Indian Council of World Affairs

Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee: May I request you to keep your phones on the silent mode, please? Thank you. Good afternoon. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to welcome you all to the Indian Council of World Affairs for this panel discussion on the theme, Current Instability in Bangladesh, Rewriting its History or Charting an Unpredictable Future? We will start this afternoon's program with Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA, delivering her welcome remarks. The panel discussion will be chaired by Ambassador Veena Sikri, former High Commissioner of India to Bangladesh. The discussion will be followed by a brief question and answer session moderated by the chair. May I now request Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA, to kindly give her welcome remarks.

 

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Distinguished Chair & Experts, Members of the Diplomatic Corps, Students & Friends!

 

After fighting a bloody liberation war in 1971 in which it successfully broke away from the oppressive and genocidal regime of West Pakistan, Bangladesh took birth to give itself a distinct identity with the aspiration of granting its people full social, political and economic rights.

 

Marred by relentless natural calamities like famine, floods and super cyclones; by severe political volatility - authoritarian rule, political assassinations and coups, military and now hybrid regimes; and by dismal socio-economic parameters, the people of Bangladesh however continue to search for the promised security, stability and prosperity.

 

State institutions like the Army and the judiciary play a larger than life role in Bangladesh in domestic and foreign policy making. Since 1971, either the Awami League or the Bangladesh Nationalist Party have been in power interspersed by military regimes or interim governments. With frequent dismissals of elected governments, the political culture of Bangladesh presents a very poor picture – one marked by severe political repression, violent protests, strikes, desecration, loot & arson, demolition of private and public properties, political incarceration and killings. As if that was not enough, every regime change has been followed by attempts to re-write history and this is what is yet again being witnessed in Bangladesh presently. 

 

Bangladesh’s inherent political culture is not far removed from that of Pakistan. Having been conjoined twins for a quarter of a century, they very much share the same political DNA. The bonhomie and affinity that Bangladesh’s Army, for instance, has enjoyed with that of Pakistan’s over the decades are miles ahead of the relationship that the apolitical Indian Army and the deeply politicized Bangladesh Army have ever had. Similarly, the Islamic radical groups which have found fertile soil in Bangladesh have fed on close linkages with their Pakistani counterparts which continue to this date. 1971 might have divided the two, but the same malaise dictates their polity.

 

The current Chief Advisor Yunus-led interim government was established after a semblance of normalcy was restored to conduct a fresh free and fair election. Given that the January 2024 election under the aegis of the Awami League Government was alleged to be rigged, demands have been made since the current interim government came to power for electoral reforms before the next election. However, instead of taking action in this regard to calm the student community and the various political factions as also the radical elements, the interim government propped by the Army is actively pursuing polarizing agendas. In the name of conducting raids like “Operation Devil Hunt” purportedly aimed at those who want to ‘destabilize’ the country, the interim government is directly targeting and arresting pro-democracy forces, weakening severely the credibility of the hybrid regime.

 

The economy and infrastructure are also at a standstill. In the last six months, Bangladesh has witnessed strikes in major sectors of the economy including export oriented sectors like textiles and the transport sector and has seen frequent highway blockades.

 

Intolerance has come to pervade inter-faith and inter-ethnic relations. Though underplayed by the interim government and the local media, there has been a significant rise in cases of intolerance and violence against religious and ethnic minorities. A rise in the presence of international radical Islamic groups is also being seen. While suppression of the freedom of the media as well as social media platforms is fostering frustration among the masses, killings of persons belonging to minorities heading local and international organizations, like the recent assassination of Project Director Utpal Roy of the US civil society organization ‘Save the Children’ are nevertheless attracting wide attention.

 

While making violent attempts to rewrite history and alter the social fabric, the interim government of Yunus backed by the Army has also opted to adjust and check the level of cooperation and partnership the previous Awami League government had forged with India. Yunus is rather opting to carve out new avenues and strengthen partnerships with countries like Pakistan and China, including in the defense and military sectors. Of course, the closeness between the previous US Administration and Yunus has been widely discussed in the media; and the dynamics under the new US administration remain to be seen. The impact of the rising political volatility on the situation at the Bangladesh-Myanmar international border, especially with the rising influence of the Arakan Army, also needs careful examining.

 

For India, Bangladesh remains an important neighbour, irrespective of the government in power and India will have to work to rebuild trust and confidence without undermining its national and security interests. While it respects Bangladesh’s internal affairs, there is especially a need to keep a close watch on the more than 4000 kms long international border, as such political and economic instability usually triggers criminal activities like human, arms, drugs and animal trafficking and infiltration. Needless to add, the well-being of people on either side of the border is paramount.

 

I welcome the distinguished experts on our panel today. I am sure they will discuss these issues in detail and make several such observations. I look forward to a thought provoking and a lively discussion. I wish them all the best.

 

Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee: Thank you, ma'am. May I now request Ambassador Sikri to give her remarks and conduct the proceedings. Thank you, ma'am.

 

Veena Sikri: Thank you. I'd like to congratulate ICWA and Smt Nutan Kapoor Mahawar for having organised this discussion very timely. I remember there was one in ICWA some four months ago that was under the Association of Indian diplomats, and now it's a good time, after six months, to review the situation. So thank you for doing it. I'd like to thank Prof Sanjay Bharadwaj and Dr Smruti Pattanaik. And we've got Ms Sohini Bose on the virtual Zoom, so for joining us. Let me say that six months is a good time to assess. So let us see what has been happening in Bangladesh in these last six months, ever since the interim regime of Prof Mohammad Yunus took over.

 

Two or three points come to mind. I think, increasingly, there is a feeling in Bangladesh about the constitutional legitimacy of the interim regime. And this feeling has come because, I think, while the regime, the Chief Advisor and the other advisors, were sworn in under the Constitution of Bangladesh, that constitution actually has no provision for an interim government. So in that sense, there is, in an immediate sense, no legitimacy for the government. But even if you see that, yes, there is a new set of judges altogether, that was also one of the issues that came up among the people of Bangladesh, a complete resort to mob justice, mobocracy surrounding the old judges, forcing them to resign.

 

So without any due process, there have been a series of new people, whether it is vice chancellors in universities or whether it is the judges. So, these judges, they have actually reviewed the 15th Amendment, which was done under the former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. And they have stalled the operation of certain part of that 15th Amendment, which had abolished the caretaker government. But even if you look at the caretaker government, even if you consider that by this method, whether it's back in the Constitution or not, that caretaker government only allowed for A, law and order to be looked at, and B, elections within 90 days.

 

And thirdly, it was mandated to be a neutral, non-party government, caretaker government. So none of these have been fulfilled, none of these requirements. More than 90 days have passed, double of that has passed. I think it is very clear that the people from the Islamist organisations are members of the, as advisors in the interim government, and also they control, the Jamaat-e-Islami is known to be in full control of the situation and really guiding what is going to happen. So I think when you see that the Jamaat-e-Islami is in charge, you do see very much that the title of rewriting of history is a very appropriate one, because the Jamaat-e-Islami is trying to move to a situation of pre-1971.

 

And this is what they are saying themselves, because ever since the regime change took place in Bangladesh, we are seeing statements from Jamaat-e-Islami and statements from Pakistan saying that we have to review 1971, we have to look at the unsolved issues of 1971, so you are seeing today the same combination of forces that lost in 1971, whether it was Pakistan, whether it was Jamaat-e-Islami, whether it was Razakar, so those are the forces which are today in charge, and they certainly are at the forefront of trying to rewrite history.

 

But is it acceptable to the people? Has law and order been controlled? Certainly law and order remains an extreme problem in Bangladesh. Policemen were killed in large numbers, and even though the army has been given magistracy and police powers, they are not really exerting themselves, and there's an apprehension that maybe they feel if they were to exert themselves, they would not be allowed to take part in UN peacekeeping operations.

 

So there is a completely, I think, a situation which has seriously affected the economy of the country, and the economy is expected to grow at half or less than half the rate that it did in the previous year, so that is going to affect, that is affecting jobs, it is leading to hyperinflation, it is leading to a lack of investment, fresh investment coming into Bangladesh, it is leading to the shutting down of a large number of factories because of worker unrest, since workers are demanding higher pay, and it also led to a lot of confusion because some of the biggest companies in Bangladesh are in receivership, and there is no money for them, so their previous workers are being laid off in the thousands, in the tens of thousands, because it is a very large company.

 

So all this is creating a lot of confusion, and I certainly hope that our panelists will be able to shed some light on this confusion, and then maybe at the end of it, I will summarise once again what we have talked. So with these few words, may I request Prof Sanjay Bharadwaj, he's from the Centre for South Asian Studies, the School of International Studies in JNU, Jawaharlal Nehru University, you have the floor for 10 minutes.

 

Sanjay Bharadwaj: Thank you, thank you, ma'am. So thank you, Ambassador Veena Sikri, ma'am. I also extend my thanks to ICWA, especially Additional Secretary, Smt Nutan Kapoor Mahawarji, for giving this opportunity, and having discussions on very significant issue that had been in discourse in the policy makers, academia, and think tank, at least for last six, seven months. This is… I can say it's very unfortunate developments had taken place in India's neighbourhood, where India had invested a lot, politically, economically, and diplomatically, I can say.

 

We try to cultivate and connect very inclusively with India's key projects, key policies, like Act-East policy, connecting with North-East, connecting with the Bay of Bengal projects, and inviting different actors for the development projects. But it could not go in good taste for the Bangladeshis, and sometimes we have also faced the criticism. I was in a conference in North-East, and a professor told that you are just wasting and you're dumping money in Bangladesh, they are ungrateful to anyone. So those are the words, then I said no, no, no, we have to invest, cultivate Bangladesh, and I think it's very important geoeconomically and geostrategically to serve India's interest.

 

I have divided my submission in three parts. One, of course, I will discuss about the internal discourse, what Bangladesh is facing. The second, what are the regional dynamics keeping these issues, these developments into mind, and how extra-regional powers involvement has been witnessed and seen in recent past. These are well-known facts that the polity and society in Bangladesh is dichotomised between the two forces. One is ethno-cultural forces, that I can say, these ethno-cultural forces, they believe they represent the spirit of 1971. That spirit is based on the very inclusiveness, the Bengali nationalism, secularism, democracy, and socialism. These were the basic principles that later came to know as Mujibism. And they are known as the pro-liberation war forces. They had been progressive, they had been working to bring the cultural dynamics or the inclusivity that the Bengali culture had over the years.

 

This has been contested by the forces who believes in ethno-religious construct. I would say that they are known as the forces of 1947. They are old Muslim leaguers. They believe in the Islamic nationalistic construct, and they wanted to impose these kinds of identities in East Pakistan at that time by introducing Urdu as the national language over the Bengali and that Arabic scripts, and all that attempts had been done. These forces are joined by the radical Islamist forces based in Bangladesh. I would say the Jamaat-e-Islam, where there were Islami Chhatra Shibir, Al-Badr, Razakar, Al-Shams, all these people and the leadership of Jamaat-e-Islam joined. And these forces, they opposed the liberation or creation of Bangladesh in 1971.

 

And so these dichotomies and contestations carried on and in 1975, when Bangabandhu Mujibur Rahman was assassinated, they tried to change the history. They tried to rewrite the history as the topic itself is also talking about the rewriting the history of Bangladesh. And today also, there is an intense discourse, discussion in Bangladesh to change the constitutions, rewrite the history, change the heroes, change the symbols, change the holidays, change the father of the nation, and they are celebrating… Jinnah's anniversary was celebrated and there, and in the Urdu language was the language they have used that they tried to bring the forces of 1947 back to Bangladesh.

 

Even after the assassination of Bangabandhu in 1975, that there were attempt to change the constitution and that constitutions and, like particularly, if I'll say that the freedom struggle was replaced by the war of independence, that the contribution of war of independence has been highlighted. The Bengali nationalism was replaced by the Bangladeshi nationalism and Islam was the core of that Bangladeshi nationalism. Secularism was replaced by the Almighty Allah, or you can say later on has declared that Islam as the state religion of Bangladesh. The preamble, on the top of the preamble, Bismillah ur Rahman ur Rahim.

 

So you can see that there were attempt to change and rewrite the history in Bangladesh in post-Mujib period from 1975 to 1990, and that these conflicts had continued. I think somehow, the Bangladeshis, they come back again and again. They came back in 1989, then they came back in 2007, and after 2008, I think what was the slogan and what was the election manifesto of Sheikh Hasina in 2008 election to reinstate the spirit of 1971. What was the spirit of 1971? That I have talked the Bengali cultural ethos, values, secularism, democracy, and all that. However, to sustain and to maintain the legitimacy, she tried to further dichotomise the ethos and values in Bangladesh, particularly dichotomise between the goals and the values, and the goals has been linked with the economic performance, and that she has demonstrated very well in economic sectors that the Bangladesh was graduating to the developing countries.

 

Instead of values that the people, they were asking more inclusive participatory elections and all that. It has also further dichotomised between the equality and the liberty in Bangladesh. And the acts like Digital Security Act was widely criticised. But I would say that she has also made significant mistakes while she was there in power. She had been doing very well maintaining an inclusive values, ethos. She was trying to suppress the radical Islamist forces that creates law and order problem for the country, and all the way providing and bringing developments, investments for the country. But what she did it that to neutralise the Jamaat-e-Islam and radical forces, the forces of 1917, she has tried to create an alternative discourse by supporting and getting support from Hefazat-e-Islam. And Hefazat-e-Islam, in fact, somehow retained the Islamic ethos and values. And that was quite reflected while the 15th Constitutional Amendment was made that Islam remained the state religion of Bangladesh.

 

And that was told that secularism and Islam were coexisting. This was a pragmatic approach that had been seen. And what further had been witnessed that she compromised with the democratic credentials somehow. There were hardly any local body elections, up-zilla elections, and all that. People did not face the elections in Bangladesh. And that the apex level of parliamentary elections was also questioned time and again the way it has been held. Corruption, nepotism, and the most important factor was the role of the Chhatra League, the student wing of Awami League was very much, very much aggressive in implementations or trying to change the things. That, I think, somehow went against her. And the anger of the people were mounting.

 

This has been substantiated by two issues. One is the quota issue that was well-known, the reservations for the freedom fighters and others. And then later substantiated by unemployment, inflation, and, of course, the immediate reasons was the mishandling to the protesters, the students. So these were the issues. And that has become instrumental to oust Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina from the power. And this has been somehow labelled that the pro-Pakistan forces were actively involved to do and to support the students' against discriminations and all that. And the people's anger against India was there. But India would remain always very strong. In fact, you can say over the years that India had economically invested in Bangladesh, where the Pakistan has ideologically, or you can say, the investment was towards the radicalisation of the society. Then that continued, the deep state's presence has been now reported time and again that the Jamaat-e-Islam and radical forces was closely working with the radical forces of Pakistan.

 

The last point, what I would say, that in August, that you can see the nexus of 1971, what Ambassador Sikri has also indicated, that nexus between the radicals, Pakistan's, Americans, and the Chinese were quite active, were reflected. The Chinese, they were silent, they remained silent, but you know, they have been also working in Bangladesh society, but there were clear-cut indications. There are also reports in Greyzone that you can see that how the people had been, or civil society people had been used, and there are also evidences and reports that the Pakistan and the American were collaborated with the Jamaat-e-Islam in Bangladesh.

 

Americans had, definitely, Americans had linked all their strategic, I mean, that democracy and human rights and all these issues are linked with their strategic interests. Americans had deep strategic interest in Bay of Bengal, and they were trying to have presence in Bay of Bengal since long. 1972, they have asked a base. 1954-55, though they was opposed that. 1998, they have asked for the SOFA agreement, and again, they were, that a white man is asking for a base in St. Martin Island, that kind of, so they wanted to, maybe Americans were not confident what India and the other powers are doing, and they were apprehensive, the increasing Chinese presence in Bay of Bengal, particularly in Myanmar, as correctly pointed out, Madam Mahawar, about the way the China-Myanmar economic corridor, the way the Chinese supporting military junta, the way Arakan army and they are making their presence, I think somehow it has concerned to the people.

 

Last point, what is in Bangladesh today? There is constitutional crisis. There is no constitutional provision for this government, interim government. The caretaker government provision was there, but it was removed in 15th Constitutional Amendment. So this is unconstitutional government, first crisis. The second crisis is there is legitimacy crisis, that, this government is not legitimate, and none of the interim government's people, advisors are having any kind of people's support, except the, you can say, students against the discriminations. They are supported by the young generations. They are frustrated with employment, and they are frustrated with law and order, and all that.

 

There are political crises. Political crises in a sense that, there are the positions, the position of a particular student against discrimination, they do not have any political party. They are thinking to have a political party. So there is political crisis. Only one political party is there, the BNP. And the interim government is trying to remove Awami League to participate in the election. So there is a political crisis, and there is leadership crisis. That none of the people are interim government, have any experience being leading the people. They have served in different capacities in the government here and there during the BNP government, BNP Jamaat government from 2001 to 2006.

 

And the last very important significant point is that there is trust deficit. Trust deficit not between the Awami League and the interim government. There is trust deficit within the ruling alliance now. The BNP doesn't trust on Jamaat-e-Islam. Jamaat-e-Islam doesn't want election. BNP wants early elections. The BNP and Jamaat-e-Islam has been traditionally rivaled to Mohammed Yunus and these people there. So there is a deep trust deficit among the state. And this is the fundamental reason that the elections, they are getting delayed. They are looking forward to reforms and all that.

 

So my point, the last point that I would say that I think that what Trump has said yesterday that India will take care, Modi will take care, that issue is, I can answer if there is any question. But the point is that the Bangladeshis, they have their own solution. They had reacted in 1971, become independent. They have reacted in 1989 through Jamdani revolutions, brought, restored democracy. They have reacted in 2007 and removed the caretaker government, Army-backed caretaker government, where they were looking forward minus two diplomacy. And I'm sure that they will react again to finish the unfinished revolutions that happened in August. So the Bangladeshi people, they will reinstate the secular, democratic, progressive forces in the power. Thank you very much.

 

Veena Sikri:  Thank you. Thank you for bringing out all those very important points. May I now request Dr Smruti Pattanaik to make a presentation?

 

Smruti Pattanaik:  Thank you, Chair. Thank you, ICWA, for this invitation. What I will do is that I will look at three, four points, so basically mostly internal issues. One is what ma'am was also mentioning, the composition of interim regime. I'm not getting into the legality. Obviously, they have taken oath under the constitution, which they are trying to reform currently. If you look at the composition of interim regime, we can see a few things. There are a few student leaders who are playing a very significant role.

 

So their political identity has been questioned by many. Some of the people, basically, they have been termed as, some of them have been termed as Islamist. Because if you look at the student movement, the Islamists played a very prominent role, especially the Jamaat-e-Islami. They have claimed that 89 of their cadres, including both the student organisation and the party, have been killed in the July-August revolution, as they say it. Now, once this interim regime has come about, it's not very clear that when the election is going to happen. Initially, they said that they will take four years. Then the army chief gave an interview, and he said that probably we will complete it by two years. But now the government has said that towards the end of this year, they're going to have election.

 

But the question is that whether the election will happen after having reforms, or whether the reform can wait. So now the political parties are very, very divided regarding the roadmap to the election. The BNP's position is that they can have the minimum reforms which is required to have the election, and the major reforms can be left to the elected government whenever it comes to power. But the Jamaat-e-Islami, very interestingly, is saying that if we are not going to have the reforms and have the election, I found it very funny that the government is going to commit electoral genocide. So this is the terminology they said, that because the argument which the Jamaat is giving that if there is no reform, there is a possibility of the kind of government which the July-August revolution replaced, the same kind of government is going to come back.

 

But if you look at the history of Bangladesh, for example, 2007-2008, when there were quite a few reforms which was carried out by the then military-backed government which was in power, and when the Awami League came to power, most of the reforms were not accepted. Because you can have the reforms through the ordinance method, but once the parliament convenes, then those reforms have to be passed by two-thirds majority. So we saw at that point of time, I think almost 90% of the reforms which were brought by the military government in 2007 and 2008 was not accepted by the ruling political party. So what is the guarantee after the reform takes place, those reforms will be accepted by the government, which will take over the power. But there is major difference between the BNP and the Jamaat.

 

Many people argue that perhaps the BNP, which is seen or described as a party which is waiting to come back to power, the Jamaat actually needs some time to organise itself and fight the election, though they have to fight the legal case, because it continues to be deregistered as a political party. The case, the deregistration case is still pending before the court. No decision has been taken. But given the way the interim regime is going, I feel that, soon they will get that registration back in any case. If they're going to implement the constitutional reform, which does not have secularism, but has pluralism, then Jamaat constitution actually will not clash with the Bangladesh constitution, the basis on which the Jamaat-e-Islami was deregistered.

 

Now when you look at the narrative, I find it very interesting. Many people are using this terminology of second independence or second liberation. Though there is, a lot, many other people in Bangladesh are saying that we should not say it as a second liberation, because ’71  was very sacrosanct, ’71 was very different. Many people laid down their life for the independence of Bangladesh. So how can you equate that with the 24th uprising? But I see mostly in the Jamaat newspaper and the leaders, whenever they speak, they keep on, in fact, they always emphasise on this second independence and second liberation.

 

I was speaking to one of someone whom I know in Jamaat-e-Islami that why are you clinging on to this second independence or second liberation? Is it because in the first liberation you played a very negative role in ’71? So does the ’24 turns it politically for the Jamaat-e-Islami, which in a sense played a very important role in the student movement, because they have been, in fact, taking shelter within the Awami League student organisation, within the Awami League also. It's not that the Awami League did not know that the Jamaatis are taking shelter within Awami League and its student organisation. I think the Awami League was overconfident, and they thought that probably nothing is going to happen. But then again, the Jamaat had this ideology, because if they don't be part of the Awami League, then what happens is that they become target of the torture and all and arrest. So therefore, yeah, therefore, within that, it also becomes a problem.

 

Now within the rewriting of the history, not just Mujib's house was demolished, 32 Dhanmondi, but also many people are trying to say that this is a symbol of fascist, the Awami League had completely owned Mujib's legacy. So Mujib's legacy was not Bangladesh's legacy, it belonged to the party legacy. So if we're going to have a new Bangladesh, then Mujib's, anything associated with Mujib should go. But there is also at the same time, many criticism regarding what happened in 32 Dhanmondi earlier.

Also on 5th of August, the attack on 32 Danmadi is happening. Few days back, I think today or yesterday, there is this Lalon festival has been opposed by Hefazat-e-Islami, now that has been stopped. So I see assertion of religious right in Bangladesh, not just Jamaat-e-Islami, but there are other political parties, Hefazat and others. So that is important.

 

Now very quickly on the political parties in Bangladesh, as I said, BNP wants the election as soon as possible because they are the party in waiting to come to power. They're prepared. In fact, they're having, I think, meeting all of the country from 12th of February to 25th of February. The Jamaat-e-Islami wants to have reform so that they can prepare themselves. They have a preliminary round of selection, they are saying, preliminarily we are to identify our candidates, but this is not final. Now the question is that as far as Awami League is concerned, some people argue that Awami League needs to apologise for what it did in July and August. And I find it very strange and I ask someone that has Jamaat-e-Islami apologised for the killing that happened during the liberation, but yet it is participating in the election and now you're speaking of Awami League.

 

So I see a concerted effort to deny participation of the Awami League. So if the Awami League does not participate, which actually opens up the opposition space to be contested by other political parties, not BNP. As I said, BNP will definitely come to power as it appears. I'm not sure how the students are going to put on a new political party, but so the opposition space is open. Now somebody told me, I'll just end with this, in the rural areas, the Jamaat is providing protection to the Awami League. This is something I found out when I was in Bangladesh. So I asked them that why is Awami League taking Jamaat support, because Jamaat has, in the rural area, they're strong and since Awami League is in back foot, so Jamaat is providing them a kind of shelter as Awami League student organisation had done to the Jamaat Islami when they were pursued by the police. So there is this thing that perhaps if Awami League does not participate, so what happens to the Awami League's vote? Will it come to Jamaat-e-Islami? This is a kind of calculation which the Jamaat is working on. But I'm not very sure. Till now, a decision regarding Awami League's banning has not happened. The student, the Chhatra League has been banned.

 

Let us see how the student political parties is coming up, who is the leader, what is the agenda, and only then one can say how the election, if it happens towards the end of this year, how it is going to pan out. Thank you.

 

Veena Sikri: Thank you, Smruti, for giving such a vivid presentation on the current situation. May I now request Dr Sohini Bose? I think she's coming on the virtually, right? Ms Sohini Bose, are you there?

 

Sohini Bose: Yeah. Yes, hello, hello, Ambassador.

 

Veena Sikri:  You have the floor.

 

Sohini Bose: Good afternoon, everyone. I'm very happy to be here…

 

Veena Sikri:  Can the volume be turned up? Yeah.

 

Sohini Bose: To present my views on India-Bangladesh foreign policy as it is playing out now. Before I begin, let me thank ICWA for inviting me and the chair for allowing me to speak. Very much of what I have to say has already been covered by the two speakers, but I will specifically talk about foreign policy. And as I see it, India-Bangladesh relationship exists beyond and goes deeper than the bilateral ties between the two governments, because these are the two countries that share history, they share culture, they share languages, food habits, and very important geographic factors, such as land, transboundary rivers, 54 transboundary rivers, and also adjacent maritime zones in the Bay of Bengal. Therefore, this is a geographical reality that cannot be altered, no matter any regime change or changes in government transition in either of the two countries.

 

But the interesting thing is, this geographical reality, this cultural nuance, can be capitalised for mutual progress and growth if there are complementarities in the governance between these two countries. Now, given that, this kind of complementarity was the hallmark of the partnership that has so far existed between India and Bangladesh, primarily with the Modi government at present in India, and the former Awami League administration, headed by Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh. But, why was this partnership called the golden chapter in India-Bangladesh relations? It was called that because not only was there an expanding portfolio of areas of bilateral cooperation, but also there was this ability in the partnership between these two countries to move past lingering issues of contention and continue to nurture bilateral ties.

 

However, now with the interim government at the forefront in Bangladesh, this partnership that has so long existed between the two countries has been brought to a halt. This interim government is a fledgling government headed by Mohammed Yunus, and it is trying to grapple with economic and political turmoil that is happening in

Bangladesh right now. And therefore, at present, India and Bangladesh are both facing very unchartered territories and they will need time to decide on which diplomatic footing they would like to resume their bilateral relations. But so far, the interim government's foreign policy choices are a projection of the uncertainty that it faces at home and also the struggle with its own legitimacy that has already been highlighted as part of this conversation.

 

Now, it is understood that because of the constitutional caveat that questions the legality of this government, although that has been now addressed by the High Court in Bangladesh, the popular support base of this government is the student movement that happened in Bangladesh. And to a large degree, the student movement was characterised by anti-Awami league feelings, not initially, because initially it was a quota movement, but with the government crackdown happening, it took an anti-government turn in Bangladesh. And this was capitalised by other political forces which were fanning the anti-Awami narrative in Bangladesh, especially since the election in Dhaka last year. So, this took an anti-Awami colour and by an extension, because India has been so closely associated with the Hasina regime in Bangladesh and has supported the consecutive returns of this government to power, by an extension, this also highlighted an anti-India feeling in Bangladesh among the public sentiment, which was a characteristic of the student movement and the political narrative that played after it, just preceding the August revolution. And therefore, now that the interim government has been formed, particularly based on the popular support of this student movement, it is trying to create an identity for itself which is very distinct from the Awami League, which is why we are talking about the rewriting of history today, which is a part of the new government's domestic policy.

 

Now, as a foreign policy is also a part of domestic policy, this finds its projection in the foreign policy and you see that India and Bangladesh at present are maintaining a political distance, because closeness with India had been one of the greatest criticisms that the Awami League government has faced and the interim government is trying to create an identity which is as different from it as possible, also because the former Prime Minister Hasina continues to be sheltered in India and extradition requests have been made but we don’t know the answer to that yet. So, this continues to add fuel to fire and India-Bangladesh relationship is now at a great distance from each other.

 

But, wherein lies the diplomatic prudence of these two governments, even though the interim government in India-Bangladesh lacks a distinct amount of political prudence, is that the diplomatic prudence and bilateral projects that have been undertaken by the two governments, none of them have been terminated. They have been stalled and therein lies the silver lining of India-Bangladesh relationship right now. Now, coming to the interim government, it is trying to diversify its political partnership. Once again, taking away from the Awami League mooring, it is trying to cultivate increased tie-ins with Pakistan, which also goes hand-in-hand with the growing Islamisation in Bangladesh.

 

Now, this growing partnership with Pakistan is great. It's excellent that Bangladesh is trying to diversify and increase its political partnership and therefore there has been an increase in trade, there has been a security meeting, there has been MOU signed on some economic cooperation. But, Pakistan with the state that its economy is in, it cannot be a replacement for India. Once again, the 1971 realisation that we cannot ignore geography. We have to understand that India and Bangladesh share very fundamental interdependencies. For example, if you look at trade, the regular necessities like oil, soap, vegetables, these are the products that go to Bangladesh across the border. India has the highest number of medical tourists coming to it from Bangladesh. And also, if India wants to develop its north-eastern region, it would be impossible to do so without the cooperation of Bangladesh.

 

Therefore, creating amicable ties with Pakistan is excellent, but those cannot be a replacement for India. That is one reality that the government of Bangladesh has to understand. Second is that Bangladesh government, the interim government, must realise that this country functions principally on foreign funding. And India is one of the largest funders. It is the second largest trading destination for Bangladesh. India is also one of the largest foreign direct investment sources. It is also one of the greatest sources of foreign aid. Therefore, the role of India is not to be undermined. But now, with this kind of aid withheld and USA also withholding its aid, Bangladesh must be very cautious so as not to spew in favour of any specific country, because it has to preserve its political autonomy. The geographic significance of Bangladesh is great, and therefore it has many investors like China, India, Japan, and Australia.

But now, with two of the major investors restraining their aids, Bangladesh has to be very cautious how it will proceed diplomatically. But once again, the suspension of the project and not the termination continues to be the silver lining in the relationship between the two countries and gives hope for a better future. Thank you.

 

Veena Sikri: Thank you. Thank you for that focus on the bilateral relationship with India. So now we have our three panellists have presented different aspects, and that's very interesting. So I think for the audience, they've got three very different aspects analysed by each of our panellists. So now we can have a brief discussion. Are there any questions? Yes, one.

 

Unidentified Speaker: Good afternoon, ma'am. So my question is to you. As female participation was evident in the July uprising, do you think women's political participation transferred into governance and administration and chart a better future for Bangladesh? And my question is to the panel. Is there a possibility that henceforth youth activism can be a source of political instability in Bangladesh? Or can youth activism keep Bangladesh on the right side of history? Thank you.

 

Veena Sikri: Yeah. I'll take three questions. Yeah, please.

 

Unidentified Speaker: Thank you, Madam Chair. I think it's very strange that Trump is silent about Bangladesh, the way he's taking active interest in Russia and Ukraine, Israel and Gaza, and he's very much keen to have Mexico, Canada, Greenland. So the problem initiated because of island in Marshall. So what is the agenda of US to deal with this type of future, whether US is interested to have island or not?

 

Veena Sikri: Yes, one in the back. Yes. Third question.

 

Ashish:  My name is Ashish. I'm a Ph.D. first-year student at the Centre for South Asian Studies, JNU. My question is to Prof Bharadwaj. Sir, you talked about American apprehensions regarding Indian free hand in Bangladesh. And only yesterday we had President Trump speaking about Prime Minister Modi having a free hand now in Bangladesh with whatever he wishes to do. So does that put an end to American scepticism with respect to India's engagement with Bangladesh? And the second, which is an interlinked question with it, that now that India can have an engagement with Bangladesh, what policy options do we have to counter the mass hysteria that the religious right in Bangladesh, led by Jamaat-e-Islami, has been spreading since last July, and the unholy Awami League-India alliance that they have spread? Thank you.

 

Veena Sikri:  Okay, so we have these questions. I think I'll invite each of the panellists to respond, and at the end I can say a few words. Would you like to start? You can answer the third question, and maybe we begin.

 

Sanjay Bharadwaj: I think I will answer the second and third question. I think, the American involvement, or Americans, you can say, presence in South Asia, I think initially, in a decade or more, it was seen in a totality. India managed the neighbours, and let the neighbours also work together with India to promote the democracy, to promote the human rights, to promote the other developmental agendas, and all that. But the Biden administration, I think somehow they had been trapped into the personalisation of the relations where Mohammed Yunus has a particular support, in the United States, and they have been actively involving in Bangladesh, not for two years or four years, but they have been having that kind of grievances against Sheikh Hasina regime in the past. And I think they have found opportunity to launch Mohammed Yunus to replace Sheikh Hasina. But very interesting point is that why Mohammed Yunus? Because Mohammed Yunus was not accepted to any of the political stakeholders in Bangladesh. When Mohammed Yunus was…his name was floated in 2006, that he can lead as the chief advisor of caretaker government in 2006, there were constant crisis, and the two political parties were not coming together. All the stakeholders, including BNP, Jamaat-e-Islam, and Awami League, they have rejected, no, Mohammed Yunus is not at all accepted, in the Bangladesh politics. He was considered as a most unpopular, particularly the radicals, they never liked Mohammed Yunus, because of his microcredit and interest taking, and that is anti-Islamic and all that, that you see instead of the personal rivalry or against Sheikh Hasina and all that.

 

But now you can see that these forces, the radicals and Mohammed Yunus, they are working together, because it was the Americans, they do not have any hesitance to work with anyone to meet their geostrategic interests. They were working with the Jamaat-e-Islam, they were working with the radicals, and they had become instrumental to launch Mohammed Yunus there. So two things are very important. One is the personal issues, the personal equations and calculations, and one, another was the geostrategic considerations. I think somehow I have that apprehension that Americans did not have--they lost faith on India, that India will take care of things in Bay of Bengal. The way the Chinese were increasing their presence in Bangladesh, in other South Asian countries, including Myanmar and all that, building ports and all that. And then I think Americans had become very active, and they wanted to make their own presence. And that is, I think, was not acceptable to India as well as with Hasina. And this has somehow become instrumental to oust Sheikh Hasina from the power.

 

The second very important question that you have raised, how we can change the perception and perspective among the Bangladeshis, that they have been considered as most, today, like most of them, they are anti-Indian. I was recently in Bangladesh, and I used to go for last 30 years regularly and clearly moving here and there. This time, every friend has said, be careful, and don't tell that you are an Indian and whatever. I thought, why so deep anti-Indianism is there? I think one is, of course, that somehow, the anti-Awami League or anti-Sheikh Hasina has linked somehow with the anti-Indianism. That is one of the factors that whosoever is anti, who is supporters of the Awami League is not in the good book of us. Now, the popular narratives and sentiments was against the Sheikh Hasina. I don't know, today, if there is an election, I can bet it, 30% vote would be casted to Sheikh Hasina or Awami League, even today.

 

I think these are very critical issues that how we can address. We have been fairly doing. We have invested largest, given largest line of credit to any country that is Bangladesh. We had been instrumental for their developmental projects. There are many sectors, like the Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation. They were always in loss, but because India's support, they are now earning money for Bangladesh. We have been instrumental to develop the railway and everything. So India did a hard job to bring and to change the perspective of the people, but the sentiments and things went wrong. The one thing that what India, I think still can do it, that we should be always cultivate the democratic forces in Bangladesh. And that democratic forces may be either this or that.

 

I think that we should not be very selective that this force would be more suitable and this force. I think we should not compromise the democratic ethos in Bangladesh. Particularly, I'm talking about Bangladesh, because Bangladesh is very important in the sense that once there is democratic ethos and credentials are there, then most of the people, or I can say except few, the Jamaat-e-Islam, and the pro-Pakistanis, and ’47, and all that, most of the people, they love democratic institutions and democratisations in Bangladesh. And that automatically will change the perspective that India is supporting the democratic forces in Bangladesh.

 

Smruti Pattanaik: See, on the issue of youth activism, I think whether it can be a source of instability. This was what was asked. I think youth activism has always been very, very aspirational. And if you look at in the context of Bangladesh, it started with the quota reform movement. And obviously, the manner in which Sheikh Hasina's government dealt with the quota reform movement at that point of time actually provided opportunity to anti-Awami League force to take advantage of that. There was already a lot of dissatisfaction on ground regarding price rise and the manner in which election has been happening in Bangladesh. So it galvanised into a large-scale political movement.

 

Very quickly, on the point of the India-Awami League, this is a question which always comes up. In Bangladesh, many people keep on asking, India is putting all its eggs in one basket. My question is always whether the other basket was available to India or not. I think India's position has been to deal with any political party which is in power in Bangladesh or anywhere. We have dealt with military regimes in the past, both in the context of Pakistan and also in Bangladesh. So I don't think there is any restriction, per se, that we will not deal with a particular political force.

 

Second is that the entire two elections, not 2014, sorry, three elections, 2014, 2018, and the 2024 elections, were completely engineered by Awami League using the internal forces. The police was with them. The army was with them. So they engineered. So if there is no movement from within the country to protest that and blaming it on India, I don't think India does any kind of democracy promotion. We prefer democracy, but we will not promote democracy by actively getting involved and having a kind of election. And very quickly, whenever India has, in fact, tried to get in touch with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, it has always, the Nationalist Party is also very careful about being seen with India, because its vote base is anti-India constituency. In fact, if you look at the interview which Khaleda Zia gave in 2012 when she visited India, that point of time, many people asked that if you were asking for a kind of good relationship with India, what happens to my constituency? And her reply was that you cannot drive by looking at the rear view mirror. You have to look at the front. But the question is that the BNP's constituency is very different, so they will make all kind of noises. Publicly, they would not like to acknowledge a good relationship with India. And 2001 to 2006, perhaps, is the worst period in India among the relations.

 

I would not even say the ’75 when the military regime was there. I don't think we suffered the manner in which we suffered between 2001 to 2006. Countrywide bomb blast happened. 10 truckload of arms landed in Chittagong jetty. And then after all this thing, if somebody says that, why you have good relationship with Awami League, not with BNP, the BNP has to come out very clearly what exactly, what kind of relationship needs to have with India. Thank you.

 

Veena Sikri: Yeah, thank you. Ms Bose, do you want to add anything to this? Ms Sohini Bose, are you online? Yeah, we can't hear you. Unmute yourself. We can't hear. There is no volume. No. No, there's no sound at all. Can you establish the connection, please? In the meanwhile, yes, you have a question. Yes.

 

Madhurima Pramanik: I am Madhurima Pramanik. I'm a research scholar from Jamia. I want to know…Hello, I'm Madhurima Pramanik, research scholar from Jamia Milia Islamia. So my question is that after the fall of Awami League, exploitation over Hindus has been raised. And according to Buddhist Christian Unity Council, that around 700 to 800 Hindus are trying to flee, fleeing towards India. So what is the take of India? And how should we focus on the border security? How, as a neighbour, we should look at Bangladesh right now?

 

Veena Sikri:  Oh, yeah. Any other questions? I think there are no more questions. So let me just, I'll give it the floor again. But I just wanted to answer that one question, the first question about, which was addressed to me, on the women's participation. I think here one should know that, yes, in the quota reform movement, there were a lot of women. But I think after 15th July, when the violence started, and really everything was taken over by the Islami Chhatra Shibir, which is the youth wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, I think you saw very few women on the street after that. So I think, really speaking, the myths about women's participation was really the quota reform movement. And those people left when these when the Islami Chhatra Shibir took over. And in fact, on July 21st, when the Supreme Court gave its verdict in favour of the government, saying, yes, we are going to bring down the quota to just 5%, at that time, these ladies in the quota reform movement themselves said, yes, we are going to withdraw our participation in any kind of movement. And we are going to have separate talks with the government. And we have a nine-point demand, which they presented.

 

So I think the movement really became a very violent movement in just 15, 20 days, from 15th or 16th July till 5th of August. And that violence is what actually brought the regime down. And I think that the theory that was given to the rest of the world, that it's a spontaneous students' uprising, I think that myth was destroyed by Muhammad Yunus himself when he spoke in September 2024 at the Clinton Global Initiative in New York. And he said himself that, don't think it happened by itself. It was meticulously designed. And he presented his own special assistant, Mahfuz Alam, who later became an advisor. He presented this Mahfuz Alam as the mastermind behind the whole planning. So obviously, the fact that this had been planned for a long time with the Jamaat-e-Islami and with other forces from Pakistan and through the Islamic section of the army, so that is why I don't think that the role of women was any much in that.

 

I think that what you said about the Hindus and Buddhists and Christians and the attack on them, I think the very interesting part about it is that this time, there actually has not been a broad movement for them to leave the country. Although it is very evident from the kinds of attacks that are taking place, the destruction of property, taking over of establishments and so on, and forcing many of the Hindus and Buddhists and Christians to resign if they have government jobs or if they are in universities or schools. But still, they said, no way. We are citizens of Bangladesh. We want to stay here, and we want our rights. So actually, they have made an eight-point demand for Mohammed Yunus' government, but Mohammed Yunus has chosen to completely ignore it. But still, there is no pressure at the border from them. The border is closed. But you do not see any pressure from them. They rather would like to stay and consolidate their position. Anything you want to add?

 

Sanjay Bharadwaj: About the minority communities in Bangladesh, if you go, there are a number of studies. Like Barkatullah has also come out with a study. And you have seen, and you will go with the statistics, then you will find that Hindus in Bangladesh does not have developmental problems. They are good in business. They are good in everywhere. But the problem is that there is political discrimination, and the security threats are there. We have been reading regularly that their temples and puja pandals has been attacked, the minority communities has beaten, killed at number of times, number of incidents that we have seen. But very interesting point, Madam has also indicated about that. You will see that the presence of Hindus in army, in administration, in academic institutions, vice chancellors, everywhere you won't find anywhere, a part of the Awami League being in power. There are very less people have been given opportunity to the Hindu communities in Bangladesh. That majoritarian discourse is dominating in Bangladesh politics, and that is forcing the Hindus to migrate, to go abroad, and they are feeling insecure.

 

Even in the Jatiya Sansad, if you will see that the minority, there are 350 seats including the women, you will see that 12 members are from the minority communities. So these are… being giving slogans of inclusiveness, Bengali cultural society, and all that. But the problem is that the Hindus has been systematically marginalised over the years in population-wise. You can see they are less than eight percent population today, and I think that's why I was emphasising that the democratic credentials of a country should not be seized, that should not be declined, that democratic values that they have sacrificed their life in 1971, 30 lakh people had been killed for the democracy, and where is that? The democratic ethos has been compromised by a part of all political…forget about the BNP and Jamaat alliance and the way they have been doing, and aligning with the radical forces, and making Bangladesh the next Afghanistan, whatever. But other political forces had also not been doing justice with that, and they are just using minority communities as the vote bank. I think we need to rationalise, we need to think that whichever political stakeholders we are supporting in Bangladesh, how much they are taking care of the inclusivity while they are making the policies and participate, and how much involvement they are ensuring in the decision-making and policy-making process in Bangladesh. This is very concerning, very important. When Donald Trump is talking about that the minority Hindu communities are killed and atrocities are going on in Bangladesh. So what is left? The world is known and only the other minorities, everybody is giving the slogans, but the Hindus has been going, then there's no, we are silent. I think need to deal it very carefully and very firmly, so that the minority communities, otherwise India is the natural destination. There's no Hindu left in Pakistan, no Hindu left in Afghanistan, and tomorrow you will not find that no Hindu left in Bangladesh. So I think need to have very strong approach for that. Thank you.

 

Smruti Pattanaik: Very quickly, I think post Hasina's downfall, there was complete lawlessness within the country. The police left their post because the police were seen as complicit in all the elections. They were also part of the torture which the regime had imposed. So in this complete lawlessness, one saw both an attack on Hindus and the Awami League supporters. The interim regime statement is that these attacks were not confined because Hindus were the religious minorities, but they were the supporters of the Awami League. But having said that, I think that there has been instances of where particular people in a particular community actually took advantage of the situation. And the Hindus were also attacked. Actually, simultaneously, when you look at this minority attack, you also see most prominent Hindu officers, including vice chancellors, who were in a decision-making position, were forced to resign. I know some of the university vice chancellors resigned. Police officers and others, they were, in fact, forced to resign post Hasina.

 

But currently, as Ma'am was also mentioning, I think it is always better the Hindus remain in Bangladesh. Let them fight it out. They're planning to have a Hindu political party awaiting Election Commission’s registration. This is the first time they'll have a Hindu political party. Earlier, mostly their vote was divided between the Awami League and also the BNP. BNP also has a substantial number of Hindu leaders. So they also have been asking for a reserved seat, not separately electorate, but reserved seat in the parliament. But I don't think that has come up in the Constitutional Reform Commission's report. I did not see any reserved seat for the Hindus being made.

 

So I think any person in Bangladesh, if they are liberal, secular, they always want the Hindus to remain in Bangladesh. So the fight is much more broader, not just, I would not say Muslim liberals. It will be a liberal force. So they look at each other. The Hindus, for supporting within Bangladesh, they look at the Muslim liberal elements. And the Muslim liberal elements also look at the Hindus. That is how they think that they can sustain if there is a larger Islamisation. You also have a force which can fight against the larger Islamisation.

 

Veena Sikri: Okay. Are we connected to Ms Bose in Calcutta? You can ask for her comments.

 

Sohini Bose:  Can you hear me now?

 

Veena Sikri:  Yes, please. Go ahead.

 

Sohini Bose:  Oh, great. I'll just take a very brief time. My point would be that as far as the India-Awami League nexus that you have been talking about is concerned, while, of course, India has been repeatedly critiqued that it does not understand the sentiments of the people, or it does not--it works with only one political party. It has a party-based working relationship with Bangladesh. What I would like to point out here is that India only works with a government that works well with it. And if you look at the last joint statement that had been issued by the Modi government and the Awami League government together in last June or July, they said that they have sensitivity to each other's shared interests. And this sensitivity to shared interests is something that is very important in a regional scenario. Because now we see Bangladesh trying to increase its political partnership with Pakistan, trying to increase its partnership with China. Of course, with China, Bangladesh had already maintained the relationship. But there was a diplomacy of balance that was critical in Bangladesh's engagement with any country. And I think if Bangladesh needs to retain that diplomacy of balance, even if it wants to retain its own political autonomous voice in the coming years. So this mutual sensitivity is critical. And it is only if that is mutual that India and Bangladesh can have a robust relationship.

 

Also, I think the media and social media can play a very important role right now, especially as public sentiments between the two countries are diverging from one another. It is this time that people can actually use platforms such as social media to reconnect and treasure the actual points of commonality and values that these two countries share. Of course, the political narrative is very different. But to understand what the people really want, I think it is very important to hear the people speak for themselves, rather than tuning into the microphone of politics all the time. Thank you.

 

Veena Sikri:  Thank you. I think that's been a good summary of all the questions. And thank you for the interest. Let me give some brief closing remarks. And then we can all break for tea. I think we had a good presentation of the situation in Bangladesh. And I think that is becoming crystal clear every day, that the takeover is by the regime change operation. The takeover is by the anti-liberation war forces, the 1971, those who were against the liberation war of 1971, those who do not stand for the four principles of the Bangladesh Constitution that you mentioned, those who stand for more the religious forces, the forces of religious extremism, they are the ones who have sought to take control in Bangladesh. The interim government regime, whatever you may call it, even Prof Muhammad Yunus, he is just doing their bidding, I think. And that's an important point. But we've seen it by the destruction of all the statues of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and you've seen by renaming all the things, they want to change the constitution, they want to change the national flag, they want to change the national anthem.

 

But the question is that this has found a severe pushback from the people of Bangladesh, because they don't want the memory of the 1971 Liberation War to go. There are many people who actually fought in the Liberation War, they were in their teens then, in 1971, and they are now maybe in their 60s and 70s, but they have communicated these values to the next generation, the school books, the college books, particularly under Sheikh Hasina, 15 years, there's been a huge presentation on what the Liberation War was all about, what Bangladesh stands for as a country, and there is a definite pushback on this, and there's no going back on this. So the regime has tried to moderate its statements, and no, no, we don't want anything, but still, they're going on with the reforms.

 

The second aspect of the situation is this very vicious anti-Awami League, and I think linked with that, of course, is the anti-Indianism, but basically, it's a very strong anti-Awami League position, where they're calling them fascists, and they want them out of the political structure totally. The effort, whether to ban the Chhatra League, and now the Awami League, but again, this is not really accepted by the people of Bangladesh, because I think the 30-40% vote bank seems to be absolutely intact, as mentioned by our panellists also. So again, we've seen that this attempt to push out the Awami League is not finding acceptance. Even the BNP itself has come out in favour of Awami League participating in elections, because they feel this business of banning a registered political party is not democratic. So basically, I think the interests of the people of Bangladesh seem to be in going back to a democratic structure, and let the people of Bangladesh decide, let there be free, fair, and inclusive elections as soon as possible.

 

Nobody wants to wait, even end of the year was a little long, because the BNP had said August earlier. So I think that this is the thing, and to have the elections under the present constitution without any reforms, because reforms are not the mandate of a regime-chamber operation. I think, I'd like to mention here about India-Bangladesh relations, which Ms Sohini Bose spoke about at great length. I think that the government of India had made its position clear from the first day that we are prepared to deal with the present government.

 

And of course, there was no comeback at all from the interim regime. In fact, nobody from them showed any interest even in coming to India or talking to India. They kept making, they kept doing media diplomacy, megaphone diplomacy, talking to the media, making statements, oh, we want to change this, we want to change that. This is not right, this is not good. This is not in keeping with the interests. But I mean, if you want to do all that, you have to talk to somebody, isn't it? You can't do it by giving it out in the void on a megaphone and expecting that something will happen.

 

India took the initiative and our foreign secretary visited Bangladesh in December, on the 9th of December. I think that was a good visit, but it did not elicit much of a response from the government of the day in Bangladesh. And they really still have not shown any interest really. There's some talk maybe this weekend itself, there might be a meeting between our external affairs minister and the foreign affairs advisor of Bangladesh in Muscat or Oman where there's a conference. But still, I think the treatment of minorities has aroused a lot of anti-Bangladesh feeling in India. There's been a huge public furore against it. And demonstrations by, in many states, not only in West Bengal or Tripura, but across the country. So this is really, and again, this has led to a response in Bangladesh. This is the media in India is exaggerating and so on. So this has created even more ill will because it's not the media exaggerating, it's the actual people. We've seen the people who've lost their families, lost their breadwinners, and created a lot of, really, really a lot of ill will between the two countries. So we have to see now whether the regime is interested in going towards it.

 

I think that we've seen yesterday, I don't know how many of you have seen this publication of the UN Human Rights Commission report. They were invited by Bangladesh to, by the regime, by Muhammad Yunus regime, to come to Bangladesh and write a report, but only on a very narrow period, just 15th of July to 5th of August. And they, the UN Human Rights Commission, first Volker Turk went, I think, for a visit, then the Human Rights Commission sent two delegations, but they left, they've not been given enough information. Now I think a report has come out yesterday, but the interesting part is, while this report does talk about some of the events that happened, it also talks about some of the events against the minorities, against the killings that happened after 5th of August, and it also says, in a very interesting conclusion, that we do not have enough information to establish any individual guilt, and we feel that there's much more inquiry is necessary, and they need a more broad-based inquiry, not only looking at what happened after 15th of July to 5th of August, but what happened after 5th of August itself, because I don't know how many of you know that this present regime has indemnified themselves against anything that happened after 5th of August. So if any killings have taken place by them, then that has been indemnified, whereas we know that some of the, even the advisor, Sakhawat Hossain, he himself said, he said that, there were a complete looting of thanas, and there should be an inquiry into that, and when they looted the police stations, they stole the weapons, they killed policemen, there should be an inquiry into that. So the advisor of the present regime in Bangladesh said all this, but he was removed from his job, so he's no longer, his voice is no longer there. So obviously it means that if you are going to do any inquiry, it should be a very broad-based inquiry, including what happened in the quota reform movement, in the students, anti-discrimination movement, what they call themselves now, and in the killing of the minorities, in the way in which democracy has not been allowed to go ahead in Bangladesh, all this. It certainly needs a more detailed inquiry.

 

And finally, we have, of course, the global position, and what President Trump said yesterday, I agree that most of the interpretation of what he said is that he said, I am leaving Bangladesh to Prime Minister Modi, and it's up to him, and I'm not going to say anything on this. So, I think that seems to be the conclusion. The foreign secretary has given a press conference, I think, just before they caught the plane to come back to India, and in that, also, he said, the foreign secretary, Vikram Misri, he said, that yes, Bangladesh was discussed between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi, and we have conveyed our concerns about the situation in Bangladesh, and we certainly hope that the situation will improve.

 

So, clearly, there is a meeting of the minds there, between India and US, even on Bangladesh, and we will wait to see what happens in the next few days. So, with that, I call the meeting to a close. I thank all of you for being here. I thank the panellists, Prof Sanjay Bharadwaj, Dr Smruti Pattanaik, and Ms. Sohini Bose, for participating, and have a good day. Thank you.

 

Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee: It goes without saying, that this was an interesting panel discussion. On behalf of ICWA, I would take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the distinguished chair and panellists. My special thanks to all our members of the audience. To know more about ICWA's research work, events, outreach programs, and publications, do visit our website and social media handles on Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube, and Facebook. Thank you again, and please join us for high tea in the foyer. Thank you.

***** 

List of Participants 

1. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA
2. Ambassador Veena Sikri, former High Commissioner of India to Bangladesh: Chair
3. Sanjay Bharadwaj, Centre for South Asian Studies, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University
4. Dr Smruti S. Pattanaik, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA
5. Ms. Sohini Bose, Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Kolkata