Indian Council of World Affairs

Arshad Ali: On behalf of the Indian Council of World Affairs, it is my pleasure to welcome you all to this Panel Discussion on Ukraine and Gaza Wars, Crisis of Liberal International Order. The program has been circulated, and we will go by the order of the program. 

To start, may I invite Mr. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA, to give the welcome remarks. 

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Excellencies, members of the Diplomatic Corps, distinguished experts, and students. The textbook definition of international order is a set of rules, institutions, and norms that govern the interaction between states in the modern international system. To my mind, however, it is the objectives and goals of an international order that should more clearly define what constitutes an international order. 

The objectives of a human-centric international order are one, absence of war; two, long-term peace, stability, and security; three, firm states as essential units of international political independence, and responsible behaviour; four, harmonious and friendly interstate relations premised on respect, trust, cooperation, interdependence, dialogue and diplomacy, and sovereign equality; five, multipolarity; six, humanities and states resources dedicated exclusively to people welfare and environmental consciousness; seven, all-round prosperity; and eight, a just balance of rights and obligations at all levels. 

Effective governance at global, regional, national, and local levels facilitates the meeting of these objectives. Multilateralism assists this endeavour at the global and regional levels. 

The liberal international order that has emerged and evolved over the last few centuries is in crisis today. The world today is in turmoil. A deeply polarising spirit of competition and hate has made its way across all realms globally from inter-country relations to international economy, from technology to interfaith interface. There are broken interdependencies. Disrupted supply chains are but an example. Multiculturalism has been seriously challenged. Defence expenditures are increasing. Look at Europe. There is increased nuclear rhetoric disturbing the existing nuclear order. We are seeing soft borders somewhere and artificial borders elsewhere. There is a rethink about free markets. Unfettered markets have not led to efficiencies and enhanced welfare. There is an absence of working welfare systems, especially in the Global South, and the jury is still out on multi-stakeholderism in governance. 

While the crisis of the liberal international order has been in the making for some time, the 2008 international financial crisis being a watershed, the current conflicts of the world in Ukraine and Gaza and the growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific have markedly brought to the fore its weaknesses. While fervent efforts continue to be made on dialogue and diplomacy, the world seems to be going down the path of war. Cooperation is a fundamental tenet of international relations, and that is being severely impacted adversely. Divisions are becoming acute. 

So, as the world embarks on constructing a New World Order amidst the current unparalleled geopolitical tumult, what are the solutions that come to mind? One, the liberal international order originates from the West and has been propagated to the rest of the world from there. There are plenty of lessons to be learnt from this journey, chief among them being the need to understand and imbibe oriental values and value systems. The Occident and the Orient need to synergize. Two, a study of indigenous cultures and governance concepts and a public debate on the subject will be useful in this endeavour. Three, a consensus around what constitutes universal values and principles of a rule-based international order and what constitutes internationalism. Four, initiatives at all levels to promote greater acceptance of diversity and plurality within and between countries and mutual understanding. Five, reform of institutions of global and regional governance so that they are able to support the New World Order, including its emergence. And six, discussions and awareness of this theme in every country and among every people. 

I'm sure the panel will come up with many such interesting suggestions and observations. I look forward to a thought-provoking and engaging discussion. I wish the panellists all the best. 

Arshad Ali: Thank you, ma'am. Now may I invite the Chair, Ambassador Professor Mohan Kumar from OP Jindal University to give his remarks and carry forward the proceedings? Thank you. 

Mohan Kumar: Thank you very much. Can you hear me? So I want to thank first Ambassador Nutan Kapoor and ICWA for this amazing opportunity, and I'm an extinguished ambassador trying to be a distinguished scholar. 

In one case, distinction is conferred on you. In the other, the distinction has to be achieved. The latter is much more difficult. I'm looking at the diplomatic corps as I say this. I'm sure they understand what I'm saying. So I want to confine myself to just five minutes of provocative questions, and I have some really distinguished academics instead of someone like me masquerading as an academic. I think there are some wonderful academics alongside me who will I think be able to answer some of these questions. 

The first question I want to ask myself and the panellists and the audience is that the world is on the cusp of change. There is a crisis. So what kind of crisis, how would you describe this crisis, and what kind of change can we expect? So that's the first. The second obviously is the all-important election of President Trump and its impact on the international strategic landscape. The liberal international order, I'm inclined to think it's a bit like bankruptcy. You know bankruptcy happens gradually and then suddenly. So liberal international order has been like this. It's been in crisis for a long time and suddenly we find that it's really reached breaking point and I think we should take a good look at what constituted the liberal international order. What is the state of liberalism in the world? Why it is in such a bad way? And I'm not just talking of the United States, but really the Western world and even the rest of the world. Liberalism is in a state of full-blown crisis. Who is to blame? What is happening? And what can be the future? 

And then of course you have these two unending wars, it seems to me. One is obviously more long-standing than the other. That is the war in Ukraine and then you've got the war in Gaza. And I think the question really is, what is really going to happen after the war ends because at least one of them, that is the war in Ukraine, it is fair to say that it is going to end in 2025, one way or the other because you have the. Not because President Trump necessarily says that he can put an end to it in 24 hours, that's important too. He is the President of the United States of America but because the Ukrainian President has said he would like to see it end and so do the Russians. So I really see that we are moving inexorably towards a diplomatic solution. What the diplomatic solution will be? What will that outcome be? Who will really conduct these negotiations? Those things remain to be seen. 

On the Gaza conflict, I invite all of you to take a look at 22 pages of G20 communique, which has just been issued this morning. It ruined my morning from six o'clock. I hope it doesn't ruin your afternoon and evening. I'm kidding. Don't take me seriously. But it was a 22-page communique. And on Gaza, there has been an emphasis on the humanitarian assistance. They're not talking in terms of resolving fundamentally the causes of this conflict. But there is a lot of talk about how humanitarian aid should reach those for whom it is intended. So it's quite an interesting joint statement. There are times I felt the joint statement kind of pretends Trump has not been elected. But that's my personal view. And I could be wrong. Take a look at it. But it's a comprehensive statement, which I have no doubt will be analysed to death over the next few days. The future of the liberal international order and India's role. Very briefly, before I ask Professor Mahapatra to speak, and you will all have 10 minutes each, just give me two more minutes. 

On the future of the liberal international order, it's my understanding that to some extent, the whole movement, the liberal movement has to do a lot of self-introspection, frankly. It's not just the United States result. I'm talking about the wider movement worldwide. Where are those liberal values? To people who are out of work, and who are disadvantaged in a society, do you expect them to share liberal values? That's the first question. If you don't have a job, and if you are in poverty, are you going to talk about liberal values or not? But that's one thing that we saw in the American elections. But as I keep saying, it's not just the American elections, although you could argue that is the most important election, but the number of elections elsewhere are really sending out the same message. What are the priorities for people? So there is a whole rethink that is needed on the part of the liberal movement, in my view, and I think that's begun. It'll take time, and then we will see what happens to the movement itself. The movement is important. 

The liberal international order is another matter, because if you consider the liberal international order as comprising of three things, I mean, it comprises a lot of things, but it comprises three things. Politically, the multilateral institutions, they're in a terrible way. If you look at the UN Security Council, it's not been able to stop wars. If you can't stop wars, what the hell are you doing in the UN Security Council? You could ask yourself that question, because they are in charge of war and peace. So that. 

Second, in terms of economics and trade, you know the WTO. I spent 10 years of my life in Geneva at the GATT first, and then the WTO and it pains me to see the WTO this way. The dispute settlement function is not working. The negotiating function is not delivering and the trade monitoring function is not delivering. These are the three important functions of WTO. So that is the economic dimension of the liberal international order. The military or the security dimension of the international order is fundamentally based that states will give up a little sovereignty for international peace, for the UN, etc. That simply is not happening. People are back to being nation states and people, or when I say people, countries. Countries are back to attaching undue importance to sovereignty, not parting with it. So there's a whole new definition of sovereignty if you look at the Russian war in Ukraine and other examples. So the liberal international order, I'm afraid, will have to also be rebooted. You need to have a liberal international order 2.0. 

And last point, what is India's role in all of this? If I am brutally honest, India alone does not have the agency at this point to really recraft a new international order in lieu of the one which is collapsing or which is on its last legs. So India will have to work with like-minded countries. India itself is, I think, conducting a foreign policy of multi-alignment. I believe it's doing well, but the future may be difficult for all countries. Just because a particular policy works for you during a particular period of time, it doesn't mean that it will work forever. So we will also have to make adjustments and modifications as we go along. As I said, it's done – it’s served us well so far, but we will have to see what happens. 

So I'm going to stop here. I will be happy to come back after I listen to the panellists and then hopefully we will have a 20-minute discussion. When I say discussion, I'm actually looking to you to ask questions to the panellists. Otherwise, it'll be a bit of a monologue. So if you do have questions, I would really, really appreciate it if you can either put it on a piece of paper, pass it on to our colleagues in the ICWA or at least keep it ready so that when I give you the floor, you can ask. 

So with those words, thank you very much for turning up in such large numbers. I see that you're also escaping from the pollution and that may be a reason, I'm joking, but thanks for coming anyway. And I think it'll turn out to be an excellent discussion, I promise you. 

I'm now going to turn to my colleague on the right, Professor Mahapatra. All of us, I think our CVs are available. So Professor Mahapatra, you will forgive me if I'm not introducing you in full and therefore he is well-known anyway in the strategic community in Delhi. So you have 10 minutes, sir, please. 

Chintamani Mahapatra: Ambassador Professor Kumar, Ambassador Nutan Ji, my co panellists, distinguished people in the audience, and some of them dear students. Good evening and Namaste to all of you. Thank you for this opportunity so that I can share some thoughts very briefly in 10 minutes on an issue that we can discuss for five hours. 

First of all, Ukraine war and the Gaza war. Both the wars are very, very critical, and it's appropriate that we're discussing it because the Ukraine war has impacted food, fertilizer, for people living in Africa, in Latin America, all over the world and Gaza war is taking place in the heart of the hydrocarbon resources of the globe, and the whole world is affected. So these are not just regional wars.

In the Ukraine war, you have the United States, which are directly involved. They may not be fighting the war with Russia directly, but without the US help, what is the Ukraine war? And in case of Gaza also, similarly, the US involvement is there. If you read the narratives in the US newspapers and journals, they're all talking about liberal international crisis and putting all the blame on Russia. But if you see and compare, in case of Gaza, the blessings on Israel is there. Every other day, we'll have a statement that Israel, you must do this, you must do that and then the weapons will be flowing in. And in case of Ukraine, without the US weapons flowing in to Ukraine, Ukraine war would have been over a long time ago, right? So here is a double standard. 

And when I read all these, ideas about crisis in the liberal international order, let me say the following things. This is my own views. I think the liberal international order is a myth. It has never been there. Most of the specialist on IR and the professors and the students and the researchers, they talk about liberal international order, socialist international order, full of textbooks and articles. Nobody appreciates that after World War II, there were three different orders. Not exactly orders, but attempt to create orders. One, of course, was the liberal international order, which was supported by the United States and some of the European allies. Then you have the socialist order, which was championed by the Soviet Union. And for some time, China supported and then again, China opposed it. And then India, along with a few other countries like Egypt and Indonesia and Ghana, were trying to create a non-aligned order, and people don't appreciate it, don't build theories on it, don't talk about it. Three efforts were there. 

Having said that, the reason I'm saying three orders, even now, that is going on. Having said that, liberal international order was an attempt. And the creation of the institutions, like the United Nations, like World Bank, and the IMF, and first GATT, and then WTO, all were the structures which were supposed to create, establish a liberal international order, a rule-based order. So instead of war, you do commerce on the basis of certain rules and regulations. If there are conflicts, you resolve it through dialogue and negotiation. There are mechanisms for that. But if you just take a little look into the past, was it a peaceful order? No. 

Now, the people who are complaining about the liberal order in crisis were responsible partly for the disorder in the whole mechanism to establish the new, sorry, liberal international order. Just to give you an example, soon after World War II was over, and the UN was set up, and the goal was to prevent another war from taking place, how many wars have been fought? Hundreds of them. And the Cold War's hotspots? Everywhere, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Afghanistan War, the war in the Middle East. You can't even count in your fingers, right? And who was responsible for this? People who tried to create order, they were responsible for this. 

Today, people are saying, they're talking about regime change. Was there not a time when Washington's connection with third-world dictators were very blatant? Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Chon Do-won in South Korea, Mr. Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan. Then you have Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panama, Allende in Chile and as and when they cooperated, they were part of the liberal international order, and the goal was to democratise the international system. As and when they fell from grace, they were thrown out. Manuel Antonio Noriega was picked up from his house, brought to Florida, tried, and put in jail. Was it a liberal international order? It was not. Similar thing can be talked about in the Soviet Union. It's not that they were very clean. We know about the Hungarian crisis, the Yugoslav crisis, so many other crises are there. So the countries which are trying to create order, liberal or socialist, they were partly responsible for whatever happened at that time. 

And today, when you are talking about crisis in the liberal international order, I must say that although the attempt was not complete, although it was not successful, it was always a work in progress. Even now, it is a work in progress. Even then, an attempt was made, institutions were built, treaties were negotiated, trade and commerce was taking place, and after all, today, when you have 193 countries which are independent, and they're existing on the basis of the principle of sovereign equality of nations. Was it at all thinkable before World War II? No, it is all, the whole world was carved into colonies and all, but today it is possible. So some kind of effort is there to create a liberal international order. 

But today, why put the blame only on Gaza War and Ukraine War for discussing crisis in the liberal international order? What is happening today, number one, is the world, particularly in important countries, they're moving to the right. You have the AFD in Germany. You have the Trump phenomenon in the United States of America. Now, the anti-immigration movement that you see today, the hatred towards the immigrants, the immigrants who really built up the societies are today the target, not only in the US, but also in Europe and elsewhere. That is also part of the liberal international order in crisis, right? 

The global political economy is in turmoil, partly because of the war going on, partly because of the pandemic, of course. It is an external factor, but today, when you talk about alternative supply chains and value chains and all, it's all because of the pandemic and the war and the insincerity of the countries who really want to make a liberal international order. That is the reason and not just the war and all that. However, I would argue that at the moment, like after World War II, efforts are going on to create multiple orders, not just liberal international order. 

One, of course, there are people in the West who are trying to restore peace, stability, and maintain or maybe promote liberal international order. Second thing, Russia today, Russia was ticked off as a major power. It is back with a bang. It is a powerful geopolitical actor. No amount of sanctions. 

Mohan Kumar: So you have three minutes. 

Chintamani Mahapatra: Three minutes, sir, yeah. No amount of sanctions could really bring Russia down to its knees and the war is ravaging on. And today you see the latest position in war is tilting in favour of Russia. We don't know when the war is going to come to an end, right? Okay. Now, this is the, so what I'm saying, Russia back as a geopolitical actor is trying to carve out a counter-hegemonic order of its own and building ties with Cuba, with Venezuela, with North Korea, with China, with so many other countries. 

The third one is by China itself. China has emerged as superpower along India's border. It is really posing a big challenge to the United States of America. It is trying to create an alternative order in the world where human rights will be determined by the nation states and not by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They have their own BRI program. They're flush with money. The way the Chinese media is now all over the world competing with CNN and BBC and whatnot, right? So they are trying their own way of creating a new kind of order. 

Fourth one, I strongly say, is India, during the Cold War time, tried to stay away from the Cold War and tried to promote non-alignment. There were hurdles, there were obstacles, but the movement continued. The moment the Cold War ended, the bipolar structure was there, non-alignment as a movement became irrelevant. But today, it is back in the form of Global South and India has an agenda. When India says that globalisation is not bad, but globalisation has to be Global South sensitive, there is a message there. When India is trying to promote its own relationship with the rest of the world, even share some of its achievements in DPI and in vaccines, in public health, India is trying to create an order of its own. A country like India could sell or could even supply vaccines to 100-plus countries in the world. It was magical in a way. When the Prime Minister is repeatedly saying, this is not the era of war, what we need is dialogue and negotiation. It is not just empty talk. India has its own narrative. And during the global, this G20 meeting, all of you saw the skillful diplomacy of India, where the entire world was watching whether a joint statement can ever be issued, and all of us are surprised it was issued. It was because of skillful diplomacy of India and the narrative is fantastic. When we are saying One Earth, One Family, and One Future, we are not talking the way the American Presidents do. Whenever they have a meeting like this, they will address and say, God bless America. Here is a country that talks about the globe. It talks about negotiation, dialogue, diplomacy. And One Earth, One Family, One Future. So this is Indian narrative. India wants to create an order where the whole world will be treated like a family. There will be quarrels, differences, but still, no war. That is our message. 

I have many things to say, but 10 minutes is over. So, thank you very much. We can discuss again during Q&A. Thank you for your attention. 

Mohan Kumar: Thank you. Thank you, Professor Mahapatra. Difficult for me to summarize, but just for students especially, but others as well, two main takeaways that the liberal international order was largely a myth, and the second that India is crafting and constructing an order of its own as part of the Global South. So, thank you very much. 

I now turn to Professor Pandey. 10 minutes, please. 

Sanjay Kumar Pandey: Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Mohan Kumar. Thank you, Nutan Ji, co-panellists. After Professor Mahapatra, it's difficult for me. I have shared stage with him many times. Also, because some of the things that he said, I fully endorse and would like to take forward that argument, the argument, for example about how liberal was the order, which is now referred to as liberal international order. In fact, as a student of Russian studies, I remember when I used to appear in interviews in 1990s, the most repeated question I was asked was about the collapse of Soviet Union and the reasons behind it and I normally started my answering questioning whether what collapsed the so-called Soviet system or socialist model, how socialist was it, whether the 1917 revolution can be called a genuinely Marxist socialist revolution. 

Similarly, here also, when we talk about liberal international order, the first question that comes to mind is, how liberal was that? And how inclusive was that? How legitimate was that? And I would refer to one of the proponents, advocates and champions of liberal order, Joseph Nye, who in one of his articles said that the so-called liberal order was largely limited to a group of like-minded states centered on the Atlantic littoral and did not include many large countries such as China, India and Soviet bloc, and did not always have benign effect on non-members. As Professor Mahapatra very rightly said, regime change, we talk about now, it has been going on for a very long time. There was Ayyinde, there was Mossadegh 1953-54, there was Bay of Pigs Invasion, there were attempts at many other places, some successful, some not so successful. 

So there are certain myths about, Professor Mahapatra also said, it was a myth. The first myth about US-led liberal hegemonic order is that it extended for much of its history, especially during the Cold War. Well, as I said, it did not. Despite its exalted claims about power, legitimacy and public goods function, that order was little more than a European-US-led order, in which large parts of the world, especially Asia, Africa, Latin America, Professor Mahapatra referred to non-aligned movement and non-alignment, if you remember, in 1970s came out with New International Economic Order, New Information Order. So the so-called liberal order was under challenge, even during 1950s, 60s and 70s, when it held sway. Some would say the best chance for liberal international order was after the Soviet collapse, when Russia itself declared itself to be a liberal democratic market country, and a lot depended on how much Russia could become a normal country on the Western model. 

And the fact that by the end of 1990s with Russia's economic crisis collapse in 1998 and Kosovo, I mean, NATO bombardment of Serbia and Kosovo, already the strains were there on the liberal order, and it was becoming clear that many of the countries who otherwise were largely acquiescing in that order, because they did not have the wherewithal, the capacity, and the will, Russia was one of them. 2003, there was Iraq. During the first decade, you had colour revolutions and regime changes in Georgia, in Kyrgyzstan, in Ukraine, 2004, 2005, again, 2012-13. And these regime changes, Russia would like, challenge them, saying that so-called humanitarian intervention, democracy promotion from above is not acceptable. 

Russia and China were more accustomed to, or attuned to, an older version of 19th-century order, in which territorial integrity, respect for sovereignty, and great powers, and balance of power held this way. There is a view that 1990s, when the so-called liberal internationalists, for the first time, they believed that after the end of Cold War, and with Fukuyama's thesis, now was the best time but that best time turned out to be a very testing time. 

I would refer to another very important writer. One can even call him Cold Warrior, George Kennan, of the Long Telegram fame. In February 1997, in one article in New York Times, and that was the time when NATO expansion was being discussed, and he clearly warned that this is going to be a fatal mistake and he says, he calls it a fateful error. Something of higher importance is at stake, and perhaps it is not too late to advance a view, I believe, is not only mine but shared by many others. About NATO expansion, he says, it will be a fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame nationalistic, anti-Western, and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion, to have an adverse impact on the development of Russian democracy, to restore the atmosphere of Cold War in East-West relations and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking. 

There have been many others who have clearly warned that, Mearshiemer, for example, he also. 

Mohan Kumar: You've got three more minutes. 

Sanjay Kumar Pandey: All right. Mearshiemer, in some of his interviews and writings since 2014, after the Crimea war, Russian intervention, he clearly said that international peace can be best maintained if great power interest and balance of power can be maintained. The promotion of democracy and humanitarian intervention is not going to work. He even advised the Ukrainian leadership to pay heed to some of Russia's concerns. Unless that is done, he believed, things are going out of hand. So the liberal international order has been challenged, not now, but for a very long time. It's only now that since Russia and China, because of their capacity and also their will, and they, as I said, believe in balance of power, national sovereignty, and are opposed to democracy promotion and humanitarian intervention. 

Unless these various opinions are taken into account, no attempt at building an international order. Russian invasion of Ukraine, for example, was considered as one of the turning points. In the sense, it sharpened the commitment of the Western countries and the US to the liberal order or democracy. But many countries, including most of the countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, so-called Global South, they believe that the war should not be seen as a contest between democracy and authoritarianism, that the so-called liberal order is a Western construct, and the Ukraine war is a matter of geopolitics rather than about norms and principles. Therefore, any attempt to build an alternative order will have to take into account the opinion, the historical, cultural experience of non-Western societies, especially in Asia and Africa. Unless it is done, no such world order is going to be sustainable. Thank you very much. 

Mohan Kumar: So, thank you. So one of the fascinating things about chairing a session in Delhi is that you come prepared for something, and then the panellists take you in a completely opposite direction. So I might as well throw all my notes in the dustbin. Joking aside. I think Professor Sanjay Kumar Pandey has taken this argument further. My understanding of what the two speakers have done before I hand it over to Dr. Atul Mishra is that they are arguing the liberal international order was neither liberal nor international, but they're not questioning that it was an order of sorts, at least. That's my understanding. So we have knocked off the two pieces of the acronym, namely liberal and international. Liberal, obviously, because they say it's a myth. There was one hegemon, and there were other things done which were illiberal. International, not because obviously countries like China, India were not part of it, at least initially. 

So I will come to my little bit of a rejoinder. Otherwise, it would be dull. So I have to say something against it, but that I will reserve for later. But let's listen to Dr. Atul Mishra. You have the floor, sir. 10 minutes, and you don't mind if I tell you three minutes more. Thank you. 

Atul Mishra: Good evening, and thank you, Arshad, for the invitation. I'm very glad to see colleagues, distinguished members of the diplomatic corps, students, and my co-panellists and thank you so much, Ambassador Professor Mohan, for conducting this discussion. 

I've listened very carefully to my colleagues, and I just want to build upon some of the arguments that they have made. And I'll keep strictly to time, and I will give propositions, place propositions in front of you, so that we could potentially in the Q&A, in the discussion to follow, we could sort of build upon it. And I will stick to the points that Ambassador Kumar has given us. 

The first question that he asked us to reflect upon is the description of the crisis. And what I'd say there is that what we are looking at currently is the crisis of the rules-based international order. To me, the liberal international order is in fact in terminal decline. And in order to sort of elaborate very briefly, I do the following. Draw your attention to what went on in the 1940s. Between ‘44 and ‘48, roughly during that period, the victors of the Second World War ended up putting together an order. And if you want to sort of understand the elements of that order, Ambassador Nutan Kapoor actually ended up giving us a sense of what those elements could be. Now, that was a rules-based international order. That was not, to my mind, the liberal international order. The liberal international order was one of the three bounded orders that we saw under the umbrella of the rules-based international order. The liberal international order had as its geography, as its reference point, as its actors, the Western countries, and their allies. 

Simultaneous with them, you had another bounded order, which was the socialist international order and we could unpack that concept in ways that we want to. And the third order that we had, or the striving towards an order, was the one that India was leading alongside some of the other countries as part of the non-alignment striving and non-aligned movement. My, so what happens is that at the end of the Second World War, because the Soviet model collapses, the Soviet Union comes to an end. And of course, because the polarity is not there, non-alignment also sort of takes a bit of a back foot. What we see at that moment is the field of international relations opened to the American power to bridge the gap between the rules-based international order and the bounded liberal international order. 

And on my reading, what America does in the 1990s and the 2000s is essentially to turn the rules-based international order into the liberal international order. Now, what are, to me, the three fundamental pillars of the liberal international order were liberal democracy, capitalism, and American power. And the number of ways in which this was attempted, firstly, this was attempted through the enlargement of the European Union and NATO eastwards, which I don't necessarily think was a bad thing. But I may be in a minority here. 

Number two, the attempt on the American part to get the Chinese, the Russians, and India to build a buy-in into the order that they had created. So they were very, very keen on getting the Russians to democratise. They also wanted Russia to become part of the financial order that they had put in place. They were hoping, since the late 1970s onwards, all through the 80s and into the 90s, that the development of capitalism in China would turn the Chinese into, would sort of start making the proposition of liberal democracy attractive to the Chinese. And of course, after our tests in 1998, they quoted us, tried to sort of make us part of their democracy promotion agenda, and so on and so forth. 

I think what has happened is that over the past 10 to 12 years, increasingly in different ways, there's been a push back to that agenda. And the consequence of that is that, to my mind, liberal international order is in terminal decline. There are few takers today for the idea of liberal democracy as the final form of human government, also known as the Francis Fukuyama thesis. There are few takers today for the Washington Consensus modeled capitalism. And of course, American power has, which is still very formidable, has come increasingly to be balanced. And so, to my mind, what we currently see is a liberal international order in terminal decline and a rules-based international order in crisis. And part of the crisis is, part of the reason why we have this crisis is because the Americans thought that they could have the liberal international order overlap with the rules-based international order. 

Now, from there, I want to sort of link it to the Ukraine and Gaza wars. Prof, how are we doing time-wise? We're okay? 

Mohan Kumar: Yes, yes, please, please. 

Atul Mishra: In terms of, so just linking it to these two wars, I think what the wars are doing is that because they have come to be so seriously juxtaposed, they are illuminating to us the extent and the depths of the crisis. I mean, there is a lot of this charge that is levelled against the West to sort of say that, you know, this is Western hypocrisy. 

My question, as a good old realist, is at what stage in international relations do you find great powers not acting hypocritically? I think the interesting question to ask is, if this crisis, if these two wars held in juxtaposition are illuminating the crisis, then what is it that we can take away from that crisis? And I think what we can take away from that crisis is the need very seriously to reconceptualize the rules-based international order itself, and more importantly, to not push in an ideological agenda onto what can potentially be a universal order. So you have a rules-based international order, you fix it, but don't inject it with any particular ideology, the mistake that the Americans committed in the 1990s and in the 2000s. 

Mohan Kumar: Two minutes. 

Atul Mishra: Perfect. Now that then the whole question about what India can do, we can take it up later, but I just want to come to the last point, which is the point about the future of liberalism outside the West. To my mind, this is how I frame this question to my students. If you give me a better alternative to the core principles that liberalism stands for, I'm ready to change my mind, right? I think that is the serious challenge before all of us. Liberalism has originated in the West, but I don't necessarily think that it is a Western idea. It's an idea that others can make their own and fashion it, and there's a 125, 130-odd-year history in India of having internalised liberalism and made it our own. So that is the direction in which we can potentially think about. 

Last but as attempts are made, say for example at BRICS and other fora, to conceptualise an international order as an alternative to the one that the West has helmed and led for quite some time, I think the attempt should be to make sure that it speaks to a universal need rather than something that is negative in its fundamental orientation. How we do that, of course, is a matter of both genius and circumstances. So thank you so much, Professor. 

Mohan Kumar: So I feel like thanking Dr. Atul Mishra for several things, but the main thing I will thank him is, at least he says there is a liberal international order, and he says it's in terminal decline. I heaved a huge sigh of relief, because if he had carried on in the similar vein as the first two speakers, that this is largely a myth and it doesn't exist, then I would have felt like tearing my hair and said, Oh My God, what does the Chairman do? What do you moderate if there is total consensus? So I'm very grateful to Dr. Atul Mishra for giving, I think it's fantastic for you guys as well. 

And if I can just try, I can only try, he made a number of points, but I can recapitulate that the rules-based international order comprises three bounded orders, as he called it. One which is the liberal international order, terminal decline, a socialist order, I'm not putting words in his mouth, which got aborted with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and then, of course, a non-aligned movement, which also got aborted. Again I'm putting words in your mouth. So it was only the liberal international order which persisted. That's at least something we should accept. The other two were aborted, self or by others, I don't know, and I really don't care. It is the outcome that is important. 

What I also want to say before I throw it open to questions, is that whatever you might think of the liberal international order, it kept peace for a long time. And I want to invite all of you to a report which was released recently by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, PRIO, which says the maximum number of conflicts in the world, armed conflicts, which, the point is, it's really tragic that you keep only talking of Ukraine for obvious reasons, heart of Europe, and Israel, again for obvious reasons, tons of oil underneath the soil. But do you ever talk of the 53 other conflicts in the Middle East? The Middle East has got 53 armed conflicts. Take a look at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo. Last three years has been the most violent ever in the world. So the liberal international order, for all its flaws and faults, and I concede that it is not flawless, but it kept peace for over 30 years. That we are losing now, the danger of losing. So I think that makes it very important that we discuss these questions. I'm not leaning in one direction or the other. A chair should not. But I think you've heard wonderful expositions, and I'm glad you've also got all sides of the issue now. 

So now, can I throw it open for questions, please? We are trying to keep to time, not least because some of us have to leave at 4.45. But really, that's the outer limit. So I'll still give you 15 minutes, which I think is ample time to ask questions. Yes, please get up, introduce yourself. 

Yeah. And then the lady. Yeah, please. Quickly, and no long comments. Okay, you're not a panellist. I'm sorry. We'll have to get you as a panellist next time. Thank you. 

Unidentified Participant: Thank you, sir, for such a wonderful discussion. My question is very brief, though I have a lot of ideas to say. And we are living actually in a liberal international disorder where we have multiple points of friction that can easily turn out into an escalatory ladder. I just want to know a brief from both of you, Ambassador and Professor, from your side as a practitioner between crisis and stability and from your side as an academia, what are these tipping point can you know, go into an all*out war? Are we seeing the possibility or still we are figuring out some options? 

Mohan Kumar: Okay, question is World War III. Okay, next lady. I'm sorry, I don't know your name. So I'm saying lady and forgive me. 

Nilofar Suhrawardy: Hello, I'm Nilofar Suhrawardy, a journalist. So I have my questions. Number one, there is no order if there's no democratic order in the world. How can we talk about any way the Ukraine crisis is concerned? I think the Ukraine issue, Ukraine has been used as a pawn by America to corner Russia as much as it can. I'd like your view on that. Third, I'll be very brief. I just have two more points. 

Mohan Kumar: What is the view you wanted? Repeat it, please. Ukraine is being used as a pawn against Russia, but it hasn't succeeded as yet, as you've pointed out. Secondly, where Gaza issue is concerned, again, the way it's aggravating somehow or the other attempts are being made to involve Iran and that's again, an anti-Iran policy. Thirdly, irrespective, I think a lot has been said, but little importance has been paid to media, the Western media. It gives a lot of importance to the American side of the news. It has given little importance, the role played by Arab nations. I think they've exercised a very wise and shrewd policy regarding the Ukraine issue. Of course, they're regionally one where Gaza crisis is concerned, but even India, where Ukraine issue is concerned, they've been very wise diplomatically. But then, we haven't given any importance to the Arab media, even the African media. The African countries, they've been very shrewd diplomatically. They have not been won over by USA. In fact, I can say, that about the eastern part. 

Mohan Kumar: Thank you. Thank you, Madam. I'm just taking note of the questions. Any other question? Oh, great. Okay. Sir, please tell me your name as well. What do you do? 

Lakshay: I'm Lakshay. I'm preparing for UPSC right now. 

Mohan Kumar: Welcome to the club, my friend. 

LakshayThank you. Thank you for the wonderful discussion. I just want to ask, is profiteering in liberal international order driving us towards talking about supplying more weapons and more aid rather than talking about resolving the disputes? The profiteering part, like by defence industrial lobbyists in the developed countries especially. 

Mohan Kumar: Okay. 

Lakshay: We saw that the US has the agency to indulge in backtrack diplomacy. It did with Taliban, but it can't do with the established state like Russia. Instead, we are supplying more and more weapons, proliferating other regional wars as well. 

Mohan Kumar: Okay. Thank you. So, I will take care of the tipping point question, World War III. If you can take care of the Russian part of it, Ukraine being used as a pawn, if you can deal with no order without democracy, and Dr. Atul Mishra on the media, this African and Arab media not represented. That way, I think we will be fine. I'm sorry, there's also our UPSC aspirant who was, maybe I should take that as well, the military industrial complex. 

Okay. So, if I can take care of the tipping point and the World War III. Look, I'll be honest. I think if you look at, there is one book that is worth reading, since a lot of students are there in the audience, Sleepwalkers into World War I. Take a look at the book. It's excellent. I sometimes get the impression we may be sleepwalking this time as well, hopefully not into a World War III. But I will not conceal from you my concern that North Korean soldiers getting involved in Ukraine is a kind of a paradigmatic shift, I have to say. You cannot view this as normal, frankly. So, I think we have to look again. But then you have the American President, and you have now the Ukrainian President saying, we want a diplomatic solution. So, it seems to me that American power, the decline of American power is hugely exaggerated, as is the increase in Chinese power. This I have been noticing for some time. So, it still seems to matter that the American President has not even taken office, and still the main protagonists are saying, we want a diplomatic solution. They were not saying that until the other day. So, we will have to wait and see. I don't think it will come to that, is my simple answer to you. I don't think, although the signs are there, we are not. 

Then the other thing about the UPSC aspirant, sorry, I didn't get your name. Look, there has always been a military industrial complex. Look at the statement of Mr. Donald Trump's son on the supply of missiles by who? Sorry, Joe Biden. These ATAMS, whatever you call it, Attack MS, I think it's just army tactical missile systems which have been supplied or which are going to be supplied by Joe Biden to the Ukrainians. Mr. Donald Trump's son has said that this is pandering to the military-industrial complex. My father would take over and we would put an end to the war. I find it extraordinary that he's making this statement. So there is a military-industrial complex, whether you like it or not, which has benefited hugely from the Ukrainian war. There is no questioning it. It is there and that also benefits from what's going on in the Middle East. So that I think you can never really ignore. But you will still have to deal with the outcome of these wars. Can I turn to you, Professor Sanjay Pandey for that question on Ukraine being used as. 

Sanjay Kumar Pandey: First, maybe I would like to respond to what you said about liberal order having maintained peace. The reason why there was relative peace was not so much because liberal order had its legitimacy, but because there was a countervailing power. Soviet Union was there. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and Americans dare not intervene for five months till January 1991. It was only when Gorbachev convinced them that the Soviets, who had a treaty with Iraq 1972, like Indo-Soviet, Indo-Iraqi treaty. So that was the main reason. The Soviets would always argue that no international or regional conflict could be resolved without Soviet input. Gromyko, 28 years Soviet Foreign Minister. So this is one point. 

The second about Ukraine, about Ukraine having been used as a pawn. Well, since 1991, one of the major challenges before Ukraine, apart from what they wanted, I mean, by aligning with West in terms of prosperity, democratic polity, but another attempt on their part was to establish their distinct, unique identity, distinct from Russia. Well, that desire, there are scholars who would say that Ukrainians wanted to be a member of EU, member of NATO, wanted to have a democratic, capitalist polity and economy. It was all right to have at least two of these, but NATO was the issue on which the Russians had serious objection and we have seen the result. After, even after the start of war, there was a time when there were attempts, there were proposals that perhaps if the Ukrainians agreed to 2014 Crimea annexation or, and maybe giving certain autonomy, there was this Minsk Accord to the eastern provinces and Ukraine remaining neutral, not joining NATO, that would have satisfied Russia. The fact that the Americans and the British persuaded Ukraine not to agree to these terms, in fact, was more a cause of what we are seeing today. 

Mohan Kumar: Thank you, that's the Istanbul process that you're talking about, yeah? 

Sanjay Kumar Pandey: Yes, Istanbul. 

Mohan Kumar: Professor Mahapatra, you are supposed to deal with no order without democracy, so what kind of an order is it? And secondly, also the Iranian thing, if you can also include, because she did ask a number of questions, but one of the questions she asked was that even the present Gaza conflict, why bring in Iran? That's the question she's asking, please. 

Chintamani Mahapatra: You have three minutes, sir. In three minutes, I'll tell 30 things. No, no, you can extract. Number one, I very emphatically said, order is always the goal, it's never the reality. Democracy is always the aspiration, never the reality. Equality is always an aspiration, never the reality. So liberal international economic order was just a project, work in progress, meeting all kinds of challenges, this is number one. 

Number two, anybody who recall what Nutan Ji said initially, if you recall, is there order in the world? Of course, if you go to Singapore, fantastic order. Go to Beijing, more fantastic order. You go to Sudan, you go to Yemen, you go to Syria, you go to Afghanistan, you go to Ukraine, you go to Gaza, is there order? Go into the air and look at Earth, is there order? Disorder everywhere, so it will always be the goal, never be the reality. 

Secondly, you talked about the media and all that. There was a time when we demanded a new international information order because only four news agencies were controlling the flow of information around the globe. So cow in the streets of Delhi would hit the headlines in New York Times. Something great happening anywhere will find a small place in 13th page of Washington Post. So but today, the media has changed. Social media is more powerful than your print media or your visual media, so much so that in the recent American election, both Trump and Kamala Harris used social media to reach out to common people. So today, those issues are gone. But you are right. If we really want to understand, we have to read African news, we have to read Middle Eastern news, we have to read all kinds of news. Then you know what exactly going on in the world. 

Third, World War III. Recall what Einstein said. Somebody asked him the same question. Mr. Einstein, sir, what do you think about Third World War? He said, I can't tell you exactly about Third World War, but I can tell you about the Fourth World War. And what is that? In Fourth World War, people will be fighting with sticks and stones. Total devastation if there is a nuclear war. So when the Americans talk about relative peace, it's simply about nuclear war not taking place. Otherwise, the way Ambassador Kumar talked about the number of conflicts going on around the world, is it called peace? It's not peace at all, right? So World War III is not going to happen in terms of nuclear war. 

But finally, just one footnote. When the pandemic took place, like all of you, I was confined to my home. I used this camera, shot a small film about one minute or so. And I said, in my view, Third World War has started. This time the war is not between nation states. It is between the human beings and the virus. If this is not the time for the human beings and the nation-states to bury the hatchet and cooperate and fight back the virus, when can we? Facebook made a pat pat pat pat like again. But after some time we read about vaccine nationalism. We'll never change. I'm coming into the ring, we'll never change, right? So ultimately, the Third World War is again going to be between the human beings and the climate, between the human beings and the next pandemic in the waiting. That is where we have to see Third World War, not in terms of fighting nuclear war. Small, small wars will continue. Thank you. 

So, Dr. Atul Mishra, you pick any issue you want. I have to be fair. You have three minutes. So if you want to talk about the media, that's fine. But also in response to other questions that have been asked, thank you. 

Dr. Atul Mishra: Thank you, Chair. Just a quick one. On the media, because I had some time to reflect on it, I think two things are happening. The control of the West over narrative. I think that has fundamentally gone. So you have a multiplicity of narratives. There are two other things that I wanted to sort of say that one is that we are living in very polarised times. Emotions are running high everywhere. So in the face of the amount of polarisation that we are seeing, the fact that there's passions are running high, it's very hard to expect and it's slightly unfair to expect media in general to be as balanced as we would want it to be. That's just unfair, I think, which is not to say that that's not what they should be doing, but I think it's important to understand. 

The other part is that the emergence of alternative platforms have given a lot of visibility to voices, to perspectives that we would otherwise not have, and that I think also is a very, very good thing. Just a quick response, Chair, just want to add to the question on the military-industrial complex. I do believe that once a crisis breaks out, the ability of the complex in any particular situation to sort of aggravate it, that ability obviously comes into play. But on my reading, it's more traditional geopolitical concerns that cause conflicts to break in the first place. So I'd be slightly careful about moving in that direction, which is to say, assign a causal force to the military-industrial complex, because that kind of seems to me like policy capture of the sort that is not very persuasive. So that would be my response to it. Thank you, Chair. 

Mohan Kumar: Professor Mahapatra? 

Chintamani Mahapatra: I just wanted to add one point on this military-industrial complex. There is one city in Northeast America which is producing 90% of the equipment and weapons for war in Ukraine. If Donald Trump comes to know about it, then he may continue to support Ukraine. Ukraine war has benefited the Americans the most. Devastated Ukraine, probably worse than most, if there is a word, right? Even Russian economy is going, going, gone. Africa, Latin America, all of us having all kinds of problems, but the Americans have benefited a great deal from the Ukraine war. Military-industrial complex will continue. When America is giving billions of dollars to Ukraine, no cheque is given. Mr. Zelensky, go and spend the money. Not a single dollar goes, either through GPay or through cheque. It all remains in the United States. Wars are profitable. Great Depression was won over because of World War II by the Americans and all. So military-industrial complex has come to stay. It's not going to disappear at all. Thank you. 

Mohan Kumar: Thank you. Professor Pandey, last word, and then just room for one more question. If somebody fell out, the lady, ladies always, but first you. No, no, first you and then she. Just formulate your question. 

Sanjay Kumar Pandey: Someone asked about Trump and what is going to be the future. Well, Trump, we have seen, has been very transactional, whether it was NATO, whether it was Taiwan, even Japan. In all these relationships, the one thing he wanted was that they should, they should not piggy ride on Americans, and they should start spending more, and this relation should be mutually beneficial, especially for Americans. So the very transactional nature of U.S. under Trump would mean that the so-called liberal international order or liberal values will take a backseat. In any case, he has been an admirer of both Putin and Xi Jinping, and the North Korean leader also. So the biggest question marks are in the times to come when Trump assumes power, takes precedence. 

Mohan Kumar: Thank you. The lady at the back, please. Yes. If you can introduce yourself, madam. 

Nandini Khandelwal: Good afternoon, everyone. I'm Nandini Khandelwal. I'm working at ICWA as a Research Intern. So, thank you for the insightful discussion. My question is for Professor Atul Mishra. So you mentioned about the rules-based order, that it needs, since it's in crisis, and not the liberal order which is in crisis, and it needs to be reformed. But for that, it should not be injected with any ideology. But history tells us that liberalism has always dominated this rules-based order. Now, since you've talked about the liberal international order, which is in terminal decline, how will it exactly resolve an order, which is already in terminal decline, help a rules-based order, which is in crisis? Like how will it help and resolve? 

Mohan Kumar: Okay. Dr. Mishra, try and attempt that answer, and then I will sum up. I don't think I can sum up. But anyway. 

Dr. Atul Mishra: I'm very glad that you said attempt that answer, because that's a difficult one. Okay. So, you know, an order, a bounded order that is in terminal decline, of course, is not going to be coming to the rescue of an order that is in crisis, right? So let's just hive off LIO, talk about RIO. So what are rules? Rules are basically a set of codified agreements among states that A, constrain, B, bind, you know, state behaviour, and then sort of socialise states into basically decent cooperative conduct. That's not hard to arrive at. 

And the reason why it is not hard to arrive at this stage, I think, in the previous century, in the first couple of decades of this century, have told us that either ideological bipolarity or ideological unipolarity leads everyone to ruin, right? So you can have ideological preferences at the national level, at the international level, if you can just come together to commit yourself to a set of very basic minimal rules, the already available, the Westphalian template, mutual recognition of each other's sovereignty, the norm of mutual non-interference. And at this point, you know, just the common concern towards the environment, the common concern towards the governance of the global commons, that's good enough for you to sort of start working with, right, as opposed to an animus towards the West, which seems to be at the moment, the thing that is leading the convergence of a whole bunch of non-Western countries, or, this liberal messianism that has brought us a lot of unhappiness. Yeah. 

Mohan Kumar: So thank you very much. Most fascinating kind of discussion, which I frankly did not fully anticipate, I knew it would be interesting, but this has turned out to be even better than I thought. 

On the media, you might want to take a look at some reports emanating from the US that, by the way, most people in the US don't read New York Times and Washington Post anyway. It's only the diplomats who keep reading it. I'm told Joe Rogan's podcast did it, and I don't even know if people in the audience know who this Joe Rogan is. I didn't know until my 36-year-old daughter said, Daddy, you should take a look at it. Sinclair Radio, have you heard of these? These are the things that Americans listen to and voted for Trump, not your traditional. Fox News is the only traditional media that I can think of that may have had some impact on the election outcome. Otherwise, it's all media that you and I have not even heard of. But that's, I think, what the panellists were alluding to. 

I will just conclude by once again thanking ICWA, for this most fascinating discussion that they had planned. I think the only thing students can do, there's no right, wrong answer, you've heard all sides of the debate. Try and situate LIO, the Liberal International Order, in whatever paradigm you want, but the bounded order framework Dr. Atul Mishra proposed is a good one, in my view. It's a good starting point, so take a look at that. Take a look at the arguments made by both Professor Mahapatra and Professor Pandey that it was at least neither liberal nor international order, they both agree, but neither liberal nor international, and you will find a number of arguments to support that point of view. And then see what India did during that period. Did we subscribe to the LIO in full because we were, after all, a bounded order in that whole rules-based international order paradigm? And I can tell you many instances where India really took positions which are, sui-generis, to put it mildly. So that is something which is interesting. And then you can look at the two conflicts and see what India did as well. We've taken positions on both Ukraine and Gaza, which are sui-generis. They are not your traditional Indian positions. So that is also worthy, in my view, of examination. So all in all, an excellent evening. Thank you very much for attending. 

Arshad Ali: On behalf of ICWA, I would like to express my gratitude to Distinguished Chair Ambassador Mohan Kumar and Panellist Professor Chinta Mani Mahapatra, Professor Sanjay Kumar Pandey and Dr. Atul Mishra for making their observation. My special thanks to all the invited participants for their active participation. My special thanks to the leadership of the Council, Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar for her support and guidance to the event. And thanks to Director of Research for her help in conducting the program. Thank you and please join us for high tea in the foyer.

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List of Participants

1. Amb. Mohan Kumar, Former Ambassador of India to France: Chair
2. Sanjay Kumar Pandey, Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University
3. Chintamani Mahapatra (Retd.), Jawaharlal Nehru University
4. Dr. Atul Mishra, Shiv Nadar University