Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: The Aizawl–Tuipang highway in Mizoram is a prominent example of India–Japan strategic convergence in Northeast India. As a key infrastructure project funded through Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA), it advances India’s Act East Policy (AEP) and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, positioning Northeast India as a strategic node in the evolving Indo-Pacific order.

1.  Introduction

The Northeastern Region (NER) of India spans approximately 262,230 sq km, constituting nearly 8% of the national territory. Geopolitically significant yet physically peripheral, the region comprises the eight states of Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Sikkim and shares a 5,182-km international boundary with China, Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh.[i] This geographically strategic configuration makes Northeast a significant stakeholder in India’s foreign policymaking.

Northeast India’s engagement with the neighbourhood makes it crucial to two fundamental pillars of Indian foreign policy, i.e., Neighbourhood First and Act East.[ii] The Act East Policy gave the Northeast an “arrowhead role” and positioned the region as the heart of India’s ASEAN policy.[iii] Northeast India plays a key role in India’s policy for eastern engagement, and “connectivity” has been identified as a core objective in the policy for continuous bilateral and multilateral engagements in the extended neighbourhood.[iv]

2.  India–Japan Strategic Convergence in Northeast India

The Indo-Japanese relationship has evolved significantly, from a friendship treaty in 1952 to a strategic and global partnership in 2000, 2006 and 2014, with Japan transitioning from a development partner to a strategic partner. Multilateral engagements and connectivity are key areas of mutual cooperation.[v]

With India’s eastward regional orientation, Northeast India has become a crucial strategic juncture for the creation of connectivity corridors towards the Indo-Pacific. Japan has identified the strategic potential of the region and made it a focal point of the India–Japan partnership. India has recognised Japan as a natural partner in development[vi], while Japan has recognised India as the starting point for its FOIP strategy.[vii] India’s Act East Policy and Japan’s FOIP share significant overlaps, both of which seek to enhance regional stability and economic integration. While FOIP is regarded as the cornerstone of Japanese foreign diplomacy, Northeast India is recognised as the focal point where FOIP intersects with AEP.[viii] Thus, with the convergence of India’s Act East and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the Northeast is emerging as a primary area of cooperation in political relations and cultural ties.

Japan’s engagement with the Northeast is driven by strategic, economic and connectivity interests and reflects its broader strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan has actively supported infrastructure projects with its Official Development Assistance (ODA) for connectivity and infrastructural advancements in Northeast India, including the Northeast Road Network Connectivity Improvement Project. The region’s proximity to neighbouring countries, such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar and China, positions it as a crucial node for enhancing connectivity within the Indo-Pacific region.[ix]

3.  The Aizawl–Tuipang Highway: Infrastructure and Connectivity

The Aizawl Tuipang Highway is a prime example of the strategic deployment of Japanese ODA through infrastructure as a diplomatic tool in Northeast India. It is a significant symbol of a strategic convergence, determining the intersection of India’s Act East Policy and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

The highway is a segment of the National Highway 54 and spans approximately 381 kilometres, stretching across five districts of Mizoram. The project is implemented jointly by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and India’s National Highways and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (NHIDCL) under the Northeast Road Network Connectivity Improvement Programme.[x]

(Map of Aizawl–Tuipang Highway) Source: Mongabay [xi]

Strategically, the highway is central to India’s efforts to enhance physical connectivity in its eastern frontier. Located approximately 88 kilometres from the India–Myanmar border, Tuipang serves as a key transit hub. The highway links Mizoram to Sittwe Port in Myanmar via the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP). With broader implications for border management, regional security and Indo-Pacific connectivity, this alternate trade route reduces India’s dependency on the Siliguri Corridor and strengthens the Indian eastern frontier infrastructure. Beyond its geopolitical relevance, the highway also offers broader economic potential and national logistical value. It is expected to bolster trade and transit with Myanmar and Bangladesh, integrate with the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, and be in alignment with regional frameworks such as the Mekong–India Economic Corridor and BIMSTEC.[xii]

The project is more than just a material asset; it is a concrete example of infrastructure diplomacy and represents Japan’s development-focused yet strategic footprint in Northeast India. The highway serves as an instrument for infrastructure diplomacy, economic resilience and regional integration by connecting local infrastructure with cross-border corridors. The project reflects a convergence of national development priorities and regional strategic interests. As such, it repositions Mizoram in particular and Northeast India at large, not merely as a periphery but as a core geopolitical gateway within the regional architecture of the India–Japan convergence.

4.  Challenges and Opportunities

Despite the Aizawl–Tuipang highway being a significant infrastructure project, it faces challenges due to Mizoram’s steep terrain, landslide-prone slopes, dense forests and high rainfall, necessitating high engineering precision, resilient design and continuous monitoring for sustainability and safety. 

Political sensitivities further complicate the development landscape. Land acquisition processes in Mizoram, as in many parts of Northeast India, intersect with customary land tenure systems and ethnic governance structures. Ensuring local community participation, addressing tribal concerns and maintaining transparency are essential for minimising resistance and facilitating smooth implementation. Additionally, the proximity of the highway to the India–Myanmar border renders it vulnerable to geopolitical shifts and regional unrest, particularly in the Chin State and Sagaing Region of Myanmar.

Implementation hurdles have also emerged in the form of bureaucratic delays, inter-agency coordination challenges and the need for advanced environmental clearances. Yet, the project’s opportunities outweigh its challenges. The project offers strategic benefits, such as anchoring India’s eastern frontier presence, facilitating multimodal integration with Myanmar, border management and regional connectivity.

Economically, it holds the potential to boost intra-regional trade, local livelihoods and investment inflow. For Japan, the project reinforces its image as a development partner committed to quality infrastructure, stability and regional balance in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, despite operational constraints, the Aizawl–Tuipang highway remains a high-value geopolitical and developmental asset for both India and Japan.

5.      Infrastructuralism: Strategic Tool in India–Japan Convergence

The Aizawl–Tuipang highway illustrates a broader transformation in how infrastructure is viewed, not merely as a material asset but as a strategic and diplomatic instrument. Drawing from the emerging theoretical framework of “infrastructuralism”, infrastructure is increasingly recognised as a tool that shapes global politics by mediating power, enabling connectivity and fostering influence across borders. On one hand, infrastructure has been considered an addition to economic expansion and development, frequently from an engineering or technical standpoint; on the other hand, it overlaps with socio-cultural forms. [xiii] Thus, infrastructuralism encompasses the societal aspect of the material function of the infrastructure. [xiv]

Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Northeast India exemplifies this shift. Infrastructure projects like the Aizawl–Tuipang highway go beyond physical connectivity and function as vehicles of soft power by embedding socio-cultural underpinnings in physical infrastructures. Japan’s assistance in healthcare, water management and youth exchange initiatives reflects a people-centric diplomacy aimed at long-term goodwill and regional integration. Simultaneously, such projects influence and reshape geopolitics. As China expands its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Japan’s infrastructure-led engagements offer an alternative development model. [xv] Moreover, Japan-assisted corridors are reconfiguring territoriality by enhancing Northeast India’s cross-border connectivity with the neighbourhood.

India-Japan convergence in Northeast India represents a compelling case of development meeting diplomacy. However, this strategic convergence also invites critical reflection. The reliance on external funding, however well-intentioned, raises concerns about the erosion of strategic autonomy, particularly when such aid may be accompanied by conditionalities of donor interests. ODA has embedded priorities and timelines that may not always align with local needs or national priorities, even when it is provided within the framework of a strategic partnership. This is especially important in Northeast India, where sensitive border regions and complex ethnocultural dynamics necessitate infrastructure that is sensitive to local needs and aspirations. Additionally, the reliance on ODA risks creating donor-driven funding structures that are vulnerable to diplomatic shifts, donor commitment or global economic turbulence. Such donor-dependency can lead towards an ‘infrastructural-trap’, rather than an infrastructural asset, where vital networks are shaped less by domestic imperatives and more by geopolitical competition.

Projects like the Aizawl–Tuipang highway highlight the need for a “bottom-up approach”. The emphasis must shift toward building indigenous capacities in terms of financial, technical, and institutional structures to plan, execute and maintain infrastructure that is strategically autonomous and regionally integrated. While Japanese ODA can serve as a powerful accelerator and model for quality infrastructure, it must not become a substitute for indigenous innovation and investment. In this regard, the principle of Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) should not be seen as isolationist, but as a framework for resilience, where strategic partnerships support, rather than substitute, domestic growth. Balancing external partnerships with internal capability is crucial to ensuring that the benefits of infrastructure-led diplomacy are sustainable, sovereign, and contextually rooted in India’s long-term strategic vision.

Infrastructuralism provides a useful lens to understand Japan’s evolving role in the region, where connectivity fosters convergence. For Japanese ODA to be effectively operationalised, both Delhi and Tokyo must recognise the Northeastern states as a central stakeholder in such geostrategic initiatives. Integrating local governance structures, socio-cultural dynamics and ground-level realities into planning and execution would ensure more responsive, sustainable and community-sensitive infrastructure development across the region. And, infrastructural projects, such as the Aizawl–Tuipang highway, would gradually reshape the region’s geopolitical architecture and positioning Northeast India as a key node in the Indo-Pacific.

6.  Conclusion

The Aizawl–Tuipang highway exemplifies the shift from infrastructure as a developmental asset to a strategic instrument of engagement. It leverages connectivity to reposition Northeast India as a gateway to Southeast Asia and a vital node in the Indo-Pacific. While terrain and political sensitivities persist, the project reflects the promise of inclusive, locally anchored cooperation. As India and Japan converge through such infrastructure-led partnerships, Northeast India moves from the periphery to the core of regional geopolitics.

*****

*Bagmita Borthakur , Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i] “Center For North East Studies | Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration.” https://www.lbsnaa.gov.in/lbsnaa-sub/center-for-north-east-studies, accessed on June 10, 2025.

[ii] Bose, Sohini, Sreeparna Banerjee, and Anasua B. Chaudhury. “Connectivity and the Northeast: Challenges to India's Neighbourhood First and Act East Policies.” Observer Research Foundation, 2025, accessed on June 10, 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/connectivity-and-the-northeast-challenges-to-india-s-neighbourhood-first-and-act-east-policies.

[iii] Ministry of External Affairs. “Northeast at the Heart of India’s ASEAN Policy.” IndBiz | Economic Diplomacy Division, 2018, accessed on June 10, 2025. https://indbiz.gov.in/northeast-at-the-heart-of-indias-asean-policy/.

[iv] Maitra, Sreya. “The Northeast Region’s Place in India’s Indo-Pacific Vision.” Observer Research Foundation, 2025, accessed on June 12, 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-northeast-region-s-place-in-india-s-indo-pacific-vision.

[v] Ministry of External Affairs. “India–Japan Bilateral Relations: India and Japan Share ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’.” Ministry of External Affairs, 2023, accessed on June 12, 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Japan_-_Bilateral_Brief_MEA_Website_Oct_2023.pdf.

[vi] Jaishankar, Subrahmanyam. “Opening Remarks by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the 16th India–Japan Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue.” Ministry of External Affairs, 2024, accessed on June 12, 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/37687/Opening_Remarks_by_EAM_Dr_S_Jaishankar_at_the_16th_India_Japan_Foreign_Ministers_Strategic_Dialogue.

[vii] Kishida, Fumio. “Keynote Speech by Prime Minister KISHIDA Fumio.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 20, 2023, accessed on June 13, 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100477791.pdf.

[viii] Satoshi, Suzuki. “Japan’s FOIP and Northeast India.” Embassy of Japan in India, 2021. https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/files/100149566.pdf, accessed on June 13, 2025.

[ix] Nayan, Shonit. “Discovering the Vibrant Connections Between Northeast India and Japan: Uncovering the Cultural, Economic, and Strategic Tapestry.” Forum for Integrated National Security, 2024, accessed on June 13, 2025. https://finsindia.org/discovering-the-vibrant-connections-between-northeast-india-and-japan.html.

[x] JICA. “Preparatory Study for North East Connectivity Improvement Project in India: Widening and Improvement of NH54.” Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 2015, accessed on June 14, 2025. https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/english/our_work/social_environmental/id/asia/south/india/c8h0vm00009ijqki-att/c8h0vm00009pa7wg.pdf.

[xi] Guha, Nabarun “Mizoram Youth Protest against the National Highways Widening Project.” Mongabay India, November 7, 2022, accessed on June 24, 2025 https://india.mongabay.com/2022/11/mizoram-youth-protest-against-the-national-highways-widening-project/.

[xii] “352 km Mizoram NH to Boost Ties with Myanmar: Govt.” Business Standard, August 21, 2017, accessed on June 14, 2025. https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/352-km-mizoram-nh-to-boost-ties-with-myanmar-govt-117082100587_1.html.

[xiii] Rubenstein, Michael, Bruce Robbins, and Sophia Beal. “Infrastructuralism: An Introduction.” MFS Modern Fiction Studies 61, no. 4 (2015): 575–586, accessed on June 15, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1353/mfs.2015.0049.

[xiv] Sahlins, Marshall. “Infrastructuralism.” Critical Inquiry 36, no. 3 (2010): 371–385. https://doi.org/10.1086/653405, accessed on June 15, 2025.

[xv] Lin, Qi. “Japan’s Strategic Counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2017, accessed on June 15, 2025. https://aagc.ris.org.in/sites/aagc.ris.org.in/files/2021-08/GRI-28-12-2017-Japan%20s%20strategic%20counter%20to%20China%20s%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative-Qi%20Lin.pdf.