Indian Council of World Affairs

 

Sanjeev Kumar: May I kindly invite Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA, to kindly give welcome remarks. Thank you.

Nutan Mahawar Kapoor: Distinguished experts, scholars, and friends, we are having this Panel Discussion today on “China's New Global Initiatives: Agenda, and Outcomes”. These global initiatives are Global Security Initiative, GSI; Global Development Initiative, GDI; and Global Civilization Initiative, GCI, which China has launched over the last three years or so.

Diplomacy is a playground for launching initiatives to bring countries and peoples of the world closer and make them friendlier towards each other. Diplomacy is also a tool to bring to bear one country's strengths to the benefit of another country or for global good. However, diplomacy can also prove to be a playground for forces that seek to establish hegemony, for countries that seek to outdo others at all costs, and for forces that do not believe in healthy competition.

The GSI, GDI, and GCI are cast in the framework of US-China strategic rivalry. They are set in an anti-West mould. In these initiatives, East-West and North-South divide deepens. Despite claims of endorsements by countries in three digits, they lend themselves to polarization and block politics, of which the world needs less not more, at a time of tremendous geopolitical shifts and tumult. Also, it remains open whether endorsements by other countries are genuine endorsements or mere hedging. Moreover, these initiatives discredit another's leadership to make space for one's own.

As one examines the principles and conceptual framework of these initiatives, one senses a replication of the agenda, principles, and objectives of the UN. The security objectives, the development objectives, the civilizational objectives, all of them. Though Chinese official documents cite importance of the UN, the initiatives seem to be an attempt to create an alternative UN, a Sinocentric Global Security and Development Governance Architecture. Needless to add, the world needs only one unifying UN, which has taken 100 or so years to build, and one which everyone wishes to reform and update and strengthen for the benefit of all. There are voices to amend the UN Charter, too.

The concept and content of China's grandiose new global initiatives are vague and broad, and seem hurriedly done to meet the exigencies of geopolitics of the day, and not the genuine requirements of human welfare. There is a debate, for instance, on whether GSI is a response to the Indo-Pacific strategies of various countries. Cooperative approaches are the need of the day, not exclusionary ones. Also, these initiatives are far from being fully operationalized.

A vision of the world that is not multipolar, cannot be acceptable when the actual geopolitical trends of the day are showing otherwise. We have to craft a world order where the options and choices available to the weakest are maximized and not constrained to only one or either/or. Instead of seeking to create a counter-narrative and an alternative to the rules-based international order, global efforts to synergize and build consensus on what should constitute a people-centric, rules-based international order would be helpful.

I'm sure the panel will come up with many such interesting observations, analysis, and suggestions. I look forward to a lively discussion. I wish the panelists all the best.

Sanjeev Kumar: Thank you, ma'am, for your valuable remarks. Now may I invite the Chair, Ambassador Nalin Surie, to kindly give his remarks and conduct today's proceedings. Thank you, sir.

Nalin Surie:  Thank you, Sanjeev. I’m delighted to be back in Sapru House to see so many familiar faces and friends. I'm sure we'll have a very stimulating discussion today. Ambassador Nutan Mahawar, Professor Deepak, General Narasimhan, Avinash, and friends. I'm going to give you some introductory remarks. I'm not going to go into the detail of the initiatives because we have three outstanding speakers who will tell us all that we need to know about them. But I'm going to try to give you my remarks so that I can set a kind of framework looking forward at where we are going.

I think Ambassador Mahawar already outlined some of the basic points and I think the weaknesses in the Chinese positions. And I think as we go along, we'll find that this so-called set of initiatives is nothing but an attempt to cover up China's attempt to achieve its stated goals of unipolarity in China's favor. In spite of its enormous progress over the last five decades, China remains insecure yet determined to regain its past glory, self-defined territorial integrity and sovereignty and achieve to begin with G2 status.

Hegemony in Asia is the, I would say, the first step before achieving G2 status. Its global initiatives should be seen in this backdrop. China under Xi Jinping is carrying forward a well-thought-out game plan to use its special status in the UN as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and its rapid economic, scientific, and military modernization over the last three to four decades to change the international status quo in its favor.

You will note I said the word carrying forward. I think these policies which Xi Jinping is implementing should not only be ascribed to himself, they are part of a long-term plan which the Chinese have had in play for at least three to four decades, if not going back to the Mao Zedong era. Things were going rather well in this direction for China till it began to openly challenge the West led by the United States, especially after China supposedly successfully managed the downsides of the global financial crisis.

Unfortunately for China, its arrogant handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and since then its struggling economy and the growing realization in the West that China had uniformly and in a one-sided manner used the generosity of the West to gain unilateral advantage meant that the barriers began to come down. This intensified in the first Trump administration and Trump's election for a second term has reportedly given rise to considerable trepidation in Beijing. But the Ukraine war, the war in Gaza, and the economic slowdown in Europe has given some sort of second wind to China and it's guiding and it's guarding itself to stand up the US during Trump's second term.

Chinese attempts to divide Europe and reach out to the global south, especially via a reformed BRI, the GDI, and GSI continue. I'm not speaking too much of GCI, because I think it's the latest and I think the weakest link in this whole process of global initiatives. Let me briefly digress. I think Ambassador Mahawar referred to this, the BRI and GDI have gained some traction. The GSI not so much and the GSI the said least. The latest of course is the Indian Ocean Initiative. I'm sure somebody will speak about that. And that essentially is to sidetrack IORA, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad processes.

The Chinese efforts to strengthen new alternative bilateral initiatives like SCO, BRICS, the Indian Ocean, etc. are also processes to help build Chinese influence in the international community. While continuing to benefit from the advantage it has as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, as you know, today, China is perhaps definitely the most powerful second member of the United Nations. It has left the British, the French, and even the Russians far behind in this respect, especially because this budget contribution is now so large.

Now, I think that the new development from my perspective in the last few years has been the attempt by Xi Jinping to push the Chinese agenda further through the intellectual and normative domination through his so-called formulation of, “a community with a shared future for mankind”. Again, what it means, what his definition is, you can talk about it when the cows come home, there's no clarity. Now, these initiatives, which we are going to discuss today are intended to take the world in that direction, according to Xi Jinping, toward the direction of a community with a shared future of mankind. But the only direction I see is that it leads to Chinese domination in as far as they can achieve that.

Now, regrettably for the Chinese, while the BRI and the GDI have found buyers, the effort at achieving the higher normative ground by Xi Jinping is facing serious challenges, not only because of Chinese double standards, but also on account of the serious pushback by the West, and even otherwise well-disposed important partner countries in Latin America, like Brazil, under President Lula, who would otherwise supposedly be very friendly towards China. And I'm going to quote this example to show you how Lula has stood up to Xi's pressure just a week ago, during the bilateral summit in Brasilia.

An important indicator of this was the reluctance of Brazil to accept the Xi Jinping mantra. And instead, it was agreed that China and Brazil will work towards and I quote, a community with a shared future for a more just world and a more sustainable planet, which is very different from Xi Jinping's formulation. The difference is quite considerable, both in normative and economic terms, and of course, in political terms. What is more, Lula did not sign on to the BRI, even though Brazil has been a substantial beneficiary of the BRI.

But he and Xi Jinping have agreed instead to and “establish synergies between Brazilian development strategies, such as the New Industrial Industry Brazil, the Growth Acceleration Program, South American Integration Routes Program, and the Ecological Transformation Plan, along with China's BRI”. For the latter purpose, for developing these synergies, the two task forces have been set up and will present priority projects to the two governments within two months. This is very different from the BRI processes and the GDI processes.

Now, lest there be any doubt, Lula spelt it out in his press conference with Xi Jinping present. And he said, and “we want to densify the value chain in our territory, Brazilian territory, as well as expand and diversify the agenda with our biggest trading partner”. Will this become a model for other BRI partners? Time will tell. It will depend on how strong the other partner is. The point that I'm trying to make is that Xi Jinping is willing to be flexible, especially in the current complex international context, which is relatively inimical to China. But China has not stepped back from its determination to double down in establishing a community with a shared future for mankind, and achieving the Chinese dream of rejuvenation for the Chinese nation.

I think, it's very important to understand what these phrases mean. Ultimately, it means just one thing. China seeks number one position in the world by 2047 or whatever you want, whatever date you want to wait. Chinese initiatives, major initiatives are intended to underwrite an assertive foreign policy and military expansion in the Asia Pacific, in the Indian Ocean and beyond, to reshape the world to the extent it can to achieve G2 status to start with.

But China is now also aware that it will not be able to muscle its way through, as it may have hoped, including in pluralistic groupings, such as the BRICS, SCO, G20, etc. because China is not the dominant player in these organizations, not even in the SCO, which it is actually the original founding member of. Notwithstanding the pushback to Chinese policies and initiatives from the West, and several developing countries, including in Southeast Asia, and the uncertainties created by a new Trump presidency, China continues to want to be seen to be standing up to the US and be treated as an equal.

It seems to believe that its gamble in supporting Russia and the Ukraine war is paying off. You must have all seen the Chinese readout of the meeting between Xi and Trump in Lima on 16th of this month, on the sidelines of the APEC summit. Now Mr. Biden is the outgoing president. And he's the messenger and Trump the target. The Chinese message to my mind was both arrogant and aggressive. If we have time, I just like to read a few excerpts of what Xi Jinping has said. And this I'm quoting from the official readout of the Chinese foreign office. I mean, this is not something even if you do say something like this to your counterpart, you don't print it out in the open. So what did he say?

“The Thucydides’s Trap is not a historical inevitability. Containing China is unwise, unacceptable and bound to fail. The US side always says one thing, but does another. Contradictions between two major countries like China and the US are unavoidable, but one should not undermine the core interests of the other, let alone seek conflict or confrontation. The Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, China's path and system, including the monopoly of the Communist Party in power, and China's development right are four red lines for China. They must not be challenged”.

And finally, there are many such interesting quotes, but I'd just like to quote one last quotation from what he said. As you know, the Americans have been accusing the Chinese of cyber attacks, including during the presidential election process. And Xi Jinping bluntly told Biden, “there is no evidence that supports the irrational claim of the so-called cyber attacks on China. And if you have not read this readout, I would advise anybody interested in China to read it out, because it reflects where China is coming from. And it is there in unambiguous, unadulterated terms.

So let me before I conclude, share with you a classic example of Chinese doublespeak. In his address at session two of the G20 summit in Rio on 18th of this month, Xi Jinping reminded his audience of his mantra, that “mankind lives in a community with a shared future”, but before concluding, he says, and he does not see his contradiction, and “global security governance is part and parcel of global governance. The G20 should support the UN and its Security Council in playing a greater role in support all efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of crisis”.

Now, you know, on the one hand, you talk of future of mankind. And the other hand, you talk about support me as a permanent member and don't undermine my rights. And he referred in this context to the Ukraine crisis, ignoring the fact that China entered into a no limits partnership with Russia, just prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and its subsequent future support Russia and the Ukraine war. And he ended by saying, and that it is necessary to, and “practice true multilateralism”. I mean, your guess is as good as mine what he's trying to say. But you know, the point is, China believes that it can get away today by saying and doing whatever it wants to. To conclude China's global initiatives are intended to enable it to become the most powerful nation in the world by helping it protect its political system and meet its economic, raw material, technological, military, and market access needs, among others. So let me stop at this. I think I've taken more time than I should have. Our first distinguished speaker is General Narasimhan. I think all of you know our speakers extremely well, so I'm not going to waste time introducing. General Narasimhan, you have the floor.

S L Narasimhan:  Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. Ambassador Mahawar, Ambassador Surie, Professor Deepak, Avinash, Dr. Sanjeev, and friends. It's a privilege to be speaking to this audience on a subject which has been actually drawing some attention of everybody, what China has started doing. So before I go on to global security initiative about which I was supposed to speak, I thought I'll also cover the other initiatives which are actually of importance. China started sending out initiatives one by one starting from September 2020 onwards. Global initiative on data security was the first one as a response to the clean network initiative which the US had put out in the month of August.

One month later, they brought it out. It has six advices for the countries and two advices for the ICT companies. Basically, when one goes through this entire document, what it appears to be is China is trying to substantiate her views on data security, data localization, and also to protect its actions with respect to data. So this is global initiative on data security. In September 21, in the UN General Assembly, global development initiative was brought out and that actually saw a lot of development and a development report, a progress report of GDI came up last year in the month of June.

If you look at it, it writes on the sustainable development goals of the UN 2030 and it creates eight particular sectors which are relevant to 17 SDGs and how they interact with each other. And they selected 50 projects out of which the progress report mentioned, 10 of them have been already achieved. So basically, they are trying to garner the support through constant mention of these initiatives in all the documents that they try to do bilaterally or multilaterally. Then came the global security initiative in April 2022 in the Boao forum. Mr. Xi Jinping announced this.

Thereafter, in the month of May 2022, two people, Mr. Wang Yi and Mr. Le Yucheng, who is no more in the government and his whereabouts are not known, they gave out explanatory notes on this global security initiative. If one analyzes this global security initiative, the explanation that have been given by these two gentlemen, there are two points that stand out very clearly. One, the GSI subsumes GDI and the One Belt One Road initiative. That is point number one. Point number two, China is looking at establishing an alternative security architecture in the world, which is not the present one, but it doesn't want to usurp the entire UN Charter. It wants to leverage the existing system to its benefit. So this is the way it comes up.

Then came up the Global Civilization Initiative, proposal for reform and development of global governance. If you read these documents, it clearly indicates that China seems to be dictating how the world should behave, and how it appears as if it has assumed a superior position from which it is dictating to the countries and everybody as to what they should do. The other initiative that came up is the Global Community of Shared Future, and then came Global AI Governance Initiative in October 2023. In between, they also went and established an office in Hong Kong for international mediation.

So all these things, I fully agree with what Ambassador Surie mentioned, all these things are an endeavor to place China above everybody and to attain the global position which it wants to attain by 2049 with the Second Centenary goal. Having said this, this is my view. Please understand, all these initiatives are subsumed into the next one, and ultimately all of them land up in Community of Shared Future. And on the left-hand side, I have put a proposal for reform and development of global governance. This, as well as the two technological initiatives, that is the Global Initiative on Data Security and Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative, all of them feed into this Community of Shared Future. And you may question whose community, who is sharing, and what is being shared? These are all questions out in the open. However, the understanding needs to be very clear that it is the Chinese who are supposed to, who is expecting that their community will share the future with others, and their way of model of governance, etc., are the ones which probably would be propagated.

So this is the way we need to understand the entire initiatives that the Chinese have brought out over a period of time. Most of the analysts actually take them individually, and therefore they seem to miss this link. So that is something that I think we need to keep in mind. So let me talk about the GSI now. What is it? After those two gentlemen spoke, Mr. Nong Rong, Assistant Foreign Minister of China, spoke in Xiangshan Forum on 31st October 23. He mentioned these things which are given in the slide. Basically, they claim that 100 countries and international and regional organizations have supported GSI.

The same is the case with GDI, wherein they created a group of friends, wherein 70-odd countries say that they have supported that initiative. They try to garner support, whether they give it or not, wherever it is mentioned in a bilateral document, etc., they try to accumulate that and put it as support given to this kind of an initiative. He mentioned about four key areas of action, which I have listed here. These are nothing new. They are already given in the initiative, but he has given these four particular aspects to work on. This progress report was brought out in July 2024 on the Global Security Initiative. This has been brought out by the China Institute for International Studies, and this report is available on the net. One could go and have a look at it.

What it implies is, it talks about these 20 areas and five categories of cooperation, of platforms and mechanisms, and then it talks repeatedly about common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable global security. If you go to page 15 of this particular report, it lists what all people in their bilateral meetings, etc., have mentioned this. It seems to be taking it as a success of this Global Security Initiative. It talks of six core commitments of GSI. These are given here. These are basically to explain that these are the six headings under which they say that they'll commit to the global security. Indivisible security is being talked about. That is a concept that has been borrowed from the 1975 Helsinki Act.

I have taken this from the progress report. You find these six commitments that have been given. Each of them have been given a name, guiding principle, basic requisite, etc., etc. Basically to say that they follow the UN Charter, they want to support the UN Charter, and use the UN Charter to achieve what they want to achieve as part of the Global Security Initiative. The inferences from all of this is very simple. Each initiative is subsumed into the next one. If you read the documents in detail, each of them mention the previous initiative and then tries to subsume it within itself. All of them feed into Global Community of Shared Future, as I explained to you earlier.

Most of them are released in the month of September, as you have seen from the dates that have been released. Why? Basically to gain support of the UN, because that is the month in which the UN actually meets for the General Assembly, and also the Beidaihe meeting which takes place in the first week of August, those things are discussed and thereafter they are put out. It also seems to justify China's actions and offer a defense for the action that it has taken. So this is the way I think all these initiatives feed into each other and this is the way they come out. On the Global Security Initiative, what appears to be the aim is to create an alternative global security architecture, as I mentioned to you earlier, to leverage the present architecture to China's advantage and not create a new one. And third, they always keep saying under the umbrella of UN and not out of it. That is the way they gain the support for most of these initiatives.

On the Global Security Initiative itself, they mentioned all the UN actions that they have taken, the proposal for the peace discussions to take place between Russia and Ukraine that they have proposed, the offer that they are given to mediate between Israel and Lebanon, all those things they have listed in this particular report and claim that it has been a global security initiative of theirs. So this is the way I think you need to look at it and this is the way you need to see it. And the progress report that is there in the net, it is very clearly, it indicates what all has been done so far. All mundane activities that they have been carrying out has been listed as a successful story of the Global Security Initiative. I'll stop here and if there are any questions, I'll take it up further.

Nalin Surie: Thank you, General Narasimhan. That was very useful. I think we are underscoring the point systematically that China seeks unilateral advantage through its various initiatives and you spelt it out very clearly in terms of the security dimension it concerns. And if we have any questions, I'm sure others will have also, but before that, I'd like to turn to Professor Deepak.

B R Deepak: Thank you, Ambassador Surie, Ambassador Mahawar, General Narasimhan, Avinash and Sanjeev. It's good to be here again. Well, I've been asked to speak specifically on Global Civilization Initiative, so I'll focus on this aspect.

Nalin Surie: But feel free to cover the broader aspect.

B R Deepak:  But I think given the paucity of time, so maybe, okay. Thank you. Well, you know, my presentation would be structured under three broad points. So one, I'm, you know, looking for the drivers, domestic drivers and international drivers and what would be the consequences. So these three points I would be touching upon. And of course, slightly delving into what Xi Jinping proposed when he launched this initiative on 16th March, 2023 at a CPC dialogue with the World Political Party's high-level meeting. And he quoted his often-repeated phrase, a single flower does not make spring, while 100 flowers in full blossom bring spring to the garden. Typical saying from this Gu Jin Xian Wen, Proverbs, Ancient and Contemporary, a compilation of Ming dynasty vintage. And during Qing period, it was further edited and added many more proverbs. So Xi Jinping seems to have found interest in this book. And he often quotes many things as far as culture is concerned.

And what is meant by this proverb perhaps encompasses the sense of four points he elaborates. And these are primarily pronounced as four advocacies that largely explains GCI. So one is respect for the diversity of civilizations. And second, the common values of humanities. And the third, the importance of inheritance and innovation of civilization. China believes that it has innovated and it has learned from other civilizations and created a new kind of civilization. And the fourth is advocacy for robust international people to people exchanges and cooperation.

Now, when I look at the internal drivers for GCI, I reflected on a couple of points which I would like to share with the audience. One, of course, is meant to consolidate his own position and legitimacy of the party. And of course, his thought. And as it was flagged out by a panelist, including Ambassador Surie, the Chinese dream or the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the important component of Xi's thought. And he has outlined to realize socialist modernization by 2035.

And the 2035 deadline, such as transforming China into a manufacturing power, technological power, education power, etc. And now with the launch of GCI, so he wants to make China as a cultural power by 2035. So it becomes one of the important components of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, or the so-called Chinese dream, as could be gleaned from October 28th Politburo meeting, where Xi Jinping made a speech and said that we must anchor the strategic goal of building a cultural power by 2035. China's rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the target, and it is to seek dominance and make China number one in a military, technological, or cultural power, whatever you may perceive it.

So the culture becomes extremely important driver to realize that. And second internal drivers, I think it is, in fact, Ambassador Surie has also touched upon it, it becomes an important element of the four matters of confidence. That is, you know, the path, system, theory, and the fourth itself is the culture. And if you see what he told Biden, you know, at Lima, it is particularly this, you know, and this is the red line, the new red line, which he has proposed to next, you know, president. And therefore, the kind of cultural self confidence, you know, for developing socialism with Chinese characteristics he is talking about in the new era, it remains indispensable for realizing Chinese dream of great rejuvenation. And obviously, Xi Jinping looks for answer in the 5000 years history of Chinese civilization.

In fact, you know, he says, and “foreigners have also run to us in search of material, in search of inspiration, aren't Hollywood movies such as Kung Fu Panda, and Mulan sourced from our cultural traditions or resources”. Now the third internal drivers I have, you know, flagged out, or I wish to flag out is construction of socialist culture, which have been, you know, deemed very, very important to realize the socialist modernization in two phases, phase one till 2035, and the second till 2050. It is in this context that he has introduced the concept of core socialist values, or the CSVs, and deemed them a fundamental factor for the texture and orientation of a culture, the soul of cultural soft power, and a key to building a nation's cultural soft power. So CSVs, it comprises a set of moral principles.

And nowadays, if you visit China, so they are all over the places, schools, colleges, universities, public spaces, wherever you see, you will find these being displayed in the public everywhere. And these are everywhere you will find. Even the neighborhood localities, you will find there are these notice boards. You will find it all over the places. And it appears that these are being fed to young school kids, even at the preschool, forget about primary and other schools. So these are prosperity, democracy, stability, harmony, freedom, equality, justice, the rule of law, patriotism, dedication, integrity, and friendliness. These 12 set of values are there. And we see that many of them, at least four of them, they are from the Confucian classics.

So the core socialist values, they embody the thought of ancient sages, the aspiration of the public-spirited people, the ideals of revolutionary martyrs, and the expectation of ordinary people. So this is Xi Jinping saying one of the speeches. And this is also incorporated into the third volume of Xi Jinping on governance, China's governance. And the fourth driver I have identified is, so he says, culture remains indispensable for art and literary creation and for rolling out the kind of cultural products that China is presenting to the global audience. And therefore, he advocates inheriting of Chinese cultural genes. So he is very fond of using this gene. The red gene is also being used. But now the cultural gene is also being used to further his position and legitimacy. And he cites an example that Cao Xueqin. Cao Xueqin is the writer of Hong Lou Meng, this Dream of the Red Mansion, one of the very famous novels, Qing vintage novel, and he said that Cao Xueqin could not have produced the encyclopedic classic Dream of Red Mansion, and Luxun could not have created such memorable characters as Sister Xianglin, Runtu, Akiu, and Kong Yiji. It is primarily because, you know, they had drawn insight from the Chinese culture and civilization, so they were able to create these characters.

So when he's talking about art and literature, so he's invoking, you know, the Chinese cultural confidence again and again. Another driver, the driver number five, I identify is to propagate the idea of great unity, and this is quite interesting, the idea of great unity, and this is considered important for the unification of Taiwan, as well as integration of minority nationalities into the mainstream culture. You know, by the way, if you happen to talk to the Chinese academicians, they will discover that, you know, the mainstream narrative nowadays, it discourages the usage of minorities, especially the concept of 52, you know, 54 minorities in China, and they blame Mao for creating this narrative and, you know, putting China or the great cause of unification to the press. He is not, you know, favoring Mao's connotation of these nationalities.

The sixth internal driver is, you know, he has emphasized the importance of safeguarding cultural relics, celebrating cultural heroes, and promoting cultural tourism. To blaspheme ancestors, classics, and cultural heroes is strictly prohibited, and if you do that, then you could be subjected to imprisonment. Remember in the wake of Galwan, when, you know, some of the social media account, they questioned, you know, the figures which were given by, the fatality figures given by state media, you know, they were immediately imprisoned. There were two cases, and of course, Confucian statues, you can see, so they have mushroomed all over the places now. At one point in time, they were, you know, subjected to abuse and misuse, but now even institute of, you know, no Chinese academy of governance, that in the party school, it has also a big Confucius statue now, you know, if you happen to go there.

Yes, yeah, the newly, the Marx, Lenin, everyone is there, but Confucius is also there. And the final point I have identified it is, you know, it's also to diminish foreign influence in China, especially amongst young people, as we have seen many Chinese people taking to halloween processions, celebrating Christmas parties. So, sinification is encouraged, rather than, you know, following these Western festivals or traditions. And it doesn't matter if these habits, they are taken over by the Chinese products. And one typical case I found during my China visit, this time, I was surprised that Starbucks in it had been squeezed out of Chinese markets. And the coffee culture, you know, China is not a coffee drinking nation, it is a tea drinking nation. Now the Chinese brand is called Luckin coffee. It has replaced the Starbucks. Starbucks is having just 9000 outlets all over the country. But this Luckin coffee, it has now over 24,000 outlets. And it is being encouraged.

So it doesn't matter as long as you, you know, have the Chineseness. So it is encouraged. Now external drivers. I think many of these have been touched upon, as Ambassador Surie and also General Narasimhan, they said that ultimately, you know, so they converge to building community of shared future for mankind. Because it is the pillar, you know, of Chinese foreign policy at this point in time, building community of shared future. And of course, the other being building a new type of international relations, which has, you know, so two branches in the form of major power relations and the relationship with developing countries or the BRI countries, of course, with differentiated policy approaches from China. So it deals very, very differently with major powers and the BRI countries. When China deals with major powers, it talks about equality, it talks about mutual respect. But when it talks about BRI or the developing country, it doesn't talk about these, it talks about affinity, it talks about inclusion and so forth.

So essentially, I think, GDI, GSI, GCI, so they have been added as flanks, you know, so to the overall concept or framework of building community of shared future for the mankind. And the second external driver I have identified as, you know, it proposes a new model of international relations away from the US model, as has been argued by General Narasimhan, and Ambassador Surie has also mentioned about it. And, you know, China says that, you know, US model, it doesn't uphold the principle of equality, mutual learning, dialogue, and inclusiveness among civilizations. The advocacy of the diversity of civilization underscores the point what Kiron Skinner, you know, if we may recall in 2019, when she made a statement and said that it is for the first time that we have a great power competitor, that is not Caucasian. It was Skinner who said this in the context of China, and China now often works in this to deny inequality or, you know, not having sensitivity towards diversity in civilization, so on and so forth.

The third thing I have identified is the common values of humanity emphasize, you know, of course, China's perspective that peace, development, equality, justice, democracy, freedom, so they are the universal values. Xi Jinping argued that countries must refrain from imposing their own values or models on others and from stoking ideological confrontation. Here again, we can infer the target US and its Western allies and to propose a new model, you know, in place of the existing model of governance. And fourth is to convert China into cultural power by 2035, as we have also said it before. Therefore, it is aimed to enhance China's cultural soft power and influence of Chinese culture abroad. At the moment, it is at play with the BRI country that all of us know, especially the Middle East and Africa. So if you see in China, you won't see golden hair people, you know, in great numbers. So mostly it would be people from Africa and the Middle East, mostly, and most of the projects which were under BRI, whether they are the publication of books or various other projects in terms of infrastructure building.

So they have now moved to these areas in large numbers. Though through GCI, China also wished to wrest the discourse power away from the West. Not only GCI, I think GSI, GDI, so they are all meant to tell the Chinese story well, as Xi Jinping says, and offer an alternative narrative to the, especially global South. They know that global North, they are not going to listen to that dictates, but at least global South, they will find it interesting. Now consequences, I have identified two consequences, then I'll end my presentation.

One of course, it flares the sectarian nationalism anti-foreignism, so which we can see it is on rise in China. As could be gleaned through some of the recent indoctrination of school children, the killing of Japanese kids in Guangdong and Suzhou, attacks on US nationals in Jilin province. And in fact, I witnessed, you know, when I was in China, I generally like to take metro and the kids, small kid telling his father, I'm a Chinese, so why should I learn English, you know? So these are the things, you know, so you could see it is the kind of indoctrination which is going at very, very young age level.

And second consequence, will GCI succeed internally or externally as we have identified some of the drivers? Well, I think it will depend on China realizing socialist modernization as they have planned, which in turn is dependent on China's economic growth trajectory and technological advancement. China's technological innovation and poverty elevation have indeed attracted, you know, attention of the global south to a certain extent. You know, some of his cultural products also, I think, has a massive fan following across the globe. For example, this PUBG, you know, the Chinese online game, and the latest Black Myth: Wukong, I don't know if you people have heard about it, adopted from the Journey to the West. It was launched just two, three months back on August 20th, and it's already, I think, amassed over $1 billion. And then the Chinese gaming industry is supposed to be, you know, $40 billion strong at this point in time. So therefore, it depends as long as, I think, China's technological prowess, you know, is there in front of all the people to see its economy continue to rise the way it rose in the past, it will depend largely on that.

But I think the situation is a little tricky. The economic slowdown is very, very, very much there, as we have seen almost in a 4.3 billion secondary industries, secondary and tertiary industry, they have shut down their businesses in China. And that is a huge problem of unemployment.  Unemployment rate between the people of, you know, working age of 16 and 24, it has shot up 21.3% last year, but it has come out, come down slightly to 17.78% if, you know, this South China Morning Post figures are to be believed. So there are various other social problems which China is grappling with. So it has to be seen how China handles its domestic, you know, dynamics. And then perhaps, you know, so we would be able to gauge where these initiatives so they go in future. So with this, I thank you for your patience.

Nalin Surie: Thank you. That was fascinating. And I have many questions, I'm sure the others do. Our last presentation is by Dr. Avinash.

Avinash Godbole: Thank you, chair. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Dr. Sanjeev. This is like a homecoming to me. ICWA is a second home. I also had a question for you like earlier days, we used to hear that young Chinese used to take an English name, you know, as a sounding cool. Is it continuing now? Or has it been abandoned? So maybe you can include it in the answer. It just came to my mind. So I thought here. So I'm going to be speaking on the GDI. And I'll talk a bit about what is GDI, but also mainly on what is there in it for China to gain from and many of the points have been covered. The GDI came in 2021, Xi Jinping mentioned it during his during his UNGS speech.

And it was towards the end of the second wave of the COVID. We didn't know where the world was going. And China was facing significant status crisis at that point of time, because being the cause of COVID and its unwillingness to control it or acknowledge the faults in mismanagement of COVID at that point of time. So status crisis at that point of time was serious and China being a status conscious country sought to include, you know, create a GDI at that point of time, it realized that the world did not need more infrastructure that was being promised through BRI.

It needed different kinds of growth strategies. It needed issues like food security. It needed social security on local developments, green development. Digitalization, we know, was upon us, but we didn't know where it was going. So it kind of sought to cover these areas. So GDI goals are six, development as priority, people-centered development, benefit for all, innovation, harmony between man and nature, and result-oriented activities. And there are eight priority action areas as well, poverty, elevation, food security, pandemic, financing for development, and other issue areas. GDI basically does five things for China, or China hopes GDI and other initiatives achieve these things.

First of all, it addresses the criticisms of BRI, the initiative in GDI. We all have critiqued BRI for the last 12-odd years, and there are six categories of criticisms that BRI is a debt trap. It's unilateral activity. It lacks transparency. It leads to human rights violations wherever it has gone. BRI has aided authoritarian regimes, and BRI looks like a neo-colonial activity. So GDI kind of addresses those issues, and towards doing that, GDI was launched under UN. And a lot of the speeches have focused on the point that GDI will fulfill or achieve UN goals and SDG goals as well, as was mentioned. And in some locations, GDI complements BRI projects in parts of Southeast Asia, in some locations in Central Asia where activities have been started. So the first idea is to address critics of BRI.

China is a revisionist power, and it wants to delegitimize the West-led order. So that is a second objective. As a rising power, it is going to be a revisionist power. It wants to challenge the institutions in the world which support the status quo of the Western power. So GDI will have political goals, and it does have. China will not waste its capital, human resource, or money on something without expecting anything in return. So in that sense, its behavior is consistent with the previously risen powers. China is at the stage of influence, a stage like you mentioned. It has built its capability and created power out of it over the last 35 odd years. And the influence stage begins when China began to perceive that the West is in terminal decline, 2008 as a starting process, and the first election of Trump as the start of that decline of the West, that the West is anti-globalization and the deglobalization is permanent, and there's a bipartisan agreement in the US in containing China and taking the world towards deglobalization. So the vocabulary of GDI, GSI, and everything else is about delegitimizing the West.

And that is why the vocabulary like true multilateralism comes in the picture, it has been used repeatedly over the last five or five odd years. True multilateralism breaks down into issues like dialogue without confrontation, partnership without alliance, and shared benefit with consultations and joint development. Basically, China will correct from Chinese perspective, everything that the West has done wrong, and that is where the Chinese model comes in the picture. But we all were alarmed during the 19th Party Congress when Xi Jinping had said that China should take its model of development abroad.

I think these initiatives start taking that model abroad, quite clearly, bringing Chinese experience to the world. The third goal is to create alternative development narratives, and China has always wanted it. Now it has the money, power and capacity to do it. It was a wish list, now it's in a shopping basket. Through GDI and such initiatives, China is promoting alternate views on development, sovereignty, human rights, and over the last several years, we have had this debate coming in Chinese academia on the relation between development and security, whether development should go first or security first, and the right to choose own development path, and opposing interferences in development strategies are outcomes of those vocabularies.

So development as the first right over everything else, and that is also interesting because it pushes democratic rights or human rights to the secondary or tertiary levels, perhaps. It also speaks of common development and other legitimate developmental needs of others as strategies. The White Paper on Global Community of Shared Future, September 2023, brings out several of these points and brings out that vocabulary of Xi Jinping through this discourse.

The fourth point is to gain legitimacy as a rising power and use United Nations for that purpose. And China has deliberately and steadily used UN and expanded its role and activities through UN agencies to show harmony between its goals and the global shared objectives. So in 2020-21, China was heading 9 out of 15 agencies. In 10 more, it had deputies or the secretarial positions in those agencies. And Global Development Initiative has been helped because it has partnered with the UN as such. And the last party congress, the 28th Party Congress, there was one of the longer acknowledgements of UN once again in this regard, that China is firm in safeguarding international system with United Nations at its core. I'm quoting from Xi Jinping's speech there. Again, these initiatives are also a response to the expansion of Indo-Pacific into non-political goals, non-political areas, IPEF and other frameworks that we all are aware of.

China likes multilateralism and plurilateralism when it is at the center of it, but it's going to hate it when it's outside of it, and then it overestimates the goals and the threats of all of this. So it uses GDI to again delegitimize those initiatives and push forward its own initiatives. And finally, China is a norm builder. China is pushing the norms once again that China is a builder of world peace, China is a contributor to global development, China is a defender of globalization and defender of international order, and China is a provider of public goods. So GDI has helped China to push through all these norms forward once again as such.

Like we mentioned, Ambassador Surie, you mentioned that GDI has more takers in the world. Mostly the countries who hedge between China and the West and they see GDI as non-threatening and development, they have signed up on that. Like for example, Southeast Asia has been a vocal advocate of GDI. Last two ASEAN-China summits have mentions of GDI as a shared kind of goal as such. One point I also missed, SDG leadership in the absence of US. The more US withdraws from globalization, China is filling that vacuum. So GDI, China hopes, helps it achieve these objectives. I'll stop. Thank you.

Nalin Surie: Thank you Avinash for that very comprehensive presentation on GDI. Okay, before I throw up in the floor for discussion, I have some questions. I'll use my jury as chair to ask each of the presenters a couple of questions. I'll start with General Narasimhan. My question is much more fundamental. Will Russia buy into the GSI? After all, they are now allies for all sorts of purposes. And my question, I have several questions for Professor Deepak, but let me minimize them because we can go on all night then. It would appear to me from what you said, that what Xi Jinping is attempting domestically, which is where most of the success has happened, success in inverted commas, is basically Hanization of mainland China, as distinct from what is already happening in Mongolia or Xinjiang or Tibet. And if that be the case, will this not lead to a lot of internal dissent? Will it not add to their law and order problems?

My second question is, you talked about the Chinese focus externally on the global south. You talked about this, these video games or whatever they call it. I've read about that. I don't follow this game. But yes, I realize it's had an impact. But from what I read, this is one segment of their initiatives, which has actually been, for want of a better word, a singular failure. Because the gaming industry is a different ballgame altogether. I mean, that way, Japanese games, Korean games are far more popular. So I would not bring gaming, but I buy your point. It's a very good way of selling influence. But does it mean that they are failing on this front or do you think they make more effort in this regard?

And my last question on the on this side, you know, you talked about the core socialist values. Now, is this the Chinese people have been used to seeing these core socialist values being defined, redefined. And when they are being asked to project them, they suddenly find a crackdown against them. You talked about 100 flowers, I mean, 100 flowers, if I were a middle aged Chinese or old Chinese, I would say my god, nowhere near 100 flowers. I mean, we all know what happened to us then. So you know, the cultural aspect for me is from the perspective of political internal domestic stability in China, very critical, perhaps more important than this 5% growth rate, which they believe they must have.

Okay, Avinash for you, I mean, if I may, and then I'll, you know, do you believe the Chinese actually believe that the West is in terminal decline? Because the data is just the contrary. Forget the fact that China is not going to be the largest GDP in the world for another 10 years or whatever, we'll see. But if you look at any subset of data, whether it's GDP or expenditure on science and technology or defence expenditure, or even for that matter, trade, China, including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, they pale in insignificance. I mean, the fact that some power is shifting from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific is a fact, it is happening gradually. But is the West in terminal decline?

You think the Chinese generally believe that? I'm asking a question because I wonder whether they're constantly saying this or implying this is a belief or counter propaganda, or just trying to fool the people. And in this debate on development versus security, my impression was that this debate had been settled by Xi Jinping in favour of security. On development his focus is on innovation and on new technologies. And he believes that through that route, he can overcome all the disabilities of the Chinese economy. And he may well turn out to be right. I don't think he may be wrong. But we'll see. Only time will tell. So these are my questions to all three of you, if I may. And then we'll swap and let go. General Narsimhan, you want to start first?

S L Narasimhan:  Yes, sir. On your question regarding will Russia buy into GSI, the progress report actually gives a paragraph of a joint statement between Putin as well as Xi Jinping, wherein he has mentioned that they support GSI. But heart of heart, I am also knowing that Russians, though it's for the public they have said this, heart of heart, they won't buy into this, basically because of two things. One, in this partnership, Russia has always been having an upper hand. And because of the Ukraine campaign, maybe that they may go down a little bit. But their own pride will not allow them to play a second fiddle to China in any manner. So I don't think they will buy into it that way. But for the public consumption, they have put it out in public to say that, ok, they are supporting the GSI. That is the way I see this.

Nalin Surie:  Supplementary question, does it mean that the Russians will be willing to provide high technology equipment on the defense side to China?

S L Narasimhan: At the moment, most of the equipment that China needs is being produced indigenously in China. What they are looking to Russia is for very, very high-tech kind of a technology, particularly in terms of space technology. Beyond that, I don't think, and maybe to some extent, the hypersonic glide vehicles. But the fact of the matter remains that most of the things that they need are being produced indigenously today. But for a few very high tech kind of a thing which they are trying to look for Russia, Russia may very well help them out because of the kind of support that they have got during the Russia-Ukraine campaign from China. So that is the only aspect. Otherwise, most of it is indigenously produced today.

Nalin Surie:  Thank you. Professor Deepak?

B R Deepak:  Yeah, thank you, Ambassador. I think I need a whole lot of time to answer these questions because it pertains to the domestic dynamics and how Xi Jinping would be dealing with these. Of course, I think I agree with you that it is sinification of mainland China and the kind of products which are being rolled out. It is also aimed at that, especially in academia, if I may cite one example. For example, recently, I went through a book by Sun Tung, who is one of the very famous scholars on Buddhism. And the whole narrative that is, especially when you're talking about, you know, this years of disintegration in Chinese history, say, after Han dynasty to the formation of Sui dynasty, you know, that is, you know, roughly 220 AD to 489 AD, 589 AD. So this period of disintegration, now it is being reinterpreted as a period of, like, Hanization, Sinification.

So how these minority nationalities, those who came to South to find green pastures, you know, in mainland China, so they were sinicized by the local Chinese because of their superior civilization, culture, values, so on and so forth. And these minority nationalities are the monarchs, so they accepted these. So this is the kind of narrative which is being built in academic works. And there is another, you know, book by Professor Chen Lai of Tsinghua University. So he's also talking on the similar lines when he's, you know, talking about this amalgamation of rather, you know, metamorphosis of minority nationalities, you know, with mainstream Han culture. So he is again, you know, giving this color of sinification or hanization. This is very clear.

And I think in that context, this unity, international unity, or the greater unity of five races they talk about now, which at one point in time, you know, so it was diluted by these various minority nationalities. So this narrative now it has come back. And I think this also shows what kind of debate or narrative, so they wanting to build and sell inside China as well as outside China. Now, as far as these cultural products are concerned, I was just roughing, so it is, you know, in terms of like selling influence, whether they are sellable, some of them, yes, you know, like this monkey king, of course, and three body problem of Liu Xinyi, yes, you know, but not beyond that. But I think the kind of innovation which takes place in freer societies, in, you know, Western world, and even in India, you see Bollywood, you know, if you compare this Black Myth: Wukong with Dangal, it doesn't stand anywhere, right? So Dangal amasses 1,600 crores, where it has been able to amass only 100 crores in two and a half months. I don't think it will reach the figure of 1,000 or 1,500 crores.

So that stifling of academic freedom, or, you know, that thinking of free speech or free thinking, it simply is not that everyone battles, you know, the same line from the school kid to, you know, to the university professors. And CPCs, of course, I don't think there are many takers, you know, for these internally. And this is reflected in the kind of... In fact, I wrote an article recently, you know, for China reeling on the Tang Xiantong phenomenon. I don't know how many of you got hold of it. So Tang Xiantong was one rebel in the late Ming dynasty and mostly active in Sichuan province. And when the Ming forces wanted to annihilate him and the Qing forces, they were coming down and he turned to innocent, you know, people for his revenge.

And then this kind of phenomenon is, again, I think gripping China at this point in time, that people, those who have suffered injustice, so they are turning to innocent people, whether they are school, kindergarten, schools, kindergartens, you see too high air show. It was so impressive. But at the sideline of the Tuho, there was this killing of 35 people in. One person ramming his car into the sport complex and, you know, killing, 35 is the official figure. It is believed that, you know, it is much more than that. So 35 is the official red line, because if it crosses, then I think there are different parameters to interpret it. So this kind of, you know, phenomenon, which is going on there and in November itself, you know, there have been eight cases in November itself. And if you count from February, you know, there are hundreds. So this is very, very serious phenomenon. One of my students, he was saying that after reading my article, saying that now his son is going to kindergarten and there are police, policemen guarding the gates, you know, of the kindergarten.

This is a recent phenomenon. So there are a lot of churning going on, you know, internally in Chinese society. The dissent is that people are not being able to express it. And you see 20,000 official figure, you know, Zhenzhou University people, you know, riding the bicycle, going all the way 50 kilometers to Kaifeng. So this, I think you must have read about it in the newspaper. So why, you know, all of a sudden, so many people, so this is one of the expressions, you know, to express their dissent with the regime that, you know, things are not going well, frustration, you know, and we see it during COVID also, the white paper revolution and, you know, the various other incidents. So I'll stop myself here. Thank you.

Avinash Godbole: I'll continue with what Sir was saying. Since you mentioned 100 Flags, there's a book by Ian Johnson called Sparks. He talks about 100 flowers as the first mistake of the party. And everything that happens is one mistake to cover the previous one. And the party's growth has been as part of that. But it's also I mean, the civilization initiative is also about controlling the narrative of the history, that party centric narrative and party controlled narrative, putting party back at the center as such. You mentioned this issue of the question of the terminal decline of the West, that was a perception at that time of at the peak of COVID, that the West was in decline, that the American health system was in crisis, people didn't know how to handle it.

So, you know, at that point of time, I believe it's a belief that it's a slow process that has started. That is what most of the writings reflect. But it also sells well to the people that the West is in decline. And that what we are doing is right, the path shown by the party is right. So again, party centrality comes in play here. On the point of security versus development, it's security for us at home. But when you're selling the product abroad, the right to development comes first. So, you know, the terms and conditions set by the West on environment or on the regime stability or the regime's human rights record won't matter when the money will come from the Chinese project. So that is a distinction I wanted to highlight.

Nalin Surie: Thank you all very much. Okay, the floor is open for discussion. Okay, we have 25 minutes. Please ask your questions. And please make it clear which of the speakers you want to respond to your question. But please, a question not narratives because we have only 25 minutes. Sanjeev, we can take a bunch together, three questions.

Sanjeev Kumar: Thank you, sir. I have two short questions. First to Narasimhan sir. You rightly referred to six commitments in the context of GSI. On the one hand, it talks about common and comprehensive security. But on the other hand, it also talks about legitimate security concerns. So the legitimate security concerns is a subjective idea. So do you think a contradiction between these two? The second question is to my colleague, Dr. Avinash. Professor Deepak referred to the question that since Global North is not favorable to China, they are moving to Global South. Now, do you think more focus on Global South in the context of GDI after India hosted G20 summit and highlighted the aspirations of Global South? Thank you.

Unidentified Participant: General Narasimhan Sir, my question is regarding GSI, GDI and GCI. China is trying to challenge USA or UN or the whole world with this initiative including BRI. Second about Elon Musk is also interested in e-vehicle. China is also doing e-vehicle in a huge number and their purpose is for a data collection. So, what's your opinion about this Elon Musk? How will he survive? How will he compete?

Unidentified Participant:  So, I have two broad questions and the chair can direct, anyone can answer including the chair himself. So, you had asked about to General Narsimha the Russian buy-in on the security initiative. My question is what is the global buy-in on any of the initiatives of China given the fact that much water has flown in the past 25 years? And I think Dr. Avinash had mentioned, how is the civilizational initiative different from the Confucius initiative? How is BRI initiative different from the global development initiative? Is it not just basically repackaging and tweaking it for the year 2025? One. Second question is that when China becomes number one or they hope to be number one, will the distance between them and the top 10 be absolute as it was in the case in the till the turn of the century where the Soviet Union in the past and U.S. after the Cold War, there was no number three. It was only statistically, but now with the distance, no margining, what is the actual utility value of being number one? Can they just bulldoze their way and get what they want?

Nalin Surie: Okay, General Narsimhan first.

S L Narasimhan: Yes, sir. The question of the legitimate security versus common security, which we just talked about. If we need to see it in the way China sees security, China's policy is very clear. It has got two connotations. One is territorial integrity and sovereignty of a country is sacred and it should not be disturbed. That is one. Second thing, other countries should not get involved in the internal issues of others. This is a stated policy of China. So if you look at it from that perspective, you get to see that what is being legitimate is territorial integrity and sovereignty is legitimate. That is definitely legitimate to everybody. Similarly, there are aspects of security which can be attributed to only a particular country and its own interests. So that is what is legitimate security that they talk about.

As far as common security is concerned, they talk about a region. Like for example, if you look at that progress report, they talk about how they deal with this common security for a particular region. Like for example, the Middle East they talked about. They have talked about Russia, Ukraine. So in region wise, when you look at it, it comes to the common security aspect of it. So for every one of these terms, they do have a kind of explanation which can be actually fitted into this. But to my own view, you find that whatever China wants to do as far as security is what they will push for. You look at many of the things that they have mentioned in that report is all very common things that everybody does, but they will propose it as if they have done their own. And therefore, they'll push that agenda of that having done that particular thing.

The second question regarding this challenge to US definitely is a challenge to US. There's no doubt about it. That is what that is the country they want to replace by 2049 or a little beyond that. And therefore, they will actually put everything in place to ensure that they take that lead to that extent to come up to 2049. So this is something that we need to keep in mind all the time. Their primary objective is to reach where US is there and thereafter go beyond that. That is the point. E-vehicle data collection. Please look at China's data collection, not only from e-vehicles, from everything that you do. Like, for example, even the construction equipment that they have sold to India, those also send the data back to China. The data collection is a major, major operation of the Chinese, and that is what will ride their AI development, artificial intelligence development.

The artificial intelligence development precisely needs data, and that data they will collect from anywhere and everywhere that it is required. Elon Musk is one example, but please look at BYD, how they have now sold more cars in Europe and everywhere else last year. I think it was 4.5 million units have been sold last year to beat what the US has done. So this competition is going to be on. Musk may be there, but the competition will still be on.

The global view on China's initiatives, I think global view on China's initiatives varies from region to region. If you look at different countries, they will have different views on these initiatives. When you say 100 companies, 100 countries have supported, some of them really mean it and they have supported it. Many of them may not have. So to differentiate this, you need to look at regions. Within the regions, you need to look at the countries. Then you will get to know which country is really meaning to support these initiatives.

Lastly, the gap of number three, please understand this number three gap is going to remain. US is at $28 trillion, China is at $18 trillion, we are at $4 trillion, and somebody else is at 4.4 trillion. Between 18 and that 4.4, that differentiation is going to be very, very difficult to bridge for a very long time to come. So it doesn't matter whether third is there or not, but the competition will remain between first and second, and if China comes first, the competition is going to get more fierce. That is the way I see this.

Avinash Godbole: Sanjeev had this question, yes, going towards the south, that is where the development space is and that is where demand for China is. On the issue of India and the G20, Chinese had also objected to the term Vasudheva Kutumbakam when it came. I also wrote something on competition between Vasudheva Kutumbakam on one hand and harmonious world and shared destiny on the other. So it's a non-competition. We don't know how far it is taken forward and it is, you know, forward. The difference between BRI and GDI, there are several differences. One is like infrastructure centric, one is people development centric. I mean, I did a piece somewhere, it's like BRI is kind of hardware and GDI is supposed to be a software kind of thing. It came as a response to COVID at that point of time.

BRI will go based on infrastructure requirements of the country or, you know, as such. BRI is also long term. Infrastructure will give returns, is what's supposed to give returns over the long term. And BRI was strictly multilateral. As such, GDI is, BRI was bilateral, GDI is multilateral and UN goal centric. And the agency from China was NDRC. So again, overcapacity, allocation of Chinese overcapacity was through BRI. And GDI, it is Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SIDCA, International Developmental Cooperation Agency, I think that's what it's called. Again, there's overlap of those agencies. There's Japanese agency, there's Indian overseas aid and projects. So Chinese in this market, I mean, in this field with a new vigor as such through these initiatives. So there's a difference. And it's not just symbolic.

Nalin Surie:  Deepak, would you also like to address the bigger question of acceptability of three initiatives abroad? I mean, Narasimhan has done part of it, maybe from your perspective.

B R Deepak:  Yeah, I think my view is mostly, you know, it reflects the viewpoint of all the panelists, that it is, I would say, the marriage of convenience. So if you are getting, you know, freebies from China or getting benefit from China, you bandwagon with them. If you are not, then you are antagonistic to them. And this polarization could also be seen, you know, case by case in Global South also, not necessarily that entire Global South is bandwagoning with China, like India is standing out, right? And moreover, you know, if you see the kind of values or the narrative they are building, you know, for example, some of the values of socialist core values, you know, freedom, justice, equality.

Do you think people will buy the Chinese argument, you know, when the freedom is not there in China, they have banned all the Western apps, you cannot have access to Facebook, WhatsApp, you know, Insta, whatever, Google in China, whether China cries foul when WeChat is banned by the rest of the world. So therefore, of course, they say that, oh, it is whole process democracy, they keep on coining these new things, right? Yeah, but even the Chinese, they don't understand what is that, forget about other people. But I think what General Narasimhan pointed to that gap, that I think is a matter of concern. And we really need to be very, very serious about it.

Even, you know, by 2030, we reach a GDP of $6 trillion, you know, that was the figure China achieved in 2006. So therefore, this gap is really huge, you know, and this translate into your technological, military capabilities, so on and so forth, you know. So therefore, so here we have to be very, very serious. And, you know, the kind of market access we are thinking of post Galwan, I mean, post patrolling arrangement, that again, is, I think, very serious. You can say question how to ponder and how to respond to what Chinese so they are saying, because overcapacity, it is a serious concern, you know, so not only, I would say, within China, also the people, people are objecting to this kind of, you know, state driven consumption model. And then, of course, Trump is ready to impose almost 200% duties on these cars, if they get into to the United States, and Europe also, there they have, but I don't know, in India, there is no debating. And in fact, I got message the other day on my phone, that, you know, you can buy a BYD here. Yeah, they are on the road, but I don't know how, you know, so they are circumventing all these rules without a policy discussion at government circles. So this is very strange for me.

So therefore, I think we have to do our homework and the kind of piecemeal approach. So that has to be left behind. I think I'll reserve my comments except one point, you know, in the context of this globalization. So China now, they don't talk about globalization, they're talking about unilateral globalization. And China, so they are now making a narrative, you know, behind this term, and trying to sell it that if US is, you know, decoupling or retracting back from the globalization, so then China, you know, unilaterally will do it, you know. So this is, yeah, so this is the kind of debate. Yeah. Thank you.

Nalin Surie: For round the questions. Yes, please. Please introduce yourself.

Nandini: Insightful discussion. My question is for Professor Deepak, since he talked about global civilization initiative. So it is in context of Africa. So in the recent FOCAC meeting, which was held in Beijing, GCI specifically was given a priority. So, now explicitly or overtly, China always talks about sovereignty, non-interference and a non-westernized way of democracy or modernization. But implicitly, is it an attempt to export its form of governance? Like, for example, you talked about how China aims to become socialist, aims to have a socialist modernization by 2035, I suppose. So Xi Jinping also talked about modernization at this meeting. So in a way, is China trying to influence Africa into building its own form of modernization there? Thank you.

Ratan Jagoswamy: Well, thank you, Ambassador, for channelizing this wonderful discussion. I am Ratan Jagoswamy, Research Intern at the Indian Council of World Affairs. My question is directed to Professor Avinash and Professor Deepak. As you have highlighted about Chinese aspiration of becoming a Marxist-Leninist nationalism, drilled with the Confucius ideas. And on the other hand, we Indians, we are also talking about concepts like Vishwa Mitra. Dr. Jaishankar highlighted this thing broadly in his book, Why Bharat Matters, especially when we have borders that are very hot between both the countries and these kind of conflictual ideas, are we seeing any kind of contestation or it is bound to happen between both the civilizational states, especially when you know concept of nation state is decreasing and concept of civilizational states is increasing. Thanks.

Chandan:  Hello, first of all thank you for the wonderful lecture. My name is Chandan, I am from Delhi University, PhD scholar. My question is to Professor Deepak and Avinash. You were talking about the global civilizational initiative. In terms of India and China, in India we have the Viksit Bharat Agenda of 2047 and we have the same thing in case of China about the developmental goals at 2035 and 2049. So how you see the role of culture being projected in terms of both the civilizational states at a global front when we see that in the last year at G20, China was not in a state to participate directly, rather it sidelined and it didn't object it at all but we could manage it because we were the power to bring all the parties. So in that sense, how you see the culture? I am specifically asking this question from a historical lens. Thank you.

B R Deepak:  Yeah, again a whole volley of questions, I think three questions. First, Nandini, of course, there's no doubt, you know, it has been debated over and again that China would like to export this model of governance. They say it very openly, they used to be very discreet about it, but now they are saying openly, you know, yes, we have cast the dice and here we are one of the players you choose between the United States and China, primarily. So this is very, very clear and that's why the kind of narrative is also being built around it. You know, so there exists many metaverses simultaneously, you know, they talk about metaverses.

So China as one of the metaverses, you know, and you can say Western values represented by the West and the United States, another metaverse. So the kind of choice China, you know, trying to give it to the global community. So this we have to keep in mind. And in fact, some of their scholars, you know, quite so-called Rajagurus, you know, I call them, Professor Zhang Weiwei from Fudan University in Shanghai, and Professor Jin Canrong, I think all of you should be familiar with these, these guys, you know, they are very famous and sort of like drive the narrative in China or feed the narrative to the system of Renmin University School of International Studies.

So, in fact, he says that, and I have quoted it many times, that it is not a United States which is decoupling from China. It is China who is decoupling the American bubble, because now they have created their own bubble. They believe that they are successful in creating China bubble away from the American bubble. So therefore, there is no doubt in them. They are openly admitting that they want to, you know, propose a different governance model or Beijing consensus. They talk sometimes.

Second question, you know, Ratan has asked, it was about the contestation. I think contestation would always be there, you know, and it is visible why Xi Jinping didn't want to come to G20. And of course, border was there in the background, but he didn't want to give India to steal the limelight. And then he would have been just, you know, insignificant participant there. And it is precisely because of this reason that they invited all these Central Asian Republic later, just before G20, this Shanghai Cooperation Organization, right? So you can see the kind of contestation which is going on, even if, you know, India has not been accorded very high priority by China when it comes to this.

But then I think it is very, very clear that they are skeptical of India stealing the narrative away from China. And it could be reflected, you know, at various, you can say their decisions at the highest level. I think maybe I covered perhaps all the questions, you know.

Avinash Godbole: The civilizational competition between India and China? Oh, yeah. Yeah. So, so civilizational competition between India and China will remain and it will be played out. I'm not a big fan of the idea of, you know, the civilizational states concept because it makes people angry for no reason. In China, people are angry with Japan and angry with the US. And, you know, the whole Chinese new way of nationalism started with those couple of books. Chinese people are not happy. And then re-edition of that came, Chinese people are still not happy. So what is the world supposed to do to make them happy, you know? So we can't have the world run by angry… anger everywhere. That is what Trump's re-election also reflects, actually.

The US has been at the richest level it has ever been, but they still think that the world is doing something wrong to them, and Trump comes back. So I hope the civilizational pride reduces somewhat. Sorry, I digress from the point, but yeah, thank you.

Nalin Surie: Okay, no, I think the point to note here is very simple. You either have civilizational states or you have nation states based on the restatement system. You can't have anything. The Chinese want both, and that is where the problem starts with the contradiction. Okay, before we run completely out of time, I think our speakers deserve a minute each for final words. So General Narasimhan, we'll start with you.

S L Narasimhan:  Yes Sir, I have precisely five points. I'll take 30 seconds. One is on free thinking. There was a discussion about free thinking. I think we need to differentiate the free thinking between academics, media, and the scientists. Please understand, in certain technologies, Chinese are actually world leaders today, and that couldn't have come, you can borrow technology to some extent, but it couldn't have come without the innovation happening within China. So innovation, you need to look at it in two different parts. One is with the academics and the media. The other one is on the innovation aspects related to scientists and others. That is one aspect of it.

The second is development versus security, which Ambassador Surie mentioned about. I get a feeling I think we need to look at it differently from growth versus innovation. Growth in GDP versus innovation. Growth in GDP has been compromised a bit, basically to give a push to the innovation so that the innovation can actually lead them to further growth subsequently. The third, One Belt One Road initiative is not mainly for infrastructure. Avinash made a point about it, but if you look at the projects that they have taken under One Belt One Road initiative, anything and everything is grouped under One Belt One Road initiative, including education projects, including agriculture, including everything else. So this is something which is a broad-based thing, which is supposed to be helping people in some form or the other purportedly.

BYD in India, there was a question. BYD is in India basically because the major share of that company is owned by an Indian company. That is all. It's a 51-49 partnership. BYD has got a minor partnership, and that is how I think they have been allowed, but that is open to debate and discussion. I will leave it at that. The last question on contestation. Contestation need not necessarily be only on the border. It can be in economy. It can be in any other issue that we talked about. The contestation is likely to remain there. These are the points I had, sir. Thank you very much.

Nalin Surie: Thank you, General Narasimhan. Avinash, I'll give Professor Deepak the last word.

Avinash Godbole:  Yeah. I mean, I agree on all those points. I also had a point to add on BYD. The company actually came as a truck manufacturing unit in 2015 and then they abandoned those plans, Sanjeev and me did a draft work on that at that point of time. And then they changed the plans just before COVID. And then they chose to launch the cars at that point of time.

Yeah, China wants to be a world leader and wants a recognition as well. I mean, along with power, it wants that status and everything else that it's doing right now, it's to seek that status as a provider of public good. And you know, everything it's doing will go in that direction. That will be my short comments.

B R Deepak:  Yeah, I think undoubtedly, you know, that China would like to be the number one and not merely the global power. And all these initiatives or any narrative emerging out of China, all are geared towards that. So that is very, very simple. Well, I think things so far, they are going good for China. But what would be important is the internal dynamics of China. I don't think it would be China's contest with the United States or with us, you know, we are not there yet. But if, you know, anything goes wrong in China, it would be that internal dynamics and it remains to be seen how China handles, you know, these contradictions and problems within China.

Nalin Surie: Thank you very much. I have no intentions of trying to summarize this fascinating discussion. I only want to thank our speakers, I think presentations were outstanding. And before I hand the mic back to Ambassador Mahawar, I just like to request you all to join me in a round of appreciation for them.

Sanjeev Kumar: Thank you. I think we all will agree that we had a fascinating and enriching panel discussion today. Now, on behalf of ICWA, I would like to express my gratitude to Distinguished Chair, Ambassador Nalin Surie Sir, and Distinguished Panelist, Lieutenant General S L Narasimhan, who joined us online, and Professor B R Deepak and Professor Avinash Godbole. My special thanks to the invited persons who have participated in this panel discussion. And thanks is also due to the leadership of ICWA, especially A S Ma’am, and D R for their support and guidance.

And thank you all and please join us for high tea in the fire. Thank you.

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List of Participants

1. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA
2. Nalin Surie, Former Ambassador to China, Distinguished Fellow, DPG: Chair
3. Gen. S. L. Narasimhan, Former DG, CCCS
4. B R. Deepak, JNU
5. Prof. Avinash Godbole, O.P. Jindal University, Sonipat