Indian Council of World Affairs

Unidentified Speaker: Wishing you all a very good afternoon, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, friends, it is my pleasure to welcome you to the Indian Council of World Affairs for today's book discussion titled Trial by Water, Indus Basin and the India-Pakistan Relations, authored by Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha, Sinha Fellow, MPIDSA. I would please request you to keep your mobile phones on the silent mode. Thank you. 

Today's program is as follows. Welcome remarks will be delivered by Shrimati Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General and Additional Secretary, ICWA. The author, Dr. Uttam Sinha, will make brief remarks about his book before the discussion. The discussion will be chaired by Ambassador T. C. Raghavan, former High Commissioner to Pakistan and Singapore, having eminent discussions. The discussion will be followed by a brief Q&A session.

I take this opportunity to say a few words about the author. Uttam Kumar Sinha is a leading scholar and commentator on transboundary rivers, climate change, and the Arctic. He was co-chair of the Think20 Task Force on Accelerating SDGs, Exploring New Pathways in the 2030 Agenda. During India's G20 Presidency, after a brief stint in the print media and a doctoral degree from JNU, he joined the MPIDSA in 2001, where he coordinates the non-traditional security center and is the managing editor of Strategic Analysis, published by Routledge, the Institute's flagship journal. He is a recipient of many fellowships and leadership programs. Along with the present book and discussion, he has also published many other books, noteworthy among them being Indus Basin Interrupted, a History of Territory and Politics from Alexander to Nehru, in 2021, and Riverine Neighborhood, Hydropolitics in South Asia, in 2016.

Chairing the discussion, Ambassador Raghavan, former High Commissioner to Pakistan and Singapore, remained to be an expert in the nuances of Pakistani decision and policymaking. Dr. Shalini Chawla, Distinguished Fellow, Center for Aerospace, Power, and Strategic Studies, publishing four books on the various strategic aspects of Pakistan, remain one of the eminent scholars in Pakistan in the country. Dr. Ashish Shukla, Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA, is also a scholar of Pakistan, making wholesome reviews of the present book in discussion that will be discussed today. Srimati Umashekar, Advisor, International Law, the Indian Council of World Affairs, has been an Additional Secretary to the legal advisory team to the Ministry of External Affairs. She has been an active participant of the legal processes in the Indus Water Treaty discussions.

May I now request Srimati Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General, ICWA, to kindly deliver her welcome remarks. Thank you, ma'am.

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Distinguished Experts, Members of the Diplomatic Corps, Students and Friends!

Welcome to the Book Discussion on ‘Trial by Water: Indus Basin and India-Pakistan Relations’ by Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha.

A few weeks ago, some of you may recall, ICWA had organized a Seminar on River Water Sharing and Agreements in South Asia which included the case study of Pakistan and the Indus Water Treaty - discussions on which were chaired by Ambassador Satish Chandra, Former High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and Deputy National Security Advisor, who has also been quoted in Uttam’s book.

That ICWA discussion agreed that the ‘abeyance’ of the Indus Water Treaty in April 2025 post-Pahalgam terror attack was a necessary strategic step, justified under international law on the basis of ‘fundamental and unforeseen changes’ such as climate stress, demographic shifts, technological advances and persistent cross-border terrorism. It was a step to inflict punishment for consistent bad State behaviour. It was also agreed that India’s river water management strategy should be guided by its long-term development goals – energy transition, food security, and regional resilience – with the IWT’s suspension serving both as a strategic deterrent and a developmental opportunity. Further, it was emphasized that India must prioritize optimizing its entitlements by enhancing developmental activity including hydropower and irrigation projects on the western rivers, enhancing storage infrastructure, expanding irrigation networks in Jammu and Kashmir, and constructing new canals.

The Indus Water Treaty has been widely acknowledged to be unbalanced and unfair to India. Recalling the time of its negotiation and conclusion in 1960, the author states, and I quote, “the Indus Water Treaty far from resembling a matrimonial union, politically, resembled a divorce settlement, characterized by conflicting claims from the Partition and a pervasive atmosphere of mistrust” Unquote (Pg 58). The author further states that the Government of the day in India “wanted water to flow to Pakistan” and that it did not see the sharing of the Indus and its tributaries as “a political issue” (Pg. 38). Parliamentary debates “post-signature” of the Treaty show that the Government of India received criticism for its stance from across the spectrum. The Treaty was labelled by some as a ‘second Partition’, while others were ‘shocked’ by the financial obligations India had taken upon itself as part of the deal, as the book states (Pg xxi). Further, far from showing any gratitude for India’s magnanimity, Pakistan reverted to its deviant behaviour shortly after the conclusion of the Treaty. The Indian Government’s posture, therefore, failed to result in any goodwill with either the Government or the people of Pakistan who continue to be brought up till this day on Pakistan’s false narrative of their water vulnerability in face of a perpetually scheming India bent on denying their ‘due’ (Pg 262).

The book also gives interesting facts on the interest of foreign countries in the Indus Water Treaty during its negotiation and conclusion, with some of them even ‘guaranteeing’ the implementation of the Treaty through the setting up of a ‘Fund’. The author states, and I quote, “The Treaty’s international flavour was unmistakable with the world’s most powerful nations watching in amazement that the two countries could actually reach an agreement and brimming with excitement about the prospects it promised.” Unquote (Pg 78). Surely, the politics of the day have lessons for current power relations and geo-politics which I am sure the Panel will dwell on.

There have been comments in the media and within the Indian strategic community  on the meaning of India’s call for ‘abeyance’ and what next. The book, towards the end in the epilogue, presumes that India might be seeking ‘renegotiation’ of the Treaty which it sees as ‘long overdue’ (Pg. 266). Experts on India’s relations with Pakistan would recall that calls to ‘abrogate’ the Indus Water Treaty are not new. Such calls were made, for instance, post terror attack of 2001 on the Indian Parliament and Operation Parakram. The book too states that, post Parliament terror attack of 2001, there were calls to ‘revisit’ the Treaty (Pg 71). More recently, we are aware, India served notice twice to Pakistan to ‘modify’ the ‘one-sided’ Treaty in 2023 and 2024 which, however, fell on deaf years. At the same time, there have also been recent comments which have seen the ‘abeyance’ as a bugle for war and for a final resolution of the India-Pakistan imbroglio. We, at ICWA, clearly do not see any ‘renegotiation’ on the cards. ‘Abrogation’ seems a more likely scenario, and we don’t really have to hurry into that too.

A word on the title of the book ‘Trial by Water’. To me, the Indus Water Treaty saga symbolizes the trial of the masses who inhabit the Indus Basin, who have been denied the development dividend that comes with peaceful co-existence, who have been bred on conflicting and instigated narratives, who have been subjected to violence – both physical and mental, and who continue to be caged in the dark politics of the region. Underneath the veneer of exemplary bilateral cooperation applauded by the world, the Indus Water Treaty is nothing but a story of multi-faceted, unrestrained greed and hate. I would, of course, like to hear from the author on what the title of the book means to him.

I look forward to a thoughtful discussion. I wish the panellists all the best.

Unidentified Speaker: Thank you, ma'am. I would now request the author to deliver his remarks. Thank you, Dr. Sinha.

Uttam Kumar Sinha: Namaskar. Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you, ICWA, for organizing this book event. I've often stated that I'm very uncomfortable talking about the book that I have written. But book discussion is always a good exercise. You get to hear certain, you get to hear comments from those who have read it and it is always useful, because this issue itself is an ongoing issue, I think. It hasn't ended just because I've written the book. Abhi picture baaki hai, I think, and then we have to actually reflect upon what the future will be when it comes to this treaty.

Thirty years ago when I was in JNU, in the School of International Studies, a friend of mine gave me a book, a play written by John Osborne. It was called Look Back in Anger. And this particular lady met me thirty years later, having picked up my book, and she asked me that, do you look back at the treaty with anger? I think we have the benefit of hindsight and we tend to look at the treaty as being unfair to India. And I think we've seen this narrative being built. And having studied the treaty in detail, having examined the actors who participated in the long-drawn negotiation that happened from 1952 onwards till the treaty was signed in 1960, I have come to a fair conclusion that it was not an unfair treaty.

I think politically we might have various interpretations of that, but from a technical perspective and from an engineering perspective, and because the engineers were involved in the treaty process, in the negotiation process, they did protect the interest of India by protecting the interest on the eastern rivers. Again, the benefit of hindsight, we today talk so much about the western rivers, the western rivers that flow from Kashmir to Pakistan, but in those times, in the '50s, and given the partition that happened in 1947, Punjab was critical. And the rivers were critical to Punjab's development.

So, therefore, the upstream control of the eastern rivers, Ravi, Vyas, and Sutlej, was absolutely important for us. We had to have complete and exclusive right on these eastern rivers so that we could develop Punjab, the 15 million hectare farmland that we needed to develop. We needed, of course, the Bhakra and the Nangal dams were coming up. That needed control of the rivers. The Rajasthan canal project, was in the pipeline. Therefore, the eastern rivers' control was critically important to us. And the Ravi Vyas Link Canal was also planned.

So the control of that rivers was critically important, and I think the engineers did a remarkable job negotiating for our interest on the eastern rivers. And it wasn't easy because the Pakistani negotiators were also interested in controlling the eastern rivers for their Punjab and we therefore have to go back a little in history and understand why the control of the eastern rivers was important for both of us.

So on that count I think and I would say through the research I have done that our engineers were very nationalistic, they understood what India's interest was then and they fought tooth and nail to retain India's interest on the eastern rivers. Now no treaty can be a treaty which is one-sided tilted. So since we got the eastern rivers we had to concede and give away something somewhere. The western rivers was one such area where we conceded because we controlled the eastern rivers so we gave the western rivers to Pakistan.

Over there, again, I think our engineers played a very smart role I think and they convinced the Pakistani engineers that 3.6 million acre feet of storage capacity is good because it will help you to control floods. If you just allow free flow of the western rivers to you, you'll unmanage it. And therefore, we retained some interest on the western rivers as well. What we haven't done on the western rivers is build on those provisions that was entitled to India. So that is not really the fault of the treaty, it is the fault of the successive government till of course 2014 when things changed. When the perspective changed and the entire attention fell on Kashmir and the development of the western rivers.

What else did we concede? We conceded because we retained complete right on the eastern rivers. We conceded also financial terms and obligations. We gave money to Pakistan to build the link canals on the western rivers to the eastern rivers because the eastern rivers is also very important to them. And we gave away GBP 62 million to the Indus Development Bank. And that money could be used for the link canals. And this is an argument that was played out in the parliament debate in 1960, 30th November. And it is a debate because the Indus Waters Treaty was signed on 19th September. We're just three days away when we'll mark 65 years of the treaty. The debate happened, it was a debate because it was listed. And the time allotted was two hours. It started at 3:25 in the afternoon on the 30th November. And it went on till 6, so it expanded the allotted time.

And I think in the debate it's very interesting and you should read the debate because I think for me that debate is interesting on many counts. It's interesting because the political leaders and the parliamentarians of course did not understand the technical nature or the engineering-oriented approach to the treaty. They looked at the treaty from a common understanding that we are giving away more water to Pakistan. Now this giving away more water is something that we even talked today. And it's quite simple. If anyone who sees the basin and does a quick backhand calculation and says the entire basin volume would be about 168 million acre-feet of water that is flowing annually, in which the eastern rivers is just about 32.6 million acre-feet of water, and the western rivers is about 136.

So if you look at 32 and 136, it's a very simple logic that we have given away more water to Pakistan. But this is where we fail to read the treaty's nitty-gritty. The treaty was not determined by volume. The treaty apportioned the basins, eastern rivers and western rivers. It was a sub-basin arrangement. Rivers were more in attention, not the volume of the water. And for us at that point of time, the eastern rivers was very critically important. And therefore that debate becomes very interesting because all these questions are raised. The GBP 62 million given away to Pakistan and members of Parliament, seasoned members of Parliament, not only the opposition but also members of the Congress Party, they were raising questions that India was giving away, conceding far too much to Pakistan.

Financial matters was raised. The issues of the volume were raised. But I think their perspective was entirely non-technical and no one knew actually the technicality of the treaty. Therefore, for us, it is important to look at the treaty, read it carefully and see what are the provisions and what are the restrictions of this treaty. And I think when it comes to the provisions, India has done what it could on the eastern rivers. It has not done, at least till this current government has come in, not enough on the western rivers. And there's plenty of objectives to fulfil on the western rivers in terms of storage capacity. We might not reach 3.6 million acre feet, but through proper assessment and site selection and using right technology, because these are difficult terrains, by the way.

So I think the engineers were quite clear that at that point of time, the western rivers didn't really matter to us because we didn't have the technology, the wherewithal, the financial ability to build those dams on the western rivers. The eastern rivers were important because they were the sedate rivers flowing gently on the plains of Punjab. And that could have been harnessed more quickly and effectively than the western rivers. The treaty does not have an exit clause. And this is also something that I bring out in the book. Why didn't it have an exit clause? I mean, ideally speaking, a treaty should be revised after 10 years, 20 years, 30 years, whatever. But this has no exit clause because the engineers knew that the political equation between India and Pakistan would never be normal.

And therefore, they binded the two countries together by saying there's no exit clause. They wanted the treaty to work. They wanted the development of the water projects to happen. And therefore, they said no exit clause. It was like locked into each other's intestine, so to speak, the treaty was. They didn't allow that interest time because they knew that the political equation between India and Pakistan would have always derailed the treaty if there was a certain time period given.

It was an engineering-oriented treaty. It did not have role of diplomacy or diplomats or the Ministry of External Affairs. And this is again a question which comes out in the book, that since it was so technical, so determined by the engineers, therefore the perspective was very different of the treaty. Now had diplomats been involved, probably the treaty would have gone on in terms of negotiation. Probably it would have never come about, but it's a guess here. There was, of course, a leadership perspective. Prime Minister Nehru's leadership was all about getting the monkey off his back, and the monkey was Pakistan. Pakistan had become a troublesome country, creating a bad image of India all over the world. And I think Nehru was very conscious of that image.

India stopping water to Pakistan, which happened soon after the 1947 partition, had played on. And the Western media was castigating India for stopping waters. Jafarullah Khan was making great claims about India being the nasty country and hurting poor people and farmers in Pakistan, and Nehru was quite conscious of that image. He wanted an India to progress and develop. He didn't want India to get caught in this bad publicity of the West. We needed Western support, we needed development, we needed finances, and this kind of bad image obviously was playing against his own thought process.

So there was a political objective to quickly get this issue, this irksome issue, as he would call it, this irritant of water issue between India and Pakistan, off his back, and move India forward to many other objectives that he had planned. I think, therefore, that political objective was there. When the treaty was signed, I think the political objective of peace and stability with Pakistan failed. And I think Nehru himself realized that that objective never came about. Ayub, soon after the treaty was signed, before the ink was dried, he was claiming for Kashmir, and he made a good, quick link between Kashmir and the Kashmir rivers, which he called the Western rivers. And he said, if the Western rivers are given to us, in a certain sense, Kashmir also belongs to us.

And this kind of narrative agenda, you'll find in the book, was quietly supported by the US administration also. Eisenhower, a week before the treaty was signed, called it a bright spot in a larger international relation, which was not very good. And he also talked about, if the treaty is signed, he makes a statement to the media, maybe the Kashmir will be resolved. So I think there was a Western approach. There was certainly the Cold War geopolitics playing into India and Pakistan negotiating and getting a treaty done.

The engineers, of course, valued the Western modernity and engineering ability. And that is why David Lilienthal, when he came to India and met Nehru and walked with him in the lawns of Teen Murthy, Lilienthal convinced Nehru about this great plan of the Indus Basin and how technology and modern engineering can uplift the whole water resource. And water resource is linked to development. I think it was attractive. And Nehru was clearly impressed by, tentatively impressed. He knew the Americans were not the best of the people when it came to coming into the subcontinent. But I think he was impressed by the general approach to developing the Indus Basin.

So I think Lilienthal and his writings, and then Black and the World Bank financing the treaty because they were the third party, all added to the atmosphere of the 1950. So the lesson I draw from the book, and as a researcher, and I will end here, is that history is important. But history has to be studied objectively, not with a sense of prejudice here. We have to acknowledge history's incoherence. There's no one narrative of history. And it's important to understand that many of the development of the 1950s were a product of the circumstances then, were a product of the situation. The context is very important.

The context then, as the book tells us, was eventually to sign the treaty, but not to concede too much and protect our interest on the Eastern River. The context today is very different. Thank you very much.

Unidentified Speaker: Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Sinha, for those remarks. I would now request Ambassador Raghavan to provide his remarks and conduct the proceedings. It's all to you, sir.

TCA Raghavan: Thank you. Thank you very much, and may I begin by thanking Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General, ICWA, for inviting me and making me part of this very distinguished panel. Dr. Uttam Sinha has written this excellent book, and much like his earlier work, it opens up a number of fields for further inquiry, and it's good to have such a knowledgeable panel consisting of Dr. Shalini Chawla, who's a well-known Pakistan expert and writes and contributes a great deal to our analysis of developments in Pakistan. Dr. Ashish Shukla, who was earlier in ICWA and now is with the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, and also has been studying Pakistan for a number of years, is also a published author on Pakistani institutions, and Dr. Umar Shekhar, who earlier was in the Legal and Treaties Division of the Ministry of External Affairs and is now Advisor International Law in the ICWA.

And I'd like to begin by congratulating the Acting Director General for having this post of, I think it's a gap which has been filled because international law was… because probably we are next to the International Society for International Law, we never attended to it, but it was certainly a gap in the council. And it's good you're here, Mrs. Uma Sekhar.

Now, I'll just take a few minutes to provide some context because I do want to hear what each of these experts have to say about the treaty and about the book. But I'd reiterate that it is an excellent book and it merits being read closely to understand something which dominates our current discourses and narratives. Now, it is, of course, true that the discussions about the Indus Waters Treaty are very often, not always, but very often, more about the state of the India-Pakistan relationship than about the treaty ourselves. And much of the criticism of the treaty in terms of whether it is fair or unfair or too generous or whether it is outdated actually stem from our numerous frustrations out of the state of the India-Pakistan relationship.

And the fact that despite so many initiatives, we have not been able to move that relationship to a better place. And this is something I think reflects, this really colors all the discussions about the treaty. Dr. Sinha is absolutely right that if you take even a cursory glance at the treaty, you realize immediately that it has been drafted by engineers for engineers. It's a very intricate, very complex piece of work. And it's something which I think when we look at it impressionistically or episodically, we fail to understand. This point about whether the treaty gave away too much water to Pakistan.

Now that question, of course, in the current situation of floods is somewhat absurd because we're not hearing too much about not one drop of water going down the Indus because the idea is to send as much water as possible down to the Arabian Sea. But I think the point to remember is the treaty did not give anything. The treaty is only a piece of paper concerning relations between India and Pakistan and how they handle riparian issues. What goes into the Arabian Sea via Pakistan has to do with gravity and geography. So the treaty does not give anything. It is the natural topography of the region and the way the water flows that governs what is going where.

And I think because of this particular perspective, there are sharp differences in India. And there were, in the past, many differences within people in the Ministry of External Affairs and within the larger strategic fraternity about how we should view the treaty. Those differences are there even now. But I think despite these differences, there are two points on which both sides in India agree. And the first of these two points is that Pakistan has a kind of acute psychological vulnerability when it comes to the Western rivers, and in particular to the Chenab.

The joke in the Ministry of External Affairs at one time used to be that if you go and take a bath in the Chenab or have a swim in the Chenab, there will be a no to Abad from the Pakistan foreign office the next day. So there is this kind of acute vulnerability about the Chenab, but also to the Jhelum and so on. But the second point on which both sides agree is that Pakistan has misused the dispute resolution mechanism to a very great extent. So a treaty which was otherwise intended to create a framework for a cooperative development of the Indus rivers on every point became a point of contestation and dispute.

So projects would continue forever. There would be delays. The Indus waters dispute, the commissioner's dispute resolution mechanism dragged on. Currently, you have this thing of whether the neutral experts or a court of arbitration. So I think this dispute resolution mechanism certainly required a relook. And when the treaty, if and when it is ever renegotiated, I think you need a more pragmatic dispute resolution mechanism. Having said that, I would also say that it's important to recall that interstate rivers, whether they are international rivers or rivers within the same country, are always prone to contestations.

And if you ask river water engineers or river water experts in India, they will say that it's important that you see the international disputes, whether India-Nepal, India-Bangladesh, India-Pakistan. Just see also the domestic river water contestations which are there. Interstate rivers, by their very nature, are prone to contestations and disputes. And there is this case of the Mekedatu Dam on the Kaveri River between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, which has been held up for years and years and years because of lower Iberian objections to what the upper Iberian wants to do.

I think that perspective, that background, is important. Because at some stage, we will have to look at more pragmatic arrangements with regard to river water flows in South Asia. And our own domestic experience can inform our international approach and enrich that international approach.

My final point is somewhat ironical. Because this debate about whether the treaty was more generous to Pakistan. And I always felt that this debate was deeply impacted by what we were saying to Pakistan. Because in Pakistan, too, there was a great debate for a long period of time that the treaty is fundamentally unfair to Pakistan. And to reassure them, we had made various arguments. And over the years, the people who were posted in Pakistan and who worked on the Pakistan desk in India had made these talking points to reassure Pakistan that the treaty is not unfair to you. In fact, it is excessively generous to you.

Now, these talking points, which were intended for a Pakistani audience, are now, in fact, being played back in a domestic audience to say that you have conceded too much to Pakistan. But I think the important point to remember is that these discussions are not so much about river waters or about the Indus Waters Treaty. But as I said, the frustrations we have about our incapacity or our inability to have moved this relationship to a different kind of place. I think this is one of the principal problems which we have, that despite all our different efforts, the Pakistani response to these initiatives has always been less than optimal or, in fact, very bad. And that has impacted how we look at the treaty, as, in fact, it has impacted all other aspects, whether you look at trade, whether you look at people-to-people cooperation, whether you look at cooperation in other areas. The overall state of the relationship has had a deep impact.

But as I said, I would like to really hear comments of these experts. And may I first ask Dr. Shalini Chawla to convey her remarks. Thank you.

Shalini Chawla: Thank you, sir. I'd like to begin by thanking ICWA for inviting me for this discussion today and I'm extremely delighted to share my perspective on Uttam's brilliant book, which I felt is a very fair book and adopts a position assessing facts without any bias. The book is an exceptional work with exhaustive research and analysis, which fills the gap in the domain of Indus Water Treaty. It offers a comprehensive examination of complex relationship between India and Pakistan, which Ambassador Raghavan has highlighted, but the relationship with the lens of Indus Water Treaty.

And we, being in this field for more than two decades now, we normally assessed Pakistan's from military positioning and strategic options that it has exercised, but for the first time I think we have ever seen the relationship being examined from this dimension. The book obviously traces the origins of the treaty and presents the evolution of the issues with the evolution of the geopolitical dynamics. It also incorporates the perspectives of the key actors from both the countries, taking into account the impact the personalities have had on the treaty and on the water management in both the countries.

I'm sure some of you have read this book and you would agree with me that the book has fascinating anecdotes, historical details, and couple of them I will mention here because some of them might be known, but some of them are not known in the public domain. Like it says that Pakistan often engaged US engineering firms paying a premium fees and sometimes sidestepping the World Bank mediation on water issues.

Now Pakistan is trying to manage perceptions in the US from the beginning. We see a very exaggerated version right now when Pakistan was trying to crack the crypto deal in the middle of the crisis with the lobbying funds which it pays close to about $600,000 a month to do that. Second, that the Gwadar port was actually first extended to India in 1956, but Nehru was advised to turn it down and the decision was criticized as a strategic mistake.

Third, after the creation, after its creation, Pakistan experienced a much faster growth rate and the initial decades mainly due to inheriting a more developed irrigation system linked to agricultural output. I mean, we've seen the GDP in the beginning, in the initial decades has been extremely high, but I don't think so many of us know that it was basically mainly because of the irrigation system linked to agricultural output.

So I think the book actually tells you that to be able to understand this relationship, one needs to understand the water-related issue, the river-related issue. And also what we see right now that Pakistan is extremely rattled on India's decision, and book actually provides in a way a rationale for India's position post-Pahalgam. Now India's decision of suspending the treaty is an outcome of a decade of crisis, it's not one event. It has been a series of terror attacks which we have seen, also change in the circumstances, India's hydro requirement.

So although the study overall, the book is a treasure of facts and analysis, and it's difficult to choose which one are more critical, but I have six points to make here, which I think I could assess after reading the book, relating them to the current realities. First is that India viewed the treaty as a gesture of what Uttam calls a principle magnanimity, a commitment to regional cooperation, so moral idealism drove the treaty. And he writes, and he quotes Nehru where Nehru said that we purchased settlement, we purchased peace. But obviously this was something which did not hold true, which has been talked by the author and Ambassador Raghavan.

And obviously Pakistan never regarded the treaty as a breakthrough, the larger unresolved disputes with India have all remained, Kashmir remained very much the unfinished agenda of partition. And what we see today also in Asim Munir's speech, what we saw in April before Pahalgam, where he again talked about the issue, how they see it. So the treaty has definitely failed to bring in stability, and Uttam calls it a divorce settlement, which we also heard in the welcome remarks. And Uttam talks about it that the treaty did little to elevate the underlying political military tensions between India and Pakistan.

Now, I feel that it also the book somewhere brings out that factor that for Pakistan, the treaty was a treat to its false sense of entitlement. And I think this is that sense of entitlement which Pakistan carries from the beginning, that it needs to be treated in a certain way. And it has been deprived of its optimal share. And that's the position we have seen throughout in Pakistan. And this is the sense of entitlement, which has actually driven its victimhood. It's also to a large extent, it's rational for its acts of terror.

Secondly, irrespective of these positions, which India and Pakistan adopted, and we saw the behavioral evolution of Pakistan, the treaty has obviously endured through some of the worst events. Extreme rhetoric on both sides. India's declaration of blood and water can't go together. Then Pakistan accusing India of water terrorism. But now, obviously, there is a change. And the change has been because of the change in the circumstances. When the treaty was designated, Himalayan glaciers were much more stable.

We did not face the challenges of climate change, population, et cetera. And then, given these dimensions, definitely the request for relook into the treaty has been made even past. And yes, obviously, the treaty was signed in goodwill as we talk about it. And repeated breach of that goodwill has led to where we are here. Like Ambassador Raghavan said, that Pakistan has all the time stretched that leverage, extended by it, and misused it. So this is one of the biggest, startling case that we see.

Third, we have seen Pakistan posture of victimhood, which, again, the book brings out very beautifully throughout the book. It has blamed, we have seen even now, for its victimhood. It blames United States for its security and economic woes, India for different problems here. Now, the book effectively highlights how the treaty was initially portrayed as an unequal arrangement, and how Pakistan's victimhood was asserted from the outset. So that is another factor which I think comes out very well in the book.

And what we saw that it managed that victimhood with a war of propaganda, which, again, how it managed that war on propaganda, how treaty itself was, I think, a result of that propaganda war that Pakistan was launching. And we tried to neutralize that propaganda with this, but it did not happen there. So obviously, there was an atmosphere of suspicion about the treaty was created, which became one of the potent tool. And even nobody, including Ayub, ever recognized the fact of the 80-20 distribution. And this is the propaganda that we have seen Pakistan has taken to the extreme till this date.

My fourth point comes from the question which Uttam has raised in the book, and two points he raises in the introduction part, that can the decades-old treaty evolve to meet a new era of crisis? Or will the basin fracture become the new front line of conflict? I think these are very, very critical questions which he raises that what's going to be happening next. So the book has presented historical details, which actually help us now to assess the future behavioral pattern of Pakistan after India has decided to keep the treaty in abeyance.

And in my view, obviously, this is one of a very strong punitive measures which India has adopted. And we see Pakistan extremely rattled, and that's because of a number of facts, number of realities. And the most critical ones are that, you know, Pakistan's 90% of agricultural production depends on the Indus River Basin, which is country's primary water source. Secondly, it is ranked at fifth among the 23 most water insecure countries globally, according to the study by United Nations. It is obviously comes into the category of water starved country, and then the per capita availability of water has decreased significantly from, say, 5,000 cubic meters per capita per year in 1951 to less than 1,000 cubic meters now, and it's expected to reach 500 cubic meters by 2035.

And there's lack of storage capacities, which don't allow Pakistan to store more than 10% of the inflow of the water as compared to the world average, which is 40%. So, obviously, these are the issues which are troubling Pakistan, and we see this rattle behavior right now. But with this rattle behavior, what do we expect, and what is Pakistan expected to do? I think that is a more critical question. So I think what we will see in the coming time, and which we are already seeing, that we will see that Pakistan is going to keep a narrative of victimhood and aggression at the same time.

So we will see this combination of emotions in Pakistan, and it's raising this voice on multiple international forums. We have seen on SEO how it talked about it. It will continue to, I think, express its eagerness to talk to India, but we will see that initiative or eagerness comes with a threat or a blackmail parallel to that. So that will definitely continue. Pakistan does not have the money to build in the dams which it wants to build, so we will see more and more aggressive behavior and desperate behavior to see collaborations and raise money on the international forums, and that is something we will see in the coming time.

And my last point is that, what is India going to do with this kind of rattle behavior that we see in Pakistan, and what is India's position going to be? And Uttam has stated in his book that while Nehru viewed the treaty as a gesture of principal magnanimity, a promise of regional cooperation, and Modi has, over time, come to see it as an instrument of strategic intent. I think he describes it very well, and he talks about it that this is the difference between the two leaders has been because of the generational shift.

I'll just add to it, Uttam, and I say it's also a circumstantial shift. It's also a position shift of India. India is in a much different position right now to be able to take this position. What India is going to be doing is, I think, was highlighted very well in PM Modi's 29th July speech in Lok Sabha, which he made, where he talked about the fact that how more water projects can be there for India to benefit farmers of Punjab, Haryana and also about the fact that how desilting was never an option with India, because it had to take permission of Pakistan before doing that and that is something that India can use to increase the operational capacity of the hydroelectric projects.

So I think India definitely two parts. Strategically we have taken it as a punitive measure. We have taken it as a punitive measure. The objective of this decision is to kind of seek some kind of behavioural change in Pakistan in terms of its strategic calculus. I think that's going to be a big challenge. How we maneuver it and how we use that pressure will be able to achieve that. A lot will depend on our diplomats. And the second part economically definitely this decision is going to benefit us in the longer run. Thank you.

TCA Raghavan: Thank you. Thank you very much, Dr. Chawla. Very interesting remarks and I'm sure there will be some opportunity to discuss them. May I request Dr. Ashish Shukla now to...

Ashish Shukla: Thank you, sir. I hope I'm audible. Thank you, sir. Thanks to the council especially Additional Director General Madam Mahawar for inviting me to share my two cents on the theme. It's great to be back home at ICWA and in a familiar setting and I can see many of my former colleagues sitting in the audience, Director Research, Athar, Sanjeev, Fazlur, Professor Variku who has mentored me at some point of time when I was in JNU.

Anyway, at the outset let me first congratulate the author who happens to be my senior colleague at IDSA for bringing out this wonderful book on such an important and relevant issue. It is one of the many scholarly works undertaken by Dr. Sinha which is of immense importance and interest to both academic fraternity and strategic community in Delhi and elsewhere. Today we are discussing his trial by water at a time when both sides of the border is actually grappling with the excessive water. And as sir said in the beginning, interestingly the upper riparian has no intention to stop the flow.

Similarly, the lower riparian is also not claiming that there's less water in the river. It's a thorough and scholarly work enriched with plenty of primary and primary sources and anecdotes which I'm sure will be used by both academic fraternity and policy makers alike when they try to analyze or make their own arguments on the issue. The book debunks many myths and misconceptions including the one surrounding the disproportionate share of water given to Pakistan. And according to the author, people often make simplistic arguments overlooking what we say, complex hydrology which guided the process of negotiations.

Rather than over-analyzing history, in light of the current political and technological development and progress, the author tries to normalize the discussion on IWG, which has become a highly emotive issue in both the countries. Water, as we all know, is both an emotional and a strategic issue in the region. There is a great deal of resentment in India, especially in the northern part of the country, to be more specific, in Hindi-heard land. Actually, in Hindi-heard land, it is often hurt to see water flowing down to Pakistan, a country which uses terrorism and non-state actors as a strategic asset and foreign policy tool, or sometimes as paramilitary arms against us.

And the talks and terror statements like talks and terror cannot go together, blood and water cannot flow together, actually reflects the prevailing sentiments in the country. Post-Pahalgam, we have of course put IWG in abeyance, which theoretically means that we won't be bothered by the provisions of the treaty for the time being, the important question here is, is India losing its faith in institutional mechanism to arrive at some common ground leading to resolution of the issues in the region? Given the current geopolitics, is it possible to use water as a weapon or punishing tool to deter Pakistan? That's another question.

Many in India, in Pakistan and elsewhere are also asking, what is our next move? Are we looking at building new infrastructure on the western rivers? Or would we be only focusing on completing the existing projects, ignoring Pakistan's objections, which is more often creates problems for us? The propaganda narrative I would like to talk about a bit, propaganda narrative across the border is woven around what we say, India being an existential threat to Pakistan. Pakistan has always played the victim card to get their people mobilized at home and attract international attention to portray India in a bad light.

Earlier, some of the religious zealots and terrorists, including Hafiz Saeed, used to incite people by saying, and these days, they say that India is out there to stop every drop of water flowing down to Pakistan. It appears that water discourse in the region is being securitized, which to me as a scholar, as a student of international relations and South Asian studies, is not a good omen at all. Both sides need to do the reality check, and here I would like to refer to Ambassador Raghavan. I think he said it at IIC a couple of weeks ago and today also, that treaty doesn't give anything to Pakistan.

And to quote the author, my senior colleague at IDSA, the question of giving away water to Pakistan appears to be less about the merit of the treaty and more about emotional rhetoric. Dr. Sinha has aptly underlined that many in Pakistan were highly dissatisfied with the outcome of the treaty, outcome of the negotiation, and when Ayub agreed to sign the agreement, there were many in Pakistan who said that Ayub is not doing the right thing to sign the treaty. Pakistan, in fact, during the negotiation, wanted 70% of water from the eastern rivers, which fed its canal system in Punjab, and they knew that water flowing in the western rivers were to come to them due to the gravity and gradient factors.

So there was no doubt about it. Now, long before the IWT negotiations actually began, Radcliffe, as chairman of the Punjab Boundary Commission, explored the possibility of a joint venture governing certain irrigation networks between the two countries. However, both Congress and Muslim League, were opposed to any such possibility. Jinnah even stated that he would rather have Pakistan turn into a desert than have its field water due to courtesy or mercy of Hindus. That was the kind of statement Jinnah made.

During the negotiation process, if you see, Ayub Khan once conveyed to Eugene Black, the World Bank president, that people have told me very plainly that if they have to die through thirst and hunger, they would prefer to die in the battle, and they expected me to give them that chance. That's Ayub Khan telling the World Bank president. Now fast forward to 2025. Look at what Asim Munir is saying. Asim Munir told the overseas Pakistanis recently that Indus water is not India's property, and we will wait for India to build a dam. When it does, we will fire 10 missiles. So that's the kind of statement Pakistan is making even today.

This explains how powers that be in Pakistan look at the waters of Indus Basin. We must also understand why Pakistanis are so emotional about it today, as per capita availability of water is around 930 cubic meters, which has made it a water-scarce country. I think you need at least 1,000 cubic meters to be a country which can survive. Add to that the mismanagement of water in Pakistan and interprovincial differences that make it impossible to build dams like Kalabagh to store the water. So that's another aspect. India on its part made several attempts to purchase or what we say negotiate peace with Pakistan through a variety of means and mechanisms. IWT is one such attempt.

As Dr. Sinha writes, it will not be off the mark to say that Treaty was an agreement of disagreement at worst and at best a confidence building measure. Page 59. This is something the book clearly brings out. The problem which we now have is that India's attempt to negotiate or purchase peace has not succeeded. So that's the real problem. And on the style of the book, you don't need to be an expert of the subject to make sense of the comments and arguments presented in the book. Even a layman will find it an interesting read because of the lucid style adopted by the author to convey his thoughts on the theme. Besides a scholarly approach, sometimes I also assess a book on Pakistan, whether it makes me smile or not.

To be specific, if I laugh a lot reading the book, I term it a good book on Pakistan. So the book doesn't disappoint me on this count also. And I would like to refer to two, three events. Eugene Black in his response to BK Nehru's indirect accusations say, I have been called everything on earth. I have been called the murderer. I have even been called a socialist, but never before have I been called a blackmailer. Actually, BK Nehru was saying that India is being blackmailed to give more money to Pakistan to link the canals in Punjab.

Page 64. Second incident is there when Maharaja Hari Singh refused to meet Mountbatten on the pretext of a colic attack and later Mountbatten termed it a diplomatic colic, Page 121. Another moment comes when the author discusses the fate of Viceroy's horse-drawn buggy being decided with the flip of the coin, Page 122. Now, as I can understand the time is running out for me, I would like to say that such a wonderful book needs to break all the barriers to reach the wider audience. And if Penguin guys are here, so they must think of allowing the book to be translated into other languages, especially at least in Hindi so that people in North India can actually know what the reality is.

With that, I think I'll stop. Thank you very much. Thank you, Council, again for inviting me.

TCA Raghavan: Thank you, Dr. Shukla. Thank you. May I now request Shrimati Uma Sekhar to deliver her remarks. Thank you.

Uma Sekhar: Thank you very much, sir. Well, a lot is said and a very well-narrated about the author's book in a very wonderful manner, left nothing to say. But let me congratulate you. The way you navigated the whole journey of this Indus Water Treaty is so fascinating, like a novel. Even the facts also you have reflected in such a manner. But congratulations to you. Sir, you have already done much of my job as far as Indus Water Treaty and its applications are concerned. Before that, let me just acknowledge and thank my colleague, Nutan, for bringing this international discourse into this ICWA platform.

One point we all agree that this treaty is uniquely structured. You say it is engineer's job. Someone else say it is one-sided. And others say politically it's a failure. But see, whatever may be the geopolitical scenario, whatever may be the tension out of which the treaty arose, this is a treaty. This is part of international law, a binding treaty to begin with. Let me proceed in that way. Because my job is not to criticize what happened in the past. I don't have the luxury like the scholars have done that. But within the government of India system, my job is to interpret the treaty as it exists.

So, I mean, ever since, say, in 2005, I think I joined, along with my senior colleagues, to work on this Indus Water Treaty. The first and foremost that attracted all of us is the preamble, the basic structure, the intended objective of the parties who entered into this treaty, the crux of the whole treaty is just structured in the preamble. I mean, I don't want to miss a single sentence also. The treaty clearly highlights that both parties have equally decided the attainment of the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system of rivers and have recognized the need of fixing and delimiting in a spirit of goodwill and friendship the rights and obligations of each in relation to the other concerning use of these waters. What a beautifully structured preamble.

As a student of law, I must appreciate this. The fulfillment of development of waters of this Indus system and for the optimum utilization for the achievement of which the treaty created mechanisms, the commission was given ample powers, discretion to interpret, to discuss, to interpret, to come to an understanding. That is the basic premise on which the pioneers of the treaty proceeded. You have to look into this objective of the treaty along with the annexes. Nothing should be read in isolation. Nothing should be read in isolation.

And this fact was thoroughly reiterated by the Baglihar expert, first time when the treaty was interpreted. He made it very clear that the integrity, the sanctity, the predictability of the treaty should flow from the preamble and then annexes. You cannot read Annex D in isolation. He gave an alert message to the treaty partners. And that was the time, of course, I will come to that when it comes to the details of the Baglihar. He also took note of the other issues, what we have been grappling and we have been arguing, we are making statements.

Way back in 2005, the Baglihar expert said, look, 20 years down the line, you negotiated this treaty. The art of state practice, the scientific knowledge, even the guidelines adopted by the ICOL, the technical experts, the guidelines of the hydrographical projects and all that, is totally different. You cannot stuck here. You have to move ahead. But our treaty partner said that when the outcome of the Baglihar determination comes, he misinterpreted. He messed up the treaty. Very unfortunate.

So throughout on that premise, they proceeded. Pakistan proceeded. Whenever I'm taking some development project, fully in accordance with Annex D, or other storage projects, in accordance with Annex E, Pakistan raises the right of objection. The record shows that almost more than 52 projects they have objected out of 71, if I correctly remember. So there's never ending. And then, that means, in spite of the cooperation, why I read the preamble is that, as you all are aware, India is committed to its obligations, whether it's multilateral treaty or bilateral treaty, and we followed it in its spirit and letter. But unfortunately, that was not demonstrated from the other side.

Otherwise, I do not fault the treaty as such. As you rightly pointed out, the engineers have taken note of all the pros and cons. Yes, it is unique, unlike the other water-sharing treaties where there is a mechanism. Because engineers are dominated in framing the treaty, they have not contemplated, perhaps, the mechanism to review mechanism so that the changing developments we can take note. But that was not there. But that doesn't mean the treaty is totally a faulted one. It is a matter of interpretation. You have an obligation under the preamble. We waited. The obstructionist approach from Pakistan at every stage, every stage, every stage, prioritizing India-centric approach.

And what is the perceived losses of India are Pakistan's gains. That is the only stated agenda for them. But what needs to be done, the treaty was very thoroughly interpreted by the Baglihar expert in accordance with the principles of international law. He interpreted Article 31, 32. And he said, well, even if I get into the principles of interpretation of international law, the Vienna Convention of the Treaties, I do not see what India is doing on Baglihar, gateway spill, and other bondage issues very much in accordance with the treaty. That was not palatable to our partner.

The other issue is while we were navigating through the treaty, and then the issues raised by the other side is the supply of data. What needs to be supplied under Article 6.2 or 7.2? Under 7.2, as a matter of right, every second day, the Indian commissioner receives some objection or the other. What are you doing here? What are you doing there? So that was the time we were asked to examine. Then we said that, look, Article 6.2 or 7.2, you have to read in conjunction with Article 3 of the treaty, which says that Article 3.2 says that only those waters India has to let flow. Pakistan is entitled for unrestricted. Not all waters. Unlike in Article 2, when it is described about the eastern waters, all waters it's mentioned.

So that distinction we need to make. You cannot just raise, as a matter of right, everything you're entitled to take. And second, what is the additional data? When I am doing for my irrigation purposes and in the permissible waters, there also you want the information. You cannot, again, raise it as a matter of right. When I have information, I will share. But you cannot adopt this obstructionist approach. But it went on. And then the issue of Kishanganga, and very well narrated by the author, what happened in Kishanganga.

Again, I'm not getting into the technical details of the objections raised by Pakistan. I think many of you are aware. Otherwise, if the discussion starts, it is never ending then. The discussions are happening about, it is a straightforward project, Kishanganga. Unlike the Baglihar, Baglihar's circumstances are a little bit different. The expert took note of it. In Kishanganga, it is straightforward. I'm entitled, and it is in compliance with Annexure D, but still. Then the two issues, no, no, no, I have to go to the Court of Arbitration. This is a dispute. Let's go to the Court of Arbitration.

Then, of course, India, as usual, very disparate of cooperation. While the discussions are happening within the commission, Pakistan wanted to go ahead. We participated in the discussions. There, the Court of Arbitration mentioned that. We call it as a partial award. With respect to the diversion of Kishanganga water for hydroelectric power generation, KHAP being a run-off river plant for the purpose of Annexure D, India is entitled to divert this Kishanganga-Neelum River as designed, of course, subject to its obligation to maintain a minimum downstream flow. It's okay. We respected that.

There is another issue. Pakistan went to the court. The court held that the treaty did not permit reduction below the depth storage level of water level, and accumulation of sediment in the reservoir did not constitute an unforeseen emergency. I do not understand the logic behind it. Sedimentation is a major concern for anybody. Then again, the other issues that left during the Kishanganga concerns, whatever Pakistan raised, as well as the Ratle project. Again, Pakistan said, well, these are the technical issues. We need to look into it. A lot of discussions took place. And then Pakistan requested for an appointment of a neutral expert. But still we are discussing that they have changed their stance. Saying that, substantially, if not substantially, predominantly legal in nature.

So let's go to a court of arbitration. And then, I don't know, you want me to stop it here, sir? But there is something more I mean I'll have to discuss. Maybe any questions or answers? If they come, I will be very happy to join. Yes, exactly. Thank you very much.

TCA Raghavan: Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Uma Sekhar. Actually, I think the legal points are very interesting. Because this is not an issue which has begun in the past few months. But as you explained, from the time of the Baglihar project, the intricacies of treaty interpretation with regard to the technical design of the project has actually been at the heart of the discussion. And the provisions of the treaty. I think those aspects are, but the fact is they are so complex that sometimes discussing them also, there are probably a dozen people in the country who will understand all the intricacies.

But thank you very much for your intervention. And it took me back to the time when we used to prepare for the meetings with the neutral expert on Baglihar and thereafter on Kishanganga. But I think I'm sure there will be many questions. And I'd like to now throw it open for any questions or comments. But since we don't have very much time, I would request you to be brief and also identify yourself as you pose your question or your comment.

Well, while people decide on the questions, may I also exercise my prerogative and ask the first question to Dr. Sinha, but also to Uma Sekhar, that when we look at the treaty, the dispute resolution mechanisms of the neutral expert versus the court of arbitration, I think any neutral expert will tend to go with the latest available technologies in the design of the project. But this is something which Pakistan objects to. Is this something which is there in other river water disputes? Also, is this something which we encounter in our own domestic river water contestations? Or is this something unique to the Indus waters? This is something which has often interested me. I wonder if you'd like to…

Uttam Kumar Sinha: Yeah, I think what plays on between two countries at the interstate level also plays between two provinces within the country and there is Article 58 of the Constitution says that water is a state subject. But there is a tribunal which is created to resolve these disputes as well. So in the cases of the recent case between Punjab and Haryana, which is really flaming up, I've just come back from Punjab and there is a mood in Punjab to say that I'm not going to give a drop of water to Haryana. It's also politically framed, but I think there is a lot of angst, emotion and the nature of divisiveness that water brings into play.

Water is very theatrical. It plays out in a certain manner in the public domain. And Pakistan beautifully did that, to play it out in the public domain. I've heard that most of the time the technical engineers who would come and have a debate at the Indus Commission meetings would be quite satisfied with the way things were progressing. The moment they went on and they introduced it to the domestic constituency, it took a very different color. But yes, I think internally also, I think we have created tribunals and there are tribunals to look into matters.

In fact, and I would just add here to your point, that my own reading and understanding of Pakistan positioning themselves in the negotiation on the waters was very judicial. They always felt it was about arbitration and court matters and legal aspects of it. There's a very interesting account which Gurcharan Das related, that when the first negotiation started, Pakistan had very little engineers in the negotiation process. They had more lawyers, 120 odd lawyers and just a few engineers, while we went with engineers to negotiate.

So I think this mindset, the Pakistan mindset, and even today, I think it's all about arbitration, third party, seeking the legal recourse to it, there is a certain purpose and intention behind it. And that's why for us, the third party is a no-no now with Pakistan. It's bilateral completely. And the bilateral and the third party has always been part of this whole narrative between India and Pakistan. But you would be probably better to explain the legal tone.

Uma Sekhar: Yeah, thank you very much. Yeah, I fully appreciate. As I mentioned in the very beginning, sir, this is a slightly uniquely structured treaty. As the other mentioned, engineers' treaty, right? Then unlike other treaties, where mostly it's bilateral, a commission is constituted, followed by an arbitration, no third party intervention. So when this arbitration takes place, perhaps the court concern will take the experts into also confidence. But here we have a very clearly well-structured dispute settlement mechanism under Article 9.

So the expert, while exercising his mandate under Annexure F, has the right to interpret the treaty. And this being purely an engineer's work, certainly he or she will be rather tempted or required to interpret the treaty. So bringing the skills, which is necessary, you ask me. Thank you.

Uttam Kumar Sinha: Thank you. Very quickly, I think the dispute resolution mechanism is a three-tier process. Yes. And it was done in good faith. I don't think our engineers thought that eventually Pakistan will take us to the court of arbitration. I think probably there was a lack of foresight here. The engineers did not understand the legality of the whole exercise, maybe in the future. It's something like Radcliffe. He was more a lawyer than a hydrologist, and yet he drew the line. And his interpretation was that the best mechanism to deal with the Indus Basin is joint development.

Uma Sekhar: I'm sorry to object to what you're saying. I do not look into the treaty from that prism. Given that the very structure of the treaty talks about the construction, the engineering work, the engineers framed this treaty, the mechanism is very clear. First of all, the substantial issues, if any, that arise are the differences in terms of design and structure of the construction. So it is the expert concerned. First, if you are not able to resolve within the commission, expert is there. However, if the expert, while exercising his mandate, thinks that, well, some of these issues seemingly a dispute for the purpose of interpretation of the treaty, please, you people, take note of this. You do whatever you want to do. And then, again, within the commission, we will decide, or G2G, and then, if both are given consent, go to the court of arbitration. So it is very purposefully, very clearly structured. Article 9, in fact, beautifully structured, rather.

TCA Raghavan: Thank you. You wanted to ask something?

Shalini Chawla: I just have a very small question, sir, to you and to Uttam, if you would like to comment. So because now, in the last three months, we have heard a lot about what India could gain economically with this, how now we also heard from Mrs. Uma that how Pakistan was irrationally objecting to every single project. But why was it these never made public? Was this by design or by default that this information about our being not a significant gainer in the treaty and also Pakistan objecting and adopting that. This never came into kind of a common knowledge, but just what I was curious to know was it deliberate or it was just by default?

Uttam Kumar Sinha: I mean, the dispute resolution mechanism, well it all started eventually with Baglihar which was around 2005 onwards. Till then I think the treaty was well within the Indus Commissioners meeting and discussion. I think Baglihar changed the whole paradigm of the relationship on the waters. And I think, I won't give due credit to Pakistan but they knew how to beautifully exploit the provisions. I think they've become quite aware. Up till the neutral expert it's fine, but beyond that taking to the court of arbitration was carefully designed by them.

After Baglihar I think a pattern emerged quite clearly and as you have mentioned they've raised 52 objections to projects in India, deliberately designed to prolong these projects. And these projects are on the western rivers. Western rivers are in Kashmir. You need water for development in Kashmir. So there's a lot of political objective which fits into Pakistan. It's a counter mechanism here for them. It serves their purpose. Projects delayment is crucial. You delay the projects, the cost adds up and you create an environment of uncertainty that India can't achieve these projects. So it was a deliberate exercise and in certain sense it worked well for them, till we realized nothing doing.

TCA Raghavan: From the 70s and up till the late 90s there was something which we used to term as called the Salal Mindset. And the Salal Mindset was that let's try to keep any India-Pakistan riparian difference away from the dispute resolution mechanisms. Let the Indus Commissioners handle it and if a compromise requires that you concede a little more than is required, then you do so. So in the Salal project we agreed to make design changes which in the end the engineers didn't like, but because of this view that we shouldn't escalate it and take it to a third party or to a neutral expert, we went along with it.

From the late 90s and early 2000s the view was that this is now for the Baglihar project that doesn't matter, let's go through the entire dispute resolution mechanism. And there the neutral expert came out very clearly in favor of the Indian position. And that, in fact, if you look at it, that gave us the confidence to embark on more projects and say that we'll go through the entire dispute resolution mechanism. So it was also a learning process on our part. Any comments or questions? Yes, Professor Warikwa, I was waiting for you.

Kulbhushan Warikoo: Hello. I recall I was in Kashmir in 1970s and till late 1986. So it was a common theme there, because they were whipping up anti-India. After late 1970s, this was a common theme that India has deprived us of our share of water. And I being in the office and I was working there, all my colleagues would poke me and pinprick me as if I was representing India. But when I came here, it stuck in my deep mind. And in the year 2000, there was a conference in Darjeeling. And I chose this theme Indus Water Treaty. So believe me, when I went through this, all details, and David Lilienthal, and Eugene Black, and then as an American president's letter to Nehru and other details.

So, as a Kashmiri, I was shocked. I tried to empathize. I did empathize. And here also, all of you also same, you said that the priority was to keep eastern rivers flowing, Baghdad-Nangal Dam, and other things. And Kashmir was deprived of its fair share of water and other things. And a certain blame does go to the chief engineer. I think he was Gulam Hasan Khan of Kashmir government, who was reputed. He didn't, at the time, water was flowing abundantly in Kashmir. So they didn't perceive it in a manner it should have been projected the future estimates and future requirements. So that flaw remained in the internal.

And what I could see is that where Zafarullah Khan, noted lawyer, and he was taking up the issue, both at the UN and other places, and within Pakistani establishment. From Indian side, it was the engineers. So technically, for India, it was a technical issue. For them, it was a political issue. They wanted it right. They were clear cut in their mind that they have to use it as a weapon for seeking international mediation on Kashmir or international pressure. There was no confusion in Pakistan. And I think there is no confusion among them even now. They remain committed to what they are doing.

But now, as you have seen, aviance of putting the treaty in aviance, it has evoked mixed response from Kashmir. CM Omar Abdullah and other groups have welcomed the move and hope that it will redress the previous mistakes and help in the redevelopment of Kashmir and allocating it for the chance. I think time is there. Now is the time that India should do this Baglihar and Apatma, but Tulbul Dam. Now we have seen floods in Kashmir and navigation, irrigation, and dredging of the rivers and other things. So Tulbul Dam is very important for that purpose. And you see in Kashmir, any issue, for instance, for 15 days, highway is closed.

Apple growers, their trucks are stranded on the highway. Now, currently, there is such a strong, this anger is mounting against. The entire blame goes to Indian government, that they are deliberately killing our economy. They are deliberately doing this. So Indian policy making should be conscious of these inherent or internal thought processes going on in the valley.

TCA Raghavan: Thank you, Dr. Malik. Well, are there any other questions? Of course, we have run out of time, but I do wish to, maybe we can ask Uttam's response to this. What we spoke about today, in many ways, is also like discussing, it's like they say about the military, that generals are always fighting different generation wars. And to a great extent, when we talk about river water sharing and river water, how much water is to be divided in what manner, it also appears in a certain context, a debate about from an earlier generation.

Because given the speed at which climate change is occurring, and the way the river water flows are altering, and the incidence of flooding, and we are still in the midst of major floods all across the north of the Indian subcontinent. These debates about river water sharing have a slightly old-fashioned air to them. Many of you will know that just three years ago, a major dam on the Testa River was totally washed away because of unprecedented floods. So when we talk about river waters and how we exploit them, I think this frightening pace of climate change and our incapacity for engineers to actually anticipate what is going to happen is something which we also have to keep in mind. I wonder whether you have any thoughts on that.

Uttam Kumar Sinha: No, I have in terms of what the future of this treaty will be. I think we have to really consider now what is called the new knowledge in the space. And this new knowledge did not exist then. And Professor Warikoo, your point about Kashmir is a bit covered here. I think one of the reasons why Kashmir also did not become a big factor, it was an important factor, it didn't have the leader to turn the event around. Sheikh Abdullah was most of the time in prison. Whereas in Punjab, you had an engineering powerhouse telling Nehru what to do. There were leaders in Punjab saying that these are our rivers. They need to be developed.

There was no such articulation from Kashmir because they didn't have that. But remember, Kashmir rivers were for the future. The Punjab river was for the present in 1960. So that was the only difference, I think. And the future was 3.6 million acre feet of water to store. I don't think we can ever reach that storage capacity on the Western rivers.

TCA Raghavan: Ashish, is there anything you'd like to add?

Ashish Shukla: I think I would like to say that we have been given 3.6 MAF on Western rivers. What we have done, what we have utilized in the last 65 years, you would be surprised to know, 0.6 MAF. So the treaty now put in abeyance, we have an opportunity to complete the projects which we are already in the pipeline. And if possible, we want to initiate new projects. This is the time. Because any Pakistani objection is not going to play into the business. We are not going to hear any objections what Pakistan is going to do. So this is a time we should be focusing on completing the existing projects if they are viable.

Maybe some of them may not be viable, because as you were saying, sir, in the beginning, that the DPR were prepared long back in the 70s and all. So we have to understand that particular point. That's all I think from my side.

TCA Raghavan: Yes.

Uttam Kumar Sinha: Author should have the final word. Not the final thing in the book, but just responding to you, ma'am, about why the title. I think it was an evocative title. It wasn't a title which I thought about.

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: I guessed as much. That is why I gave my interpretation of the title.

Uttam Kumar Sinha: It was a title where the smart people in Penguin thought about. It was a coveted title. But I think instead of trial by water, the water itself is now being trialed by the two countries. So we have to see how it develops the Indus Basin. Remember 250 million people in the basin, and I think their survival depends on this river and the flow of the water. So yes, it's a very new Indus Basin now, which we'll see.

TCA Raghavan: So we'll see whether trial by water becomes trial of water. Well, thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen, and may I, in conclusion, congratulate Dr. Sinha for his book, thank our panelists for the very, very interesting and enriching discussion, and most of all, thank ICWA for organizing it and inviting all of us. Thank you.

Unidentified Speaker: It goes without saying that we had a fascinating and enriching discussions. I also appreciate and thank the active participation during the interactive sessions. This is an important book, which is extremely relevant and needs to be discussed. I would take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the distinguished chair and speakers, Shrimati Mahawar, Acting Director General, to guide us to organize and conduct the discussion. I would also thank the diplomatic corps, members of the media, the publisher, and invited participants, as well as my friends, colleagues, and all the members of the Council for making this discussion possible. Thanking you all again. Please join us for high tea in the foyer, please. Thank you.

*****

List of participants

1. Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General and Additional Secretary, ICWA
2. Amb. TCA Raghavan, Former High Commissioner to Pakistan and Singapore (Chair)
   
3. Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha, Senior Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)
4. Dr. Shalini Chawla, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS)
5. Dr. Ashish Shukla, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA
6. Smt. Uma Sekhar, Advisor (International Law) ICWA