Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: As the conflict rages between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces, the recent attacks on Port Sudan could potentially escalate and worsen the situation, resulting in severe geopolitical implications. 

Introduction

On 4 May 2025, drone strikes targeted the Red Sea city of Port Sudan, which was once regarded as the safe haven for the Sudanese population seeking refuge from a violent power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which escalated into a conflict two years ago.^[i] The Sudanese army, led by General Abdulfatah Al-Burhan, has blamed the Sudanese paramilitary force, Rapid Support Forces,^[ii] led by General Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, also known as Hemedti. 

The attack came after a speech made by General Hamdan Daglo in March 2025 after losing Khartoum to the SAF, stating that “I assure you, we left Khartoum, but God willing, we will return”.^[iii] However, RSF’s leader did not mention the Port Sudan drone attacks directly during his speech. Instead, Daglo accused the SAF of targeting civilian infrastructure and state institutions in RSF-controlled areas. The group also stressed its vision for a new Sudan, free of “dictatorship, discrimination, and authoritarianism”, and that the country must not return to being ruled by a single dominant group, reiterating its call for a peaceful resolution and a state built on equal representation and democratic principles.^[iv]

In this context, this paper gives a brief background of the Sudanese conflict, analyses the key reasons for the attack on Port Sudan and the role of the external actors in the conflict, and assesses the domestic and regional implications of the conflict further fuelled by the attacks. 

Areas controlled by the SAF, RSF, and other local resistance as of 31 May 2025

Source: https://tinyurl.com/4cwt8y4w  

Conflict in Sudan: A backgrounder

Sudan has a history of instability since its independence in 1956. The country has witnessed three civil wars,^[v] including the present conflict. President Omar El-Bashir was removed through a military coup following the popular protest for democracy by General Abdulfatah Al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and General Mohamed Hamdan Daglo’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in 2019. The Transitional Military Council (TMC) (which assumed power after the coup), led by General Burhan and the civilian leaders, signed a Constitutional Declaration in August 2019 deciding that a transitional government comprising civilian and military members would run the country. The agreement included the formation of a Transitional Sovereign Council (TSC), a cabinet, and a legislative assembly.^[vi]

Abdulla Hamdok Al-Kinani, an economist and development expert, was appointed as the new Prime Minister along with Burhan as the head and Hamdan Daglo (Hemedti) as the Vice Head of the TSC. In 2021, the SAF and RSF removed Al-Kinani through a coup, leading to nationwide protests.^[vii] The protest was crushed violently by the anti-riot police and Central Reserve police under the control of General Burhan. Since then, Burhan has been operating as the de facto head of the Sudanese government. According to the deal between SAF and RSF for a joint civil transitional government, Hemedti was promoted as ‘equal’ to Burhan. However, the conflict between the two actors persisted regarding the timeline of integrating Hemedti’s RSF into the Sudanese National Army. This disagreement has led to a violent power struggle that resulted in the deaths of over 150,000 people and the displacement of millions. ^[viii]

In April 2023, the struggle intensified with both sides targeting each other’s strongholds, following days of tensions as members of the RSF were redeployed around the country in a move that Burhan’s army saw as a threat.^[ix] The conflict escalated in March this year as the Sudanese Army recaptured Khartoum (the capital of Sudan) and attacked RSF’s Nyala Air Base through drones in May.

Understanding the Attacks on Port Sudan

Port Sudan was attacked on 4 May, which continued for a week, targeting critical infrastructure including the city’s only working international airport, a power station, several fuel depots and an air base. Alan Boswell, the Horn of Africa expert for the International Crisis Group, said, “It’s a level of power projection within this region that we haven’t seen yet”.^[x] Notably, the attacks on Port Sudan hold special magnitude because of its political and strategic significance.

Political Significance

The city holds immense significance since it serves as the de facto administrative capital of the country, including an international airport and hosting various UN agencies, especially humanitarian agencies, sheltering thousands of displaced people. It is also home to government officials and diplomats. It had long been a safe haven for the Sudanese citizens who were affected by the ongoing conflict.

Geographical location of Port Sudan
Source: https://tinyurl.com/2t23hbtw  

Strategic significance

Port Sudan is a strategically important city. Apart from being home to 60% of the Nile Basin, rich in resources like gold and oil,^[xi]it is also an essential link in the global supply chain. Furthermore, it is also the transit point for Sudan and other neighbouring landlocked countries’ trade in the region. It is in proximity with the Suez Canal and the Horn of Africa, playing a vital role in facilitating international trade. Domestically, it is a primary outlet for Sudan’s exports, especially oil, and a key entry point for consumer goods and industrial supplies. It is also crucial for arms supplied by external powers to the SAF. The port city is thus extremely significant for the economic development of Sudan and its neighbouring countries, including East African nations, as it facilitates regional trade.^[xii]

Although the RSF has not claimed responsibility for the attacks, according to experts, through this attack the RSF might want to disrupt supply chains, causing destruction and unease in common citizens, showing that the once safe city is also within their reach. It also signals a continued fight against the SAF, asserting strength, despite losing significant territories to the Sudanese army. The attack was also said to have been in retaliation against an attack on the Nyala Air Base by the SAF, which is under the control of the Rapid Support forces.^[xiii] According to the Sudanese political analyst Kholood Khair, “the group is trying to shift the narrative in its favour after losing Khartoum”. It is important to note that the Port Sudan attacks might shape the public narrative against the RSF since, as mentioned above, the city provided a safe haven to the Sudanese citizens, as it was largely protected from the ongoing conflict.

How are the External Actors Shaping this Conflict?

Various external actors are involved in the ongoing conflict in Sudan, arming both sides with weapons, especially high-technology drones; escalating the conflict and further reshaping the geopolitical landscape. Their presence is driven by the military-industrial complex, which fulfills their own economic, geopolitical, and ideological objectives. It is reported that countries including Turkiye, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Qatar, Russia and Ukraine have been supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces. While the UAE, Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Libyan National Army (Khalifa Haftar) have been allegedly supporting the Rapid Support Forces.^[xiv] Furthermore, Israel normalised relations with Sudan in 2020 and, as of 2023, was acting as a potential mediator in the conflict.^[xv]

Since late 2023, Turkiye has supplied the Bayraktar drones (TB2 drones), including hundreds of warheads, to the Sudanese Armed forces, which helped the army win Khartoum in March this year.^[xvi] In January last year, the RSF shot down the Iranian-made Mohajir 6 drones which were deployed by the SAF over Khartoum, raising questions about the increasing capabilities of the RSF and greater involvement of foreign actors in transforming this conflict into a proxy war.^[xvii] The Sudanese government also urged Beijing not to supply its drones to RSF, which were used during the attacks.

In addition, the Sudanese government has recently accused the UAE of supplying ‘strategic advanced weapons’ to the RSF through Chad and has cut diplomatic ties with the Emirati kingdom, labelling it as an “Aggressor state”.^[xviii] However, the UAE has rejected the charges and has long denied involvement despite various media reports and the UN claiming Abu Dhabi’s involvement.^[xix]These developments have aggravated drone warfare in the conflict, maximising its scale.

Another dimension in the conflict is that Moscow signed a deal with the Sudanese government in February 2025^[xx] to build a port on the Red Sea coast in the Port city of Sudan, aiming to build its naval presence in the region much like the US, France and China. The Trump administration has recently warned the Sudanese government of serious consequences of Moscow’s naval base in the region, potentially sanctions,^[xxi] which could have grave repercussions for the already war-torn country. There are also reports of the involvement of non-state actors like the Wagner Group which is involved with different group in Sudan. According to experts, the group is very likely engaged in the current conflict to protect its business interests and maintain its presence in the country.^[xxii] The involvement of foreign actors has complicated and escalated the crisis, further delaying a political solution due to varying interests and disagreements.

Domestic and Regional Implications

Earlier this year, the African Union stated that the civil war in Sudan has created “the worst humanitarian crisis in the world”.^[xxiii] Experts have also stated that the displacement has led to stripping people of access to food, water, shelter, and basic protection, placing an unbearable strain on already overwhelmed humanitarian operations.^[xxiv]The recent attacks would further adversely add to the situation, evident from the water and fuel shortage in the Port city.

As a result of this conflict, there is an increase in the flow of refugees from Sudan to neighbouring countries of Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia.^[xxv] Moreover, the recent USAID cuts by the Trump administration led to massive disruption of supply chains and wastage of food, affecting 3.5 million people per month. These cuts contribute to the already worsening famine situation in the country.^[xxvi] However, India has ramped up aid efforts, sending life-saving medicines for the Sudanese people.^[xxvii]

On 22 May 2025, the Trump administration announced that it will put sanctions on Sudan expected on 6 June 2025, claiming that the Sudanese government used chemical weapons in the conflict in 2024.^[xxviii] This move will further put financial borrowing limits on Sudan, including restricted exports.^[xxix]

Furthermore, since the Port city lies on the coast of the Red Sea, the attacks could potentially threaten and prevent ships both for regional and international trade. The Sudanese foreign ministry has warned that the attacks threaten regional security and the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, calling on international actors to take "effective action against the regional sponsor of the militia".^[xxx]

Conclusion

The Sudanese civil war has entered its third year and is projected to worsen, as evident from the recent attacks on Port Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces continue to target key civilian infrastructures, as seen in the recent escalation as a part of the long and vicious power struggle. The conflict has resulted in a mass displacement, killing thousands and resulting in gruesome humanitarian conditions. Furthermore, the involvement of foreign actors continues to complicate and fuel the conflict. The situation demands an urgent political solution and ceasing of hostilities to avoid further worsening of the situation, which could have grave implications for the region.

*****

*Sugandhi, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i] Reuters. 2025. “Sudan’s RSF Conducts First Drone Attack on Port Sudan, Army Spokesperson Says.” CNN. May 4, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/vkpvh9vs

[ii]The group evolved from ‘Janjaweed militias’, which fought in a conflict in the 2000s in the Darfur region.

[iii]Amgad. 2025. “Hemedti Acknowledges RSF Retreat after Sudan Army Gains - Dabanga Radio TV Online.” Dabanga Radio TV Online. Radio Dabanga. March 31, 2025.

[iv]Post, Sudans. 2025. “RSF Denies Role in Port Sudan Drone Strikes, Warns of Islamist Resurgence - Sudans Post.” Sudans Post. May 7, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/yck2tjdu

[v]First Civil War 1955-1972; Second Civil War 1983-2005.

[vi]BBC News. 2019. “Sudan Conflict: Army and Civilians Form Sovereign Council,” August 20, 2019. https://tinyurl.com/k85rc6bb

[vii]BBC News. 2022. “Sudan Coup: Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok Resigns after Mass Protests,” January 3, 2022, sec. Africa. https://tinyurl.com/39p8ty4d

[viii]Center for Preventive Action. 2025. “Civil War in Sudan.” Global Conflict Tracker. Council on Foreign Relations. April 15, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/2z7xbr4w

[ix]Ochieng, Beverly. 2023. “Sudan Fighting: The Military Rivalry behind the Clashes in Khartoum.” BBC News, April 15, 2023, sec. Africa. https://tinyurl.com/4ts6ep43

[x] Usher, Barbara Plett. 2025. “Port Sudan Strikes: Drone Attacks Raise Stakes in New Phase of Bloody Civil War.” Bbc, May 14, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/4ywh4vy6

[xi]Tounsel, Christopher. 2023. “Sudan’s Plunge into Chaos Has Geopolitical Implications near and Far – Including for US Strategic Goals.” The Conversation. April 28, 2023. https://tinyurl.com/4yh449we

[xii]Admin. 2015. “The Rising Importance of Port Sudan.” Africa News Portal. October 12, 2015. https://tinyurl.com/2er47xva

[xiii] Post, Sudans. 2025. “Yale Analysis Confirms Aircraft Destruction at Nyala Airport – Sudans Post.” Sudans Post. May 10, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/3n6zytda

[xiv] Salih, Zainab Mohammed. 2025. “Conflict in Sudan: A Map of Regional and International Actors.” Wilson Center. January 14, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/3c623h34

[xv]Ahmadi, Ali Abbas. 2023. “Who Are the Major Foreign Actors Involved in Sudan Fighting?” Https://Www.newarab.com/. April 18, 2023. https://tinyurl.com/4uz3m6pf

[xvi]Abdul, Kazim. 2025. “Turkish Bayraktar TB2 Drone Instrumental in Sudan Army’s Advances.” Military Africa. April 10, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/4uj76reb

[xvii]Abdul, Kazim. 2024. “RSF Shoots down Sudan Army’s Mohajer Drone.” Military Africa, January 15, 2024. https://tinyurl.com/52z72zkt

[xviii] FP News Desk. 2025. “Sudan Labels UAE ‘Aggressor State’ for Alleged Support to RSF, Cuts Ties in Major Diplomatic Fallout.” Firstpost. May 6, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/2wky72e7

[xix] Houreld, Katharine, and Hafiz Haroun. 2024. “Sudan’s Civil War Fueled by Secret Arms Shipments from UAE and Iran.” Washington Post. The Washington Post. October 15, 2024. https://tinyurl.com/2kvzbhbf

[xx]BasilliohRukanga. 2025a. “Sudan-Russia Deal: Final Agreement Reached over Red Sea Naval Base, Says Sudan.” BBC, February 13, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/2xe9s4zj

[xxi]Frudd, Timothy. 2025. “Trump Admin Warns of ‘Serious Consequences’ If Russia Builds Naval Base in Sudan.” American Military News. April 24, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/3rywpry2

[xxii]Ahmadi, Ali Abbas. 2023. “Who Are the Major Foreign Actors Involved in Sudan Fighting?” Https://Www.newarab.com/. April 18, 2023. https://tinyurl.com/4uz3m6pf

[xxiii] Jazeera, Al. 2025. “Sudan Scene of World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis: African Union.” Al Jazeera. February 11, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/3bzuvr4z

[xxiv] “UN Experts Demand International Action as Human Rights Violations Escalate in Sudan’s Displacement Camps.” 2025. OHCHR. 2025. https://tinyurl.com/yvkkav3x

[xxv] “A Sudan Roadmap for Trump’s First 100 Days - Kate Hixon and Kehinde Togun.” 2025. CIP. March 13, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/y6vjns9y

[xxvi]Global Desk. 2025. “Trump’s USAID Cuts Leads to Wastage of Food for 3.5 million per Month.” The Economic Times. Economic Times. May 17, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/vck7eyr5

[xxvii]“India Sends 2 Tons of Life-Saving Medicines to War-Torn Sudan.” 2025. Ndtv.com. 2025. https://tinyurl.com/w6putjkb

[xxviii]“Imposing Measures on Sudan for Its Use of Chemical Weapons - United States Department of State.” 2025. United States Department of State. May 22, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/y66w5e8x

[xxix]Mitchell. 2025. “US Says Sudan Used Chemical Weapons in Civil War,” May 23, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/4fvadhsj

[xxx]Sudan Tribune. 2025. “Attacks on Sudan’s Port Sudan Threaten Red Sea Safety, Ministry Says, Blaming UAE,” May 13, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/mw5m8rp7