Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee: Thank you, ma'am. May I now request Ambassador Anil Trigunayat to give his remarks and conduct the proceedings. It's all yours.
Anil Trigunayat: Thank you. It's a great pleasure to be here today, and a privilege to be in the company of such distinguished experts on Pakistan. We have all been reading their contributions, listening to them. But although I personally felt that we give too much attention to Pakistan and Pakistan endeavored in the past to bring us to their level, that is something we could have avoided. Fortunately, we are doing it so now.
India has always believed that an economically strong Pakistan is good for us, which is a part of our ‘Neighborhood First’ policy, which equally applies to Pakistan. But Pakistan has followed a policy vis-a-vis India, using terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy for years. Today, like Bhasmasur's story you must have all heard, it is crying foul against the TTP, several terror attacks. The security forces, which used to take pride that they are the real power of the country, behind whosoever is placed in the so-called democratic manner, has also failed to protect its people. 2024 was the worst year in terms of their own losses, number of attacks, and they have had problems with their other neighbors, western neighbors also, Afghanistan, very recently.
As 2025 has started, with their spat on Baloch Liberation Army and others, and with Iran, the country remains focused on activities against India’s national interest. So it is important that we keep looking at it. China became another major factor in this. And so today's Pakistan, as we look at it, the political landscape, as has been defined so brilliantly by the Acting Director General, is a constant power struggle, which is natural in this part of the world.
Human rights violations, it's so common there. There is an aversion by the politicians to any genuine commitment to the public welfare. So people obviously discuss that, economy is not doing that well. Today some indicators show, and I'm sure the panelists will be talking about it. But I have always believed, and I'm sure the esteemed panelists will deliberate on it, that while we will be talking about the domestic problems of various political parties, what happens to Imran Khan, what happens to the PTI, what role Trump plays in it, all those will probably come in the discussion.
But what I think is that going forward, we'll have to also watch whether the Pakistan army, its intelligence outfits, will continue on the path which they have followed all along. Or we look at some kind of a change, given the kind of challenges that they are facing, and everybody can read what is writing on the wall. And so we'll have to look at that.
Pakistan, this new government came in February 8th, the elections were held, the PTI party was not allowed to contest on their own, so they contested as independents and became the highest winners in that, but they were not part of the power. The other two parties got together along with some others and formed the government. And they are having their own challenges domestically.
So we'll have to deal with that because any unrest in our part of the world has multiple implications for the region, and in the region, we being the biggest, we need to be always very, very careful in this. One more thing that happened in the last elections was greater participation of youth in Pakistan, which is, previous elections, they had about 33% of the total. This time, it was 44% young people participated in the election, which is quite an interesting development, seeing the kind of despondency that was there.
But in the foreign policy domain, we'll have to see how, and you all are reading it because you must have thought about it, that Pakistan used to have, or probably still has, a certain kind of a nuisance value where it is able to encash it to its advantage with all the superpowers, be it USA, be it China, be it Russia, and they have all been somehow or the other invested in. But for the good of it, India always wants stability in Pakistan. We have never wanted to destabilize Pakistan. That's a bigger challenge for us.
So I'll not take, I'll suppose to speak only for five minutes but going forward, we'll have, and we actually have such a distinguished panel of experts that they know much more, and I don't have a disclaimer that I have not served in Pakistan, but I am a former Indian diplomat and, as such, this becomes one of your major duties to see what our friends are doing and try to counter their ill-conceived designs.
So now I'd like to request Shri Tilak Devasher, who is the author and a member of the National Security Advisory Board and a leading authority on Pakistan. Ten minutes each, I guess.
Tilak Devasher: Thank you. Thank you very much. Chair, fellow panelists, distinguished guests, as has been well said in the introduction, Pakistan faces a lot of problems and crises as it steps into 2025. But interestingly, there has barely been a time when Pakistan has not faced a series of crises as it was told in Pakistan. It's always in a critical situation – a ‘nazuk modh’ Now let me quote from editorials, and I'll quote, it's interesting. “For almost a decade now, the political arena has been the safe playground of men cursed with unlimited greed and limited ability. Every year has been a year of crisis, and every season, the season of intrigue. It almost seems that the only stable factor in our political life has been a constant instability”.
Now these words could have been written yesterday, but actually were written in a Pakistan Times editorial in 1958 on the 11th anniversary of Pakistan's creation. And if you fast forward this and compare it to a recent editorial, and I quote, “Today, Pakistan is again at a crossroads, where politicians are baying for each other's blood, and where the people have been left to either rot away or run away. The only way to bring back credibility into the system is by admitting their mistakes, apologizing, making amends, and then holding dialogue to resolve the crisis. Otherwise, the system is collapsing quite rapidly, all at once”. This is from April 2023. You can pick up any one at random and it conveys the same kind of feeling.
Now the similarity between the situations what struck me, 1958 and 2023, was amazing. It seemed that the clock had moved and Pakistan had not moved, showing that Pakistan has been in a periodic crisis and now it moves. But this has led to a complacent belief, especially in India, that since Pakistan has recovered from earlier crises, it will recover from the current crisis also. But I think as analysts, the situation today is possibly different than what it has been during the last 70 years, and we need to look at these various elements of the difference. Why Pakistan is going through a much more critical mode than it has in the past?
Perhaps never before in the past 70 years have so many serious problems come together in time and space like at present. There is a serious political crisis, economy is on the ventilator, and the security situation is going from bad to worse.
Now, why these problems are visible? And on the surface, Pakistan suffers from a greater crisis that is coming to a head. In my first book, Pakistan: Courting the Abyss, I'd asked a fundamental question. "Isn't Pakistan ungovernable, or are its leaders incapable of governing Pakistan”? Even in the situation Pakistan is in, the jury is still out on this one important question. The first of my argument was a WEEP factor. It was an acronym I had coined for Water, Education, Economy and Population. These are the long-term, non-traditional security threats that eat the innards of any country. They take decades to deteriorate, and take even longer to rectify.
I have demonstrated that Pakistan faced an emergency situation in all these areas a decade ago, and today it should have been in the disaster management mode, but there were no signs that it was. As a question I had posed was important in 2016, that's when the book was published, it is critical today, given the multiple crises that Pakistan is faced with.
The second new element in the situation is the persona of Imran Khan, and his undoubted popularity. A product of the establishment, Imran Khan went rogue, and challenged his benefactors in a manner unprecedented in Pakistan. Due to his immense popularity, even among sections of the army, the veterans, the judiciary, the families, the army has been unable to do much about him so far. He has hypnotized the urban middle class, and the youth, with slogans of accountability, Tapdili, Naya Pakistan, and Riyasat-e-Madina, that would be corruption free.
In the morass that the people are in, the dream that Imran Khan has sold has worked like opium. Not surprisingly, he has ensured that even from prison, he is a threat to the establishment, and can destabilize the situation in a short time. The third element is the demographics, which the chair had mentioned, and greater youth engagement in politics, that has shown itself to be in favor of Imran Khan. This has obvious electoral implications, as well as implications for the street. Over 47% of the electorate, or around 58 million, are young voters between the ages of 18 and 35. Youth activism, translated into vote at the ballot box, would be a game changer, but there would be even a bigger game changer on the streets, because they can paralyze the government.
Fourth, social media today is another factor shaping the political scenario. Traditional methods by which the establishment and political parties determine the narrative no longer work. While the print and electronic media is often subjected to government controls, social media is difficult to restrict. It is a mobilizing vehicle that taps into and galvanizes public sentiment and shapes the narrative. The PTI is streets ahead of the other parties in terms of setting the narrative on social media.
Finally, in the past, Pakistan used to leverage its geographical position, raking in rents. Today, the global environment in which Pakistan's crisis are being played out is unstable, with mounting geopolitical tensions. Some of these are the intense US-China competition, the focus of the major powers at war in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the unpredictability brought about by Donald Trump's impending second term in office. I look to this as a fact that post-US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan has lost the utility as a front line state.
Recently, Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have lurched into hostilities. Relations with India are frozen, while old weather-friend China has uncharacteristically expressed public concern over the security of its personnel. Domestically, the violent attacks of the TTP and the BLA have escalated significantly, with the army unwilling or unable to tackle these organizations. As you will be aware, the security landscape in Pakistan has seriously deteriorated over the past year. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, the country experienced a 70% increase in incidents of terrorist violence in 2024, compared to the previous year. Not only is the increase significant, but almost 60% of all attacks recorded in 2024 targeted personnel, vehicles, convoys, and facilities belonging to the security and law enforcement agencies, that is, hard targets. This reflects the growing strength of the two major groups, the TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army.
One reason for the uptick in violence is that these groups have now got access to sophisticated weaponry left over by the US in Afghanistan. Added to this is the failure of the state, primarily the army, to envisage and implement effective political and tactical strategies. This inability is largely due to being bogged down in dealing with Imran Khan. To my mind, the biggest challenge for the army leadership is to devise effective strategies and demonstrate vision and capability to counter these threats. This provokes the question that why has the army been unable to do so? And does it demonstrate the fact that the Pakistan army is losing its grip on the people and on the nation?
In terms of physical strength, the army is as strong as it has always been, if not stronger. But it is not physical strength alone that accounts for the army's domination. As Major General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi told General Yahya Khan way back in 1969, and "that the army's ability to rule lay in its being perceived by the people as a mythical entity, a magical force that would succor them in times of need when all else failed. The army was a final guarantor of Pakistan and its well-being. This has been the philosophical basis for the army's dominance." It is this perception of the army's image as a mythical entity, a magical force, that has been seriously dented by Imran Khan. Through his accusations against the army when he was not in jail, the vicious social media campaign by supporters, especially those based overseas, and the 9th May attacks on army installations.
Despite this there is no doubt that under the present trajectory, the army will continue to dominate politics, especially the core area of its interests. But the establishment's power to force things, whether through martial law or a hybrid regime, is now being questioned because they have lost legitimacy and charisma. Some groups and political parties feel that they can resist its power to force things, but the army itself does not believe that its power has been eroded. Therefore, a clash and instability is inevitable.
Finally, to answer the question I had posed in my book, Pakistan has become a country whose challenges have become greater than the capacities and capabilities of its leadership to tackle. The current leadership has neither the vision nor the ability to do so. The consequences of a combination of an inept civilian leadership and an inept military leadership of Pakistan can well be imagined. Thank you very much.
Anil Trigunayat: Thank you so much. You made some excellent points and I'm sure a lot of you would like to read his book as well, which has been one of the bestsellers and touches upon all these intricate issues which Mr. Devasher mentioned very casually. He very importantly brought out a couple of points, that is, Pakistan is still stuck in a time machine. So it has not changed its attitude and will it recover like previously in the past and let's hope it recovers. And then the weak factors are very interesting and I think that they provide a good indication exactly how it goes. And the fact that the army is losing its sheen in the public perception is something that we'll probably ask them will the Army become a little more hard-nosed or will it deal with the situation with a better public diplomacy platform, try to win over the people while the government be allowed to perform. So we'll have to see how it eventually plays out.
And the last thing that you mentioned is so true that the challenges are far bigger than capacities, capabilities, and I would add to that the intent to do it. So thank you very much for that. Now I will request Professor Ajay Darshan Behera, who is from Jamia Millia University and of course a well-known commentator and writer of Pakistan.
Ajay Darshan Behera: Thank you, Chairman sir, and thanks to the Director General for the invitation. The problem in Pakistan, the crisis that we see, Mr. Devasher has brought out the multiple crises that the country has. I think everyone is aware of the facts of what's happening. I, as a political scientist, would like to make some sense of where is Pakistan heading. Is there any way we can make sense of the current problems that it's going through?
The first thing is of course trying to understand the political system in Pakistan. It's very different from what we are aware of. Essentially because the entity of the military, which makes the system so different for us to understand. While that's something which we know that there is a historical role for the military in the governance of Pakistan. What is new is the Imran Khan factor that we probably haven't had something like the Imran Khan challenge that has been there to the system since 2002 or since he was removed from power.
That has implications for civil-military relations. Civil-military relations is something important in the context of Pakistan. But the dominance of the military which has been there historically and the questions being raised about it now to what extent the political system is controlled by the military. I will quickly give you some snapshots of how political scientists have modeled Pakistan or models they have used in trying to understand the nature of the state in Pakistan. One of the earliest frameworks we had was trying to understand Pakistan from the concept of over-developed state. The importance of the military that is essentially a very, very over-developed institution which dominated the political system.
From 2008 there is Professor Shahid (inaudible) who brought up a concept called post-military hegemonic order which was with the end of General Musharraf's regime in 2008 there was a new trend and that is the assumption that the political process is back. The political leaders would now be able to play a role. I think it is still right in saying post-military hegemonic order because today what we see is the hegemony of the military has eroded. Of course, this is an assessment which we need to do now that how do we look at the hegemony of the military in the country.
And since Imran Khan came into power in 2018, many have tried to understand the political system in Pakistan as a hybrid regime, which gave us an impression as if the political leaders and the military are on the same page, and governance is fine, easy, because there is a kind of harmony between these institutions. But I would like to also use another term, which I think is important, which has some reflection on the role of the military in Pakistan, and that's, I would like to call it a guided democracy, because in my understanding, and this is a very serious observation to make, that I don't think the military is going to take power, take over direct power in Pakistan ever. I think that phase is out. We may not ever see the military going for a direct move, because the country has become so difficult to govern that the military also does not have any solutions to the problems of the country.
The military essentially has to ensure that it needs to be in a power structure, which is important for the kind of dominance it has over the political economy. Guided democracy, the reason I use that, is what is important to the military, therefore, is a semblance of electoral democracy, that Pakistan has to have elections, whether the question of legitimacy of those elections is something that we can raise questions about that, but elections are important, but essentially, the military is going to decide what kind of government we are going to see in Pakistan, and that became clear from the 2018 elections to the elections last year in 2024.
But the role of the military, the dominance of the military, the ability of the military, actually, to play a larger-than-life role in Pakistan's politics, has actually weakened the civilian institutions. I mean, this crisis, who's going to deal with it, the military cannot deal, neither it allows the political institutions to deal with it. So there is an erosion in the legitimacy of the state. Effective governance is not possible in the country, and what this suggests is something that I've been looking at recently, going back to old literature by Huntington who had given a term called political decay.
What we see today in Pakistan is a kind of political decay. That is that in the process of modernization, the assumption is institutions go forward, modernize. But in fact, in the context of Pakistan, the opposite is happening. And that is, besides the military which is entrenched in the power structure, you see essentially political decay in all the other institutions. Huntington said, it's a regression rather than a progression, rather than a political progress or social progress.
And it happens with modernizing states. Modernizing states can lose the capabilities of gaining. And at times, gaining in one institution can lead to weakening of the other institutions. And I think that's what has happened in Pakistan. That the gain in the institution, the military institution has essentially weakened all the other institutions in the country, which we may not be able to make a direct correlation between everything. But the implications are obvious. Whether it is the politics of the country, whether it is the harmony in the country, whether it is in the economy in the country, we can see that there is an issue of institutions which have failed or institutions which have failed to adapt to the changing realities.
Now, in this scenario, today, what we find is the instability that is there in Pakistan. We can raise the question that if the kind of challenge that Imran Khan is posing to the political system, if that challenge would not have been there, maybe this is a hypothetical question, that maybe the military might have been able to deal with the issues or the problems. Imran's challenge is essentially what is keeping everyone on toes. Whether it is the political leadership or the military. They essentially don't know how to deal with it.
And this has got to do with the kind of structural changes which have happened in the context of Pakistan. And those structural changes are factors and because of which I agree with Mr. Devasher when he raised this question about whether Pakistan will recover. I don't think it will recover because these changes are bringing a new dynamics. So, it's not as if we can go back. We will only go forward. But conceptually what I am arguing is that we are only going to go forward becoming more and more weak. Meaning, the system is going to become more and more weak. The changes which again Mr. Devasher pointed out, the demographic changes which have taken place in Pakistan, which essentially wants a change.
Today you find that there is a significant segment of the population, which wants to stand up or speak up against the military. I mean, the military is no longer acceptable. It's a different matter that, I mean, the military still remains entrenched in the power structure. And that is getting reflected through the challenge that Imran Khan is facing. Why is it he is able to bring the street power? I mean, what is this, he gives a call and people are on the streets trying to defy the military and the security forces.
So, this has to be studied in the context of the demographic changes, which have happened in Pakistan and some of the data that I have. 35% of the population below 15 years. 63% below the age of 25. But literacy rate only 50% of this group. So, there is an aspirational class today in Pakistan which is very troubled by the economic problems, by the entrenchment of the military in the power structure. And Imran managed to give a different vision, right or wrong, which he has been able to create a support base for himself by giving a vision about how he is going to deal with the problems.
Even though Imran simplified Pakistan's problems. In the few years of his rule also gave us sufficient indication that Imran also doesn't have any solution to any problems. Neither he has a vision or a policy. But his way, language or what one can call is the idioms that he uses about how he portrays the military or how he portrays the political leadership, dynastic politics, anti-corruption. The agenda, one of the important agendas is anti-corruption, anti-dynastic politics, anti-feudal politics. All that has been important in his ability to mobilize a significant section of the population.
And Imran's support base today is across both spectrums. From the urban areas to the rural areas, it's not limited to certain class. But what is Imran's purpose in all this? And that is a very important question that one needs to raise in the context of Pakistan and in the context of the military regimes coming into power. Military regimes have come into power also because of the way the politicians have allowed them or have essentially used the military to remain in power.
So, Imran's purpose today is not that he really is going to change the balance between the military and the political elite or the political class. His purpose is only to come back to power. Even though, I mean, he has been able to use language, he has been able to use the questions of legitimacy of the elections to make a good case for himself. But his purpose is essentially to come back to power. He is not trying to change the imbalance in the civil-military equations. He is essentially wanting to use the military to come back to power.
So, tomorrow if the military tells, gives him space that this is the way you can come back to power. He will be more than happy to again deal with the military. So, the military has a problem today because the legitimacy of the military has weakened. It has weakened over several reasons whether it is got to do with the electoral process, whether it is got to do with some of the controversial judicial decisions. There is today actually a public backlash against the military. And that Imran is able to do that.
So, my prognosis for the next couple of years, one, that it is important for the military to essentially ensure that they don't give in to Imran Khan. Whether that will happen or not is something, would be depending on how Imran plays his politics. What new strategy Imran has to use street power against the military. Does he have anything else? I mean, they have said something about boycotting military economic infrastructure, etc. Would that make any difference? I have my doubts. It will be essentially about how much of political pressure Imran is able to put on the military.
The military will not allow for a change because it would then suggest the failure. It will raise questions about the legitimacy of the elections. It would also suggest the failure of the military in the kind of arrangement they have done in governing the country. So, which essentially means that here is a military which does not have solution to problems. Here is a government which is in power, which essentially does not have power. It cannot deal with the problems that Pakistan has.
So, the crisis that we see in Pakistan is essentially probably will become more. And this is my thesis of theory borrowed from my teacher. He is essentially saying that here is a state which is in a state of political decay. How that political decay is going to get arrested, a very radical thought and that is the military has to go out of power which is never going to happen in the context of Pakistan.
Anil Trigunayat: Thank you, Professor Behera, for invoking Huntington and talking about the militarocracy basically in Pakistan. And that military which is also a major economic power and actor in Pakistan will not let it go easily. We have seen that recently Faiz Ameen, the former ISI chief was arrested for land grabbing. But what we are also looking at it and which probably is not being touched, that the PTI has been talking to both Nawaz Sharif's party is PDP and earlier on, I think, January 2nd, they had the second round of discussions. Probably everybody is trying to find a modus vivendi now. Because Imran Khan was probably the first leader to have challenged his masters who brought him to power. And that was what happened. And tried to undermine them to a great extent. And the weaknesses of the armies within Pakistan was clearly evident.
So, how it plays out and you are absolutely right. One thing you also suggested that Pakistan is going really downhill and will require some kind of maybe an implosion within, which probably is happening already. But that will be a bit dangerous and we will have to understand that. And he also touch upon two things. Dr. Chawla, that about the Constitutional Amendment, the 26th Constitutional Amendment. How do you perceive its implications? And secondly, the changes in the Army Act. Basically increasing the limit of the chief to five years from three. And I think higher retirement age for the four-star generals.
So, I will request Dr. Shalini Chawla, who we all know, for her significant work at the Centre for Air Power Studies.
Shalini Chawla: Thank you, sir. Thank you, Director General, for inviting me here. It's always a pleasure. Obviously, I have a disadvantage of being the last speaker. Much ground has been covered. But with Pakistan, the beauty is that the ground never ends, and you always have something to cover. So I will start with what the chair said, that Pakistan has a nuisance value. And also, Mr. Devasher talked about the fact that how it has cherished its geographical location.
And I think the biggest challenge right now, what Pakistan itself is facing as a state, and it's not a challenge for us, but for this Pakistani state, that it has cherished the narrative for decades that it's a state which is too dangerous to fail. Because it's a state which is located as a geographic location, which is critical, strategically critical, for China, for the United States, in the region. And then it has nuclear weapons. And it also has the highest number of, say, terrorist organizations. It has the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, has this whole, it has been the hub of terrorism.
So the world cannot allow Pakistan to fail. That's been the narrative and the belief which Pakistan has cherished for decades. And it always felt that no matter how much it goes down into any crisis situation, Pakistan would have the helping hand and the assistance coming through. And this phase of crisis, I think, has challenged that belief, where Pakistan literally came to the verge of economic default, it had to struggle very hard with IMF to get the economic loan. The assistance, it wasn't easy. There were tough conditionalities which were bang on, which were required for Pakistan as a state which is going repeatedly to the IMF.
So the assistance did not flow that easy that it has kind of felt that it would. It has been highlighting the security situation, talking about the attacks. And the security assistance from the United States has not come through. So there have been, that is something which Pakistan is struggling with. And I think, after the US withdrawal, which Mr. Devasher has said, its decline in its relevance. The US focus on the Indo-Pacific strategy has obviously dented that part for Pakistan. And then very importantly, I think India's rise has been a factor in this whole issue that I'm talking about, and continued instability in Pakistan.
So I think Pakistan is really struggling very hard to revive that relevance at the international level, regional level for itself. What we see in Pakistan where the crisis has been highlighted, and Professor Behera talked about the fact that it's going down and down, I think what I would say is Pakistan has been on a reversal mode. It is walking backwards away from the values of progressive state, which at some point in time maybe it managed to touch, and it was talking about it.
So there is a contradiction that we see in this state, which is a militarily modernized state, has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal, claims to have the capability of building the MIRV missiles, which it launched. It is the ally of one of the biggest power, China, a consistent strategic ally for the last 40, 50 years. It has been the US ally for long phases, but that all these alliances have been used to just strengthen the military power, and then we see the result now.
So there are crises on multiple fronts, and I'm just going to touch upon a few of them very, very quickly. The first one, which has been elaborated very well by Professor Behera, is obviously the defeat of the popular mandate and strengthening of the hybrid regime, the continuation of that. So this term, what we saw, the hybrid regime, the way it came, it has managed to now change, make the constitutional amendment to be able to deter any challenges that it could face in the future. For example, the 26th Amendment, which the chair raised a question about, obviously has challenged the Supreme Court authority.
It has challenged the ability of the judiciary to be able to challenge military in the longer term, because now the selection of the judges will be done by the Parliamentary Committee, and they will be chosen from the three judges and not essentially the senior judge. Also, what these changes have implied is extension of the tenure of the army chief and multiple other factors which have come into play, which have enhanced their capability much more, and there is no looking back now.
So there is going to be a deeper impact that we'll see, but I think the biggest impact that we see here is that the pressure on the Sharif government with this very strong military regime, which will continue and his ability, Shahbaz Sharif's ability to take decisions which will focus on the welfare of the state, because now the entire focus of this regime is its own sustainability. So it wants to sustain, and for that it needs to be in the good books of the military. So that is the focus, and the people-centric policies do not find the focus here.
So I think this is one of the leading crises that I would say, and passing of the Army Act, Secrecy Act and 26th Amendment Act has further altered the power dynamics in the country, giving military much more stronger hold and also continuation of the leadership under Asim Munir, where he will have the ability now to change the dynamics in his favor. The crisis of the military's persona being challenged, the way that the status that it has enjoyed for decades, it is probably the lowest level that we've seen and those have been elaborated. So I'm not going to go into it, but there was a question which was given to us as speakers that why that persona has suffered.
Yes, Imran Khan is definitely a factor, but a deeper realization that military is responsible for the political, economic, and also the social challenges in the country has been much more than ever before that we see and it's much more vocal. There have been also divisions within the army. I think that has dented the image of the army. The institution for the first time is so polarized. We would recall that they were very strong pro-Imran and anti-Imran lobbies, which we never saw before, and there is also continuous mistrust in the top leadership that who's with them and who's not. And as a result of this polarization, we saw first time former ISI head Faiz Hameed was court-martialed, which has never happened in Pakistan before. And I think these are definitely critical issues to be seen.
Thirdly, military has been targeted repeatedly by TTP. This has also never happened. There are close to about 900 attacks, I think, last year which happened, which brings us to more than 50 attacks or 60 attacks per month, which is approximately one and a half or two attacks per day on the military installations. This is something which obviously challenges their credibility in front of people, their inability to defend their own installations, and the Afghan Taliban openly challenging the military and defying their appeals, pressures. Pakistan has used everything from cutting trade, raising the trade tariffs, closing borders, deporting the Afghan refugees. Nothing has worked on the Afghan Taliban.
And I think a combination of these factors along with Imran Khan's popularity is the reason for this dented image of the military, which we see it's trying to overcome. The next crisis which I think are very important are the critical developments which I feel is important, and JUIF of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rahman, he collaborated with the government in passing of the recent 26th Amendment to weaken the Supreme Court. He has been up in arms with the government on implementing the bill, which has now been passed by the parliament, which is called the Society's Registration Amendment Act 2024, and this aims, obviously this bill implies reverse, to revert the registration of the religious seminaries from the federal education system to the traditional system of registration.
So, in 2019 certain reforms were implemented in Pakistan and that's why I said it's on a reversal mode, which kind of placed these seminaries under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, recognize the ministry as the only authority to collect the data, control, monitor, the kind of curriculum they have, also monitor the fact that they don't spread hatred and also monitor their finances. This whole process, the reforms which were done under the pressure of the FATF graylisting of Pakistan at that time, has been changed. And then, this is a step backward in terms of their overall a little bit of effort, which we see in terms of countering extremism and I think it is important.
The other crisis which is another, I feel it is new at this time, is that for the first time all the four provinces and what we see the protests in PoK are in trouble. So, Punjab obviously had issues with the popularity where Nawaz Sharif really struggled to so-called win, if it was actually a win for him. Then and since there are protests going on because of the fact that there is 50,000 acres of land has been acquired by the military, the building of the six canals which have been proposed and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in Baluchistan, anyway, we see that repeated attacks of the TTP, there has been no respite.
The economic crisis, which is very important, is alarming. The debt is, I think, the highest of all times. It's at an unprecedented level and it stands at 70,366 billion rupees, which we have not seen before in Pakistan. So, there has been some change in the economic indicators. The GDP has gone up to 2.4%, inflation has come down from 29% to 23%, but does this actually indicate economic growth? No, because it doesn't, in no way, indicates change in economic mismanagement and for that, obviously, sustainability, structural changes are required. Pakistan's investment in human capital and the developmental aspect is required, cutting down on the non-development expenditure, like defense is required, which is never shown, the true figures are never shown in the budget.
There are potentials of some investment which they are seeking, but how much it will come through from the Muslim world, UAE and Saudi Arabia, remains to be seen, given the fact that there is so much instability. Now, my last point is, and very quickly I will touch upon here, is what does this crisis imply for Pakistan and how do we see it behaving and reflecting in its own behavioral position at the larger level?
I think one of the things different, what we will see that it will try to come closer to the Muslim world, get the economic dividends from there. There are efforts which we have seen in terms of conducting counter-terror exercises, military exercises with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey that Pakistan has been doing. Pakistan will try to project itself as a US ally against Iran with Trump in power. There are also efforts on the other fronts like girls' education, meeting the vice chancellors in the region, those efforts are going on. So this part we will see that trying to create a bonhomie with the Muslim world, stronger relationship will be seen.
And second part I think is also interesting where I think it would light with Trump coming in. Pakistan would want to project itself as an ally of the US against Iran. And the abduction of the atomic energy personnel by the TTP, which was just given to news where 16 personnel were abducted, it is believed to be a false flag operation which was by apparently the intelligence agency there, trying in an effort to kind of draw the attention of the US and CII to the issues around the TTP and the security situation. So I think this will be another factor which we will see.
Apart from that, its position against India, its reliance on covert war against India, I don't think we see any change in that. But yes, more instability we see in Pakistan, the reliance on anti-India posture is likely to grow. Thank you.
Anil Trigunayat: Thank you, Dr. Chawla, for a very comprehensive in a short time, you covered nearly everything. And I believe that one of the key pointers there is that even if there are reforms, they are reversing the trend. The reforms are not progressive. So it's a negative way of reforms that are taking place, which is important. Another point which you need to know is that the relevance of Pakistan, which used to be, as I said in the beginning, has something to do with the rise of India. But at the same time, we will have to see how it plays out.
You also mentioned about against Iran, the Pakistanis will try to show themselves. But my feeling is that I'm going to be absolutely off the mark. There's a new kind of a trajectory which is developing in the region and which could eventually be part of the, as I put it, the Tak format, China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey. At the end of the day, we could see them moving in that particular direction. And as you also mentioned, that they're trying to go back to the Islamic world for some support. But the Islamic world has moved on also, especially Saudi Arabia and UAE are far more, I think, growth-oriented, modernization-oriented, rather than going to the old Wahhabi kind of a style.
So that's why they are facing more difficulties in getting funds and support from these countries. But as far as Trump is concerned or Pakistan, Trump's basic objective is somehow to defend the deep state. But as far as the deep state, which is really deep, goes on, they will continue to pander to Pakistan and keep it as one of the pointers for them. Maybe we'll see how it goes. Further, of course, the economy has shown a little bit of a change, positive change. And we'll have to see. As far as debt and all those concerned, I think there is a little bit of news was about finding gold. So we got some $7 billion worth of gold deposits recently in the industry, and hopefully that will help their country a little bit more.
But I'll open it now to the questions we have about 25, 30 minutes. And we have to close at five. So kindly identify yourself and to whom the question is addressed. Lady in the back, please.
Varshitha Eddula: Good evening, everyone. My name is Varshitha. I'm a research intern here.
Anil Trigunayat: Can you please keep it close?
Varshitha Eddula: So my question is to Tilak, sir. Do you see a greater youth engagement transiting from politics to governance in Pakistan and do they have the capabilities to tackle its challenges? And my question is to Ajay, sir. Do you think Pakistani identity has weakened due to various ethnic conflicts? And has political decay weakened identity and increased conflicts? To Shalini, ma'am, what are the implications?
Anil Trigunayat: One question, one question, please.
Varshitha Eddula: Yeah, what are the implications for South Asia? And do you see women of Pakistan taking inspiration from the women resistance movement in Iran and asking for a better life and more freedom?
Tilak Devasher: Take two questions.
Anil Trigunayat: Okay, let's start from here. Okay. One question only, please to one person.
Sarvajit Dudeja: Thank you, sir. I think we always talk of crisis in Pakistan. Being a big brother – Vishwa guru or Vishwa mitra, why not to give them some solution in the way India is successful? They can also learn from us, whether it's a four pillars or they can also replicate. We always talk of other problems. Why not to give them some solution instead of talking about the problem? They have Sindh problem, they have Baluchistan problem. There are so many problems. And they can learn from India. After all, we are big brothers of Pakistan.
Anil Trigunayat: Sir, we are interested, probably the national interest should be the priority of their government. It has been brought up, but India cannot tell them anything. We can only assist. We could have assisted. We assisted them during the pandemic. And if somebody is not ready to listen, if you are going to do the wrong thing, one can't help. Yeah, one more question, please. Yeah, young man.
Unidentified Participant: So my question, we have seen that the idea behind the formation of Pakistan is basically the two-nation state and the separate and distinct Muslim identity. But if we see in the recent years, we can see there is an identity crisis going on in Pakistan, I guess. So basically in Pakistan, the same foundational idea has faced challenges, I guess. And we can see that in the persecution of Baloch and Ahmadiyyas in Pakistan. So my question is for Behera sir. So how we can see this identity crisis is going to challenge the cohesion in Pakistan political landscape?
Anil Trigunayat: Okay, thank you. Last question.
Sandeep: Good evening, ma'am and good evening, sir. My name is Sandeep. I am from Kirori Mal College, pursuing political science undergraduate. My question is, given the military's dominant role in Pakistan politics, which often hinders dialogue with India, could forcing P2P relation offer an alternative path to improving bilateral ties? India has successfully used cultural, educational and infrastructural initiatives with Afghanistan, and a similar approach with Pakistan could help bypass political obstacles, promoting mutual understanding and long-term cooperation. And one more question, sir. How do you perceive the evolving relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh amidst Pakistan's internal challenges? Could this partnership help Pakistan mitigate its crisis?
Tilak Devasher: Thank you. So the first question on what you were saying is basically youth engagement in politics, right? So, the political leadership among political parties in Pakistan is like a closed job. You take the PML and Muslim League, it is a Sharif family, and close to it is for their sons, their children. Similarly with the TTP. It's the PTI which has allowed people to come, but only the people who are very close to Imran Khan are in leadership or governance for them. So whether there is a lot of enthusiasm for the youth to get into politics and be a part of the country's politics, in terms of governance, I don't see that happening for quite some time. Unless and until the very model of political parties in Pakistan changes.
In fact, one of the reasons why the army is able to dominate is because the political parties are not democratic themselves. Elections are not really held, there is no organization, there is no district level party organization. Each district even today, there is one notable, today he is in the Muslim League, tomorrow he could be in the TTP, thirdly he joins the PTI. So there is nobody coming up from the grassroots which can enable the youth to get into governance.
Shalini Chawla: Sir, on a lighter note about the gold, when you said I was about to say that the Sharifs would have taken out their gold for sale, maybe that is the gold hunting system. The question about South Asia, what is the impact it is going to have on South Asia, I think firstly definitely security factor, where you have TTP being so emboldened that it is going to be having an impact which will spread. These things don't get confined there. You already have a faction in Central Asia and you already have TTP, those kind of models coming up. So this is dangerous.
ISKP will obviously get more ground with this kind of instability. But second very important factor on South Asia will be there is a shrinking space for any probable negotiation to solve common challenges. Now if you have these kind of instability there, Pakistan-Afghanistan, Pakistan-India, there is no room for any discussion to deal with any challenges which would require some form of negotiation and talks in terms of economic integration or connectivity. So number of these projects are standing, are being caused right now. So it will have those kind of challenges in future.
Your second question about the fact that if the Pakistani women can draw their inspiration, I think at the moment the situation is that even Pakistani men don't have a voice. You see how the protests are being dealt with, how are the Baluch being dealt with, how are the youth being treated. Any anti-military voice is being treated with use of very brutal force. But to your point, the state I think in the last seven, eight months is trying very hard to project itself as a state which is driven towards women empowerment. So you have these women education, girls education summits which have happened. Maryam Sharif has become the Chief Minister of Punjab.
So these kind of developments you see and they are also talking about the fact that we will not recognize Afghanistan because of the fact that women rights are trying to stand on the same pitch. So it's working very hard. How much women can assert, I think it's not only about the women, it is the assertion of the masses which is suffering right now. So that's the biggest point here, which we'll continue to face.
The point which was talked about, about people-to-people contacts, there was one question that why can't that, I think that's difficult in case of Pakistan because people actually don't reflect at all in the policies. Even if you do people-to-people contacts, first of all, it's completely out of place right now because of the visas and the kind of relationship we have. We don't have a diplomatic dialogue since 2016 now. We haven't talked to Pakistan.
So people-to-people, there is no way it will reflect in the policymaking. The people's sentiments or the choices in Pakistan don't reflect any ways in the policymaking. That's what all the three, I think, including the chair, have been talking about, that it's a very different state which has come up and like Ajay said, talked about the dictated democracy or guided democracy, which he said. So in case of Pakistan, I think it is less likely to work. We have tried it in the past. We have played cricket matches. We have done Aman ki Asha. Our prime minister visited there in Lahore in 2015 and then we have the Pathankot attack. So I don't think that is going to work with Pakistan.
Anil Trigunayat: See, every time some effort is made and there is a record about this, that there is a discussion or a meeting, you have a terror attack. Right. So how many times can you continue this? And what do you mean by P2P contact? Their people know everybody. We are the same people. But the kind of role they can play, at the end of the day, the people cannot just talk to people like that. It has to be state-to-state relationship. And our only concern with Pakistan, there is no other concern, and that is that they should control terrorism from their soil. Are using it against India. And that's the only concern India has. There is nothing else. Everything else could flow.
Ajay Darshan Behera: Yeah. There were two questions, but almost similar, on the ethnic conflict and the political identity. See, today we see the challenges that the state has, specifically from the Baluch insurgency, the BLA. But ethnicity is a simmering thing in Pakistan. The dominance of Punjab in the political system, and the feelings that the Sindhis have, or the Pashtuns have, or the Baluch have, I mean, that's not gone. It's just that we don't have assertive movement in Sindh, even though I think the Sindhu Desh movement is also coming up. But the BLA is a serious challenge. It is a serious challenge, which I think the military has a problem in dealing with. The problem with the military or the political establishment is that they don't have any other solution. What you find is there is no negotiated solution to it.
The only way they behave with its force. Now, with the Taliban in Afghanistan again, the Pashtun or greater Pashtunistan issue is going to come up. In the sense that, one of the worries of Pakistan is the recognition of the unaligned even if they say that it is a formal border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Taliban also doesn't recognize it. The Pashtuns don't accept it or recognize it. So, they have issues. But the way the military is going to deal with it is essentially by using force. Because even in the past, the military has justified its role in governance by saying that when these problems happen, it's the military's role to deal with them. So, that's the only way they understand how to deal with it.
So, we will probably see greater challenges posed by the BLA because the BLA problem, the TTP problem will also lead to the CPEC. The CPEC, as long as the CPEC continues, I mean, whatever financial benefits they get, economic benefits they get, but the BLA and the TTP will keep targeting Chinese workers, engineers, infrastructure. The BLA will, I don't think so, the Gwadar Port is going to be acceptable to the Baluch of the BLA. So, we are actually going to see more of problems in the future.
Anil Trigunayat: Thank you. Yes, please.
Khabibullo Mirzozoda, Counsellor, Embassy of Tajikistan: Okay. So, my question goes actually to all who made presentation about the security and TTP's future. As we know, the strategic goal of TTP is to come to power in Pakistan and to launch or to introduce a Sharia regime like they did in Afghanistan Taliban. And to achieve that goal, of course, maybe we know there was agreement signed between TTP and Kabul Taliban that they will support to achieve the strategic goal of TTP in Pakistan. If there is this tendency that the geographical unity of Pakistan is under the threat, why? Because Khyber Pakhtuns are claiming their autonomy. And Baluch as well, they are claiming their autonomy. Sooner or later, maybe these attacks or this kind of movement will increase because of division in the society. Many members of political parties may join with the TTP or other groups in order, again, to change the system and to change the government. What do you think about these, how to say, perspectives of these tendencies and of this kind of movement that is taking place on the border and inside Pakistan, especially in the neighboring to Afghanistan states, villages?
Ajay Darshan Behera: Thank you. I'll go to this.
Tanya Sharma: Sir I am Tanya Sharma, I am a journalist. I have a quick question on civil-military fusion. And any panelists can answer. And how do you see, what is the dividend that… because China has already grandfathered the nuclear reactors of Pakistan. How do you see this thing panning down with Pakistan already getting deeper into the trouble? And what's the political or economic dividend for China to actually keep helping Pakistan on nuclear reactors? Thank you.
Anil Trigunayat: Last question. You want to go? You have one question?
Shubhajit Roy: I'll make a point, if possible. I'm Shubhajit Roy from Indian Express. I have a question for all the panelists who could share their thoughts. This is the ongoing crisis in Pakistan, very insightfully. I wanted to know if, what should India do? And I want all four of you to sort of think about four options. Engage; complete indifference; third is lend them a helping hand; and fourth option, add fuel to the fire. So what do you think should be India's option?
Anil Trigunayat: Excellent. Last question. Yes, please. That's it. He's given good homework.
Aryan Kapoor: Thank you. Hello, sir. My name is Aryan Kapoor. I'm from St. Stephen’s College. So my question is simple. The waves of history have always shown that perennial series of crises have been accompanied, subsequently, by a force of rebellion and revolution. That is the case with China, that is the case even in the transition, the way we talked about it. I want to know if Pakistan is right now staring down the barrel of a shotgun and they are facing a series of crises for a perennial period of time, as Tilak sir pointed out. And so if they are facing a revolution or a rebellion in the near future, which can be really a big massacre for the country of Pakistan.
Tilak Devasher: So, your question is a very long answer. I will try and keep it very short. The basic structural flaw in the creation of Pakistan, the Baloch and the Pashtuns are ancient people. They had their own civilization, own language, own culture, much before even Islam came to this region and certainly much before Pakistan came. Now, Pakistan's problem was, how do you blend these historic states into one national identity? The question of identity which was posed earlier.
They thought they will use religion. That Islam will be the bounding, because all of them were Muslim. Unfortunately, Jinnah was told by Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, if you have read him or heard about him, he told Jinnah that the loyalty, that nowhere in Islam, not in the Quran, does religion or Islam provide the basis of nationhood. All the people living in a particular place form part of that. You cannot have an exclusive state based on Islam. And loyalty of the Muslims in the subcontinent is to their sect. Not to Islam as a whole. And this is precisely what has happened.
Today's sectarianism in Pakistan is so severe. The Shia is thinking Sunnis, Barelvi is thinking that the Deobandis are kafirs because of that. And the fact that the Baloch have not accepted the identity of Pakistan. They consider themselves Baloch first. Similarly, the Pashtuns in Pakistan and in Afghanistan consider themselves as, because they have a similar code, Pashtun, Baloch similar language, similar customs, they intermarry each other. They may have developed politically differently because of being in two countries, but they hark back to the time of Ahmad Shah Abdali, when Afghanistan was Attock and they were Punjab.
So, because of these structural issues, this problem in Pakistan is going to continue to become more and more intense, as you mentioned. Pakistan has to deal with this very imaginatively. Unfortunately, neither the political class in Pakistan or the army, which is Punjabi dominated, Punjabis can't understand. I am a Punjabi. I know. Can't understand the subtleties of a historic and ancient inquiry. That's where the problem is and you will find it going to get more and more intense.
Anil Trigunayat: The last one also.
Tilak Devasher: Okay. Which was. Yeah. So your question why we should not help and what you mentioned, that all the four options that you gave, I find it amazing. Why should you help? Somebody that has been killing your people for the last 40 years, would you rather kick them in the pants than to give them a lending hand? Why should you? And why should you engage? You engage on equal terms. If a person has a knife behind his back and continues to foment terrorism, today it's not overt terrorism but you have drones dropping drugs, weapons, fake currency across the borders.
So then why should you either engage or lend a helping hand? And adding fuel to the fire, I think we shouldn't play God. They are imploding. We didn't get a chance to talk about water and the other issue which is very close to my heart, and also about population. They are imploding. Don't play God. Let them be really happy, go along with what they are doing. So neither should we add fuel to the fire, neither engage nor lend a helping hand. Indifference, yes. This is what we are doing.
Shalini Chawla: I think the question was about China, which you asked why China is helping. China's interest has been to counter India from the 60s. And China actually offered Pakistan nuclear bombs in 1960s itself and Ayub Khan declined that offer saying that Pakistan can't afford it. Bhutto was in the cabinet and he was pretty upset about it. And as soon as he came into power in 1971, he used that opportunity and Pakistan became a nuclear power.
So for China, Pakistan is a very, very inexpensive option, a low cost option to counter India. The common hostility which Pakistan and China share against India has been the binding glue for them and that's not going to change. And obviously there were other options, aspects to their strategic alliance in terms of China's quest for oil, which it has managed to now come and it is managing Gwadar. So it will in the longer term have the ability to control the oil routes, maybe it might. And it also sees Pakistan as a connector to the region where it could kind of build up its base and we have seen how it expanded, it's put into Iran, Afghanistan, other aspects.
But anti-India aspect is the strongest aspect in this alliance here. And that's why making Pakistan a nuclear weapon state helps China's objectives. China itself has a no first-use doctrine, but it has never questioned Pakistan's first-use doctrine and also the fact that Pakistan has kept it so, it has just been non-transparent, it doesn't have a written doctrine, and it uses the nuclear threat so often. So you have never seen that being questioned and you have seen that being sustained despite Pakistan's economic crisis.
So all out, Pakistan has gone through this massive phases of economic crisis, but the modernization and the nuclear buildup has remained constant. And this is not going to change, even if the Chinese workers are being killed there. There was another question. Another question which he raises very, I think, excellent point there. I agree with Mr. Devasher fully that we don't need to engage in what are the options India has. I think for us, it is most critical is to just focus on our growth, our economic growth, military modernization, and very important signaling that we have a zero tolerance for terrorism.
I think that needs to be continued for Pakistan. Once Pakistan comes into its senses, it kind of decides to change its trajectory, India can perhaps think of some kind of a conditional engagement.
Anil Trigunayat: Thank you. Do you think that there will be a revolution in Pakistan?
Tilak Devasher: Okay, I didn't think of that, but I think one problem of revolution is they don't take place in democracies easily. And what you actually probably mean is will there be a systemic change? I mean, you can have a change within the system. So you can see that as a transformative change within the system, but it's not going to be a revolution which is going to overthrow the system.
The one possibility of a revolution is only an Islamic revolution in Pakistan. I mean, that possibility we should not rule out at all. I mean, even though the army is there to stand against it. But long term, it's difficult for us to say at this point of time whether, I mean, if ever in the future, the Pakistan state can fall to the Islamists, we don't know. So I will not go further on that. But on this question, my…
Anil Trigunayat: On four points.
Ajay Darshan Behera: Four points, yeah. I have a different point of view on that, and I think we should engage with Pakistan. But I think our relationship is not only with the state. Our relationship is also with the people of Pakistan. I mean, the problem will be sometime in the future, we will end up in a situation where we have the kind of problem we are having with Bangladesh. Exactly the same kind of problem we'll have with Pakistan in case there is improvement of relations. So it's not the question of the regime which is in power.
We have to see how the people perceive India, and India's indifference to Pakistan. I mean, I'm not saying that relations can be absolutely normal. We will not have a normal relationship with Pakistan. But it essentially means that you engage, you keep talking to them on terrorism. You have certain amount of trade which is economically going to benefit Punjab. Economically it is going to benefit the traders and it is going to do an economic transformation for some areas around the borders. Which will lead to a great degree of difference in how people perceive the other state.
So, right now, I mean, the perception of the people of Pakistan, I am not worried about the state or the military. The perception of the people of Pakistan is very negative on India. That narrative you can read, you read the newspapers and you see how the kind of narrative that is there about the Indian state. That can only change provided we engage with them.
Anil Trigunayat: But one thing, thank you very much. I think most of you must have seen and those who are following the Pakistani press. More and more the commentary which is coming even on the media and otherwise is, they are talking about India's progress. And very grudgingly you have seen that they are even praising Prime Minister Modi. So, there is definitely a realization in Pakistan that the Indian model has succeeded and which is a good thing in a way. It has its own impact.
So, we have heard the brilliant panelists, they have discussed threat there about the current state of Pakistan affairs and how it is going to really move forward. And I can only reiterate India's policy in this regard. And that is that we want wealth for the people of Pakistan. They have to sort out their own problems. It should not happen that you might have like you mentioned Islamic revolution. You don't know which way to go in that case.
Bangladesh is another example for you. So, revolutions are also not always easy for the people. I basically specialize in Middle East. It's still in a very difficult phase. I have started off, it was engineered from outside. You know what has happened in Bangladesh for decades. So, you have to actually look at it from different perspectives.
So, in the end I would like to thank the panelists and my view, Shubhajit, to your question was, and I say that as a former diplomat, that we go the hybrid way, which we are going. We may not have bilateral talks directly. We exchange our lists of nuclear installations, list of prisoners, Kartarpur corridor. We also work together with them in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In other areas, they might be in the BRICS, we will be working with them. Dr. Jaishankar also attended the SCO Summit in Pakistan. In the SCO RATS infrastructure, we work together.
In the international domain, whenever there are problems, we do work together. And it is not that officially we may not have, dialogue/talks cannot continue, that remains our past. But we have to be very careful that we are not looking at Pakistan. Until a few years ago, Pakistan used to be our main challenge. Today, our main challenge is China, not Pakistan. But China plus Pakistan can be a bigger issue for us. So on that note, I pass it back to ICWA. Thank you, once again.
Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee: Thank you. It goes without saying that we all had a fascinating and enriching panel discussion today on behalf of the council. I would like to express my gratitude to the distinguished chair and panelists. My special thanks to all our members of the audience. To know more about ICWA's research work, events, outreach programs, and publications, do visit our website and social media handles on Twitter or X, LinkedIn, YouTube, and Facebook. Thank you all again, and please join us for tea in the foyer. Thank you.
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