Introduction
Deterrence, as a security apparatus, is fundamental to the American foreign policy and security framework. It aims to maintain strategic stability against the US adversaries.[i] The rise of a multipolar world order in a “new era” is marked by increased competition among major powers, driven by China’s economic and military rise and the resurgence of conflict in Europe.[ii] That has imposed strategic constraints on the existing US deterrence framework.
The US policymakers and officials acknowledged that the US is facing two near-peer rivals.[iii] With enhanced strategic and non-strategic conventional warfare capabilities, the US has been prompted to explore a new deterrence strategy.[iv] Lieutenant General Richard M Clark, former Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, a position in the United States Air Force tasked with guidance, advocacy and integration of the nuclear deterrence mission of the US Air Force stated, “The lines are more blurred between conventional and nuclear warfare strategies, and the US needs to start thinking in a way that may be different from what the US has thought about in the last 20 years."[v]
To maintain the effectiveness of deterrence posture against key nuclear adversaries and deter any adversarial action during “grey zone” conflicts, the White House has come up with a refined version of the deterrence strategy called “integrated deterrence.”[vi]
This paper will analyse the US understanding of integrated deterrence and how the US is working to operationalise this strategy.
What is Integrated Deterrence?
Integrated deterrence, as a strategy, was first outlined in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) under President Trump. The new deterrence strategy was subsequently incorporated into the 2022 National Defence Strategy (NDS) released by the Biden Administration. During the official approval of the 2022 National Defense Strategy report, President Biden stated that we are living in a “decisive decade” marked by rapid changes in geopolitics, technology and the economic front.[vii] The NDS 2022 identified China as the primary geostrategic threat to the US in the coming decades. Russia was characterised as an “acute threat” with restricted strategic capabilities to project power beyond its immediate borders.[viii]
The core principle of the US integrated deterrence strategy is to “deter a conventional war with nuclear adversaries by integrating all domains of conventional, nuclear, cyber, space and informational across the theatre of competition and potential conflicts ranging from high-intensity warfare to grey zone."[ix] Integrated deterrence represents a shift from the traditional US deterrence strategy, distinguishing between conventional and strategic or nuclear deterrence.
In response to the emerging security environment, integrated deterrence talks about integrating all instruments of power, including strategic deterrence, under a coordinated military modernisation plan at strategic and conventional levels to deter the potential adversaries during a limited and non-nuclear strategic attack which includes non-nuclear strategic weapons like conventional precision strike capabilities ( cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles). It also addresses cyber threats and potential harm to critical infrastructure affecting US allies and partners.
The Objectives of Integrated Deterrence
The objectives of integrated deterrence are not just limited to deterring a nuclear adversary from launching nuclear and non-nuclear attacks but also assuring allies and partners about the resilience and effectiveness of deterrence capabilities of the US forces across different spectrums and domains of warfare. To integrate all means of power under a common framework strategy, the concept of Conventional-Nuclear Integration, or CNI, was highlighted as a leading priority in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.[x] The CNI works to build and integrate alliances and partnerships in three significant areas of confrontation with peer nuclear adversaries: the Indo-Pacific, Europe and West Asia.
Assured sustainability and strengthening of integrated deterrence posture talks about interoperability of military and naval assets of US forces that enables and enhances coalition with allies and partners under sustained capabilities, combined and collaborative force planning,[xi] Derived from four parameters for integrated deterrence as outlined in the NPR 2018:
To effectively integrate all means of national power across domains, geography and the spectrum of conflict, there is a need for robust mechanisms based upon diplomatic and military cooperation with allies and partners, so the “combat credibility” or the ability of the "US military to fight and win” must be ensured.[xiii] However, American scholars and strategists expressed concerns about the US approach to integrated deterrence, questioning its effectiveness of integrated deterrence against Russia, China, North Korea and Iran in the event of coordinated conflict against the US and its partners. Richard Fontaine, a former Senate Foreign Relations Committee member, argues that “the key to the success of this strategy hinges not only on collaboration with existing allies and partners but also acquiring new ones and making the ties among them stronger."[xiv] To enhance the effectiveness of an integrated approach toward deterring multiple adversaries at multiple fronts, the US has intensified its diplomatic and military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe.
In response to the shifting US deterrence posture, from traditional strategic deterrence to the integrated approach, the US is facing backlash from both Russia and China. President Putin of Russia has announced significant changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine strategy. This revised strategy includes nuclear retaliation against nuclear and non-nuclear adversaries in an attack on Russia by various means and non-necessarily nuclear ones.[xv] Western scholars argue that outlined changes in the existing 2020 Russian nuclear doctrine indicate Russia is increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to deter Western assistance to Ukraine.[xvi] While the Chinese foreign ministry criticized the US move, labelling it as a "primary source of nuclear threats and strategic risk in the world, shirking its obligation of nuclear disarmament and seeking absolute strategic predominance”.[xvii]
Sustaining the core principle of "integrated deterrence", which involves the integration of various means of power to deter multiple adversaries, requires high-stakes political communication among all stakeholders.[xviii]. However, this is increasingly challenging in the existing nuclear order. For instance, the strategic communication channels between Russia and the US are in a state of flux, creating significant mistrust between both countries. Meanwhile, China remains outside the primary negotiations regarding bilateral strategic arms reduction measures with the US, and there are transparency issues regarding China’s nuclear programme and posture that further complicating the fragile existing nuclear landscape.
Conclusion
The increasing multipolarity and the resurgence of great power competition have compelled the US to adopt a more integrative approach to its deterrence posture. The emergence of new warfare domains such as cyber, space, information and psychological operations has laid the groundwork for a new deterrence strategy. Additionally, advancements in new technologies such as robotics, artificial intelligence, quantum computing and drone warfare pose significant risks of weaponization of these technologies against US allies and partners.[xix] The foundation of the US approach to integrated deterrence is based upon two pillars: maintaining the high standards and sustainability of existing deterrence capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, and bolstering regional deterrence capabilities of allies and partners through diplomatic engagements and military cooperation. The ultimate goal of an integrated deterrence strategy is to prevent conflict with nuclear adversaries and ensure that the US deterrence architecture remains intact and strong against Russia and China, the other two nuclear superpowers vying for regional and global dominance.
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*Mrityunjay Goswami, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Sisson, M. S. (2022, May 1). COMMENTARY What is deterrence, and what is its role in U.S. national defense? Brookings. Retrieved October 1, 2024, from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-deterrence-and-what-is-its-role-in-u-s-national-defense/#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20military%20is%20often,or%20that%20violate%20international%20law.
[ii]Henry Kissinger, interview by Luce Edmund, ‘We are now living in a new era,' Financial Times, May 9, 2022, available at https://www.ft.com/content/cd88912d-506a41d4-b38f-0c37cb7f0e2f.
[iii] Garamone, Jim, ‘General Says Deterring Two 'Near Peer' Competitors is Complex,' D.O.D. News, August 17, 2023, available at https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3496656/.
[iv] Narang, V. (2024, August 1). Nuclear Threats and the Role of Allies: A Conversation with Acting Assistant Secretary Vipin Narang. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved August 25, 2024, from https://www.csis.org/analysis/nuclear-threats-and-role-allies-conversation-acting-assistant-secretary-vipin-narang.
[v] Hudson, Amy. 'Russia, China push STRATCOM to reconsider Strategic Deterrence,' Air & Space Force Magazine, October 21, 2020, available at https://www.airandspaceforces.com/russia-china-push-stratcom-to-reconsider-strategic-deterrence/.
[vi] Vergun, David, 'Officials Says Integrated Deterrence Key to National Defense Strategy,' D.O.D. News, December 6, 2022, available on https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3237769/official-says-integrated-deterrence-key-to-national-defense-strategy/#:~:text=Official%20Says%20Integrated%20Deterrence%20Key%20to%20National%20Defense%20Strategy,-Dec.&text=Integrated%20deterrence%20is%20important%20in,for%20strategy%2C%20plans%20and%20capabilities.
[vii] U.S. Department of Defense, ‘National Defense Strategy 2022’, October 27, 2022, available at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.
[viii] Ibid. p. 5.
[ix] Mount, Adam and Vaddi, Pranay, "An Integrated Approach to Deterrence Posture," ‘Federation of American Scientists,' December 5, 2020, available at https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/An-Integrated-Approach-to-Deterrence-Posture.pdf.
[x] Hoschig, Doreen and Adamopoulos, Nicholas, 'Conventional Nuclear Integration to Strengthen Deterrence,' October 4, 2023, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/conventional-nuclear-integration-strengthen-deterrence.
[xi] U.S. Department of Defense, 'National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 2022', October 27, 2022, p. 14, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/conventional-nuclear-integration-strengthen-deterrence.
[xii] Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Nuclear Posture Review 2018, Feb. 2018, available at https://dod.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx/.
[xiii] Pederson, Anna, and Akopin Michael, 'Sharper: Integrated Deterrence,' Centre for New American Security, January 11, 2023, available at https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/sharper-integrated-deterrence.
[xiv] Fontaine, Richards, 'Taking on China and Russia,' Foreign Affairs, November 18, 2022, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/taking-china-and-russia.
[xv] Remarks Kremlin, September 26, 2024, available at https://ddnews.gov.in/en/kremlin-says-changes-to-russias-nuclear-policy-are-a-signal-to-the-west/
[xvi] Williams, Heather, ‘ Why Russia is Changing Its Nuclear Doctrine Now’, CSIS, September 27, 2024, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-russia-changing-its-nuclear-doctrine-now
[xvii] Ning, Mao, Ministry Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs The People’s Republic of China, August 21, 2024, available at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202408/t20240821_11477550.html
[xviii] Collins, Liam and Beehner, Lionel, ‘Thomas Schelling’s Theories on Strategy and War', Modern War Institute, December 16, 2016, available at https://mwi.westpoint.edu/thomas-schellings-theories-strategy-war-will-live/
[xix] Wirtz, James and Larsen, Jeffrey, 'Wanted a strategy to integrate deterrence,' Defense & Security Analysis, August 2024, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/14751798.2024.2352943?needAccess=true.