The Republic of Türkiye is one of the few countries in the world that spans both Europe and Asia. Türkiye has held an aspiration to be a part of the European Union since the 1980s, but this aspiration has remained unfulfilled till today. Despite significant progress in the development of European Union (EU)–Türkiye relations in terms of trade and cooperation, not only has there been no real headway in Türkiye’s accession to the EU, but a freeze has been imposed on the matter by the European Union since 2018. While some countries, such as Spain and Sweden, still support Türkiye’s membership, others have strongly opposed it on various grounds, such as the violation of human rights in Türkiye. This paper seeks to analyse Türkiye’s longstanding bid for EU membership, focusing on its criticism by the EU and the reasons for the delay in its accession.
Introduction
Ever since the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye in 1923, it has leaned towards the West as a role model to emulate, especially under the leadership of founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who intended to ‘Europeanize’ the country. Post 1945, Türkiye joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and partook in the Marshall Plan. Türkiye was one of the first member countries of the Council of Europe in 1950 and became an associate member of the European Economic Community and Western European Union in the 1963 Ankara Agreement and 1992, respectively. After gaining full membership in 1987 and the formation of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, Türkiye had wanted to formally join the European Union and applied for the membership, but negotiations remained stalled due to divisions in EU member states’ acceptance of Türkiye in the Union and their wariness toward the present President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s domestic and foreign policies related to Türkiye.
EU Criticism of Türkiye’s Domestic and Foreign Policies
Up until 2016, negotiations for Türkiye’s European Union membership were going slowly but steadily, with the 2016 migration deal between the EU and Türkiye was intended to accelerate this process by having Türkiye take in Syrian refugees and tighten its border security.[i] However, negotiations were suspended because of the political purge in Türkiye after the failed coup in 2016 that had aimed to seize power from the President and his supporters.[ii] The coup was described by the President as a “gift from God” aimed at eliminating enemies. The subsequent crackdown against opposition party members and critics was brutal; over 3,000 people were sentenced to life imprisonment, and over 77,000 were arrested for allegedly participating in the coup. A state of emergency was declared from 2016 to 2018.[iii] Under the leadership of President Erdoğan, Türkiye has faced considerable backlash and criticism from human rights organisations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the European Union for its crackdown on opposition parties, minorities, and freedom of expression in the country.[iv] The EU has criticised the regime under Erdoğan because it participates in the curtailment of press freedom, erosion of secular values, restrictions on opposition campaigns, arrest of opposition leaders like Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, suppression of the Gezi Park protests in 2013, and changing the parliamentary system to a presidential system.[v] Erdoğan’s support for the possible reinstatement of the death penalty in 2016 by Türkiye prompted the then EU President Jean-Claude Juncker to declare, ‘Türkiye is in no position to become a European Union member any time soon’.[vi] As membership in the EU is subject to fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, which includes upholding democratic values and freedoms, Türkiye’s accession process was halted by the EU for no longer meeting these criteria.[vii] Apart from the aforementioned, EU accession criteria also include maintaining good neighbourly relations, and Turkey’s dispute with Cyprus and Greece, both of whom are EU members, has also proved to be a roadblock to Türkiye’s entry into the EU. [viii] Türkiye’s assertive ‘Mavi Vatan’ (Blue Homeland) foreign policy towards maintaining maritime dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as over Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and energy resources in the region, is one of the ongoing issues between Greece and Turkey.
In 2005, the EU had demanded Türkiye recognise the Republic of Cyprus and the Armenian genocide as a condition for accession, which was rejected by Ankara. Additionally, Türkiye’s military operations in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Karabakh and its outright critical stance on Israel’s actions in the Gaza conflict do not sit well with the EU. [ix] Türkiye’s balancing act in the Russia–Ukraine war is another divergence from the EU’s foreign policy and an irritant in EU–Türkiye relations.
Divided Stance of EU Members on Türkiye
Today the opinion on whether Türkiye deserves to be an EU member or not is widely debated among EU members, where countries like Austria, France, and Germany have opposed Türkiye’s bid while Sweden, Spain, Poland, Hungary, and Finland have supported it.[x] While the supporting nations’ stance might come from a place of mutual interest, such as Sweden’s entry into NATO after Türkiye gave its nod, the opposing countries fear enlargement fatigue and subsequent new bids from more countries if Türkiye successfully joins the EU. The reason for Austria and Germany to strongly oppose Türkiye’s quest for EU membership may be linked to their fears of more immigration-they have a huge migrant Turkish population, and Türkiye becoming a party to the visa-free Schengen zone might mean an increased influx of migrants. These nations have proposed a ‘privileged partnership’ for Türkiye–EU relations, rather than full membership in the European Union.
Türkiye’s Relevance for the EU
Despite the European Union’s dissatisfaction with Türkiye’s policies, its accession process to the EU has merely been frozen, not rejected altogether.[xi] This is because of Türkiye’s geostrategic significance in terms of trade, defence, and curbing illegal immigration to the European Union, which has held the latter from rejecting Türkiye’s bid altogether.[xii] For example, the Türkiye–EU customs union since 1995 has integrated Türkiye deeply into the European supply chain, and Turkey is the EU’s 5th largest trading partner, while the EU remains Türkiye’s top trading partner as of 2025. [xiii] Coming to defence alliances, after United States President Donald Trump threatened to freeze aid to Ukraine, the EU has made defence spending and partnerships with other nation-states its top priority, and Türkiye is no exception.[xiv] Türkiye has one of the largest standing armies in NATO and a growing indigenous defence industry that manufactures drones and other military technology, making it an attractive destination for Euro-Atlantic security.[xv] Türkiye’s role in facilitating regional cooperation with the Eastern Mediterranean and Caucasus, such as the Black Sea Maritime Security flagship initiative and the establishment of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub, could provide the EU a transit route for energy and other important import-exports with the region.
Finally, the EU needs Türkiye to check migration from areas like West Asia, where the former often serves as a gateway for refugees or asylum seekers, as illustrated by the 2016 migration deal that proved partially effective in its objective to resettle migrants and refugees in Türkiye. Migrant arrivals to Europe via Türkiye have dropped by 97%. [xvi] Hence, as Türkiye is considerably important for the EU, the latter has not stopped dangling the carrot, in the form of EU membership, in front of Türkiye even if talks are frozen. Given the lack of consensus and political will on the part of EU member states, which has lasted decades ,perhaps it is time to seriously consider taking issue of the global agenda with the primary objective of not letting a country’s geography lead to a crisis in identity trap.
Conclusion
The EU–Türkiye talks of accession have been going on for decades, but the doors to the Union remained closed for Türkiye. Just as the European Union does not want to give up its leverage on Türkiye, Türkiye also has enough to offer in the arena of trade and security cooperation to the EU for negotiations to remain on the table. However, Türkiye has not only failed to meet the Copenhagen criteria, but the democratic backsliding has also made it impossible for the EU to resume talks. Even if member states like Spain or Sweden support Türkiye’s bid, the divided support is not enough to bypass the concerns of the EU regarding human rights violations, press freedom, and judicial independence in Türkiye. Unless Ankara takes steps to check the growing authoritarianism in the country, any cards it has to play in the game may be ineffective to persuade the European Union to resume talks.
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*Aishwarya Upreti, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Turkey Attempted Coup .(n.d.). Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/tag/turkey-attempted-coup/
[ii] Gotev, G., & Gotev, G. (2016, July 18). Erdogan says coup was ‘gift from God’ to reshape country, punish enemies. Euractive. https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/erdogan-says-coup-was-gift-from-god-to-re-shape-country-punish-enemies
[iii] ECPS_Admin. (2025, March 6). Erdogan’s winning authoritarian populist formula and Turkey’s future - ECPS. ECPS. https://www.populismstudies.org/erdogans-winning-authoritarian-populist-formula-and-turkeys-future/
[iv] Turkey’s ambivalence is a threat to European security. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/04/turkeys-ambivalence-is-a-threat-to-european-security?lang=en
[v] Reuters. (2016, July 25). Turkey in no position to become EU member any time soon: Juncker. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/turkey-in-no-position-to-become-eu-member-any-time-soon-juncker-idUSKCN1050L9/
[vi] Türkiye’s EU accession process must remain frozen | News | European Parliament. (n.d.). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20250502IPR28215/turkiye-s-eu-accession-process-must-remain-frozen
[vii] Majuri, A. (2021, March 4). The Eastern Mediterranean conflict: From Turkey-Greece confrontation to regional power struggles - FIIA -. FIIA - Finnish Institute of International Affairs. https://fiia.fi/en/publication/the-eastern-mediterranean-conflict
[viii] Greek and Turkish Cypriots Clash over Political Rights | EBSCO. (n.d.). EBSCO Information Services, Inc. | www.ebsco.com. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/ethnic-and-cultural-studies/greek-and-turkish-cypriots-clash-over-political
[ix] Understanding Turkey’s role in the Russia-Ukraine war. (2025, June 17). Hudson Institute. https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/understanding-turkeys-role-russia-ukraine-war-zineb-riboua
[x] Uras, U. (2023, July 11). Why Turkey changed its stance on Sweden’s NATO membership. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/11/why-turkey-changed-its-stance-on-swedens-nato-membership-2
[xi] THE MEMBERSHIP OF TURKEY IN EUROPEAN UNION. (n.d.). https://www.ifimes.org/en/researches/the-membership-of-turkey-in-european-union/2977?page=59
[xii] Biggest trading partner EU trade relations with Türkiye. (2025, July 1). Trade and Economic Security. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/turkiye_en
[xiii] Schulten, L. (2025, March 4). Ukraine: Who is in Europe’s “coalition of the willing”? dw.com. https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-who-is-in-europes-coalition-of-the-willing/a-71823102
[xiv] Carney, S. (2025, June 3). Turkey’s unfulfilled European hopes – GIS Reports. GIS Reports. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/turkey-eu-transactional/
[xv] Black Sea Tastan, K. (n.d.). EU-Turkey economic relations in the era of geo-economic fragmentation. Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik (SWP). https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2024C40/
[xvi] Uras, U. (2023, September 20). Analysis: Is Turkey’s bid for EU membership over? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/20/analysis-is-turkeys-bid-for-eu-membership-over