Indian Council of World Affairs

Tunchinmang Langel: Before we begin, I would like to request all to kindly switch off their mobile phones or put them on silent mode, please. Good morning, distinguished guests, esteemed speakers, and valued participants. It is an honor to welcome you all to the panel discussion on Inside the Hermit Kingdom, Decoding the DPRK's Politics, Society, and Global Role, organized by the Indian Council of World Affairs. To navigate the complexities of North Korea, we are privileged to have with us an esteemed panel of experts who will offer their insights into the inner workings of the DPRK and its broader strategic implications. We look forward to a stimulating discussion that will deepen our understanding and contribute to informed discourse on this important subject. 

Without further ado, let us begin our proceedings. To kick off the panel discussion, I invite Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary of the Indian Council of World Affairs, to deliver the welcome remarks. 

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Distinguished experts, members of the diplomatic corps, students and friends! 

Welcome to the discussion on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), a country that remains reclusive and yet pivotal in shaping regional and global geopolitical dynamics. When we were curating this panel discussion, we decided to focus for a change only on DPRK rather than on the peace and security on the Korean Peninsula or on situation in North East Asia to provide more room to ponder on DPRK’s society, its politics and global role. We were also conscious of the fact that such a discussion might be constrained due to lack of primary sources of information. 

Let me begin by the imagery of DPRK in the media. The DPRK has been governed by the Kim dynasty whose portrayal in the media has varied across the world. The Western media has painted the regime as authoritarian, isolationist, somewhat cranky, a nuclear threat, projecting sensational narratives with selective focus on robotic military parades and intimidating missile tests shaping the dominant narrative of North Korea in the Western imagination. 

In contrast, Russian media portrays DPRK as a traditional friend which can be trusted with Russian cooperation in strategic sectors. Chinese state media too provides a more pragmatic and sometimes sympathetic description of the regime. Kim Jong-un is depicted as a leader who ensured political continuity and national sovereignty through serious challenges to the state’s affairs. 

It is this divergence in perspectives that underscores the geopolitical fault lines that frames North Korea’s global identity and its policy choices. 

Over the years, DPRK’s society and economy have shown resilience and adaptation in face of persistent sanctions. The overall welfare of the average citizen is however subject to systemic constraints. DPRK in recent times has navigated through periods of economic hardship, famine, military provocations, and diplomatic confrontations, not always without assistance from traditional external partners. 

In spite of what seems to be rigorous state control, there appears to be sign that the North Korean society is not entirely monolithic. Over the last two decades, for instance, grassroots marketization has encouraged growth of informal economic spaces with reports of over 400 officially sanctioned private market activities. The influx of foreign media through illicit means such as smuggled USB drives have also given the people glimpses of life beyond their borders as per testimonies of some North Korean ‘defectors’. This raises speculation about possible subtle shifts and aspirations amongst the younger generation raised under Kim Jong-un’s era. 

It is no secret that North Korea has faced rolling waves of sanctions by the UN Security Council, the US, and the European Union every time Pyongyang tested its nuclear capabilities and test launched its ballistic missiles. The measures targeted sales of arms, imports of luxury goods, financial assets and access to global banking, in order to halt the DPRK nuclear program, yet their effectiveness remains contested. Additionally, the US hardening of position on North Korea arrived in 2002, when President George W. Bush added the DPRK to the “Axis of Evil”. The logic was straightforward, Washington implied that Pyongyang in its pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction supported global terrorism, which thereafter cemented DPRK’s pariah status in Western foreign policy - overlooking the country’s own insecurities and paranoia. 

North Korea’s global positioning must be placed within the larger Cold War context involving the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. The Korean War which ended in an armistice but not a peace treaty, entrenched the division of and locked the peninsula into hostility, and the North aligned itself with the Soviet Union bloc. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea faced an economic crisis and a strategic vacuum forcing Pyongyang to recalibrate its foreign relations and economic strategy. China became a crucial partner, supplying energy, food, aid and trade though with more pragmatic and conditional support. 

Despite the recent Summits with President Trump and meetings with South Korean and Chinese leaders in 2017-18, Kim’s decision of last year to abandon hopes of peaceful reunification with South Korea and declare Seoul as North Korea’s new number one enemy indicates the pulls from divergent directions on DPRK on how to position itself in current geopolitics.

In the past two years, Russia has re-emerged as a willing partner to North Korea with the signing of a comprehensive treaty between Pyongyang and Moscow which is becoming a tool to resist Western pressure.  The treaty’s provision for mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of the parties is remnant of cold war politics and is understood to be aimed at deterring the US and its allies and NATO. Deployment of DPRK troops is a paradigm shift for the Ukraine war and current geopolitics. DPRK is now closely aligned with Russia and China - countries that challenge the west-led world order. This evolving cooperation provides North Korea with potential economic and technological gains, possibly in the form of advanced military equipment and energy resources, while complicating efforts for denuclearization and non-proliferation. Analysts indicate nuances in Russian and Chinese approaches towards DPRK and I hope the Panel will shed light on this. 

Historically, India has maintained a non-confrontational approach towards North Korea, and has preferred dialogue and restraint. New Delhi maintains diplomatic relations with Pyongyang with limited developmental assistance. India has also recently decided to resume its Embassy operations in North Korea after it was shut in 2021 due to the Covid-19 restrictions. Within the broader Indo-Pacific outlook, India prioritizes stability on the Korean Peninsula and well-being of the Korean people as key to regional security, long-term stability and maritime cooperation. I hope the Panel will discuss whether there is room for India to broaden its outreach to DPRK especially in the humanitarian sphere. 

An element in India’s position on North Korea has been its concerns related to proliferation linkages between DPRK, China and Pakistan which have adversely impacted its security calculus. India’s concerns are well-known; and here it is for China to take the lead in creating an atmosphere of trust. 

To conclude, let me say that, being an unconventional nation-state, it is important to explore DPRK beyond clichés that reduce it to a rogue regime. And it is with this objective that we have put together an eminent group of panellists today ably chaired by Amb Skand Tayal, Former Ambassador of India to South Korea and panellists from Delhi, Seoul and Moscow for varied perspectives. I look forward to a fruitful and thought-provoking discussion. I wish the panellists all the best. 

Skand Tayal: Thank you, Ambassador Mahawar, for that introduction of the theme. My congratulations to ICWA and you and Professor Langel that normally any discussion on North Korea is focused only on their nuclear program. So, today, we will be discussing decoding the DPRK's politics, society and global role. I think that gives a very good opportunity for panelists and all of us to dig deeper and try to understand that country. Before I proceed, there are so many young scholars here. I fully endorse what ambassador said, never believe the Western media. You draw your own conclusions. Listen to diverse media, read all kinds of reports from different sources and then come to some conclusions.

Now, politics of DPRK, of course, it's a centralized political system as it is in any authoritarian, totalitarian, one-party state. But it is also personalized around the Kim dynasty. I recall when I was in Seoul, the Chinese ambassador said that it is like a Central Asian Nawab. It's not a communist state. It's like earlier Khanate. He said it's like a Khanate. Anyway. Question arises, is there any number two there? Some name Choe Ryong-hae has been mentioned Chairman of Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly. A couple years back, there was another name mentioned I'm sure Professor Mishra and others would be following some Jo Yong-won. But what happened to him? Who was he? 

Of course, dynastic succession seems to be very much part of the polity there. KJU is very young, of course. But who is in the dynasty? Next sister Kim Yo Jong, State Affairs Commission member, she has been prominent making statements and some, I think she's in the dynasty, she's high up there. Wife one doesn't hear much about her, Ri Sol-ju. But a very young daughter is visible in the media, Kim Ju Ae. So where is some succession being planned?

The society, of course, in all the communist states, societies are fully literate. But what about higher education? How is Korea able to produce a succession of engineers, technicians, scientists, who can launch space satellites and make weapons and all of that? What is the state of health facilities there? Even Cuba and many other totalitarian states have excellent health facilities. What about health facilities there? Then food security, of course, India has also been providing $1 million food assistance from time to time. I think last was 2020. What is the state of affairs today? And we all recall, under COVID, what kind of total lockdown was put in place in North Korea? What are the after effects, have they come out of it?

Now, let us pose more questions. After all, it is Indian Council of World Affairs on KJU's foreign policy. In my view, Kim Jong-un is an astute strategic practitioner. He has ensured regime survival. The world has more or less accepted it as a nuclear weapons power with credible delivery capacity. So no country can do a Ukraine or Libya on North Korea. And he is also capable of very out of the box thinking. We all recall the honeymoon between Trump one and Kim Jong-un of 2018, the Singapore summit June 2018, Hanoi 27, 28, February 2019 where agreement had been almost concluded and tables were being put in the courtyard for signature when the deep state of United States intervened and held Trump's hand. There is no deep state now around President Trump. But in President Trump's priorities, is North Korea somewhere? That is the question.

But all that depends on or any rapprochement or some understanding between US and North Korea would depend on South Korea. We all recall former President Moon Jae-in's trip to Pyongyang in September 2018, absolutely historic. But then President Yoon Suk Yeol came. He was very, very, very pro-US. We all know. But he is now out. As Ambassador, South Korea was declared a hostile state in 2024 by North Korea and they have abandoned the goal of reunification, which is a very practical thing to do, in my view. But a new president may be there on 3rd of June. Lee Jae-myung's name is being mentioned. Will the sunshine policy in a new form be back? And with President Trump, who may be nursing some dreams of having a historic agreement, they could work together.

Another trajectory to watch is DPRK-Russia. Post-Ukraine-Russia war, it has been galloping ahead with soldiers fighting, North Korean soldiers apparently, on the Ukraine front. Munitions, that is a fact. A lot of artillery, etc., has gone from North Korea to Russia. And perhaps Russia is supplying food, financial, technical assistance to North Korea because that satellite which was put in orbit after several failures, that happened after KJU met President Putin. And so perhaps some technology transfer took place, who knows.

Then, of course, the June 2024 visit of President Putin to Pyongyang has been again historic. Defense agreement has also been signed, as mentioned. One of the topics in the concept paper is China's central role in sustaining DPRK. Of course, it has a very, very central role. More than 90% of DPRK's foreign trade is with China, perhaps food also comes from there. Then the mutual defense treaty was renewed in 2021. And I always maintain that in North Korea's nuclear program, China has played a composite role. Just to have a nuclear program, you need very sophisticated computers, tracking system, composite materials. And we recall when ICBM was displayed on a 30-wheel truck in Pyongyang. Can North Korea manufacture that? Difficult.

Then DPRK's nuclear program. I think most realists believe that denuclearization of Korean Peninsula is a fantasy. And anything practical can only be around some kind of an arms control agreement. Then the future will tell which way it will go. And also the concept paper says, can DPRK or will DPRK come out of isolation? I think Chairman KJU wants to come out of isolation. And that's why all these overtures to US and all of that. But of course, he was rebuffed. But two things. One, there is no economic value in DPRK. It has neither oil, nor rare earth, nor wheat, nor nothing, which the rest of the world wants. Otherwise, they would have been coated.

The only thing which, when I was there, and there was some hope that the railway line from South Korea through North Korea to Russia, and that could open another route for South Korean goods, etc., to Europe. But that is something which is for the future. But any coming back or coming out of isolation would, of course, depend on South Korea and the United States, and also which way the whole geopolitics is headed, which, as all of you know, is today completely in flux. 

So to discuss all these issues and more, we have a very, very eminent panel. And again, congratulations to ICWA for putting it together. And we start with Professor Hwang Jihwan, Department of International Relations in University of Seoul, who has joined us from Seoul. All the panelists have about 10 minutes, Professor. And after that, we'll have a discussion. Over to you, Professor Hwang. 

Hwang Jihwan: Okay. Let me start. Thanks for having me here. This is Jihwan Hwang from Korea, University of Seoul, Korea. And today, I'm going to mention about North Korea's domestic politics, society, and also its foreign relations. First of all, with regard to its foreign relations and the strategic thinking, in terms of that, I think that North Korea has presented a grave threat to peace and stability, not only on the Korean Peninsula, but also to the rest of Asia and the world. So that threat is not actually new, but it has recently become more aggressive. Although it has not conducted a nuclear test, since 2017, it concluded a new security treaty with Russia and reportedly sent more than 10,000 troops to the Ukraine War. 

So the security treaty with Russia was an effort to make changes to the international relations around the Korean Peninsula. The current North Korean threat is, I think, the extension of the President breakthrough, strategy that it declared at the end of 2019. Actually, it maintained that its hotline stands at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, setting out targets such as hypersonic missiles, super-large nuclear bombs, multiple warheads, nuclear weapons technology, and nuclear submarines. Submarines launched nuclear weapons and SLBM, and also military reconnaissance satellite. 

In addition, North Korea enacted the nuclear weapons policy law in September 2022, which stipulated that five conditions for nuclear first use and a predetermined operational plan for legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons, so thereby escalating the potential for a nuclear crisis. Three of these conditions involve nuclear or non-nuclear preemptive attacks by the hostile forces of North Korea. And the other two concerns wartime operations and inevitable catastrophe crisis. 

So, Kim Jong-un, KJU, has implied that the nuclear forces would have no choice, but to execute their second mission unexpectedly if enemies threaten the DPRK's fundamental interests. As you understand, the first mission that he mentioned is, of course, the nuclear deterrence against the United States. So, this nuclear first use policy may include using tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. Originally, North Korea talked about the strategic nuclear weapons against United States when he win it, finally they conducted a nuclear test in 2017. 

So now North Korea has plans to develop small tactical nuclear weapons, as well as the medium-range and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic nuclear weapons. This suggests that Pyongyang is shifting its nuclear strategy from assured retaliation to asymmetric escalation, according to VP Narang, the MIT professor. It carries a much greater risk with the asymmetric escalation strategy. North Korea revised also its constitution in September 2023 to make its nuclear policy more explicit to implement that. In this way, the North Korean face has continuously stepped up its offensive against the United States and South Korea on the Korean Peninsula. 

Furthermore, North Korea has sought to change the nature of North and South Korean relations. In the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party in late 2023, Kim Jong-un declared that the inter-Korean relations and its unification policies are over and should be revised, defining the inter-Korean relations as involving two hostile relations at work, instead of pressing for unification, as his grandfather and his father said in the past. 

So North Korea's relations, and also the North Korean relations with Russia and China, present another challenge for the Korean Peninsula. An important aspect of Pyongyang's confrontational stance towards South Korea, I think, comes from its improving relations with Moscow and Beijing, because Pyongyang has actively supported China amid various U.S.-China strategic conflict and competition, and also has strongly defended Russia's invasion of Ukraine. 

Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, North Korea has provided Russia with many military equipment, reportedly including the ammunition, artillery shells, missiles, and other goods to Russia. They even sent reportedly more than 10,000 troops to the Ukraine War. So North Korea has argued that the root cause of the Ukraine crisis lies in the hegemonic strategy of the United States and the Western world, and that the Russia's demands are reasonable. So, Kim Jong-un, KJU has declared that the newly signed Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea was established on June last year to elevate their relationship to a new, higher level of alliance. 

So the treaty, particularly Article 4, stipulates that "if either country faces war due to armed invasion by one or more states, the other party will provide immediate military and other forms of assistance using all means at its disposal." So this provision presents a significant threat with profound implications for the Russian war strategy and also the regional order in both Europe and East Asia, I think. However, there are important factors to consider regarding the long-term impact of this Russia-DPRK alliance. So the thing is that whether it will endure beyond the Korean world. But the thing is that the Russia-DPRK relations have undergone significant changes over the past three decades after the end of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. 

So it remains unclear whether this closeness between these two countries will last after the war. In this sense, I think that North Korea appears to be taking advantage of the treaty to formalize its relationship with the other, the patrons of great power. So Kim Jong-un has also made effort to strengthen relations with China, and he has made the effort to deepen strategic communications and mutual understanding between the two sides, thereby providing a firm guarantee for further strengthening the bilateral relations. 

So Pyongyang is now seeking a new security environment on the Korean Peninsula while strengthening its awareness of a new cold war order. Kim Jong-un himself several times stated that, "added the structure of international relations changed into a new Cold War structure and a multi-polar one." So Kim's perception of the new Cold War order reflect the U.S.-China strategic rivalry and the Ukraine War and the change in the international situation since the Russian invasion of the Ukraine. 

So he seems to believe that the changes in the world order will also change the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean domestic situation has been always difficult for several decades, but it has not been developed to threaten the regime crisis. So to a certain extent, North Korea's domestic political and economic situations are expected to affect the North Korean foreign relations. So throughout the Kim Jong-un era, there have been serious concerns that North Korea has experienced suffered from the great domestic difficulties, which was caused by the international sanctions and shutdown of its borders during the COVID-19 era and the natural disasters, including the typhoons and the floods, something like that. 

In the Voluntary National Review, VNR, submitted to the United Nations a few years ago, that North Korea acknowledged that it has been experiencing difficulties with the cereal productions as well as medical supplies, something like that. So during the POT Congress, Kim Jong-un also even admitted that the five-year plan, economic development plan had failed. If the domestic predicament persists, then North Korea may produce other provocative measures to deal with its domestic difficulties. It may be possibly the force to engage in an aggressive foreign policy aimed at the gardening the attention from the international community. 

But although some predicted the possibility of the regime instability, I think the Kim Jong-un regime still appears to be very sustainable enough to go through all these difficulties. So finally, I think that North Korea's domestic hardship has exposed the various aspects of the North Korean regime's internal and external, the challenges and response strategy. So those strategies can be summarized as the first, the anti-globalization strategy. Second, the state-centered control strategy and third, the mobilization strategy. 

So in conclusion, so they have, North Korea is unstable, but they have this kind of authoritarian control toolbox that makes the Kim Jong-un regime survive despite all the difficulties. But there is a deep connection between its domestic politics and also its foreign policy and international relations. Let me stop here. Thank you. 

Skand Tayal: Thank you very much, Professor Hwang, for these remarks. Yes, it appears that the cold war is perhaps back again in Europe, and perhaps the Korean Peninsula it never really left. But the fundamental question is that the North Korean nuclear weapons program is just to ensure regime survival or do they harbor some expansionist designs towards South Korea still? That is for future to tell. 

Now I invite our guest from Moscow, Dr. Alexander Vorontsov, Head of Korea and Mongolia Department, RAS Institute of Oriental Studies. Over to you, Dr. Vorontsov. We can't hear you. Are you on mute? 

Alexander Vorontsov: Sorry. Yeah. Just now it's okay? 

Skand Tayal: Yeah, now it's okay. 

Alexander Vorontsov: Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Indian Council of World Affairs for kind invitation me to such a very important conference to take part. Yes, a very important topic dealing with the current state of North Korea and strategic security situation on Korean Peninsula. And frankly speaking, when we are hearing and when I am hearing repeatedly the thesis how North Korea possess very grave threat to the United States, to South Korea, to the East Asia, it looks very interesting, sometimes a little bit amazing. 

If we will compare the military capability of the North Korea and the United States, who can possess the threat to each other, the question will be quite simple. And to understand the strategy, and Mr. Chair was absolutely right when he focused our attention on the question, what was the reason for nuclear weapon appearance in North Korea? It's the task of survival or task of possessing a threat to the neighboring country. I think it's important to understand the motivation and the reason of the situation and sequences of deals and facts actions. 

It was the United States in 1951 who concluded the alliance treaty first. First who concluded the alliance treaty with the Republic of Korea and using this treaty deployed American forces in South Korea. And later Soviet Union and China concluded the treaty with the DPRK in North Korea in 1961. And consequently last year Russia and North Korea concluded the treaty of comprehensive strategic partnership, which is to a big extent similar to this alliance treaty between the United States and South Korea. 

And based on this treaty, United States deployed on the Korean Peninsula not only their troops, as we know, but their nuclear weapons. It was the United States first who deployed nuclear weapons on Korean soil. A tactical, as we remember, yes, about 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons that were withdrew by President Bush Sr. in the beginning of '19, but during a long period of time, they were deployed on South Korea. And it was calculated in North Korea strategic thinking and the response and the existence of nuclear response from North Korea. It was derived to a considerable extent by this fact also. 

And when we speak about the North Korean threat, absolutely, I agree with Mr. Chair again, that the strategic goal of North Korea is survival, to provision of survival. And they are deeply sure that the strategic goal of the United States, as well as the Republic of Korea, as other alliance of the United States, its final task is liquidation of DPRK. Yes, there were some diplomatic efforts during the agreed framework period in the second half of '19, the six-party talks, etc. But in course of these negotiations talks, North Korea felt and discovered the hidden agenda of their opponent aimed at the final liquidation of North Korea. 

So, their stance on the increasing defense capability, including the nuclear missile component, it's a logical response from their part to provide their own survival. And coming back to the inter-Korean relation, yes, it's of course a very, very sad story that North Korea, one year ago, refused from the policy of unification, which they conducted during a long period of time. But what was the reason? There are of course many reasons, but we do remember that the predecessor of the former South Korean president, Mr. Moon Jae-in, he succeeded to conduct three summits. Yes, it was recently done, five years ago, conducted three summits with North Korea. 

He was allowed, for example, they agreed, they signed important military agreement in 2018, yes, very important. Practical step. Confidence-building measures, which was appreciated by the Military Experts Society in all countries. It was a considerable success. By the way, he was allowed to speak directly to North Korean people, yes, he made a speech in the North Korean Pyongyang Stadium. It was more than 100,000 North Korean citizens who were sit down in the stadium and had the speech of President of Republic of Korea, Mr. Moon Jae-in, in 2018. So, cooperation was on good condition. 

But from the next, I'm sorry, from the last week, the former President of Republic of Korea, Mr. Yoon Suk Yeol, rejected all this legacy. And he told this, it was false peace, it was false negotiations. I will not participate in false negotiations with North Korea, etc., etc. And by the way, it was October 1st of last year when he told Mr. Yoon Suk Yeol, thanks to the Washington Declaration, the U.S.-South Korean alliance has become nuclear alliance. 

As our esteemed Mr. Chair mentioned, he was very pro-American. And it was response from North Korea, and he told that all conceptions of all administration of Republic of Korea, as well as constitution of Republic of Korea, they reject the existence of DPRK as Republic. And the conceptions of Mr. Yoon Suk Yeol that he announced in August of last year, unification conceptions, once again was aimed at creation of one liberal Korea on Korean Peninsula, to expansion of South Korea on the whole Korean Peninsula. Liquidation of DPRK as a state. 

Therefore, it was said, but to some extent logical, that North Korea decided that just now our relations is not the brother relations more, it's a relation between two different foreign countries which exist now in hostile states. It's sad story, but it was response, as well as nuclear and missiles programs development. And coming back to the Russian-North Korean relations, it was mentioned, yes, it was just now we have traditional good relations. Russian policy towards Korean Peninsula traditionally very stable. Our primary interest is peace and stability on Korean Peninsula, because it's an integral part of stability and security of our border. 

We have common border with Korean Peninsula. And our goal aimed is to have good neighboring and friendly relation with both Korean states. And every Korean state in the Republic of Korea and DPRK has their own value for Russia, strategic important value. And the relation with DPRK also was strategically and kind of traditionally good. Just now it's race as you know, and last year we concluded important treaty of strategic partnership cooperation. It's developing and the economic culture and other fields of cooperations are growing and many delegations exchange between our two countries raised. And high-level visit both to North Korea and to Russia is very intensive. 

So what's the reason? The reason some observers including Russian experts apprised and assessed the current stage of Russia-DPRK relation is the highest one in the whole history. By the way, Mr. Putin, his first visit to North Korea in 2000, not now, 2000 year, it is the first visit of the first person in Russia in the history. Even in the period of the Soviet Union, there were alliance with DPRK. The first leader of Soviet Union, the General Secretary of Communist Party, never visited DPRK. Mr. Putin happened to be the first highest person in Russian political hierarchy who visited North Korea. It was 25 years ago. Therefore, it's traditional. 

Just now is a new stage, of course. There are many reasons and one of the reasons is that the DPRK fully understood the reason of the special military operation which Russia was needed to start in Ukraine. They understood that it was respond to the non-stop eastward expansion of NATO. And just now we're speaking openly that the strategic goal of western countries including the United States headed by the United States as it was repeated many times is to inflict strategic defeat to Russia in the battlefield. 

The North Korea have had the strategic goal the United States is the destruction of DPRK as a state, as a political regime. Regime change in North Korea is a strategic goal. So the situation is similar and close and they told for us for many years, look, when we supported sanctions in the UN for example against North Korea nuclear program etc. They told… 

Skand Tayal: Dr. Voron, so kindly conclude in a couple of minutes.

Alexander Vorontsov: Okay, thank you. Therefore the conclusion of the treaty of strategic cooperation is the logical result of the bilateral relation and development between our two countries and it's aimed at stabilization of situation in North Korea. Look their behavior. Just now, two minutes, yes? Mr. May I ask two minutes? Thank you so much. 

And based on this agreement of last year, North Korea became to feel themselves more self-confident and their response, their reaction to the many, many military drills joined bilateral, trilateral United States, South Korea, Japan, United States, South Korea which non-stop are conducted in South Korea, which were nervous for North Korea. Just now their reaction became a little more calm. Look they have extremely constrained behavior and response in the face of the turbulence in South Korea after the last year December decision of former president of Republic of Korea to impose the martial law in North Korea. 

Just now DPRK is successfully emerging from geopolitical isolation and economic crisis. Yes, they impose by themselves self-isolation policy during the COVID pandemic and during three years they completely closed the borders. It was more severe effect that all sanctions, very heavy sanctions which they imposed on North Korea, but they survived. Just now they are opening to the world and quite successfully. And they became, once again, the active player in the international arena. And their counterpart in many countries, including the United States, by the way, also are feeling that North Korea became more self-confident. 

But their reaction, for example, to this domestic foreign policy, internal foreign policy crisis in South Korea, dealing with coup d'état, etc., was extremely constrained. It was also one of the result of our treaty. They became self-confident and more constrained. Therefore, I think the result is aimed at the stabilization of strategic situation on Korean Peninsula. It's not a threat to the country, it's self-defense nature of this treaty and the sense of our bilateral cooperation. Thank you so much. Thank you for your generosity. Thank you for giving me so long time. Thank you. 

Skand Tayal: Thank you. Thank you very much, Dr. Hwang, for putting the North Korean foreign policy in a historical perspective, that why it is behaving the way it has behaved over the years. And perhaps the time has come for South Korea also to formally give up its goal of reunification, so that these two countries, which are recognized as separate countries by United Nations, etc., deal with each other as separate nations and try to come to some kind of agreements. Thank you very much. 

Now I invite my friend, Professor Sandip Mishra, to speak. In this room, perhaps I and Professor Mishra are only two who have actually been to North Korea. I don't know, Professor, have you been? You have, all right, okay. But I was there when Chairman Kim Il-sung was there, in '83, for some non-aligned conference, and Professor Mishra was there more recently. So over to you. 

Sandip Kumar Mishra: Thank you, Chair. I think it's a pleasure to be here at ICWA. Thank you, Ms. Nutan Mahawar and Langel for organizing something on North Korea. And I request that it should be more often on North Korea, because I think we need to discuss more about North Korea, not only South Korea, but North Korea also, because we have, as Chair mentions, that we are having stereotypes about North Korea, that North Korea is a crazy country. Actually, there are different adjectives. North Korea is a mad country. North Korea is a bad country. North Korea is a failed state. North Korea is a rogue state. North Korea is part of excess of evil. 

So many of these things are there, and I'm not saying that these narratives are entirely wrong, but I think they are partial truth, actually. There are other complicated, the story, the truth is much more complicated. And as we Indian were quite fond of knowing details, I think we should know about a complicated aspect of North Korea. So that's important, the story is more complicated, that's one. And second thing I would like to convey that the stereotype image of North Korea, that doesn't help us in making our foreign policy choices. So I think for both the reasons, we need to have more discussion about North Korea. 

Coming to North Korean politics, I think because of paucity of time, I think I will say that it has a very long journey of being actually initially the 1948 constitution, it talked about Marxist Leninist state, then 1972 amendment started saying Marxist Leninist and Juche Idea. Then I think now the Juche Idea has also been, you can say, 1992 they left Marxist Leninist and only Juche. Recently they have removed Juche also and now they only say that Kim Il Sungism and Kim Jong Ilism. 

So basically they have their own, you can say, idea of how to organize politics and economy. It's largely influenced by socialist idea, but at the same time, many Korean elements are also there. And it has also in a way, all the allegations are to a great extent true that it has become a personality cult, it has become a totalitarian state, it has become a rule of Kim dynasty. So all these narratives are really true. Here I think I would like to emphasize in the politics when we are studying North Korea that North Korea has also, the polity has not been steady. There has been a valid model of organizing political life in North Korea, but increasingly they have deteriorated into a personality cult, totalitarian state. 

It's not that they have been like this for the very beginning. So that part also I would like to emphasize. And yes, in politics what happens that state coercion is very controlled on, society is very strong, but at the same time, I can say, some kind of legitimacy of regime has also been there in North Korea. Actually in North Korea, at different places, you can see a very interesting slogan. It says, in Korean it says, let's live as per our principles. And actually people like me who are basically born pre-1990s, we have some, you can say, idea. In 1980s, we Indian also, lots of problems, economic problems were there, but we had some kind of pride that we are living as per our own principles. So that kind of things have been also there. 

So I think we need to understand that politics which is basically deteriorating to totalitarian dictatorism and also having some acceptance plus coercion all. Coming to society, I would like to say that I think we can discuss, but I think society is also governed by, as I mentioned that it's totalitarian. I'm not using authoritarian. Totalitarian because state has control over almost every aspect of life. In authoritarian, it's only political life, but even what kind of songs you are listening, what kind of music you are having, what kind of books, novels are published, what kind of dances you are having, all these things are basically determined and quite, you can say, rigorously watched by state.

So I think society is also quite, but at the same time control of society could also be seen in how society divided into basis of loyalty. There's a core group, there's a wavering group, and there's a hostile group. Society is divided, 30% people, core group, 40%, depending on how much loyal you have been historically to regime. So I think state, they have a lot of, you can say, spies and other, you can say, mechanisms through which they try to create, but at the same time, last 15, 20 years, 2013, I had a chance to visit for 10 days, North Korea. And I realized that lots of changes are also happening, like mobile use have been there, I think there are at least out of 23 million people, around 7 million people, they are having mobile phone in North Korea. 

Earlier, it was done by some Egyptian company, but then they took over this Egyptian company they are doing. And also very importantly, what is called Changmadang, private market, private local market, they have been also in last, what happened that usually food and other things are distributed to PDS, public distribution system. But when state is not having enough capacity, what they do, like, there was a period of very severe food crisis in North Korea, from 1994 to 1998. When I think around 2 million to 3 million people, they died. So they open like if state cannot provide food, they open people to go and do some kind of barter, some kind of trade and somehow they survive. So I think society has also been, and I think, other in discussion, we may like to talk more about how outside influencers are coming to society in North Korea, and how they are changing. 

Now coming to the last part of my presentation about global role part, I think we need to understand that North Korea is a poor country, definitely, because overall GDP is not more than $50 billion, but still it's a nuclear power state. If you look at their, you can say the number of military personnel is 1.3 million people is fourth in the world, after China, India, America, probably Russia and then North Korea. So they are fourth in the world. They are having, I think, around 7 million to 10 million people who are military trained. Tenured military services there. They have lots of, maybe sometimes obsolete, but I think still they are having lots of arms, ammunition, other things, which they have been supplying to Russia, you can see that. 

I think, and missile and nuclear technology, we can discuss in case required. I think it's a very, very important flashpoint in East Asia. I think any great power politics had to take into account how North Korea moves, and how North Korea moves is also going to determine by how others they move. It's a very, very important flashpoint we need to be aware about. 

In recent past, I will draw your attention towards one thing, and then I will end. It's about that, actually North Korea had played very well from 2017 onward. 2011, Kim Jong-il died. 2012, early, Kim Jong-un came to power. From 2012 to 2017, there were no summit meeting between, say, North Korea and China, North Korea and Russia. But they had, like China, Chinese President Xi Jinping, he had three summits, 2013, '14, '15, or '14, '15, '16, three consecutive years they have summits. So China, South Korea coming together, North Korea is getting isolated, but they got a very good chance when Moon Jae-in came to power, and North Korea reached out first time in 2018, he visited China, and then I think there had been at least six visits, six summit meeting between China and North Korean leader, and Xi Jinping also visited North Korea in 2019. 

So this opportunity they grabbed, when Pyeongchang Olympic Camp in South Korea offered a peace, I can say, denuclearization talks and other things. The second opportunity came to North Korea with Ukraine War, 2022. I think then what happened that you can see that how North Korea had been able to connect with Russia, and in, I think, September, he visited, Kim Jong-un visited, 2023. Last year, June, Putin came, and they had comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. In that agreement, if you read Article 4, Article 4 is basically a mutual defense treaty, saying that any attack on each other, we are going to respond together kind of thing. 

So my point is that, there was a time when North Korea was isolated country, like Hermit Kingdom, actually Hermit Kingdom, it comes from a book written in 1882 on Korea, Korea Hermit Nation. So this isolation of North Korea I think it was very difficult for North Korea to deal with that. But over the time, I think different opportunities, they have been grabbed very wisely and very diplomatically by North Korea, and they are creating an alternate space in which they can deal more with China, they can deal more with Russia. 

Actually, there was one statement in 2024 by the President of Belarus saying that actually why can't we like Putin and Kim Jong-un and myself, we can have a summit meeting. I think if you look at Iran could be also included. So, a kind of alternate space is basically available for North Korea, and that they have been trying to grab, because I think disconnection from outside was creating lots of domestic problems. 

So, I will say that like North Korea, whenever we talk about that, think about that, usually what happened, there are scarce material about North Korean party society, especially domestic part, and which are written by scholars who have been doing it for 20 or 30 years, they know Korean language. And you will find lots of materials on North Korean domestic part in society, which is written by people who don't know Korean language. They have no serious training of social science. And they are making claims North Korea doesn't come to clarify. 

So, I think that's why I think we need to be very, we can say, careful about what chair proposed that any narrative about North Korea must be carefully read. And you don't have to accept everything. We from India, we can create our own perspective, as I think former foreign minister of India, Sushma Swaraj, then Rex Tillerson, he said that, why are you having your embassy in Pyongyang? So, see that look is our policy depend like we add for our foreign policy choices we have done. And anyway, even if we consider North Korea, not a very cooperative country, but we need to have channel of communication open with that country. 

So, I'll stop myself here. And I would like to have more discussion in question and answer. Thank you. 

Skand Tayal: Thanks Professor Mishra. Yes, absolutely right. India needs to have its own perspective on all matters whether international or internal and discussion like this really help in clarifying thoughts. Now I invite my friend Professor Choe Wongi, expert on India, frequent visitor to India. And your thoughts will be very valuable. One question I'll pose now that the entire all the international relations, strategic equations are in a state of flux. Trump too is there. And now in your country also perhaps Democratic Party may come back some version of Moon Jae-in. Then, is there a possibility of a Hanoi Summit in 2020? Hanoi again, right. Please, over to you. 

Choe Wongi: Yeah, thank you, Mr. Tayal. It's good to be back in this Sapru house. And I have to apologize, I mean, I missed the earlier parts of the discussion. Yeah, I think it's a great initiative by ICWA to organize this kind of roundtable discussion on North Korea. Well, as Ambassador Tayal said, I'm not in a position to claim myself to be an expert on North Korea. But if you look at them, every ordinary Koreans think that they know something about North Korea. So, they have certain views of North Korea. 

So, I'd like to take this opportunity to raise three specific questions rather than providing answers. To my knowledge, there are at least three very prevalent and enduring myths about North Korea. There are three theories of North Korea. The first one is a theory of imminent collapse. This is an enduring question. I mean, since the beginning of the establishment of North Korea, people were talking about collapse of North Korea, imminent collapse, crisis. So, yeah, this is theory. This is myth. Theory of imminent collapse. 

The second one is DPRK relationship with China. The theory of ironclad ties with China. So, from observers from outside, I mean, if you look at the bilateral relationship between China and North Korea, they are really close and they move in lockstep, but that's not true. So, this is another myth or theory of ironclad ties with China. 

The third one is a theory of Korean geocentrism. So, if you dissolve the contradiction between North and South Korea, then we'll be in a whole new world. So, the very source of problems, all kinds of problems related to Korean Peninsula is the contradiction and confrontation between North and South Korea. So, I think this is another myth. So, let me briefly raise these questions. Three myths. 

The first one is theory of imminent collapse. So, I mean, North Korea has been exposed to external sanctions for the entire period of its existence. So, my good friend Sandip mentioned about the great famine in the early 1990s, the Arduous March. More than 3 million North Korean people died of hunger, but North Korea survived. So North Korea is totally dependent upon China for its energy and food. And so what are the sources of this resilience, this endurance? This is a very important question. And lots of people make their own theory about imminent collapse or the durability, survivability of the North Korean regime. I don't know the answer, but I think this is a very important question. 

The second one is a theory of ironclad ties with China. I mean, whenever I talk with experts on North Korea, especially from China, they always raise issues, some frictions, some contradictions, some problems with North Korea. I mean, they told me that North Korea would not listen to what you say it should do. For example, in 2018-19, when Trump approached Kim Jong-un and they had the first Singapore Summit, then Xi Jinping all of a sudden changed his stance. He invited Kim over to Beijing. But before that, for seven years, Xi never wanted to meet with Kim Jong-un. Only after Trump approached Kim Jong-un, then Xi got a little bit anxious. And also after the failure of Hanoi Summit, you don't have any high-level interaction between Xi and Kim. 

So probably if Trump again tried to make a kind of approach to Kim Jong-un, then Xi might be tempted to meet Kim again. So yeah, I think you have to think seriously about the bilateral relationship between North Korea and China. And now, Kim Jong-un has kind of established some partnership with Putin. So he cultivated, he made another pipeline. So yeah, this is very interesting. So yeah, I think the theory of ironclad ties between DPRK and China, I think we have to look in deep ways about the source of bond, the source of common interest or source of contradiction. 

The third one is a theory of Korean geocentrism. What I mean by this is that if you look at the South Korean perception about what would be the desirable endgame of Korean Peninsula issues, some people think that if the military confrontation, if the regime competition between North Korea and South Korea gets resolved, if you have some high level of inter-Korean reconciliation, then both South Korea and North Korea would not be in a position to be dependent on China in case of North Korea. 

In case of South Korea, you would not need this kind of military alliance with America. What they mean by this is that the inter-Korea rapprochement or reconciliation is the very solution to raise, to enhance the strategic autonomy and lessen the dependence. I think this is another myth. Especially people in the left side of the political spectrum in Korea, the progressive. Mr. Lee is one of the strongest candidates for the upcoming presidential election. They think that this inter-Korean relationship is the very solution to all kinds of problems and challenges we face. But this kind of very internally oriented approach is also just a theory. I mean, inter-Korean contradiction, inter-Korean tension and challenge, this is not just a Korean problem only. This is a regional problem. This is a global problem. 

So in that regard, I think we need to have a better understanding of how the inter-Korean dynamics affect both Koreas as well as what kind of ramification it has on the regional and global level. I'll stop here. Thank you. 

Skand Tayal: Thank you very much, Professor Choe. Very interesting questions and I'm sure we and our panelists can discuss these questions for one hour. But before you came in my introductory remarks, Professor Choe, I had said that KJU is an astute strategic practitioner. And the way perhaps when Professor Hwang spoke, North Korea is already abundant the goal of reunification. South Korea could perhaps also go in that direction and try to deal as two countries separate and then resolve their issues. But what you said makes a lot of sense. 

We have a young audience and I would like to invite questions from the audience. Please be very brief. Just introduce yourself in one sentence and pose the question in two sentences. And if possible, name the panelist whom you would like to answer, otherwise I will send it. Please go ahead. 

Unidentified Participant: Thank you, Chair. I have two very quick questions. First is addressed to Professor Hwang Jihwan, who has joined online from Seoul. You rightly referred to North Korea's nuclear developments or policies in detail. My question is, the world is aware of India's non-proliferation record and future commitments. So in this background, in your opinion, what should be India's approach towards China, Pakistan and North Korea's nuclear triangle? 

My second question is addressed to Professor Choe Wongi. You rightly talked about three meets and second about China and North Korea relations. When you referred about in 2018, when Trump approached to Kim Jong-un and then Xi Jinping took a different turn, I think Chinese media at that time has suggested that China felt isolated and that is why that state. I think I see in that respect. How do you see in current position if Trump approaches again the North Korean leadership, what will be the Xi Jinping approach? 

Third, if I very quickly, in your opinion, is there any scope for countries like India, which is an Indo-Pacific region, to offer assistance or what is called as act as a neutral facilitator, especially in the field of humanitarian assistance, disaster resilience, or even digital development? Thank you. 

Skand Tayal: Professor Hwang first. Would you like to go first? Professor Hwang, there was a question to you. China, Pakistan. 

Hwang Jihwan: Okay, I see. Thanks for your question and the comment. There are several questions I need to answer, but try to answer it as quickly as possible. With regard to the first question, whether South Korea also can drop the unification policy, I think it is impossible because the Korean people are eager to reunite. Not only the common brotherhood or national identity, but also the unification prescribed in the Korean constitution. And then eventually, both Koreas have been supported for the eventual reunification of the two Koreas for several decades, more than seven decades. 

So, it is somewhat weird that Kim Jong-un, KJU, suddenly talks about the end of the unification. It is North Korea's unification policy. And also, the reason why he described inter-Korean relations as two countries that are in a state of war. 

We got a second question about India's approach to the North Korean nuclear issue. I would like to emphasize the importance of the non-proliferation and also the North Korean nuclear doctrine. Because North Korea was in the NPT and the non-proliferation regime, and I think they should be in the non-proliferation. So, it is very different from the Indian case because India was outside of the NPT. And also, second, the nuclear doctrine is really important because North Korea has recently changed its nuclear doctrine to a more riskier one, the asymmetric escalation that emphasizes the importance of the nuclear foster. 

I think in that case, that is really dangerous and risky. So, I think that it is correct for the Indian government to emphasize the importance of the peaceful and strategic thinking toward North Korea and also to the other countries in the case of North Korean nuclear issue. Thank you. 

Skand Tayal: Thank you. Professor Choe, please. 

Choe Wongi: Thank you, Dr. Sandip. I will take your first question. Trump has been constantly sending out kind of signals, what I call love calls to Kim Jong-un, right? He said that this guy, Kim, is a smart guy. I get along with him very well. I'm going to re-establish relationship with him. This is very concerning to us because he's indicating a direct deal with Kim bypassing South Korea. If there is going to be another DPRK-U.S. summit, right, then South Korea might end up with just a thirdparty bystander without a player in the process. And this logic applies to China as well. So Trump's love call to Kim Jong-un is very concerning, in my sense, to Xi Jinping as well. 

I think what would be the worst nightmare for Xi regarding Korean issue? I mean, you know South Korea is a pro-U.S. country. Both North Korea and South Korea becomes pro-US country. That would be worst nightmare for China and Xi. So in that regard, I think if Trump makes a move toward North Korea, then it's 100% that China would move, initiate some kind of counter movement. 

Skand Tayal: Thank you, very interesting, please. 

Anwesha Ghosh: Thank you, Chair. I'm Dr. Anwesha, a fellow here. My question is for Professor Mishra. What, according to you, are the avenues of meaningful diplomatic engagement with DPRK, especially in the light of denuclearization failures and Pyongyang's continued isolation? And are there innovative frameworks that can offer alternative to the present deadlock? Thank you. 

Sandip Kumar Mishra: I think, good question. I think one thing I would like to probably correct it. In the first incident last time, 2017, '18, '19, it was not Trump's initiative that talks started and neither it was Xi Jinping who approached Kim Jong-un. The information in the public domain we have that basically South Korean President Moon Jae-in, because Trump has a policy with North Korea called maximum pressure. And maximum pressure, they were trying to have secondary boycott and other things. Every day, still voices were taken from both the sides. But that time, very crucial role was played by South Korean President Moon Jae-in. He invited North Korean delegation to Pyeongchang Olympic, and then actually everything started. And what happened when it was decided that North Korean leader is going to visit South Korea and North Korean leader is also going to have a meeting with American president, then North Korean leader decided that showing respect to China, before meeting South Korean and American leaders, let's go and meet Xi Jinping. And Xi Jinping said, okay. So it's not Xi Jinping initiative, that one. So I'm bringing this role of India, because in case E.J. Myung played that constructive role this time and try to bring back, have more dialogue with North Korea, or connect Trump with Kim Jong-un. I think in that case, probably India could play a role to connect these two, three important players. And actually, it's not that they have to resolve the problem. The issue is that let's come to the negotiating table. Let's get together each other about our positions, and if we can solve any of them. 

Similarly, when you say unification, the most people who support good relations with North Korea and South Korea, they never talk about unification. They say that let's have good relations with North Korea. Reunification happens eventually. So I think talking about the goal, like denuclearization, reunification, these are going to be two big goals to start with. Let's start with simple, like, get to know each other, talk to each other, have exchanges with each other. And probably India could play a role by having good office to both the countries, South and North Korea. Thank you. 

Skand Tayal: Before I invite another question, I think here, everyone would very much like to know how Russia may react in case there is a move by President Trump to have another Hanoi II with Chairman Kim Jong-un. Professor Vorontsov. 

Alexander Vorontsov: Thank you. Already, Russia expressed the response to these questions that Russia will support and greet any kind of contact and dialogue aimed at stabilization of security situation on Korean Peninsula. And Russia, of course, will not oppose. Russia will support that if Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim Jong-un will restore the dialogue. And this question is discussing. But as I know, just for example, yesterday, it was a reception in DPRK embassy in Moscow dealing with the birthday of Kim Il-sung anniversary. And we discussed this issue with our North Korean friends. And they prefer to focus attention on the fact that Mr. Trump broke his promises in Hanoi meetings. And they have some feeling of disappointment and some feeling of mistrust. But of course, it's not exclude the possibility of the Trump-Kim Jong-un new stage of rapprochement. 

So Russia's position is positive. Any dialogue is better than the absence of dialogue. It's natural. Therefore, Russia is positive to such kind of perspective. 

Stuti Banerjee: Thank you, Chair. I'm Dr. Stuti Banerjee. I'm a senior research fellow at the Council. My question is to Professor Mishra. So you spoke about what happens within Korea has an effect on its foreign policy and vice versa. Given that context, Korea has a lot of sanctions on it, UN, U.S., all of that. How does that really affect how its domestic politics is shaped? How does the domestic politics of the Korean regime is shaped by the sanctions that have been applied in terms of its economic development, societal changes? Thank you. 

Sandip Kumar Mishra: I think North Korea has lots of problems because of that. Like food availability, I can tell you that normally, any year, North Korea needs to have 6.5 million tons, 6 million to 6.5 million tons of food grains every year. And they can produce not more than 3.8 million or 4 million. So it means they are dependent on the outside world. But because of all these sanctions, they can't do that. So huge problem people in North Korea, they suffer because of those sanctions. 

But at the same time, like support 2013, when I visited, they have created their own narrative, like they say that we are very thankful to our leader. And because of our leader, we are having two meals a day. And we are not having three meals a day because of Americans. So they have created their own types of narratives. And through that, they try to, like 1994 to 1998, I said, there was something called Arduous March famine 3 million people died. They say that, look, it's a march for nation building, and we need to suffer. And so they create narrative through which and plus state coercive power. 

So I feel that it's creating lots of problems. But until now, it appears that regime had been able to manage that. But I think it's definitely having a huge impact on Korean people and their human rights. 

Skand Tayal: Thank you. Last question, please. 

Anupa: Thank you to the chair. I'm Anupa. I'm a research associate at the council. My question is for Professor Sandip. And as North Korea faces climate issues such as floods, deforestation, etc., do you think climate change or green aid can be an entry point, an unconventional entry point for it to engage the world? Thank you. 

Sandip Kumar Mishra: I think a very good question. I agree with you because, you know, North Korea is a country which is topographically very mountainous. So around less than 20% land is used for agriculture. So it having lots of, you can say, deforestation have been also happening because of wood cutting. So I think through Green Aid or any that kind of initiative, if we can reach out North Korea, I think that will be a very good thing. But we need to remember that hard politics is going to be still prominent. 

So any entry into North Korea will be first, you can say, weighted by regime politically, security-wise, and then they are going to, but I think this could be a good choice to, you can say, like World Food Program or say Green Initiative or say other, you can say, environmental, you can say, we can go via those routes. Thank you. 

Skand Tayal: Now for me, it's only to say it has been an absolutely fascinating presentation from all panelists and it will be very useful for ICWA and all the scholars to look at North Korea with fresh eyes, not with any prejudice and be hopeful about a more peaceful Korean Peninsula. Thank you very much. 

Tunchinmang Langel: Thank you, sir. Thank you, Ambassador. As we reach the end of this enlightening discussion, it is my privilege to extend our heartfelt gratitude to everyone who made today's event a success. First and foremost, our sincere thanks to our distinguished panelists for sharing their invaluable insights and expertise. Professor Hwang Jihwan from the University of Seoul, Professor Alexander Vorontsov from the RAS Institute of Oriental Studies, Professor Sandip Kumar Mishra from JNU, Professor Choe Wongi from the KNDA, Korean National Diplomatic Academy. 

We are also deeply grateful to Ambassador Skand Tayal for chairing today's session and guiding the discussions with such clarity and depth. A special appreciation also goes to Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar for proposing this stimulating discussion on an important topic, such as North Korea's politics, society, and global role. And finally, to our engaged audience, your presence, questions, and enthusiasm have made this discussion all the more enriching. 

With that, we formally conclude today's discussion, and we invite you all who are present here in person to join us for high tea at the foyer. Thank you, and have a wonderful day. Thank you. 

Hwang Jihwan: Thank you so much.

***** 

List of Participants in the Discussion

1. Tunchinmang Langel, RF, ICWA: Moderator
2. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA
3. Amb Skand R. Tayal, Former Ambassador of India to Republic of Korea
4. Hwang Jihwan, Dept. of International Relations, University of Seoul
5. Alexander Vorontsov, Head of the Korea & Mongolia Department RAS Institute of Oriental Studies (Online)
6. Sandip Kumar Mishra, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University
7. Choe Wongi, Head – Centre for ASEAN-India Studies, Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA)