Indian Council of World Affairs

Moderator: Good afternoon excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure to welcome you all to the Indian Council of World Affairs for today's panel discussion on multipolarity in the 21st century perspective of major stakeholders. Let me first inform that Professor Srikanth Kondapalli will join us shortly. May I request you to kindly put your phones on the silent mode. Thank you. We will start this afternoon's program with Madam Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General ICWA, delivering her welcome remarks. The panel discussion will be chaired by Ambassador Asoke Mukerji, Former Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations. The discussion will be followed by a brief Q&A session moderated by the Chair. May I now request Madam Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting DG ICWA, to kindly give her welcome remarks. Thank you, ma'am.

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Distinguished experts, members of the diplomatic corps, students and friends,

That the world is already multipolar is increasingly becoming a widely acknowledged fact.

The Indian conception sees a multipolar world order as a critical foundational step towards “long-term” stability. And here, we do not mean long-term as in decades, but as in centuries. Long-term stability will lend itself to predictability and harmony in international relations and human upliftment. In our view, a multipolar world order stands for distributed power, distributed responsibilities according to capabilities, and better discharge of duties. It stands for a just and sound balance between rights and obligations, between self-dependence Atmanirbharta and interdependence of nations and countries in the interest of the well-being of all the peoples. Multipolarity implies respect for inclusivity, diversity, and pluralism. Multipolarity expands the choice of the smaller and weaker states. Multipolarity is reinforced by multilateralism and regionalism.

What is required to uphold a multipolar world order? At the present juncture in international relations, when the world is amidst turbulence and geopolitical churn, the following come to mind as regards desirable state behavior.

One, we need an understanding, implicit or expressed, among countries on the collective belief in the benefits and advantages of multipolarity for long-term stability, predictability, and overall well-being. The objective has to be to incrementally and increasingly move towards a fairer and more just comity of nations.

Two, we need a shared understanding to not take actions to undermine the multipolar order, but rather to act to strengthen it. This would call for transparency in action and openness in expressing intent, which in turn would build mutual trust.

Three, the multipolar world order will have to be upheld through robust institutional support. This would imply revisiting regional and global governance institutions, their role, their functioning, and most essentially their spirit. Rejuvenating some, rejecting some, as well as bringing up new ones. India's call for reformed multilateralism is important in this regard, which should not be seen focused only on UNSC reform, though that is important, but rather as more broad-based, including, for instance, the international financial institutions, the World Bank, IMF, the MDBs, or the trade and investment related institutions, WTO, WIPO, UNCTAD, International Trade Center, etc., or regional and inter-regional organizations, such as SCO, CICA, BRICS. And as such, India's call needs increasing endorsement from countries, especially of the Global South.

The fourth point here is that geopolitical shifts, a multipolar world order, will also necessitate reform and adjustment in national foreign policy behavior and functioning of Foreign Offices. New habits in diplomacy will have to be established and some old ones will have to be discarded. In short, there has to be greater accountability all around.

Fifth, in the backdrop of the ongoing geopolitical churn, a look within to improve the without is essential. Individual and collective introspection is called for. A country or a grouping wishing to be a credible pole has to make an assessment of its positive contributions to international relations, of what value they bring to international relations, what they can contribute and then articulate these and build acceptance for itself. Credible poles can neither be illusory, nor based on polemics. Reluctant to be visible but capable countries also need to step into the forefront.

In short, the current churn means, we have to extract the positive, build upon it and discard the negative based on individual and collective judgment, experience and learnings from the past to build a better future.

It is to discuss these issues that we have curated a panel discussion today on multipolarity in the 21st century. It is conceived as a discussion with distinguished experts who will represent the views of different powers, or shall we say poles, on multipolarity and the nuances therein. Ambassador Asoke Mukerji, Former PR to UN, will chair. Ambassador D. B. Venkatesh Verma, former Ambassador to Russia, will reflect on the Russian view of multipolarity. He will also reflect on India's view. Professor Chintamani Mahapatra will present on US's view. Professor Srikanth Kondapalli will dwell on China's view and Professor Ummu Salma Bawa will present on EU's view. I look forward to a fruitful discussion and I wish all the panelists all the best.

Moderator: Thank you, ma'am. May I now request Ambassador Asoke Mukerji to kindly give his remarks and conduct today's proceedings. Thank you, sir.

Asoke Mukerji: I would like to thank Acting Director General of the ICWA Smt. Nutan Mahawar, and her team, for organizing this discussion today at Sapru House on “Multipolarity in the 21st century”. Before hearing the views of each of our distinguished panelists on this topic, I would like to share some ideas to put our discussion within a broad framework.

Implicit in this topic is the assumption that we are moving from a unipolar or bipolar world to a multipolar world. Is this true? Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, has the world been dominated by a single power, or has there been a contestation between the major powers of 1945 and the emerging powers? Has that contestation taken place within existing multilateral institutions, or outside the multilateral framework?

What are the dominant drivers of such a world? India’s experience of having participated in the creation of a multilateral world order since signing the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919 indicates that the primary drivers have been military and economic power. These have been accompanied, explicitly or implicitly, by the use of what we would today call the “battle of the narratives”, including “soft power” and “public diplomacy”.

India upholds the “unity of mankind” as the framework of a world order. This is rooted in our civilizational ethos, our freedom struggle, and what the Prime Minister calls our “whole of society” approach. India’s role as an advocate of human rights, of socio-economic progress, of equal participation in decision-making, have created a constituency which many today call the Global South.

From this perspective I would focus on the following inter-related issues, each of which raises questions that we may consider.

The existing world order is anchored in the treaty framework of the UN Charter, which, along with an impressive architecture of legal instruments, has sought to regulate state behaviour. Article 51 of India’s Constitution adopted in 1950 commits to promote international peace and security through “respect for international law and treaty obligations”. Decisions on peace and security taken by the UN Security Council are accepted by all UN member-states as legally binding on them (under treaty law) as per Article 25 of the Charter. Have the UN Charter’s treaty provisions proved a barrier to a multipolar world?  Does a multipolar order require the negotiation of a new legal treaty framework?

The existing world order is dominated by the treaty-based veto power of the five major powers June 1945, who dominate decisions on peace and security through Article 27.3 of the Charter. Negotiators at the 1945 San Francisco Conference were persuaded to agree to the veto by their acceptance of “great power responsibility”.  Today, 80 years later, this “responsibility” lies fractured on the ground, as each major power prioritizes the use of unilateral measures to replace the principle of international cooperation, while retaining its place in the UN Security Council and its veto privilege.  According to the UN Secretary-General, the direct impact of an ineffective Security Council is on 2 billion out of the global population of 8 billion people. This is the human dimension of world order that cannot be ignored. The question that arises is whether a multipolar world order requires acceptance of great power responsibility or not, in order to mitigate the humanitarian crisis confronting us today?

What will be the ingredients of a multipolar order? Will it be driven by the use of military force, including armed alliances of states, like the NATO? Will it be dominated by states individually or collectively through their growing economic and technological power? Will it consist of both states as well as non-governmental entities, referred to as “multiple stakeholders”? Will a multipolar order lead to greater confrontation, or uphold the principle of international cooperation on which world order depends?

There are two issues linked with the aspirations of developing sovereign states of the Global South in any multipolar order. One is the human dimension, linked with the right to development as an inalienable human right. Can a multipolar world order uphold the right to development, which is currently supported by specific legal provisions in the United Nations and the World Trade Organization?

The second is the call for “Reformed multilateralism”. India’s Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi has been the most vocal advocate for this objective since the UN’s 75th anniversary in 2020. The core of “reformed multilateralism” is the equitable and human-centric participation of states in decision-making within the international system. The UN Summit of the Future in September 2024, and its outcome, the Pact for the Future, failed to provide any prioritized timelines of action to achieve “reformed multilateralism”.

Has the time come for UN member-states to convene a General Conference, as laid down in Article 109 of the Charter, to achieve “reformed multilateralism” and, with it, a multipolar world order in the 21st century?

Thank you.

D. B. Venkatesh Verma: Sir, thank you very much. Good afternoon. Namaskar, and I'd like to thank you and the Acting Director General for this invitation. It's an important topic, and I'm very happy to be part of this very distinguished panel. Sir, let me take off from where you left off in your very perceptive and very incisive opening remarks, and you asked a couple of questions, which I'll try to refer to and sort of feed it into the topics that have been given, which is to give a perspective from the Russian perspective and also touch upon the Indian perspective. You're right. The key question today is that the world is moving towards multipolarity. Whether the transition would be a negotiated transition in the terms of a dialogue, discussion, negotiation of a new framework treaty, which the UN Charter itself provides for, or will it be driven by power politics, and the new power politics will find a new equilibrium. Presently, there is no equilibrium, and that equilibrium will create a new legal framework. So what comes first? A legal framework for negotiation and a transition to a negotiated multilateralism or rejigging of the power equations taking forward, which will finally relate to a new equilibrium that will come out in the form of a new global compact. This is in the pattern of 1945. 1945, the Second World War was a shared victory. There were two defeated powers, Germany and Japan and Italy. But they were not a single victor. There were many victors. The victors themselves were not equal among themselves, so the Security Council was constructed as a power equation in a normative legal structure that was designed to prevent future wars. The most important element that they thought was to prevent wars amongst the big powers themselves, amongst the victors themselves, using the United Nations. So the veto power, in a sense, had that linkage. Fast forward to 2025. It is extraordinary that the Russian Federation, a permanent member of the Security Council, is in near war conflict, near open war conflict with three of the other permanent members. So when power changes so dramatically, will the framework hold? That is the key question that we need to ask. Let me shift to Russia and say, how has Russia seen multipolarity? Russian support for multipolarity was an adjunct to the way it wanted to tackle the challenges of the bipolar world, during the Cold War period. In a sense, if the non-aligned movement came about, it was something that the Soviet Union and then Soviet Union actually encouraged. But apart from the fact and ideological terms and decolonization issues and anti-racism, anti-apartheid issues, the Soviet Union did extend support to a lot of freedom movements which had a commonality with the non-aligned movement. I mean, today, of course, it is very fashionable to run down the non-aligned movement. But if you look at in power terms of that time, the online movement was an attempt to have collective bargaining in a bipolar world in pure power terms. Of course, power was much less divested in the other developing countries, many of them much weaker than they are today. But that was the power equation that came about. Not entirely successful, but its great success was in the fact that, it actually survived and worked for at least a couple of decades. Let me, fast forward to the Russian Federation after the end of the Cold War. I think 1990s, the Russia that we know emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union was actually quite reconciled to American unipolarity in the 1990s. It was exhausted. It didn't have the means and it was truly convinced that American unipolarity was the permanent phenomenon. It came from the Russian government. It came from the Russian people. They were amazed by the success of capitalism. They were amazed by, how the Americans fought the first Gulf War military superiority. The first decade of Russia, the 1990s, towards the end of the 1990s, after what happened in the Balkans, I think that was a learning experience. You have Primakov come up with the first formulation that moves Russia away from this docile acceptance of American primacy, which is the Russia-India-China construct, RIC. It is the first expression of the quest for finding alternatives and to come together to mask vulnerabilities, to prevent vulnerabilities from being exploited. It is one of the main motivating forces of multipolarity. Russia had other problems. Russia had problems not only at the global level with the United States, it had a near abroad problem. The near abroad problem was to find a modus vivendi in the increasing power differential that was emerging already towards the late 90s between Russia and China. That emerged in the form of the original version of the SCO. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization in its earlier form was a way of Russia and China dealing with each other in their common neighborhood, which is the central Asian states on common issues like extremism, terrorism, territorial integrity, and things like that. It had a very basic origin. It was not anti-Western at that point of time. It was more to reconcile their common interests, as it was emerging. Then you fast forward to 2007-2008, when Russia is open to engagement with India, with South Africa, with China, which comes up with the first BRICS coming together. There again, it was not anti-Western. The original purpose of BRICS was to reform, to add to the potential of the global system, to reform a Western-dominated, a G7-dominated international economic and financial system. So, it was in its origins not by design an anti-Western system. Of course, when we move to the next decade of the 2010 to the 2020s, things change dramatically, largely in account to the fact that under President Putin, after his Munich Security Conference speech, there is a break in Russian policy towards the West. Russia decides that it would no longer be pushed around by NATO expansion, number one, and American and European dictation to countries in its near neighborhood. That leads to the events of 2014. Eventually, to Crimea in Donbass, the first major sanctions that are applied to Russia in 2014. Of course, there have been sanctions before that as well. You see Russia not only moving towards BRICS and SCO, which slowly start becoming more anti-Western in their agenda, as far as Russia and then followed by China are concerned. China is a late convert to that. You also see a shift in Russia's own position or what is called the pivot to the Eurasian continent. So, there is another version that takes place. Of course, after the war started in 2022 and particularly now, Russia, I think, pays lip service to multipolarity, but I think it now sees itself in a single country conflict with the West. Whether other countries can help it or not is not germane or central to its equation. It is not. The Russians are quite determined to continue to fight NATO, the Americans and the Europeans in Ukraine for as long as it takes. I mean, they support multipolarity, but multipolarity in a very individualistic, issue-specific way. As I mentioned, their main problems, it is a great paradox of current international politics that there is no institution to which Russia is more dedicated, which is the UN Security Council, and there is no other institution in which it is more opposed, the three permanent members of the Security Council.

Now, let me quickly turn to India, I've taken a bit of time. Of course, India's essential international outlook from independence onwards was to seek engagement, but no easy acceptance of what came from outside. We interpreted democracy in our own way. We interpreted foreign relations in our own way. We interpreted anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-thing in our own way. I mean, we didn't fight colonialism the same way that the Soviets fought or, the Chinese fought. India had a very distinct and very different way of supporting countries in Africa, which goes back to people-to-people context, which were far more important than power-to-power context. That has been a very distinctive phase. You see the non-aligned movement itself, how it grew up. You had Egypt, apart from India, which was a purely nationalistic Arab revival. You had Indonesia, freshly independent, representing Southeast Asia. You had Yugoslavia's Tito, who was more opposed to the Soviet Union than the West. So, you had an extraordinarily diverse set of people that came about. Coming back to the 1990s, I think India too was reconciled, in a sense, mentally, both in our foreign policy and in our economic policy, internally and externally, to the fact that, the world has changed and shifted dramatically in favor of the West, in favor of what was called the Washington Consensus and the unipolarity and the power of Russia, of the United States. The process of reconciliation between India and the United States took a while, but between the 1990s and the year 2008-2010, especially after the nuclear deal was signed, I think a certain modest WebMD was bought in between India and the United States. The initial American reaction on India was that, the United States actually valued India's multi-platform, multi-regional influence that it saw as positive to America's own interests in the first two decades. However, if you fast forward to the present day moment, because of the global nature of multi-polarity and the fact today that we see very clearly that the United States is very clearly pushing back on the trend towards multi-polarity by pulling back on what it wants to do on its own national part, it sees more and more a problem of our participation in the BRICS, participation in SEO and in other areas, including our key bilateral relations. I think the tipping point came in 2017 when the CAATSA Act was passed in the United States, when it actually imposed a certain framework in which India would conduct its foreign relations. I will not come to the present. I think the other panelists will sort of take it forward.

Now, to summarize, India is dedicated to a more democratic international system, not only in power terms, but in economic terms, but in also the well-being of the people. When Prime Minister Modi hosted the G20 Summit, as Ambassador Mukerji mentioned, there was a very strong Global South dimension. Global South dimension is actually not new to India. It is one of the oldest facets of India's engagement, of India's self-identity in the world that we cannot see ourselves apart from where we came from. I think that is very important to remember in these days. Reform of the international institutions. Ambassador Mukerji has very rightly mentioned where it stands. It has its own difficulties. How do we go forward? I think the constant emphasis on dialogue, the constant emphasis on validation, the constant emphasis on peace, because peace today is more valuable to countries which are rising and more valuable than the countries whose position is being threatened. So, I think peace is a strategic commodity for us. It's something that we should learn. Because if we don't have peace, we don't have a negotiated transition in power. The transition will take place by use of force. That is definitely not a platform in which neither India's interest, nor a global South interest, nor the interest of a global majority of the entire world will be served.

With that, I thank you and happy to be part of this discussion. Thank you.

Asoke Mukerji: Thank you. Thank you, Venkat. It's a pity that the technology sort of stopped us from listening to a very seamless presentation, but the points that you've made are important. In terms of the perspective of Russia, we noted your focus now on upholding their privileged position as a permanent member of the Security Council, while pursuing a very individual approach towards institutions, which are in the international landscape, such as the SCO and the BRICS, and the way in which there will be a question on how much they will support the reform or transformation of the existing order if it affects them as a permanent member of the Security Council. Thank you very much. I would now turn to our next panelist, Professor Chintamani Mahapatra, who will speak on the perspective of the United States on a multipolar border. You have the floor.

Chintamani Mahapatra: Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Nutanji, distinguished panelists, and distinguished audience. Thank you for this opportunity. I'll speak very briefly about the American perspective. In that American perspective, you can see reflections of my understanding of the American perspective, and some of my own position on how the world order looks like today. Now, in the U.S., there is no unanimity about the world order and how it looks like and what kind of polarity it is there. One group of scholars, they say that, the world is actually unipolar. Whether you like it or not, it is unipolar. The United States is still the richest country in the world. It is the most powerful country in the world. The world economy runs on the basis of dollar, and you cannot replace, you cannot see a foreseeable future when dollar is replaced by any other single currency or a group of currency. That the United States maintains about 750 military bases in about 80 countries around the world, that the U.S. has alliance systems, collective bargaining system in Europe, and then bilateral alliance structures in the Indo-Pacific, and there is no other country in the world which can afford that kind of military presence around the globe, not even China, or even Russia for that matter. It is the United States, and the world is actually unipolar, whatever you may say. Other people think that today, the world is not unipolar. These are all American writers, thinkers. The world is bipolar. The U.S. and China, they constitute two poles. Together they account for an economy which is probably larger than the next 38 countries' GDP combined. In terms of military expenditure, they're the ones who spend a lot of money. Again, you cannot compare. Chinese are trying to be a superpower, coming very close to compete with the U.S. on very many issues, including technology and economy, of course military and artificial intelligence, and other frontiers of technology. There is no other country in the world which can come closer to the U.S. or China, and these two paths are competing fiercely for influence around the world. So, it is a bipolar system. Other academics and researchers, they think, no, no, it is inching towards a multipolar world in a very big way. But then the big question is, what do we mean by multipolar? How many poles have to be there in the multipolar world? Three, or you say three, and more than three? Is there a number? Five, six, seven? Some call it, say, seven, three to seven. They would include the European Union and India and Japan and so many other small middle paths. They will say this is a multipolar world. That means there is no unanimity in the U.S. academic community or the policymaking community about the nature of the world order and the distribution of power in the contemporary world. How do the American government, successive American governments, they look at the world? Their policy is the United States is the number one power in the world, and the U.S. ''Would not allow the rise of a rival power anywhere in the world.'' Then they would say that for about 40 years plus, they fought a Cold War with another pole, which many people talked about a bipolar structure during the Cold War time. It was bipolar to some extent, but if you really dissect, then you'll find that the pole number two was way below pole number one, in terms of power, in terms of influence. There were conflicts around the world, no doubt about it. After all, it was the U.S., because of this policy of not tolerating a second rival power, they had a policy of containment of the Soviet Union, later containment of the Soviet Union and China together. So, the big power, the unipolar power, were trying not to allow the other power to be at par with them. Of course, it took until 1960, there was no parity even in the military terms between the two. As in when Russia achieved the military capability, the overkill capacity to destroy the whole world, including itself and the US in the 1960s. In terms of economic ability and the soft power, the US still was number one. Soviet Union had the military capability, but the US had the economic edge and the soft power. So it was a kind of bipolar structure, no doubt about it, but the US was actually the most powerful country in the world, including in that particular system. And today, there is rise of China, fine, but there are economic limitations within China even now. Yes, they're competing with the USA, but in terms of their total GDP, the US is still number one. And they would say that, if you look at even Donald Trump's policies, he has shaken the world through his tariff policy. Not many countries in the world are even trying to confront him. Even if you see the language of China, it's not open confrontation, it's tit for tat. You impose 145% tariff on us, we'll impose 125%, then they will negotiate. China will say, we're not going to export rare materials. Then the US will come down, okay, okay, let us talk in Switzerland and then in London, and say 30%. China will say 10%. But, China is not up to the US. At any given time, 500,000 Americans are roaming around in the Indo-Pacific region and doing a lot of business. Yes, China has become number one trade partner of many, many countries, fine, in terms of goods and commodities. But if you see the overall economy, even the technological capability, it is a different kind of bipolar structure, if you see from a distance, but still, the U.S. is the number one pie in the world. Then there's another category of academics. They would say, what is good for America? A unipolar world, a bipolar world, or a multipolar world? Some would argue that to maintain stability in the world and to prevent, if you cannot prevent, minimize or sort it out, all kinds of conflicts, a unipolar system is the best for the U.S. and best for the world. It reflects a little bit of American arrogance that, yes, only we can prevent. But, we know very well how many wars were fought during the Cold War, after the Cold War, even now, and how many wars the U.S. has been able to prevent or even resolve further in Eurasia or in the Middle East or West Asia, and Africa. But they are convinced that there is no major power confrontation, and the U.S. is the unipolar power. And if it can remain so, then there will be relative stability in the world order. Otherwise, there will be more conflict. Others, including Stephen Walt and big Harvard professors, they would say, no, no. Under unipolar world order, the surface might look different, but the real stability can come only when there is a bipolar structure, because the balance of power will come into play, and major power conflict can be prevented. Then there are others. You may talk about the preference, what should be and what should not be, but the reality is different. The reality is the world is inching very fast towards a multipolar order in the world. See the language part here. Donald Trump came to power in the backdrop of big debate in the U.S. and elsewhere about the relative decline of the United States, relative decline. Somebody would write a book, Rise of the Rest. But the conclusion was still, when others rose, the U.S. is number one, but the U.S. cannot do anything and everything they want anywhere in the world, without the help of others. What can this unipolar power, having only military capabilities, can do? Then they would give an example. Look at the Korean War. Was it the U.S. alone? The U.S. was the primary power, but there are so many countries supporting them. Fast forward. Look at the American involvement in Afghanistan recently. Did the U.S. do it alone, or only with NATO partners? There are 30-40 countries who are backing them. Then look at the Iraq War. The same thing. You'll find very rare examples of the U.S. going and doing it alone. They go along with others, right? When you think about the power distribution today, and as I said, Donald Trump came to power in the backdrop of this debate about relative decline of the USA, then what does he say? Make America great again. That means what? That means America's greatness has receded, so you want to make it great again? Without saying so, in so many words, the way I'm saying, there was an understanding that other countries have become so powerful that they would not listen to the United States. The ''unipolar power'', would like to have a commanding system. Washington, D.C. would command and the rest will follow, either openly or privately or quietly, but we have to decide what is going to be done on major issues around the world, but the world is not like that anymore. There are any number of examples, including the Ukraine war. So, what Trump is trying to do now is actually try to make the United States a unipolar power in the world. That you can see, the glimpses of that interest you can see in what he's doing at home and abroad. Ambassador Mukerji was talking about diversity, equity, inclusion, the DEI, Trump is dead against DEI within the United States and he's trying to do the same thing abroad. He wants only America and the rest to follow. Although, today we see even the European Union, Professor Bawa will talk more about it, never wanted to confront with the USA. They thought it would create more disruption. Ultimately, they settled down with a 15% tariff, although a lot of news came that the European Union is making a long list of countermeasures if the Trump administration would not change its position. And when the deal was signed, somebody would say, this is much better than having, 25-30% of tariff. It is half, 15%. Then others would say, before what was the tariff, 2.5% and now 15% and you are happy? But the fact remains that the European Union is trying very, very hard to have strategic autonomy and not able to. The way Trump bulldozed the NATO member countries to ultimately agree upon a 5% of GDP expenditure on defense is also a clear example of how Trump is trying to bulldoze them to toe the American line. Japan showed a lot of advances against Trump. They did not even join some of the important conferences on the nuclear issues and NATO Summit, the Japanese representative did not go, and some statements also came, but ultimately they also agreed that, okay, 15%. Only China. China stood up. After the Chinese stopped selling the rare earth materials, which would affect the American industry in a very big way, electronics, even automobiles, and even some military things, suddenly they came down. Then, the thought was, China may be number two, but we are ''dependent'' on China for certain things, so we have to manage our relationship with China. But the goal is, there should be a unipolar world. The U.S. will rule the world. The U.S. will be the leader. The U.S. will not tolerate the rise of a rival power in the world.

About India. India-U.S. strategic partnership. India kept on talking about a multipolar world. The BRICS talked about it. The SCO talked about it. Russia-China-India triangle, they talked about a multipolar world. It's a desire. We all support the idea of a multipolar world where multilateralism can work better. There is a difference between multipolarity and multilateralism. Multilateralism worked even during the Cold War time. You have all the international institutions like the United Nations, IMF, World Bank, WTO, World Health Organization, so many. But then who dominated? The proceedings, the decision-making. The powerful countries, they did that. But if the world is truly multipolar and not unipolar, then multilateralism can work better. But in order to dismantle that also, what Trump is doing is he has withdrawn from Paris Climate Accord, withdrawn from World Health Organization, given notice to the UNESCO, we're withdrawing. People who wrote the blueprint for Trump 2.0 administration, all of you must have heard about Project 2025, there was a strong recommendation the U.S., if necessary, should withdraw from IMF and the World Bank. It's an economic bomb. Today, of course, the Treasury Secretary is making very nuanced positions, saying that we have to reform the World Bank and the IMF. When Indians are saying that, the Chinese are saying that, the Russians are saying that, the Americans are saying that, reform, but on whose term? This is yet another way of Trump saying to the world that the multilateral institutions, which never helped the unipolar power, either we withdraw, if we cannot dominate. They are teased up with India for the simple reasons that, like China, like Russia, Putin doesn't listen to Trump. There's a bragging, in one day I will resolve the problem. Now, it's six months. He's not able to bring out any solution, any ceasefire in Ukraine. Now, China, of course, I just gave one example, then multiple examples, including the way the Chinese are flexing the military muscle in South China Sea. The U.S. cannot do anything, except showing some demonstration of its power. B-2 bomber will pass by and things like that. Ultimately, China has done whatever it did, and these only statements are there to counter it. The U.S. could not do anything about it. In case of India, another votary of multipolar world, you know, Indo-US strategic partnership so systematically built an upward trajectory of relationship from 2000 onwards, and suddenly Trump, who's thought Prime Minister Modi is a great friend, and we saw what's happening today. 25% of tariff and all. Is it really economics? No. The reason why he's doing that is, India has been able to stand on its own leg, and it is not going to listen to the United States. India does not want to defy the USA. India wants to cooperate. Cooperate on whose term? India's term. When we say, we want to maintain strategic autonomy, that doesn't mean that we are against the unipolar power or bipolar power structure or anything. What we want is a world order where India's voice would also be heard. We'll not fight, we'll collaborate, we'll cooperate, but on our terms. Trump cannot digest the strategic autonomy by India or by Japan or European or anyone. So, I would conclude by saying that, in the American perspective, the world is a unipolar world. There are challenges to the most powerful countries of the USA. As it has been doing since 1945 onwards, it will not allow the rise of other power centers. It will detest a bipolar world, and if it is there, then ultimately it should be number one. It should be able to put pressure whenever it is possible and make compromise whenever possible, otherwise it will dictate. In a multipolar world where India, Russia, China, Indonesia, or South Korea will also play important role, not acceptable. Finally, when you talk about multipoles, we have to realize what kind of poles, how do you define a pole? On the basis of military capability, economic capability, political influence, what? When you say pole, what does a pole do? We have to clear in our mind, right? Japan, a very big economy, but is it independent? No, there are 55,000 American troops, a lot of military bases there. It's not independent. The European Union, of course, it's an economic powerhouse, but is it really independent? I doubt. Then who else remains? China, Russia, India, not aligned with anyone, the independent centers of power. So in my view, a multipolar world is already there where the U.S., China, Russia, and India are the poles which are trying to get a space in the world order. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Asoke Mukerji: Thank you very much. That was a very clear exposition, and we note your emphasis on unipolar and multipolar as seen through the eyes of Donald Trump. Professor Kondapalli, may I request you now to share with us your perspective on China's position on multipolarity.

Srikanth Kondapalli: Thank you, Ambassador Mukherjee. Good afternoon to all of you. My apologies for arriving late. I wanted to thank the ICW for the invite. The first thing I wanted to say in this was China is actually the key driver of multipolarity and primary beneficiary of multipolarity. If you look at when, even before Russian Premier Primakov suggested this idea in 1998, the Chinese were already talking about multipolarity and making the groundwork. Professor Chintamani raised the issue that what does a pole do? The Chinese did a lot of things. They pushed around. They created a lot of institutions, initiatives. Today, the Belt and Road Initiative has about 120 participants. Not all may agree with China, but there are 109 countries are part of the AIIB, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, including European countries, which are not part of Asia, but still part of the AIIB. So, they were the mover and shaker of this, even though Russia was also in the forefront, but Russia was sucked into all the conflicts that erupted later on. So, I would suggest that the key driver is China. Last three decades of the idea of multipolarity and the key beneficiary. I will enlist a few things here and then some policy suggestions for ICWA to carry forward first. So, what are the Chinese motivations in proposing this multipolarity? Number one, of course, they want to be a pole and they want to protect themselves. They want to rise. They want to put guardrails on the United States hegemony and they did well. Today United States is trapped by the Chinese in the magnets, in rare earth metals. Remember, the Chinese banned the rare earth metals in 2003 for the Japanese, but the Americans did not wake up. The Japanese did not wake up, and then the problem, last two decades of Chinese dominance in the rare earth metals. So, these are some motivations. A pole generally in the Chinese parlance is quantified from the point of view of CNP, Comprehensive National Power. Even though it originated in Soviet Union, the Andy Marshall's office in Pentagon accepted this, but it is the Chinese who use the CNP extensively and today the Chinese are at number four position in the global level, not necessarily translating into GDP or military, but it's comprehensive national power. In comprehensive national power in GDP terms, the Chinese were just about 3% in 2000. Last year, they were about nearly 18% of global GDP contribution. That's the move that they have made. They have the largest Navy in the world, more than what the American naval ships have. Of course, it is not just the quantity, but quality matters where the Americans are leaders in this. Yet, the Chinese have a lot of naval stuff. Today they are competing in DeepSeek in 56% of the EVs that they produce, electric vehicles, roughly about 70%, 76% of the solar energy contribution in the global level. So, they are making their own efforts in this direction. The essential thing is, how to avoid dependence on the United States and then the pitfalls associated with the dependence on the United States. In the 1990s, when the Chinese began focusing on multipolarity, the then Trade Minister Wu Yi suggested to trade diversification, and it took some time for them to establish. So much so today, China is the largest trading partner for Africa for the past 15 years, USD 282 billion, the Chinese have with Africa. With South America, they are the second largest trading partner. With Middle East, with West Asia, they are the largest trading partner, USD 450 billion. Of course, with ASEAN, with Japan, Korea, with India, the largest trading partner. If you remove the services and IT-related, China is the largest trading partner, about USD 130 billion. So, they have diversified trade and diversified the over-dependence on the United States. But essentially, they were also actually inviting the Americans and other allies to invest in China. There are 77,000 American companies working in China right now. Roughly about 80,000 European companies, 83,000 Japanese companies, more than 200,000 MNCs are working in China. That is producing a lot of those exports in which China today is the largest exporting country. But yet at the same time, they have diversified trade to other countries, Africa, South America, Asia, and so on. So, that is the key for the Chinese success today. They have also, in a way, diversified the global attention to what they call Beijing consensus instead of Washington consensus. To that extent, I think there is a lot of effort to become a normative power in many areas. Today, the Chinese are leaders in five major United Nations bodies, UNIDO, UNESCO, UNCTAD, WTO, WTO for Deputy Director General, but not Director General, and others. Quite surprisingly also, China used to be the leader of Human Rights Council in Geneva out of all UN bodies. So, that's the ability that China had in terms of these becoming a pole in the international system. So, they created, they moved several institutions, created a favorable position. Today, they are in a leading position in many of these institutions, global institutions. So, that's what a poll does. That's what India needs to do in future in terms of influencing the international system. The Belt and Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, in SEO, of course, they and the Russians are the leaders, if you look at the budgetary contribution in the SEO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization. But what is important is that SEO was able to stop the NATO expansion by including Iran, by including various other countries. Recently, Belarus has joined and other countries are queuing up for the SEO membership, so that is the leading position not just in the political institutions, multipolarity institutions, but also in technology institutions. For example, in the setting of the standards, there is now the talk on telecommunication standards, cyber security standards. In ISO, International Standards Organization, China is now taking the lead in all of these in setting up standards. This is very important for the next steps of what we see in the cyber domain in outer space. These are the things that would be challenging as well, and the problem of haves and have-nots will also arise, as we saw in the nuclear domain. These are the achievements and motivations that China had in terms of entering into the multipolarity debate. Of course, there are bottom lines, there are problems that China has while entering into the WTO, into the multipolar related world order. First is, China would walk away from multipolarity if it thinks that there are crucial national security threats that may come up, like Taiwan, South China Sea, other issues. So, there are limitations in terms of the multi-polarity engagement by China. Second is the economic and political instability globally, as well as within China. We keep hearing about President Xi Jinping being absent for two weeks, three weeks, out of the site, and so on. These are some turbulent days as well. There could be limitations in the multipolarity, or if the alliances become stronger, such as the Quad, it's not an alliance, it's a security dialogue. But if it becomes an alliance, there is the Chinese probability of walking away from multipolarity. Or, in terms of failure of any of these multilateral institutions, we did see some melting down of several of these multilateral institutions, as the previous speakers have mentioned, UN and other bodies. So if the Chinese assess that there is a decline in multilateral institutions effectiveness, probably they will even walk away from the multipolar initiatives.

The second part that I wanted to reflect was on the Communist Party Congresses. These are very important. These actually set the policy for the Chinese foreign ministry as well as for every other. China first mentioned multipolarity in 1992 in the 14th Communist Party Congress. What did they say? They said, this is the end of bipolarity because the Soviet Union disintegrated at the time. But they also mentioned about multipolarity being a very long and complex process that they need to navigate extensively and benefit out of the multipolar tendencies. 15th Communist Party reiterated about the multipolarity. 16th Communist Party mentioned about opportunities in multipolarity. The 17th Communist Party Congress mentions about irreversible nature of the multipolarity. So, what changed between 16th Communist Party and the 17th Communist Party? China became the second largest economy in the world, USD 10 trillion by 2010, and then they started now pushing around and establishing, providing support to several multipolar institutions like the SEO and others. Remember, the 2009 Yekaterinburg meeting allowed South Africa as a member of the BRIC countries. Then subsequently, others have also been expanded. I think the 2009-2010 was very crucial in pushing China more into the multipolarity, and that's where we see that China was also benefiting a lot from these multipolar tendencies. 18th Communist Party was much more stark because the Chinese started saying that we need to build a community of shared destiny, which has now become a watchword in the Chinese Communist Party lexicon. We do not know what exactly it means. But basically, it wants to create allies and friends in the international system. If China has to rise, it has to be based on, like the United States in 1945, it should be based on friends and allies, support from the friends and allies. It should also be based on bases abroad, even though they just have one base now, that is the Djibouti base, since 2015-2016 they started creating. But that is the aspiration that China had in terms of the Communist Party Congress's decisive policy prescription. In the 19th Communist Party Congress in 2017, they started saying, there is a decline in Western dominance. Western, they would mean U.S., Canada, and European Union. Decline in Western dominance, and they see this as an opportunity in terms of global governance. Another concept that they also ally with in terms of what Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister mentioned, global governance. Instead of rule of law, both Russia and China started mentioning about global governance, in which both are Security Council members and also will be able to influence the global governance in terms of climate change, in terms of various other initiatives. The last Communist Party Congress mentioned that, multipolarity is irreversible. Again, they reiterated this position, and they started working for the economic globalization. Remember, Xi Jinping attended the Davos meeting and said, we are the leaders of globalization. Of course, they are the largest trading partner. They are the largest investor through the BRI and others, USD 1.2 trillion, and also influencing across the globe. Those party congresses, just to summarize, is that, the motivation is to curb the United States hegemony, number one. Number two, to create strategic partnerships all across in the rubric of community of shared destiny. We saw that with limitless partnership with Russia, with many other countries in that regard. There is also another major institution in China, that is the Central Foreign Affairs World Conferences. These are the trend-setting events that guide the foreign ministry in terms of the policy. In December 2023, this World Conference, which is very crucial, they said, we need to build orderly multipolarity. There is now an additional responsibility. Orderly, meaning here that, there should not be any anarchic situation in the international domain. I mean, we did see wars and conflicts all over, but most important, under the leadership of the Chinese government and the Communist Party. So, that is the Communist Party's provision related to Xi Jinping mentioned extensively the concept of multipolarity in the UNGA debates, in POA forum, in various other initiatives. Wang Yi, the Foreign Minister, also mentioned extensively on this. 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, major statements by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on multipolarity.

Just to summarize this, China is the key beneficiary of multipolarity so far, and the advantages are, number one, rise of China. While everybody was debating about multipolarity and equidistance from the United States, what the Chinese did was a G2. In 2009, Obama suggested to the Chinese a G2, Group 2, that United States and China will rule the rest of the world. That's the Brzezinski's idea of G2. By pushing multipolarity, they were able to push China's rise extensively. Technology, investments, MNCs, joint venture companies, export processing zones, all of these were also in place, so they were a key beneficiary of the multipolarity. Norm-setting is one of the key variables in becoming a superpower. Those of international relations students would understand Susan Strange, structural power. Today, China is moving towards the structural power, and multipolarity also contributed for that structural power. When you look at the Chinese debates in the UN debates or the progress achieved in BRI, NDB, or others, specifically, this is also reflected in recent times in technology aspects. The cross-border CIPS, this is a new Chinese initiative, with which they want to switch over from the SWIFT system dominated by the Western banking institutions. CIPS is what the Chinese would prefer, and de-dollarization. Trump is talking about de-dollarization, etc., and the BRICS, but it is actually China who is going to be the beneficiary of de-dollarization. This is actually the concern that the Reserve Bank of India has in terms of any cross-border transactions, whether we should join these or who is going to be the beneficiary of these. So, Renminbi, for example, today is about 3.6% of the global transactions. Even though the United States is still at about 54% of the global transactions, China today wants, through the BRICS, introduced the CITS, as well as the cross-border and a BRICS currency and so on and so forth. These are the issues, advantages that China has by pushing forward the multipolarity. What are the risks involved? By suggesting that the multipolarity should be orderly, China is trying to manage competition with the United States. China simply doesn't want to walk away from the U.S. policies and so on, and the recent rare earth metals and other aspects with the Trump administration is one of that aspect. So, managing competition with the United States. Let me finally say that Chinese have three magic weapons. One is Leninist centralism, through which the Communist Party was established and spread. The second is the military, the PLA. The third is the United Front. Multipolarity is a united front for the Chinese, through which they would like to benefit from every other multipolar partner and also enhance their own power in the international system. Second point that I wanted to say is, in the Chinese foreign policy, multipolarity is only transitory in nature. This is not a permanent concept or the Chinese would stick to multipolarity over a long period of time. It is possible that China may have different opinion on multipolarity in the future, depending on their relations with the United States. Finally, I would say that ICWA will be tasked, should be also reflecting on the RIC, which Lavrov has recently mentioned about. And in terms of a policy paper, you need to reflect on whether India needs to join the RIC, revival of the RIC. As I said before, Primakov mentioned this in 1998, and we had some 30 discussions on the RIC format. This is now being revived by Russia, because of the Ukraine conflict, because of the Russia-U.S. relations, as well as the other global dynamics. We have not said anything so far on the revival of the RIC. My suggestion here is that, we need to go slow on the RIC because the key aspect is that, China had not really invested in India. China has not really resolved the problems with India. China has not really come forward in terms of resolving several problems that we have had with the Chinese, and the united front here that the Chinese are proposing in the RIC format would be again beneficial to China. That's my suggestion. We need to actually do a professional study on what are the advantages, what are the risks, what are the SWOT analysis of India's participation in the RIC in the future. Thank you for your attention.

Asoke Mukerji: Thank you, Professor Kondapalli. Professor Bawa, I give you the floor for the EU perspective on multipolarity.

Ummu Salma Bawa: We've transcended from good afternoon to an evening. I'm also conscious of the time, may I begin with first thanking Ambassador Mukerji, thanking Madam Nutan for this wonderful opportunity and for a very timely discussion on multipolarity. Coming in the end doesn't mean that everything has been said, but I think I look at it very differently. A lot of thing has been said on multipolarity, and it gives me a la carte menu really to pick up on what my fellow panelists have said. But also to ponder a little bit on a very unusual actor. When we talk about traditional powers in international politics, I think locating the European Union as an actor in this galaxy of what we call as great powers and middle powers is something which will really challenge your assumptions of who is an actor in international politics, because the EU is not really for all the design of being a unitary actor is actually backed up internally by 27 actors, and that really challenges how collective action takes place at the global level? How is power organized? And More importantly, I think, in today's context that we are talking about an idea, and to ask, where do you look at this idea? Because it depends on where you stand in the world. Very clearly. Are you part of those dispensing the rules? Or are you part of those who are actually engaging with an output that somebody else has produced? I think which version of polarity that we are talking about becomes extremely crucial. My colleague, Professor Chintamani Mahapatra pointed out from an American perspective, depending on the kind of authors you take, you would still say the world is unipolar, and I would offer that to you that, if you take Joseph Nye's version of the world being a three-dimensional chess set, you immediately recognize that power is not concentrated, as we understood at a point in time, even in 1945. The ship has definitely sailed, but has it found an harbor? Has it anchored itself? I think that is where we find ourselves on the high seas. Because power, as we understood, and its ability to regulate and produce, even what Srikanth, you told about the Chinese version of an orderly multipolarity, is still a very distant dream. I think what we are witnessing in the interregnum is how the distributive nature of power in international politics is creating a kind of disorder to which states who have been used to dispensing authority are not used to. Part of the problem is that, one of the creators of the international institutional architecture, which so much anchored what we called as this polar kind of nation of power, is itself today the dismantler of that order. In that process, what it has done, it has exposed, I would say, not only the vulnerabilities on the one hand, but it has also given opportunities. I think it is in this context that I want to introduce the European Union to all of you, which, as I clearly said in the beginning, is a most unusual actor. But, if you look at any literature on the European Union, it hardly ever mentions the word multipolarity. In fact, what you really get is the EU's love for a rules-based order. So what you will get is the other M. There are two M's of international politics, not to be confused. The EU is often talking about multilateralism. That is, how do we do the business of managing our engagements together? That's what you get. And why is this important? Because I think power dictates preferences. Power also has the ability to regulate. More importantly, if you are an economic power, you do automatically become a pole in the global economic base. I think that's where it's important to disaggregate what the European Union is, because it is not going to fit into the mold of the United States, Russia, or even China. Does that mean that we should not have it on the table for discussion? I don't mean that. I think it's more important precisely for this reason to have it as part of the discussion to understand that what does collective action produce, which is equivalent to what we would call international politics, a pole in the system. That's what the EU does. Does it do it successfully? It's a different question altogether. But more importantly, I think to draw your attention to the idea of polarity and multipolarities, to also use what Amitav Acharya has spoken about as strategic multipolarity and a normative multipolarity, right? That means, there is no one definition, nomenclature, I draw your attention to when you look at multipolarity. It's also how states make sense of what they have. Is the power shifting? You can look at it from different points of view. Are you looking at states as purely a collection of the topmost military leaders of the world? It's going to give you something else. The economics is something else. If you should go back to borrow from what Naya said, you come down to the transnational and nobody's a single dominant actor. What does that tell you about the nature of power in a world which is today far more interdependent and interconnected, right? These interconnections have produced both a cost, when states look to de-risk, it also has produced opportunities. Who then wins and loses in the game of multipolarity is a very different set of treaties altogether. I go back to the point what Ambassador Mukerji you said at the beginning and the starting point for our discussions, 45, the grand bargain or what I would call from a political science point of view, the large social contract between the countries of the world that there would be no war again. Although the article 51 gives you the right to self-defense, right? It's an inalienable right. But why is it failed? Why is it not produced? Because somewhere between an aspirational creating of a world order and the reality of a very dysfunctional nature of power does to systems and states is the gap between intention and politics. That states who are powerful will never give up their power, and those who are climbing up the ladder of power are going to get that power in many different ways, because you can't stop economic growth and progress unless something dramatically will shift the state away from that ladder. The case in point is India's own growth in the international economic hierarchy, right? As India's economic footprint grows, you will see a greater Indian visibility, voice, presence, rulemaking, you name it. All of that is a byproduct of this. So, it's important when you're looking at multipolarity to ask, well, what does it produce collectively for the system? What does it produce individually for the actors? And then where does this opportunity cost lie over there? And so, as I move into the European Union, it is often quoting and talking about multilateralism. I'd like to move that and bring it to the India-EU part of the equation to then highlight to you how both of us navigated it. And does the word multipolarity then come into the discourse over here, right? The EU was once called an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military midget. In 2022, as the EU also increases its military expenditure, notwithstanding that NATO was there and every member of the European Union, which is almost coterminous with NATO, is going to a 5% expenditure on defense, the EU is rewriting its own identity as a security actor. And definitely, it has recast itself as a political actor, but those echoes of it being an economic giant and a very disproportionate actor in security terms also draws attention to what is it we are looking at multipolarity in terms of an output polarity, when we're talking about. That means very often when you're looking at the United States, you're looking at it as a military provider, balancer, and a guarantor. Then, we have to ask, is that the label which we're looking at when we're looking at other states? And are they as powerful as the U.S. in offering this? Srikanth pointed about China building lots of institutions, right? I mean, does those institutions then become inclusive in nature? Do they provide and give states access to what others have given? Or will China one day, you know, there's a baton passing, which will take place in power, and China will be the new dispenser of this authority? We don't know. The writing is still out. But let me come to India, you and I immediately start seeing how the European Union is repositioning itself in its relationship with India, and it goes back to the first summit, which took place in 2000. It is really surprising, because it made me go back to look at, you know, the literature I used for a very long time, and reread it again with a new lens, the lens of multipolarity. What do I notice over there, that for the very first time, the joint statement said that the EU and India are important partners in shaping of the emerging multipolar world. This is from the year 2000. This year, we celebrate, 20 years of the strategic partnership. So, it is a momentous turn in the bilateral equation. But a clear recognition already in 2000, at the start of the first summit, that something in the international order is shifting. And a joint statement, ladies and gentlemen, has to be recognized and seen for the value in which both actors define how they look at the way forward. Which means, from a power analysis, EU and India were both, together simultaneously emphasizing that there is a power shift happening, and it is the emerging multipolar world. We've got to ask, are we still in a continuous world of being an emerging world order, or have we achieved, and we have come there? In subsequent joint bilateral statements, I looked at 2003, 2006, both India and EU talk of themselves as global actors in the multipolar world. Clearly, from the emerging, there is a movement towards the multipolar world, which has come about.

I also draw your attention to what we would call in layman's terms, the Foreign Minister of the European Union, who in their language is called the high rep or the Vice President, Josep Borrell. He said how to revive multilateralism in a multipolar world. Obviously, he was talking and referring to what was called as complex multipolar in 2021. Clearly, there is a recognition, even for the EU as an actor, that the world in which it finds itself as an economic giant is fundamentally shifting and changing. The change has been felt much more, even by the European Union, with reference to two particular events. One was the coming of President Trump's first term, which already signaled that the ability for a transatlantic relationship, where the EU is part of the Western collective alliance, can be shaken. The fact that, it would be shaken would have to take place four years later, with Trump 2.0 happening. Since 20th of January this year, I think the writing on the wall is very clear. First and foremost is the fundamental nature of partnerships, which the West had collectively across the transatlantic, has shifted dramatically. I think it has, for the first time, I think put it out very clearly that whatever benefits the EU got as a consequence of the order, which has been produced over an extended period of time, is not a guarantee that the order will sustain itself without it investing additionally, more so in the field of security, which is where we've seen the biggest shift take place. Second, I think what we're seeing is, individual countries within the European Union, there were two earlier who held the position in the UN Security Council and having nuclear weapons, that was United Kingdom and France. UK left as a consequence of 2016, the Brexit. There's only France today, which would push it to that extent for having Europe as a third pole in international politics. How does the EU then respond to all of this? I draw your attention to three important critical documents, which are really very silent on the word multipolarity, but really talk about multilateralism, which is how do we do the business and not where power is located. In 2003, the European Union came out with the European Security Strategy. In 2016, with the European Union Global Strategy. More recently, in the backdrop of the war in Ukraine in 2022, with a strategic compass. All the three documents are silent on the word multipolar. That means, clearly, the articulation of the EU is not looking at or not acknowledging, you could say, what is shifting and happening in the power structure. Is that a flaw in thinking? It may not be a flaw in thinking if you decide that the way you engage with the system is going to be based on your actual capabilities and capacities, and your flaw in thinking would be to think that you are a military actor, but where you don't have the wherewithal to be a military actor. I think to that extent, those three documents clearly give us an insight into where the European Union is as an actor. That means, it is definitely an economic giant, but not present in the sense of being that military mover and shaker in international politics. Does that really limit the European Union's ability to be present from a power perspective in international politics? I would answer simply over there, no. The EU, as Amitav Acharya points out, is a very large normative multipolar actor and we experience this as a regulatory power, a regulatory power where if anybody engages with the EU would have to adapt and adopt the rules emanating from this entity called the European Union, which is also seen as the Brussels effect. So, in a larger context of discussing where multipolarity is today, and in terms of what my fellow colleagues have also mentioned, let me just wrap up and, you know, draw your attention to three important points. First, in this year's Munich Security Conference, the focus and emphasis was on multipolarization. And the Munich Security Conference is a good place to get a feel or the pulse of what is happening in Europe, along with other such conferences, which are happening around Europe. Clearly, there is a recognition that, there is a retrenchment of American leadership in international politics, but the space or the vacuum is not being filled up by somebody else very soon, right? So, we have to look at it not in terms of a 4x100 relay race, in which power shifts automatically as a power of the battle. This is going to be slow and transitional. It's also going to be painful. I think we have to recognize when power transitions take place, they will impose cost. Second, I think the EU today internally, while it may have moved from strength-to-strength, and has grown larger with 27 members, it's also become far more heterogeneous. And its ability to hold together and produce the kind of a coherent foreign policy is really not visible, at times at moments of crisis. And that that is something which is visible on the outside. Third, I think the EU is slowly recalibrating itself to the fact that there is multipolarity visible. Therefore, it needs to also have an active strategy to deal with this. And as a consequence, the European Union today is building far more investing in its strategic partnerships. And one of those strategic partnerships is with India, where we see tremendous amount of movement which has taken place. The movement was negotiating the free trade agreement, getting it done. And more importantly, I draw your attention to the third point, and that was the most unusual visit of the College of Commissioners to India, led by the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 27th and 28th of February this year. It's unusual because you never have a head of state equivalent travel with the entire cabinet on a foreign visit, right? It was a statement which came out of von der Leyen's own statement in Davos this year that she would visit India to upgrade the nature of the strategic partnership, clearly engaging with what we call the shifting power dynamics in the international order. As a consequence of that visit, I draw your attention to the joint statement which came out, which really talks about why we should look at the EU, even though you may not want to frame it as this very critical actor which is critical in the multipolar order. But, the joint statement clearly stated that there's a shared interest in shaping a resilient multipolar global order that underpins peace and stability, economic growth and sustainable development. You really cannot find fault with a statement like that. But, it draws attention to three important things. First, that it is about shaping a resilient multipolar order. I think that is what we're looking at today. The order is evolving. And second, that peace, economic growth and sustainable development would have to be something, which would have to be available for all. So, I think in that extent, the EU is a nascent actor in the discourse on multipolarity that we've had today. Thank you so much.

Asoke Mukerji: Thank you, Professor Bawa. That was an inspired presentation, if I may say so, and made me think a lot about various aspects. Now I'm in the hands of the organizers. How much time do we have for the three questions to begin with? And then see, okay. So, may I throw open the floor to our audience for asking questions of the panelists, including, of course, of the Chair, if you wish. But please do identify who you are. And if you have an affiliation with an institution, please indicate your affiliation so that we can respond properly. Yes, Professor Ghoshal, since you're in the first row.

Professor Ghoshal: Behind, all this concept of multipolar world, multilateralism, and things of that sort, the concepts, there is an inherent understanding that, there is a certain amount of order in the system. Maybe the Chinese were talking about orderly multipolar world. Now, as I understand the world today, maybe because of the age and the experience that one gathers over the years, the world had never been so divided since the Second World War. Both in the domestic front, as well as the international system, there has been a tremendous divisions, a rise of identities of various types, and, you know, all kinds of sort of, you know, disruption that had taken place within the world system. Maybe, President Trump has aggravated the situation in the last couple of months that he has been in power. Now, can you really think of these concepts today in this kind of a mess that we see the world today? Because many of these concepts and institutions that we see today are the result of American social science writings. They are the ones who initiated many of these concepts and told the world that this will bring stability and order in the society. But they're the ones who really abused all these concepts. And I think there's a rethinking and relearning. I think we have to de-learn many of these concepts today. Democracy at one time used to be talked about by the United States. But they're the largest abuser of democracy, both internationally as well as domestically. So, my own problem is that in this time of a crisis, can you talk of anything that, some kind of order? Because behind all these concepts, there needs to be some understanding that we are going to cooperate. Identity crisis, all kinds of things are happening today, and this is a disruptive world. In this kind of a disruptive world, one can't really think of any of these orders.

Asoke Mukerji: Would you like one of the panelists to answer? Yes. All of them. That'll take a long time. Yes. Everybody. Then may I take two more questions so that we know how to manage our time. Yes, the lady in the middle.

Apoorva Roy: Greetings to the panel. My name is Apoorva Roy. I'm a research analyst at TICE. So my question is to Ambassador D. B. Venkatesh Verma. In the light of Russia's evolving pivot towards Asia post-Ukraine, how do you assess the potentials and the limitations of the India-Russia-China triangle as a strategic block in a multipolar world? Thank you.

Sanjay Kumar: I'm Sanjay Kumar, and I'm pursuing my PhD from Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. And I'm doing my research. The topic is relevance of multipolar world order in maintaining international peace and security. So my question is to Mahapatra sir. Sir, you talked about many poles like US, China, Russia, India. But do you think that ideology will also play an important role in shaping the structure of multipolar world order? Ideology, what I want to say, most of the wars or fights happen on this planet, because of the ideology or religion. When we talk about Ukraine crisis, when we talk about Israel crisis, when you talk about Iran crisis, we can see that whether it's European Union, they have clear stand. They are with U.S. We can see the philosophy of China and Russia. They are also together. So, once I have heard the statement of Antonio Guterres, he is current Secretary General of United Nations. He said there cannot be multipolar world order without an active global leadership of India, because India is the only country which does not make friend on the basis of ideology or religion. So, we have history of non-alignment. We have history of not to have a friend. Sorry, we are not obsessed with ideology or religion. Here, do you think that India can play important role in shaping the structure of multipolar world order?

Asoke Mukerji: Thank you. To make effective use of our time, I propose that the individual questions for the individual panelists be responded to first before we get into the collective response to Professor Ghosal's point. If you agree with that, then Professor Mahapatra, could you?

Chintamani Mahapatra: Very quickly, briefly, the role of ideology in international politics and relations. When the Chinese Civil War was going on in the 1940s after World War II, the United States had an agreement, an understanding with Stalin. Why don't you recognize Chiang Kai-shek and not Mao Zedong? Stalin said, what would I get in return? Control over Port Arthur, very beneficial for you. Control over Manchurian railways, very profitable for you. There are three, four other things. Stalin signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek, not with Mao Zedong. When the French entered into China to re-establish the colonial rule, Ho Chi Minh wrote eight letters to the State Department, saying, Mr. Secretary of State, we are more nationalist than communist, although I myself went to Moscow many times, got training. We need your help. We don't want reestablishment of colonial rule. It fell on deaf ears, right? So, there are any number of examples which would say that ideology can be used as an instrument. In reality, it is all a power game. Even all those competition between communism and capitalism, commercial capitalism, and then you have socialism, all on the surface. In reality, it's a dog-eat-dog world. Within the country, it's different in political politics. About India, in the Indian genes, I would say, when the Indian Prime Minister during G20 would put the logo, what is it? One earth, one family. We believe in unity. It is not an empty slogans. Even if you go back to Upanishads, Sarve Bhavantu Sukhino. The American president will say, God bless America. But here, the Indians will say, Sarve Bhavantu Sukhino. Let everyone be happy. That Indian thinking of inclusivity, going beyond any kind of ideology, live and let live, what I think, this one. What you think, that one. You're right in your place. I'm right in my place. Let us live and let live. So, I think India has the credibility to build a multiple world order. Whether this credibility will turn into capability is a different question. It will take a lot of time. But in terms of ideas, I think India is qualified to be promoting a multipolar world, where no ideology will play a role. All kinds of ideologies can live and let live. So, this is my view.

Asoke Mukerji: Thank you. Venkat, if you can hear us from Hyderabad, please, can you respond to the question?

D. B. Venkatesh Verma: On RIC, you see, when in 1998, Russia, India and China agreed to meet, the common factor amongst all of them was that, they were not interested in a world dominated by the United States. But at the same time, each one of them bilaterally wanted good relations with the United States, which is Russia separately, India separately, and China separately. Now, if you take RIC today, Russia is interested in an engagement with the United States, or almost entirely on its own terms, which is a derivative of what will happen in the Ukraine conflict. India is readjusting its own relations with the United States today. It's quite obvious. The only country in the world where there is a genuine trade negotiation, between the United States is China. We might talk about RIC unity, but on the main question how to deal with the United States, where is the unity? I think it will pull in various directions. We'll see where it goes. RIC like any other forum can sustain itself, if it is not based on only solidarity against someone else. It has a positive agenda, which is I think presently a little difficult to see, because if China is veering towards a G2 with the United States, what interest would it have to share the stage with India and Russia, who are in China's view much weaker powers? Thank you.

Asoke Mukerji: For the question which Professor Ghoshal asked of all of us, I think Srikanth, would you like to respond? Can you impose order in a divided world?

Srikanth Kondapalli: I will just only reflect on what do the Chinese think. Chinese get obsessed with anything which is anarchical, anything which is disorderly. To the level of becoming paranoid, they have this concept of Tianluan, heavenly kills. So, this is the mythical romance of the three kingdoms in the ancient times. So, they become very kind of worked up on this, anything that is domestically as well as internationally. One of the things that they don't like with President Trump is the uncertainty and unpredictability of the statements. I know that, there are some in the Chinese Foreign Ministry who monitor his statements, his truth social second by second and prepare for the whatever responses in the Chinese Foreign Ministry. So, many of these things that we see in the current Trump administration, Chinese are actually concerned about any of his statements, any of his assurances or otherwise. They are really problematic from a China foreign policy perspective. So, order is what they would prefer and this is very unpredictable. The current order is very unpredictable for them. On the RIC, so we began the discussions in the sidelines of the United Nations, first the foreign ministerial and also elevated to the prime minister-president level. Dr. Manmohan Singh, for example, had a meeting in the RIC format with President Putin, President Hu Jintao at that time, and this has been elevated. So, we joined for three, four purposes. One is multipolarity, which is in a way balancing other countries. Second, we joined the RIC for energy security, which is also now become controversial. Third, we joined the RIC for bilateral economic and trade relations with individual countries, but we did not really succeed in this except for with the Chinese. India-Russia trade is over about USD 60 billion, USD 64 billion. India-China trade is about USD 130 billion. China-Russia trade substantially increased, USD 240 billion, but that is when you compare with the China-U.S. trade, China-ASEAN trade, it's very minuscule, 20% to 30% of the whole. Our interests were based on those three, four aspects. Finally, on counterterrorism, the fourth subject that we are interested in RIC, because in 2000s, the U.S. administration mentioned about pre-M2 strikes, unilateralism, regime change, structural reforms through the IMF World Bank policies. So, we were concerned that this is potentially applicable to Chechnya, to Xinjiang, to Kashmir. Hence, these leaders came together on the counterterrorism issue. But today, China indirectly supports terrorism in Pakistan in terms of the 1267 Committee or the Zakirul Rahman, Masood Azhar, or even those involved in Pahelgaon. One of the terrorists was linking up with Huawei phone and using the Beidou series of satellites, the Chinese satellites. So, there was the indirect support that China was providing for. So, this became problematic now, the terrorism-related issue. I was suggesting that we need to go slow. And what is our interest? A SWOT analysis has to be done in terms of the RIC. That's what my suggestion was.

Asoke Mukerji: Professor Bawa, can we impose order on a divided world?

Ummu Salma Bawa: I think Madam DG would impose order on us now and call on time. I just want to say two things. One, order as a construct and idea is very different from order as it is experienced. It is always going to look very different from those who sat at the table and designed order for other recipients. When the shift in power can make order, or what is the assumption of what it produces, not really deliver up to par. I think then it can become sub-optimal to that extent. So, I think it's always going to be about when you look at it. And the context is extremely important when you study order. What we looked at 1945 will not produce the kind of results what we're looking at. To that extent, it is suboptimal. And then what happens is, you find that states then decide to move out of formal structures to create other structures, which can be even more powerful than where the formal structure is because it has become dysfunctional. So, I think order has to be understood from not purely what it produces, but more importantly, in the context of who really sat at a particular point in time. Why do states then shift and go outside a formal structure to look at other institutions? The G7 was informal, created in the backdrop of the 1970s oil crisis, the G20 in the backdrop of financial crisis, but don't really represent totality in any possible way. And yet, they seem to be points where there is an attempt to those conversations that some of it spills onto the formal structure, which also makes us understand that order is not just purely created by groups of leaders sitting around a table in a formal setting, but it can also happen in the other settings. And then, why the dysfunctional nature produces opportunities for other kind of variable geometries to come on board. Case in point is RIC. It came at a particular point in time. Today, the equations of the three sides of that variable geometry of RIC may not be conducive, say, probably from an Indian perspective. The others may want it. We may not want it. So, does that produce order? One doesn't know. It depends on whether those variable geometry, what is it wanting to do with that kind of a construct. Thank you.

D. B. Venkatesh Verma: Again, very, very briefly, I will request all of you to take a look at today's article in Firstpost. Trump has waged a war against the world, and that's a fact. If you go around the world and say, who is creating current disorder in the globe, at least economically? They will say it is Donald Trump and his tariff policy. He's making policy through truth social. There is no commerce minister or commerce secretary saying anything. And he can say one thing now and another thing in the evening, creating total disorder and chaos and uncertainty. Nobody knows how to behave. And then he will give a pause for 90 days. Then he will reduce the date by 8th of August, Russia, stop the war. Go to Europe and ask European Union members, who is creating disorder in the world, as Professor Ghoshal is saying? The Russians. Since 2022, they have been waging a war there and look at its ramifications for the rest of the world, food security, water security, fertilizer security, and whatnot. Then you go to Taiwan and some of the ASEAN countries. Is there order here in the Indo-Pacific? No, no. It's China. Look at what they're doing along the Taiwan Strait. Look at what they're doing in South China Sea. You come to Southeast Asia and ask the Indians, who is creating disorder? Look what we did, Operation Sindhu. What kind of people came and who sent them and who came to Kashmir and how they killed people and all that. You are right, Professor Ghoshal. But when you make an analysis of the world history, let's see from 1945, those theoretical people in the U.S. writing theories and talked about global order, changing global order. Has there been an order ever? Three years of war in Korea, 15 years of violence in Vietnam, 20 years of involvement recently in Afghanistan, before that 10 years of Soviet intervention, where do they see order? If you push it to Africa, then of course, you have to bang your head. Where is order? In the world, world order is a concept, which talks about a goal, there should be order. We talk about that goal, because there is perennial disorder around the world, and we have to accept that. How to create order in the chaos, that's the goal. RIC, 1985, I was the Research Assistant in IDSA. Primacope came to India, and for the first time, he made a statement, there should be China-India-Russia cooperation. If you analyze the newspaper headlines of those days, across the board, the strategic community in Delhi said, no, not possible. I wrote a 500 words article in Strategic Analysis, not article, commentary. I argued that time, that if RIC is going to be a block against the United States, it will miserably fail. If RIC talks about a new kind of triangular growth prosperity, and share your experiences in technology, economy, whatever, it is a great idea. Russia there, China here, India here. Russia is technologically advanced. China, remember in the 1980s, had already started economic reform. And here, India also, like China, big market. Can we think about collaboration? Then, of course, the whole idea was buried until 1998. And later, it just picked up on several rounds of dialogue. Even today, I repeat my statement. If RIC is going to be a block against the United States, it will miserably fail. The US-China relationship is so interdependent that if they really fight a kind of Cold War that the US and USSR did, it is going to be M-A-D, MAD, the nuclear doctrine, Mutual Assured Destruction. It's not possible. Same with India. 20% of all exports go to USA. Imagine how many Indian-Americans are there and how many American companies are working in India. Can we do that? No. But in the current situation, the way Trump is flexing his muscle and creating disorder, Russia, India, China can come together, discuss, debate for capacity building to ensure that unipolar world order does not succeed. Then, we'll succeed there. Thank you.

Asoke Mukerji: Our last panelist is Ambassador Verma in Hyderabad. Would you like to respond to Professor Ghoshal?

D. B. Venkatesh Verma: He was our respected teacher and professor in JNU, so greetings to him. I mean, basically, power is a result, order is a result of how power flows. For the efficiency of power exercising, an exercise of power, some order is required. I think if you look at what is happening in the United States, the United States is clearly in the process of an internal domestic revival as they see it, socially, politically, economically. Also, their right, which they believe is their right to recreate the order that they constructed for the last 40, 50 years. They are very clearly stating, I mean, if you take out all the jargon, and I think in this very troubled world, the quicker we leave the jargon behind, I think we can all think more clearly. Clearly, what they're saying is that if you wish to partake of American prosperity, you will have a tax. You'll have to pay for it. You can partake of American prosperity. If you agree to an assigned place in the international system and the EU has accepted it publicly, and the EU and NATO together clearly have accepted that, they will pay a cost, not just in political terms, sovereign terms, but in economic energy terms. For whatever reason, they have sought their peace with the United States and similarly with other allies. Now, we might wonder why is the United States pressurizing its allies and partners instead of its opponents? Because it is redoing its house. That is the order in which American revival, as it is understood, is going to come about. Now, whether it is good or bad is a separate matter. A very nice phrase that was used, The United States is presently in the process of regressive modernization of its own part. Now, what it does to the world, you have to take it as it goes, because clearly the United States is saying that, it will insist on redoing the order, which it benefits from, in its own interest. So, that is where we are. Now, let me come back to RIC for a moment because some issues have been raised. You see, there are only four independent powers in the world today. Not of the same strength, obviously not a very hierarchical strength. The United States, Russia, China, and India. All other powers are derivative powers in some way of the other or one of the other. India is the weakest of the independent powers. We might require tactical alliances and tactical alignments and things like that. We don't know. But the fact that the three independent powers, as related to the largest independent power, which is the United States, clearly are in a different league as far as multipolarity is concerned than Europe or Japan or ASEAN or Africa or the Middle East. The BRICS is an expression of multipolarity. A number of Middle East states have joined. Other states are willing to join as a platform for multipolarity. But, in terms of power, the battle lines are very, very clearly drawn. Let's see how it goes. But, sir, I want to thank you for chairing this session and greatly enjoyed being part of your panel.

Moderator: I think we all agree that we had a very productive and enriching panel discussion. On behalf of ICWA, I would like to express my gratitude to the Distinguished Chair, Ambassador Asoke Mukerji, and Distinguished Panelist, Ambassador D. B. Venkatesh Verma, who joined online, and Distinguished Panelist, Professor Chintamani Mahapatra, Professor Srikanth Kondapalli, and Professor Ummu Salma Bawa for their participation here. My special thanks to all members of the audience. To know more about ICWA research work, events, outreach program, publication, kindly visit our website and social media handles, X, LinkedIn, YouTube, and Facebook. Thank you all, and kindly join us for high tea in the fire. Thank you.

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List of Participants

1. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General, ICWA
2. Asoke Mukerji, Distinguished Fellow, Vivekanand India Foundation, Former Permanent Representative of India to the UN (Chair)
3. Amb D. B. Venkatesh Verma, Member National Security Advisory Board, former India’s Ambassador to the Russian Federation (Online)
4. Chintamani Mahapatra, Founder & Honorary Chairperson of Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies
5. Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor of Chinese Studies, CEAS, JNU, New Delhi
6. Ummu Salma Bava, Chairperson and Jean Monnet Chair, Centre for European Studies, SIS, JNU, New Delhi