Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: West Asia has been one of the major focus areas for the US. When Trump took office for the first time, Saudi Arabia and Israel were his destinations for his first visit as President. As he takes over as President for a second term, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are going to be the first countries he will visit. This visit, scheduled to take place from 13 to 16 May 2025, will shape US policy towards West Asia for the next four years. 

Introduction 

The West Asian region has been a major pillar in US foreign policy. The region is vital for the US for the many resources it holds, oil being the central element, and its strategic location. While the entire region is of vital importance, some countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) hold a special significance. It has been a long tradition that the first telephonic conversation of the President-elect is with either the King or the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. When Donald Trump took over as the 45^th President of the United States of America in 2017, his first foreign trip comprised of important West Asian countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel.[i] Now again as the 47^th President, he will visit Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. This is scheduled to take place from 13 to 16 May 2025. This was supposed to be Trump’s first visit abroad as President but Pope Francis’ death caused a change of plans. However, this trip will still be his first diplomatic trip as President. 

Trump’s scheduled visit to these three West Asian countries comes at a crucial time, with the region going through major shifts: the Israel-Hamas war still ongoing, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the HTS coming to power, and the Iran nuclear talks underway. These events had far-reaching impacts on the region and beyond. Therefore, the West Asia that Trump will visit in 2025 differs from the one he visited during his first term as President. It is in this context that the paper seeks to evaluate the issues at stake for Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, as well as for the US, in the backdrop of the changing geopolitics of the West Asian region.  There are several key issues at stake for the three countries and the US, which this visit can be expected to address, ranging from economic and strategic to geopolitical. With the US conducting direct talks for Iran’s nuclear deal and the increased involvement of China in the region, Trump’s visit will play a major role in shaping the Middle East policy for this administration. 
 
Saudi Arabia: Economic Engagements 

Saudi Arabia has been a major ally of the US in the region. The two countries not only share a strong economic relationship but also have major collaborations in the defence sector. In 2024, the total volume of trade between the two countries was estimated to be around $25.9 billion.[ii] The US has been a major security provider for Saudi Arabia with at least $126.6 billion in active government-to-government sales under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system.[iii] Following the Iranian attack on the Abqaiq oil facility on 14 September 2019, the US sent 200 troops in addition to a Patriot missile battery and four ground-based radar systems to Saudi Arabia.[iv] The pivotal position of Saudi Arabia in US foreign policy can also be gauged by the fact that during the first Trump administration, Saudi Arabia was the first country he visited as President. Trump had also made concerted efforts to get Saudi Arabia into the fold of the Abraham Accords but a change of hands at the White House stalled the process. 

A key issue at stake is Trump’s efforts to bring down the global oil prices. This will be a major concern for Saudi Arabia as the Kingdom is on the cusp of an economic transition with mega projects like NEOM on the line.[v] Lowering oil prices and increasing the production of crude oil was one of the major agendas in Trump’s presidential campaign.[vi] With the latest tariffs in place, oil prices may not drop for some time. However, Trump’s objective remains the same which might work to the detriment of Saudi Arabia. 

Abraham Accords 

The events that have unfolded since the 7 October attacks, have made the possibility of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords bleak if not negated. Prior to the attack, Saudi media had actively campaigned for the normalisation of ties with Israel.[vii] Surveys found that a majority of young Saudi people, about 76 percent below the age of 40 years, were less anti-Israeli and were expected to be more welcoming towards a possible normalisation with Israel.[viii] However, following the October 7 attacks, the popular opinion in Saudi Arabia drastically shifted with 96 percent of the Saudis being of the opinion that all ties with Israel should be severed.[ix] Therefore, as far as bringing Saudi Arabia into the Accords is concerned, Trump might have to do more than give security guarantees to the al-Saud regime. 

The Iran Factor 

The third issue at stake is the Iran factor. Saudi Arabia has followed a regional policy of “zero conflict” following the Abqaiq oil facility attacks.[x] But Trump’s policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran might place Saudi Arabia in a difficult position as there is a high possibility of a retaliation from Iran. It is worth noting here that Iran and Saudi Arabia had restored relations in a deal brokered by China in March 2023.[xi] Maintaining cordial relations with Iran is vital for Saudi Arabia not only because of the threat of future attacks but also because they are close neighbours. Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman had shown similar sentiments when he said in an interview that Iran will be a neighbour forever and neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran can get rid of each other[xii]. However, Trump’s policy towards Iran may upend this cold peace between the neighbours. 

United Arab Emirates 

Another crucial country for the US in the West Asian region and the second country that Trump is scheduled to visit is the UAE. Ties between the two countries reached new heights during the first Trump administration. The UAE had opposed the 2015 nuclear deal and was one of the foremost supporters of Trump’s decision to withdraw from the deal. It was also the first country to join the Abraham Accords on 15 September 2020. Notably, when the 7 October attacks had planted seeds of doubt in other Arab countries with regard to the normalisation of ties with Israel, the UAE was one of the few countries that had continued maintaining normal relations despite joining fellow Arab countries for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. 

Trade and Energy 

Moreover, the Emirati market is the largest export market for the US in the West Asian region.[xiii] In 2024, the bilateral trade between the US and the UAE stood at $34.4 billion with US exports accounting for $26.9 billion, which was an 8.5 per cent increase from 2023.[xiv] The two countries have major cooperations in the defence sector as well with about $29.3 billion in active government-to-government sales under the US FMS.[xv] Apart from economic and defence sectors, the two countries have also worked closely in the energy sector. The US Energy Secretary Chris Wright undertook a visit to the UAE’s Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) on 10 April 2025, making it the first high level visit by a member of the second Trump administration[xvi]. The visit lasted two days during which Wright visited the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant which feeds around 25 per cent of the UAE’s total energy demand and was developed under the UAE-US 123 Agreement.[xvii] The Secretary also visited the Shah Gas Field, which is currently producing more than 1.45 billion standard cubic feet of natural gas per day.[xviii] It is also worth noting here that prior to Secretary Wright’s visit to the UAE, President Trump had hosted Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed al Nahyan, national security advisor of the UAE in the White House on 18 March 2025[xix]. This meeting witnessed discussions on artificial intelligence and technology with the UAE committing to a 10-year $1.4 trillion investment framework in the US focusing on AI, energy, semi-conductors and manufacturing.[xx] Therefore, the key areas that will be in focus during Trump’s visit and the course of his administration vis-a-vis UAE are likely going to be the energy and artificial intelligence sector.

Defence Engagements

As Trump’s first term was nearing an end, a deal was signed with the UAE for the purchase of F-35 fighter jets and MQ-9 Reaper drones on 20 January 2021, which was worth around $23 billion.[xxi] However, following Biden’s inauguration in the White House the arms deal was suspended, signalling a recalibration in the US-UAE ties. Reports suggest that the deal was suspended owing to US concerns over the capability of the UAE to keep the F-35s and Reaper drone technology safe from other bigger powers like China[xxii]. With the return of Trump, there is a renewed hope for the UAE to bring the deal back to life and see some progress with the procurement of the arms. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect discussions around this deal during Trump’s visit in May.

The China Factor

While being close partners, the UAE has also sought to pursue an independent foreign policy and pursued a strategy of hedging by forging closer ties with countries like China and Russia.[xxiii] As mentioned above, during the Biden administration, strains began to appear in the ties between the two countries. This pushed the UAE further closer to China with which it has close cooperation in the energy and defence sectors. The UAE provides China with 7 per cent of its crude oil demand while for China, the UAE is its largest non-oil trading partner in the region[xxiv]. As recently as 23 April 2025, China National Offshore Oil Corporation has signed a five-year deal with ADNOC for 500,000 tonnes of LNG, which will be shipped to China annually beginning in 2026.[xxv] Just as the arms deal with the US was falling apart, the UAE signed a defence deal with China for the purchase of 12 light attack aircrafts with the provision for the purchase of an additional 36 aircraft if the need arises[xxvi]. Additionally, in August 2023 the two countries announced the “China-UAE Falcon Shield 2023” aerial combat exercise in China’s Xinjiang province. This close cooperation between the UAE and China is something that the Trump administration will be watching closely. Trump has time and again made his intentions vis-a-vis China clear. Therefore, any kind of closeness between a country that Trump sees as a close US ally and China will not sit well. The visit may also see Trump making overtures to bring the UAE closer to the US fold and pull it away from China.

Conclusion

The third country that President Trump will be visiting is Qatar, a country that was given the status of a major non-NATO ally by the Biden administration. Qatar hosts the headquarters of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) and Air Force Central Command Forward at the Al Udeid Air base which is also the largest US military base in the West Asian region. It is the third largest buyer of the US defence system and has imported about $4.6 billion worth of American goods[xxvii]. Qatar has also invested around $45 billion in the US economy with investments in the Gold Pass Liquefied Natural Gas Project and a $10 billion LNG liquefication and export facility in Texas.[xxviii] Qatar has also collaborated with the US to de-escalate tensions in the region and beyond through its acumen for mediation. This was illustrated during the US-Taliban talks in 2020 and the temporary ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Given the wide areas of cooperation between the US and Qatar, there are several things to look forward to during Trump’s visit. One of them is the need for Qatar to work on a more durable peace in the Israel-Hamas war. This is a key area that may be on Trump’s agenda primarily because Qatar hosts the Hamas headquarters and has greater leverage over the organisation than any other country within and outside the region. An immediate end to the war is vital for US interests as well as for other countries in the region. A second area of interest for Trump is Qatar connections with organisations that the US considers terrorists. Be it Hamas in the Gaza Strip or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, Trump has taken a firmer and bolder stand against such organisations. Therefore, there may be renewed and firmer pressure on Qatar to recalibrate and redefine its relations with such organisations.  Thirdly, Qatar’s growing economic cooperation with Iran helps the latter to evade sanctions that put Trump’s doctrine of maximum pressure at risk. The visit may also see Trump take a firmer stand against such cooperation. If Qatar’s actions are seen as going against US interests in the region, it might also lead Trump to unilaterally withdraw its status as a major non-NATO ally.

The West Asian region will be one of the primary focus areas of the new Trump administration. The visit from 13 to 16 May 2025 will put in focus some key issues for the three countries of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. The geopolitical realities of the region have changed drastically since the last Trump administration. China is far more involved in the region than it was before, the Israel-Hamas war continues to rage on and a nuclear Iran continues to threaten actors in and outside the region. There are several issues at stake vis-a-vis the three countries and the US. This visit will likely shape the contours of US engagement in the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar.

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*Stuti Gogoi, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i] Katulis, Brian. “Trump’s upcoming Middle East trip presents opportunities at a time of increased risks.” Middle East Institute, April 2, 2025, https://www.mei.edu/publications/trumps-upcoming-middle-east-trip-presents-opportunities-time-increased-risks. Accessed April 28, 2025.

[ii] Office of the United States Trade Representative (2025), “Saudi Arabia Trade Summary,” https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/middle-eastnorth-africa/saudi-arabia. Accessed April 28, 2025.

[iii] US Department of State (2025), “US Security Cooperation with Saudi Arabia,” https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-saudi-arabia/#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20has%20%24126.6%20billion,in%20FMS%20and%20DCS%20cases. Accessed April 20, 2025.

[iv] Alamer Sultan, “Trump’s Middle East Policy and its Impact on Saudi Arabia”, March 13, 2025, available at: https://newlinesinstitute.org/strategic-competition/trumps-middle-east-policy-and-its-impact-on-saudi-arabia/. Accessed April 4 2025.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Collin Eaton and Benoit Morenne, ”Trump Promised to Lower Energy Prices – But it wasn’t supposed to be like this,” April 6, 2025, available at: https://www.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/oil-prices-trump-tariffs-trade-war-a598a367. Accessed April 20, 2025.

[vii] Alamer Sultan, “Trump’s Middle East Policy and its Impact on Saudi Arabia”, March 13, 2025, available at: https://newlinesinstitute.org/strategic-competition/trumps-middle-east-policy-and-its-impact-on-saudi-arabia/. Accessed April 4 2025.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Ibid.

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] UAE USA United, available at: https://www.uaeusaunited.com/stories/strong-economic-partners#:~:text=Bilateral%20trade%20is%20dynamic%20and,to%20growth%20for%20US%20companies. Accessed April 20, 2025.

[xiv] Embassy of the UAE in Washington DC, available at: https://www.uae-embassy.org/uae-us-cooperation/uae-us-trade. Accessed April 20, 2025.

[xv] US Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates,” available at: https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-the-united-arab-emirates/#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20has%20%2429.3%20billion,security%20provider%20for%20the%20region. Accessed April 18, 2025.

[xvi] Kavitha, “US-UAE Energy Ties Strengthen as US Energy Secretary Chris Wright Makes First Official Visit to ADNOC Headquarters”, April 12, 2025. Available at: https://solarquarter.com/2025/04/12/us-uae-energy-ties-strengthen-as-us-energy-secretary-chris-wright-makes-first-official-visit-to-adnoc-headquarters/ Accessed April 25, 2025.

[xvii] The Tribune, “UAE, US to deepen strategic partnerships as Energy Secretary concludes visit,” April 11, 2025, available at: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/energy-secretary/uae-us-to-deepen-strategic-partnerships-as-energy-secretary-concludes-visit#google_vignette. Accessed April 15, 2025.

[xviii] Ibid

[xix] Emirates News Agency, “Tahnoon bin Zayed to begin official visit to U.S. on Monday” March 15, 2025. Available at: https://www.wam.ae/en/article/biofb26-tahnoon-bin-zayed-begin-official-visit-us-monday. Accessed April 10, 2025.

[xx] U.S. Embassy and Consulate in the United Arab Emirates, “Thanks to President Trump, UAE Announces Significant Investments in the U.S. Economy,” available at: https://ae.usembassy.gov/thanks-to-president-trump-uae-announces-significant-investments-in-u-s-economy/#:~:text=Following%20the%20meeting%2C%20the%20UAE,%2C%20energy%2C%20and%20American%20manufacturing. Accessed April 10, 2025.

[xxi] Alexander Cornwell, “Exclusive: UAE to ask Trump to fulfil F-35 Deal if he is re-elected, sources say” Reuters, September 13, 2024, available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-ask-trump-fulfil-f-35-deal-if-hes-re-elected-sources-say-2024-09-13/ Accessed April 15, 2025.

[xxii] Congressional Research Service, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for US Policy”, August 8, 2024, available at: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RS21852.pdf. Accessed April 10, 2025.

[xxiii] Ibid

[xxiv] Ibid

[xxv] China Global South Project, “China-UAE Liquid Natural Gas Deals Signed Amid Trade Upheaval”, April 23, 2025. Available at: https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2025/04/23/china-uae-liquid-natural-gas-deals-signed-amid-trade-upheaval/. Accessed April 28, 2025.

[xxvi] Congressional Research Service, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for US Policy,” August 8, 2024, available at: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RS21852.pdf. Accessed April 10, 2025.

[xxvii] U.S. Embassy in Qatar, “U.S-Qatar Strategic Partnership,” March 5, 2024, available at: https://qa.usembassy.gov/the-u-s-qatar-strategic-partnership/. Accessed April 28, 2025.

[xxviii] Ibid.