, new attack vectors, cyberspace. They have weakened the habit of regular contact and increased the chance that an incident can be misinterpreted. So shortening decision time and increasing the risk of rapid escalation. And apart from that, you have a lot of technological and operational drivers that are going all across these pillars. I'll wind off there. Short synthesis, greater uncertainty about thresholds, higher instability, higher crisis instability, incentives for hedging and arms races, and as I said, nuclear entropy. Just one short point out there. There's a lot of talk about latency. So what does latency means? It means that you are on the threshold or part of nuclear capability you're having. Now, that again is a problem. You might say that, okay, latency does not mean that you have attained your nuclear capability, but there is two quick points out there. There are two quick points. It shortens the breakout time and it changes signaling and hedging. I'll leave it at that. Thank you so much. 

Rakesh Sood:  Thank you. Thank you. And the floor is open. Yes, please. Can we have the microphone here, please? We'll take three questions at one time. 

Kamel Galal:  I'll be very quick. I'll be very brief. My name is Kamel Galal. I'm the ambassador of Egypt. Thank you very much. It has been a very enlightening session. So I will be very brief. You know diplomats, when they have the microphone, they can speak for days. So I'll be very focused. First, the nuclear system. We in Egypt, as the Ambassador said, we chose that we be from the have-nots from so many years. And there's a reason for that. And I'll get back to this reason in answering your remark, Mr. Rajiv, regarding the voice and the noises that Egypt makes on this issue. So the nuclear system focuses on two elements, the NPT, Article 4 and Article 6. Everybody is aware of that, the nonproliferation and the disarmament. I'm not an expert on that. But we always focus on nonproliferation while everybody else, like my country, we focus on disarmament. Because it has proven by facts that deterrence by using nuclear weapons is ineffective. And all the examples that is happening lately prove that. What happened in Iran proves that. What happened in Israel proved that. And what happened here proves that. So having a nuclear weapon does not really deter anybody. My country went to war with Israel one day in 1973 while they had the nuclear weapon. It does not deter anybody to achieve their or protect their national interests. So this is for sure. Mr. Rajiv, let me just very quickly tell you, yes, we will, it's true that Egypt usually makes a lot of noise, as you mentioned, when it comes to nuclear weapons. To answer this reason for this noise that Egypt usually makes, which is true, we have been there for the past 7,000 years. We have a habit of learning from our own history and from the history of the world. And we learned that weapons will not bring protection to anybody. It will not. And it has been proven throughout history. Empires came up and came down. One day the nuclear weapon was the maritime empire of certain countries. And this empire just faded away. And the people and the principles are the ones that continued. So in answering your question, our foreign policy, and that's why we make a lot of noise about nuclear weapons, our foreign policy is based on four Ps. Peace, prudence, and this is the main element in dealing with such an issue. And partnership and perseverance. So this is the reason why we make a lot of noise when it comes to speaking about nuclear weapon, which is a tool for killing. This will not stop, this will not bring deterrence to anybody, it did not, and it will not. This is my brief remark. Thank you. 

Rakesh Sood:  I think very powerful, very powerful point. Oh, yes, please, okay. 

Artem Nosko:  My name is Artem Nosko. I'm from Embassy of Ukraine. Thank you for this very nice introduction and your insights. So first of all, I would like to say that about nuclear non-proliferation and deterrence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine received the third largest nuclear arsenal, second after US and Russia, so it was bigger than China, it was bigger than France and any other nation. In exchange of security guarantees, we abandoned this nuclear arsenal. We had not only warheads, but capabilities for their deliveries, which is even more important. So we destroyed them in exchange of security guarantees. But Russia, despite being a nuclear country and guarantor of the security, invaded. And actually, from perspective of UN Charter and international law, it's not a crisis, it's aggression and invasion. So let's call spade a spade, despite being diplomatic and political, but it's true from legal perspective. So my question is, do you believe that after what happened and Russia gave a huge blow to international efforts of nuclear security, because everyone knows that it's not only about non-use of nuclear weapons, but also use of threat to use these nuclear weapons. So do you still believe that international community can persuade aspiring countries to abandon their aspirations in exchange of any type of security guarantees without some solid real guarantees, not just words? And second, in case of nuclear meltdown, it will touch any country in the world. And do you think that it's still reasonable and justifiable for any third country in any conflict when nuclear weapons are in question and use of threat still stay neutral? Just waiting, not expressing their concern and intervening just to avoid nuclear weapons become not just deterrence, but a part of kinetic warfare, because it's quite a serious threat. So it might be very clear. 

Rakesh Sood:  Thank you. Thank you. Here we have two countries that are party to the NPT with very different opinions voiced about the utility or otherwise of nuclear deterrence. So perhaps we can have this, you have a bilateral, I think that is a fundamental question, yes. 

Vijay Nayak:  My name is Vijay Nayak. I'm a journalist. Last week we heard Pakistan saying that they are likely to give know-how to Saudi Arabia, nuclear know-how to Saudi Arabia. I just want to know the views of panelists on this development, whether this is going to create problems for India's relations with Saudi Arabia and the region. 

Ms Pillai: Good evening to the esteemed panelists. I consider it as a privilege to be here listening to such an insightful talk. So coming straight to my question, does the pursuit of nuclear weapons by states such as Iran and North Korea stem from a failure of the non-proliferation regime, or is it a rational response to what they perceive as breakdown in the great power security guaranteed? Thank you. 

Unidentified Speaker: Good afternoon. My question is to everyone in the panel. What is the nature of this discourse on nuclear flux? Is it that we now consider that nukes are merely costly decorated pieces which won't be used until and unless a threshold is crossed, and in return will use AI and light and fast weapons? They are more cheaper and more intensive and lethal in their return. Thank you. 

Rakesh Sood:  I think the points raised by the ambassador, one saying that nuclear weapons do not provide security and do not deter, and the other point of view saying if Ukraine had not given up its weapons at that point in time under the 1994 memorandum, perhaps Ukraine's future may have been different, and that Russia may not have attacked Ukraine. So we can leave this debate, but then nuclear weapons do protect. 

Kamel Galal:  Did that stop Ukraine from defending itself against what's happening to them? It did not defend them, because Russia has nuclear weapons. 

Rakesh Sood:  Yes, it has not prevented, yes. It has not prevented. 

Kamel Galal:  So the existence of nuclear weapons in itself is not that important. 

Rakesh Sood: But it did, if they had, what the ambassador was saying was that had we not given those up, would Russia have? 

Artem Nosko: Actually, I asked about security guarantees. It's not that we would have it, but I asked about security guarantees. 

Rakesh Sood: Well, security guarantees, the relevance of that, but let me open up the floor to the panellists to, perhaps we can start with you, if you want to take any of the questions. But it is not necessary, I mean, up to you. If there is something you want to do, you answer very pointedly, briefly. Because otherwise, we are already running out of time and I would like to take another set of questions before we back off. 

Reshmi Kazi:  On the issue of security guarantees, I mean, all that can be said now at this stage is that there has to be much more responsible actions on the part of nuclear weapon states and threshold nuclear weapon states. There needs to be more demonstration of responsibility. You have something called negative security assurances as well, where, you know, the NPT also has stated that, you know, like, there will be no, as in like, there should not be any attack on non-nuclear weapon states. 

Rakesh Sood:  We are not getting into that. I said any of the other questions. 

Reshmi Kazi:  Okay. Yeah. So as such, you know, like, there should be more responsibility in that. And on the nuclear flux, what is the threshold? The threshold, again, it's a very difficult question to say in that sense, set a threshold. Because how, what are the parameters? How are you going to measure the threshold in terms of superiority of your nuclear capability? That is also very vague. Because in terms of nuclear superiority, if you are going to measure that in terms of megatonnage or in terms of your, you know, delivery systems, that's again, you know, it's very vague out there. What is needed out here is accuracy. If you're talking in terms of threshold, what is the level at what, you know, you think you can reach the threshold? I think that is in terms of accuracy, penetrability, your, you know, how hard you are hitting the target. And of course, you know, like your doctrinal status, whether you want to keep it to first strike or second strike. Second strike means there is a, you know, retaliation, you know, a second round of retaliation, whether it will be able to absorb the first strike and then go back with the second strike. There are a lot of, you know, there will be layers out there. So it's very difficult to give a clear-cut answer there. 

Rakesh Sood:  Egypt, that we can leave that for the moment. Otherwise, we are already running out of time. Okay.

Rajiv Nayan:  So about Saudi Arabia-Pakistan agreement, I don't think Pakistan will dare to supply nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia. If it does, it will be a completely different ballgame. So they are, the agreement is about giving protection, nuclear, new nuclear umbrella. This, many of them are coming up. I mean, Europeans are having a different kind of nuclear umbrella. France is going to lead that, this is what is coming up and the work is on and many leading commentators and writers and thinkers on the subject from European continent are working on it. What is the shape of European defence or European nuclear deterrence structure? So it will be very interesting. Many of the countries who are considered to be very peaceful and peace-loving are going to contribute to this structure of this deterrence. This is one. When to cross threshold? I think it's a tough question and generally, unless generally you are attacked, whatever has been coming out, you will not dare to use it, whether people like it or not. I consider that Nina Tannenwald formulation of nuclear taboo is very much powerful and it has been demolished by many, but even when you are not expecting any nuclear reprisal, you do not tend to use nuclear weapons in the world. How many times did United States really use nuclear weapons or Russia? So I think this is the situation. that consequences will be quite devastating and Pakistan also made many noises, but finally it just made noises. It did not, could not do anything because it knows what could be its implications and especially to a nuclear weapon country. So I think this is the threshold I consider. It is a long debate. Many waves, many ages of nuclear have come and gone and so they all are struggling to find the answer of this question. So this is, I mean, lady, I could not understand your question. It's okay. 

Rakesh Sood:  Any other questions? Yes. This is the last round.

Unidentified Speaker:  Thank you very much, sir. Very enriching discussions. From the panel discussion, what I could see and understand is that the nuclear flux was there. It will continue to be there and the dynamics of global politics may or may not impact it further. Now my question is to begin with Mr. Rajiv was mentioning, it's a separate question. You're saying that the emerging technologies, you are very quickly acknowledging that as long as human in loop is there, the chain of command could be established and they are welcome. Do you think the emerging technologies like lethal autonomous weapon system would comply with the established rules of maybe international humanitarian law for example? 

Rakesh Sood:  Humanitarian law has not prohibited nuclear weapons yet. We are talking about nuclear flux, can we have another question please? 

Anurag Dwivedi:  Thank you so much panelists for wonderful remarks, for very comprehensive insights. My name is Anurag Dwivedi, I'm a doctoral candidate working on Diplomacy and Disarmament, I'm from CIPOD JNU. So looking at the insights from Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan. I want to ask Professor, you mentioned that world is going to be bipolar, but you mentioned that it's going to be tri-polar when it comes to nuclear, so why in tri-polar use of word not multi-polar in nuclear order because it's more than two and three. So why it's not multi-polar, like scholars like Benjamin… 

Rakesh Sood:  Understood.

Anurag Dwivedi:  One more question, I'm so sorry, one more question. 

Rakesh Sood:  He's your professor, you can ask him these questions in the university. 

Anurag Dwivedi:  And one question to Ambassador Rakesh, sir as you have been taking insights from what Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan said, how you see, like world is going to be bipolar and multi-polar in nuclear, how you see the disarmament dynamics opening up in future? Like as we have seen, as Maurer mentions in his book Competitive Arms Control that during the Cold War it was more of a competitive arms control instead of a cooperative arms control. So as you have worked on disarmament, you have been the part of how you see the future in this taking insights, how you see the future disarmament initiatives taking place. 

Rakesh Sood:  Thank you. Anybody else has a question here? No? Okay, fine. Sorry, your question was about Iran. Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons for its own security, simple as that. And whichever other country does so, does it for its own security. That's what everybody did. 

Rajesh Rajagopalan:  Yes, since you have asked. We can discuss that in JNU, but I mean, the point is that, no, I didn't mean tri-polarity in the concept of polarity, I mean, tri-polarity simply meant as three countries having roughly the same number of nuclear weapons because China would sort of build up to that level, that's all I meant. I didn't mean it in the polarity, in the IR theory sense of the word polarity, okay. 

Rakesh Sood:  Okay. You have, we have two minutes for you and for… 

Rajiv Nayan:  This is just taking one minute. Madam, I have already answered the question. Like, it has got element, human element will be there, even if you are talking about lethal autonomous weapon system. In fact, conference on disarmament talked about that, and that is, it is covered under certain conventional, convention on certain conventional weapons. So it is being talked about and there is again, the basic problem is of definition. If you start with that, then there are other elements also. And no writings deny the fact that algorithm will not be made by a human being. It will be made by machine. So that is there. So I can – we can talk about that. I have – and it is longer because I – just there is only one minute given to me, otherwise that's all. 

Rakesh Sood: So I have to be guided by the orders of the Director General. You have one minute, if you have anything to say, or we can give it for vote of thanks. Either way. 

Reshmi Kazi:  Well, just one line. We are in the 80th year of the atomic age. We are in the 80th year of the atomic age. So this is not the age where we can really afford to go for arms race. I think the race is for reasonableness. And as was mentioned by Robert McNamara in his 1960 Francisco speech, we should all join that race of reasonableness. Thank you. 

Mukesh Kumar:  There is no doubt that today's discussion has been both insightful and thought-provoking and contributed greatly to our knowledge and perspectives. On behalf of ICWA, I would like to express my deep gratitude to the distinguished chair and panelists. My special thanks to Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting DG, ICWA, and Ms. Nivedita Ray, Director Research at the Council, for their constant support and guidance. I would also like to thank all my colleagues and audience for their engagement. To know more about ICWA's research work, events, outreach programs, and publications, do visit our website and social media handles, Twitter, LinkedIn, Facebook, and YouTube. Thank you, and please join us for high tea in the foyer. Thank you.

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List of Participants

1. Smt. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General and Additional Secretary, ICWA 
2. Amb. Rakesh Sood, Former Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament, Former Special Envoy of the PM on Non -Proliferation & Disarmement (Chair)
   
3. Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan, Professor, Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University
4. Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research Associate, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence, Studies and Analysis (MP-IDSA)
5. Prof. Reshmi Kazi, Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi.