Indian Council of World Affairs

Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Distinguished Experts, Students and Friends! 

Nuclear weapons have been a key and critical element of the global security architecture in the post WWII world. Since 1945, narratives and doctrines around nuclear weapons have emphasized the paradox between deterrence i.e. nuclear weapons not as weapons to be ‘used’ in war but as weapons to ‘deter’ war by the ‘threat of their use’; and their accidental or deliberate use. While acknowledging their catastrophic consequences, these narratives and doctrines have rested on the perverse belief that nuclear weapons can be a stabilizer. The present geo-political turbulence of global scale is now putting these narratives and doctrines to test, as nuclear rhetoric becomes shriller and as grand deals that constituted the global non-proliferation and arms control frameworks fall apart and as security postures are revised.   

The discriminatory Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which India refused to sign sought to divide the world into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”; it stands severely challenged today. Initially limited to the P5, the nuclear club expanded over the decades as security dilemmas intensified. Due to its complex security environment characterized by the inimical Sino-Pak nexus, India developed nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. Pakistan pursued nuclear weapons out of desire for parity with India. Pakistan simply kept copying our steps, following us sometimes, checkmating at others. Israel was pursued by the inverted logic of increased acceptance on the basis of acquisition of nuclear weapons as currency of power, while an insecure DPRK’s actions were read sometimes as ambition, at other times as erratic behaviour. Complex dynamics of the Islamic World, its inter-face with the Christian world led to an Iran which couldn’t make up its mind on which side of the fence it wanted to be. 

Recent conflicts have witnessed sharp nuclear rhetoric. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revived discussions on nuclear threats, while Iran-Israel confrontation, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and Pakistan’s promotion and nurture of terrorism behind the nuclear shield remind us of risks associated with such rhetoric. The collapse of INF and the uncertainty around the New START treaty reveal the fragility of arms control in an era of acute distrust among great powers. 

Friends, Nuclear weapons are once again prominent in both strategy and political signalling; and global nuclear politics has become more volatile with rising concerns over strategic stability and growing risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation.

Nuclear doctrines of major powers like the US and Russia have shifted over the last decade to greater emphasis on the potential use of nuclear weapons in regional or conventional conflicts. The US Nuclear Posture Review 2010, 2018, 2022 expanded the role of nuclear weapons to include extended deterrence, while Russia’s military doctrine has increasingly blurred the lines between nuclear and conventional warfare.  These shifts have lowered the threshold for nuclear use, increased mistrust, and potential renewal of global nuclear arms race. 

Today, the classical model of deterrence, which relied on credible second-strike capability, is less stable and under severe strain as states explore coercion, brinkmanship, and tactical nuclear options rather than purely defensive postures. The non-state actors, military and authoritarian leadership styles complicate assumptions of deterrence. Further, tactical nuclear weapons, as I just mentioned, have blurred the distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare. Their potential use on battlefields lowers the threshold for nuclear escalation and complicates crisis management. This ambiguity could lead to limited wars being riskier and more destructive than before. Above all, the threat of nuclear materials or tactical nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists is real, especially in fragile states.

The global nuclear non-proliferation architecture fundamentally rests on the foundation of ‘security guarantees’. Arms control treaties, many of which are now eroding as I said, have historically been under-pinned by ‘assurances’. Similarly, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) derive their legitimacy and effectiveness from the ‘security guarantees’ extended to participating countries. At the core of the NPT lies a grand bargain, an implicit understanding that Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) will ensure the security of Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), provided the latter are not seen as deviant by them in their behaviour. However, in today’s world, marked by deep uncertainties, resurgent nuclear rhetoric, disturbing normalization of nuclear weapons as instruments of war, coercion and fear, and with key global leaders beginning to speak openly of a WWIII, who or what will provide the ‘security guarantee? And more importantly, a critical question that arises is what constitutes a meaningful ‘security guarantee’ in an international environment where old norms are disintegrating and deterrence-based stability is under immense strain?

Finally, may I say that if there is going to be a nuclear weapon which is the ‘ultimate security guarantee’ and ‘currency of power’, how can anyone be excluded from wanting to possess it? Unless of course, the world arrives at a global security compact that delegitimizes them as a source of power whatsoever. For a world that is armed to its teeth with the most lethal, precise as well as mass, weapons, that is more attuned to hate than accommodation, where wisdom does not always get to lead and which is going through tectonic shifts, what is more of a realistic scenario? A World War III with failed deterrence and nuclear weapons as weapons of war? A WW III where deterrence somehow holds? A New Age Global Security Compact with no WW III? Or A New Age Global Security Compact preceded by the mother of all wars – the WWIII? So, the key question that remains is how do we emerge from the present nuclear flux to ‘restore Order’ as some may see it, or a to ‘create a New Order’, as others may see it. May I also mention here the AI factor which introduces new instability risks; and say, in a lighter vein, that a world system constructed to hurt and harm each other is corrupted and that the programming of the human race needs a fundamental reset.

I look forward to thoughtful discussions and I wish the panellists all the best.

*****