Abstract: As Gabon marks the first anniversary of its military coup, the leadership of General Brice Oligui Nguema has been actively engaging with domestic and international stakeholders, setting him apart from other regional coup leaders. This paper examines whether Gabon’s political developments over the past year have positively impacted the socio-economic conditions of its citizens and assesses the country’s progress towards democratic governance.
A year after the military coup in Gabon, the country remains in a transition state. While the coup is considered a contagion effect of the broader instability affecting Sahelian Africa, Gabon’s unique circumstances and the interim government’s actions have shaped its trajectory. The interim President of Gabon, Brice Oligui Nguema, has promised to conduct elections by restoring civilian rule by 2025 without giving a schedule[i] while the previous President Ali Bongo recently declared his retirement from politics following his ouster last year[ii]. Therefore, understanding Gabon’s current milieu becomes essential, given its prospective influence on the Central African region.
In light of the first anniversary of the coup, this issue brief analyses the domestic developments and the evolving global push towards Gabon’s democratic restoration under one year of military rule, impacting the country’s scope of stability and order for the future.
Introduction
Gabon’s coup d’état was a watershed moment in the country’s political history as it ousted the erstwhile President Ali Bongo Ondimba of the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG), ending the Bongo regime. On succeeding his father, Albert Omar Bongo, in 2009, Ali Bongo was linked with issues surrounding election disputes that had resulted in political unrest and large-scale demonstrations. The country’s inflexion point came with the 2023 elections, when Ali Bongo won with 64.27% of the votes following the constitutional amendments, arranged in his favour. The military intervened, declared the results null and void, and took power.[iii] This military takeover was different from other coups in the Sahel concerned with insurgencies and internal security, as it ended the 56-year-old Bongo dynasty.
Post-military coup, President Bongo was put under house arrest while his family was put behind bars for “high treason.”[iv] General Brice Oligui Nguema, former head of the presidential guard, became the transitional leader after the televised appearance of a group of military soldiers, also known as the Committee of Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI), announcing the cancellation of Presidential elections, and dissolving the institutions of the Republic.
Ironically, General Nguema is the cousin of Ali Bongo, belonging to a similar family clan. He had established himself as Gabon’s legitimate Defence Minister in 2022[v] and was in charge of the President’s security as the commander of the Republican Guard. Yet, the announcement of the coup by the military was celebrated by the people of Gabon by coming to the streets of the capital, Libreville. This led the transitional government to make efforts towards the domestic development of the country.
Domestic Developments since the Military Coup
Per the World Bank, Gabon, with a population of 2.3 million, is Africa’s fifth largest producer and net exporter of oil, classified as an upper middle-income country.[vi] Yet, the poverty rates are unprecedented at 39.2%, given the massive levels of income inequality.[vii] In 2023, food inflation remained high, and public debt rose to 57.4% of the GDP, further burdening the living conditions of the people. In the August 2023 elections, the public revenues from high oil production were directed towards public spending, multiplying the budget deficit.[viii] Thus, the military coup let people feel liberated from their long-drawn disappointment with the Bongo regime of redirecting the wealth to people in power and leaving the majority of civilians in poverty, with the highest unemployment among 40% of the youth, given half of the population in Gabon is aged 15–24 years.[ix] This put several challenges in front of the transitional government concerning the improvement of the economy and the livelihood of people that were addressed by first implementing political adjustments in Gabon.
Political Developments
The transitional President, Brice Oligui Nguema, has proudly declared that it is a freedom coup for the Gabonese people that took place without any bloodshed.[x] Since the takeover, he introduced a Transition Charter in September 2023, governing Gabon-in-transition. It comprises five organs, including the President, the National Council of Transition, the Government of Transition, the Parliament of Transition and the Constitutional Court of Transition, replacing the old institutions that were complacent to the ruling party’s abuse of power, to restore the dignity of the people, guaranteeing them fundamental freedoms and the economically strengthened country.[xi] The new organs also comprise the civil society leaderships to mend the ills of the previous government by representing their opinions. In addition, women who were under-represented during the Bongo regime at 15% of the parliamentary seats are now represented at 24% in the transitional parliament.[xii]
The transitional government majorly comprises the opposition, such as Raymond Ndong Sima, the interim Prime Minister; Alexandre Barro Chambrier, the deputy Prime Minister and Paulette Missambo, the President of the Transitional Senate, who belongs to the opposition Alternance 2023 alliance. Interestingly, four members from the previous Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) government continue to hold their positions. Camélia Ntoutoume-Leclercq continues to be the Minister of National Education, while Hermann Immongault, formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs, currently serves as the Minister Delegate for the Interior. Raphaël Ngazouzé, who formerly managed vocational training, is now responsible for the Civil Service portfolio. Jean-François Ndongou, a former pro-Bongo official, is the speaker of the transitional national assembly under the military.[xiii] This is at odds with President Nguema’s contradictory actions, as he held the PDG, the previous ruling party, accountable for the nation’s institutional shortcomings. Nonetheless, no member of the transitional government is permitted to run in upcoming elections except the incumbent President, who, primus inter pares[xiv] has assumed authority to nominate or dismiss members of the transitional government.[xv]
Some opposition members refused to join the transitional government and remained independent, calling for democratic elections to be held as soon as possible. Albert Onda Ossa, representing the opposition Alternance 2023 group, ran against Bongo in the 2023 elections, winning 30.77% of the votes. He criticised numerous provisions of the transitional charter, including one that eliminates the post of Prime Minister, claiming that it would result in no accountability or limits on the President’s abuse of power. He also emphasised the importance of peaceful and lawful elections while advocating for equal opportunity for all, including the transitional members to contest elections.[xvi]
In April of this year, the transitional government held a national dialogue to provide recommendations on a new constitution, with 600 participants from the military, civil society, religious organisations and political parties. The National Development Plan of Transition was discussed, outlining five pillars: political and institutional reforms, strategic infrastructure, economic diversification, human capital and social inclusion, environmental sustainability and climate change resilience. However, some recommendations sparked controversy, such as banning political parties until new regulations were established, barring members of the ruling party from voting for three years, and extending the two-year transition promised by the military junta by 12 months due to unforeseen events. This caused the condemnation of the CTRI in the international community.[xvii] Regardless, the government continued its efforts towards the socio-economic transition of the country.
Socio-Economic Developments
The transitional government undertook several steps towards the development of the country. It put efforts into repaying the internal and external debts, correcting unrecorded receipts and expenditures from the previous government.[xviii] Alongside, it brought transparency to the budget, announced in December 2023. The CTRI also gave foreign investors greater autonomy by removing restrictions on their ability to buy undeveloped land in Gabon.[xix] This aligned well with the African Development Bank (AfDB) relaxing financial restrictions following the coup that was placed on Gabon during the Bongo regime. As a result, the AfDB has funded over 20 projects in sectors including infrastructure, health, education, energy and governance.[xx] This has proved beneficial for the country to receive loans and grants for local projects, amidst ongoing sanctions. In addition, Gabon’s first national airline, Fly Gabon, has been formed by nationalising Afrijet’s existing private airline, which is positioned well with Nguema’s commitment to building a national carrier for the country, aiming to boost aviation growth domestically and internationally, enhancing the route network and employment opportunities throughout Central Africa and beyond.[xxi]
The initiatives helped CTRI address the civilians’ needs by combating the growing cost of living, including the suspension of customs and taxes on construction materials, food essentials, cooking gas and domestic airline tickets.[xxii] For the Gabonese people, the transition thus seems to have provided them hope for peace and advancement.[xxiii]
One year down the line, the people of Gabon celebrated the first anniversary of the Liberation Coup. However, many are concerned about the restrictions imposed on their movements. Since August 30, 2023, the populace has eagerly awaited full curfew relaxation. Although the curfew has been loosened owing to the impact on the economy, especially on port and airport operations,[xxiv] people’s fundamental freedoms remain infringed. The curfew timings continue to hurt the nightlife venues, contributing to the economically burdened country. The citizens are also frustrated due to incessant inflation and unemployment combined with poor infrastructure and services, despite the government’s focus on diversification of the economy towards the non-oil sectors, given Gabon’s declining petroleum reserves.[xxv]
In addition, the people are critical of the leniency of the transitional President towards releasing former Bongo government officials accused of embezzling public funds.[xxvi] People are wary of Nguema’s leadership given their previous experience with authoritarianism during the Bongo government. The opposition accuses Nguema of employing propaganda to transform the country into a military dictatorship. Pelgie Marle Joselle Itsana, the head of the Pan African Movement for the Unity of Gabon People, has warned about the large troop concentration along major town streets, suggesting Nguema’s attempt to hold onto power.[xxvii] Notwithstanding the internal criticism, Nguema has managed to negotiate with the international community, maintaining an image of cautious optimism.
Regional and International Standing
Nguema’s gambit at the global level is notable, differing from its Sahelian counterparts, given the leader’s constant engagement with the global and regional community. Unlike the Sahelian states that quit the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and formed their own alliance, Gabon continues to engage with the key stakeholders that include the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the international community at large since the military coup. The presence of Nguema at the 79th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was significant as he addressed Gabon’s freedom coup while abiding by democratic values and holding elections next year.[xxviii]
Regional Response
The African Union (AU) has been directly engaging with Gabon’s transitional authorities, despite the fact that it has suspended the country’s membership until the constitutional order is restored.[xxix] AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) led an engagement with the military junta leader in Gabon as part of its field mission from 12 September to 14 September.[xxx]
The AU’s PSC, in particular, has two norms governing the countries in the region concerning peace and order — prohibition of “unconstitutional change in government” (UCG) by the military and forbidding the military (transitional authority) to contest elections post-coup. Violating the norms results in suspension under the AU’s standard operating procedure. However, given PSC’s exemption for Chad,[xxxi] which held its elections in violation of the two norms, it presents a similar opportunity for Gabon to get an exemption from the AU, giving the interim President enough autonomy to run in the elections next year.
The ECCAS, although condemned Gabon’s coup, suspending the country from its membership immediately, Nugema’s efforts resulted in the restoration of the country’s membership on March 9, 2024.[xxxii] A potential rationale contributing to this decision, perhaps, is the African Development Bank’s (AfDB's) eliminating financial restrictions, highlighting Gabon’s reputation and influence in the region. In addition, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra of the Central African Republic (CAR), one of the member states, has been consistently putting efforts into mediation between the ECCAS and Gabon’s transitional leadership.[xxxiii] However, the temporary relocation of the organisation’s headquarters from Libreville, Gabon, to Malabo, Equatorial Guinea post-coup, remains in place.[xxxiv]
Since the coup, Nguema has visited all ECCAS members with the exception of Angola. He has been engaging with the neighbours by carefully balancing his arguments, advocating for democracy and fair elections while appeasing the member nations led by the long-serving, authoritarian heads of state, who themselves have been coup-proofing their security since the Gabon coup.[xxxv] Other than ECCAS members, Nguema has also met leaders of other African countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).[xxxvi] This reflects Nguma’s efforts towards regional reintegration since he has been able to convince his neighbours to adopt positive reciprocity, albeit their discomfort with a President’s guard (Nguema) for seizing power through a coup.[xxxvii]
International Response
France, Gabon’s former colonial ruler, has regarded Nguema differently from other Sahel-based coup Presidents. Despite condemning the coup, it did not impose sanctions on the government. Both countries have been amicable under Nguema's leadership.[xxxviii] France is engaging with Nguema by leveraging on the situation in Gabon, as the previous Bongo leadership had been actively strengthening contacts with other players, such as Russia and China in recent years to counter France’s influence. Post-coup, French President Emmanuel Macron and Nguema met in Dubai to attend Conference of Parties (COP) 28 in December 2023.[xxxix] In addition, the France-Gabon Economic Forum was successfully held in May 2024, which ended with signing more than 739 billion FCFA to be partially utilised for financing Gabon’s National Transitional Development Plan. This also led to an ongoing economic engagement between Airbus, a French company, and Fly Gabon in recent times for a partnership to make Gabon’s airline international.[xl] The forum proved symbolic amidst the scenario where West African states are increasingly opting to take a break from France, and Gabon has decided to continue its relations.[xli]
The United States, which initially paused financial assistance to Gabon under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), condemning the military coup, has recently announced $5 million in aid of Gabon’s transition to democratic governance.[xlii] China, which had responded to the coup, calling for peaceful settlement of differences through dialogue per the fundamental interests of the people,[xliii] has continued its business with Gabon as usual. The recent forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 2024 witnessed the presence of Nguema, signing bilateral agreements with China concerning Gabon’s economic development.[xliv] India, which had acknowledged the coup as a major event in Gabon’s history,[xlv] continues to engage with a significant increase in its imports from the country by 68.6% since last year.[xlvi] The resumption of business between the global community and Gabon, unlike other coup states, reflects the swiftness of the transitional leadership that worked its way towards normalcy in diplomacy.
Conclusion
One year since the military takeover in Gabon, General Brice Oligui Nguema’s leadership has garnered mixed domestic reactions. While he has enjoyed popular support, the possibility of Nguema contesting the upcoming elections remains uncertain. This concerns the populace about his potential to establish a dictatorship. Internationally, Nguema has successfully shifted global perceptions from condemnation to cautious optimism through engagement, positioning himself as a potential champion of democracy, unlike other coup leaders in the neighbourhood.
Given the unique experience and trajectory of Africa with democracy and state formation, and the history of military coups, Gabon’s experience could serve as a template for neighbouring Central African countries, demonstrating that sometimes military interventions can paradoxically lead to positive outcomes when sought to be combined with a commitment to democratic principles and regional and international engagement. By ousting corrupt leaders and fostering democratic governance, these nations can improve the lives of their citizens and contribute to regional stability. Notwithstanding, the future satisfaction of Gabonese citizens remains to be seen and depends upon the post-election landscape and the actions of the subsequent leadership.
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*Nandini Khandelwal, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes:
[i] AfricaNews. “Gabon: Brice Oligui Nguema Promises to Return Power to Civilians.” Africanews, September 4, 2023,https://www.africanews.com/2023/09/05/gabon-brice-oligui-nguema-promises-to-return-power-to-civilians//.
[ii] Njie, Paul. Muia, Wycliffe “Ali Bongo Quits Gabon Politics, Calls for Wife’s Release.” bbc.com, September 19, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gqw34463wo.
[iii] Obangome, Gerauds Wilfried. “Gabon Officers Declare Military Coup, President Ali Bongo Detained.” Reuters, August 30, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabonese-military-officers-announce-they-have-seized-power-2023-08-30/.
[iv] AfricaNews. “Gabon: President Ali Bongo under House Arrest, according to Military Putschists.” Africanews, August 30, 2023, https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/30/gabon-president-ali-bongo-under-house-arrest-according-to-military-putschists//.
[v] Anne-Sophie Laborieux. “Le Coup d’État Parfait: Comment Le Général Oligui a Dupé Tout Un Régime.” Gabonreview.com | Actualité Du Gabon|, August 27, 2024, https://www.gabonreview.com/paru-sur-le-gabon-le-coup-detat-parfait-comment-le-general-oligui-a-dupe-tout-un-regime/.
[vi] “Gabon - ISS African Futures.” Futures.issafrica.org. https://futures.issafrica.org/geographic/countries/gabon/.
[vii] Donmez, Umit. “Resource-Rich Gabon Fails to Share Wealth with Public.” Www.aa.com.tr, September 4, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/resource-rich-gabon-fails-to-share-wealth-with-public/2982976.
[viii] World Bank. “The World Bank in Gabon.” World Bank, March 28, 2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gabon/overview.
[ix] Sharma, Mukul. “After Niger, This Is Why Coup in Gabon Is Receiving Public Support.” WION, August 30, 2023, https://www.wionews.com/world/explained-after-niger-this-is-why-coup-in-gabon-is-receiving-public-support-630612.
[x] Christophe Châtelot. “After the Coup in Gabon, the Transition of Power Is in Search of Balance.” Le Monde.fr, September 17, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/09/17/after-the-coup-in-gabon-the-transition-of-power-is-in-search-of-balance_6136789_124.html.
[xi] “Goals of the CTRI,” Ctri-gabon.com. 2024, http://ctri-gabon.com/Goals.html.
[xii] “Gabon: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report,” Freedom House, 2024, https://freedomhouse.org/country/gabon/freedom-world/2024.
[xiii] AfricaNews. “Gabon: PM Unveils Transitional Government Officials.” Africanews, September 10, 2023, https://www.africanews.com/2023/09/10/gabon-pm-unveils-transitional-government-officials//.
[xiv] Primus inter pares means “first among equals.”
[xv] Ibid.
[xvi] Béatrice Longmene Kaze. “François Ndong Obiang: Le Pays Devrait Quitter La Transition Actuelle Avec Une Élection Pacifique.” Afrique Chronique, June 24, 2024, https://afriquechronique.com/en/francois-ndong-obiang-the-country-should-leave-the-current-transition-with-a-peaceful-election/.
[xvii] Kindzeka, Moki Edwin. “Gabon Opens National Dialogue to Bring Country back to Civilian Rule.” Voice of America, April 2, 2024. https://www.voanews.com/a/gabon-opens-national-dialogue-to-bring-country-back-to-civilian-rule/7553797.html.
[xviii] Dept., International Monetary Fund African. “Gabon: 2024 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Gabon.” IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, no. 144, May 31, 2024, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400277801.002.A001.
[xix] “Gabon - United States Department of State,” United States Department of State, July 17, 2024. https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-investment-climate-statements/gabon/.
[xx] “Gabon’s Economic Prospects Brighten after Sanctions Lifted,” venturesafrica.com, https://venturesafrica.com/gabons-economic-prospects-brighten-after-sanctions-lifted/.
[xxi] “Gabon’s National Airline Fly Gabon Begins Operations, Boosting Aviation Growth - Travel and Tour World,” Travel And Tour World, September 6, 2024, https://www.travelandtourworld.com/news/article/gabons-national-airline-fly-gabon-begins-operations-boosting-aviation-growth/.
[xxii] Op.cit. xix. US Department of State.
[xxiii] “Le Coup d’État Du 30 Août 2023: Son Impact et Ses Perspectives Un an Après,” Gabonreview.com | Actualité Du Gabon |,” September 1, 2024. https://www.gabonreview.com/tribune-le-coup-detat-du-30-aout-2023-son-impact-et-ses-perspectives-un-apres/.
[xxiv] AfricaNews. “Gabon: Curfew Maintained but Relaxed.” Africanews, September 28, 2023, https://www.africanews.com/2023/09/29/gabon-curfew-maintained-but-relaxed//.
[xxv] Op.cit. xix. US Department of State.
[xxvi] Op.cit.Christophe.
[xxvii] Moki Edwin Kindzeka. “Gabon Approaches First Anniversary of Coup; Leader’s Plans Questioned.” Voice of America, August 15, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/gabon-approaches-first-anniversary-of-coup-leader-plans-questioned/7744268.html.
[xxviii] “Gabon - President Addresses General Debate, 79th Session,” UN Web TV, September 26, 2024, https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k15/k154rd2pqo.
[xxix] Jazeera, Al. “African Union Suspends Gabon’s Membership after Military Coup.” Al Jazeera, August 31, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/31/african-union-meets-on-gabon-situation-after-military-coup.
[xxx] Tchioffo Kodjo. “Press Release: Cameroon Assumes Chairship of the AU Peace and Security Council for September 2024” African Union, Peace and Security Department, 2024, https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/press-release-cameroon-assumes-chairship-of-the-au-peace-and-security-council-for-september-2024.
[xxxi] “Coups: Why the AU Acted Tough on Mali but Ignored Chad.” Africanews, June 2, 2021. https://www.africanews.com/2021/06/02/coups-why-the-au-acted-tough-on-mali-but-ignored-chad//.
[xxxii] Reuters. “Central African Bloc Lifts Gabon Sanctions.” reuters.com, March 10, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/central-african-bloc-lifts-gabon-sanctions-2024-03-10/.
[xxxiii] Lucien Koffi, Omar. “Gabon: What Will the National Dialogue Be Used For?” afriquechronique, May 20, 2024, https://afriquechronique.com/en/Gabon-what-will-the-national-dialogue-be-used-for%3F/.
[xxxiv] Tasamba, James. “Central African Bloc Suspends Gabon’s Membership after Coup.” Aa.com.tr, September 5, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/central-african-bloc-suspends-gabons-membership-after-coup/2983505.
[xxxv] Dent, Alexandra. “Gabon’s Balancing Act,” www.cfr.org, January 25, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/blog/gabons-balancing-act.
[xxxvi] “New Gabon President Gets Show of Support in Congo Trip,” Voice of America, October 1, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/new-gabon-president-gets-show-of-support-in-congo-trip/7292455.html.
[xxxvii] AfricaNews. “Central African States Uphold Gabon’s Suspension after Army Coup.” Africanews, December 16, 2023, https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/16/central-african-states-uphold-gabons-suspension-after-army-coup//.
[xxxviii] Kane, Coumba. “France-Gabon: General Oligui Nguema, a Putschist Friend in Paris.” Le Monde.fr, May 28, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/05/28/france-gabon-general-oligui-nguema-a-putschist-friend-in-paris_6672952_124.html.
[xxxix] Ibid.
[xl] Modérateur. “Airbus Wants to Equip FlyGabon with a Long-Haul Aircraft to Serve Paris.” Gabonactu.com, October 3, 2024, https://gabonactu.com/blog/2024/10/03/airbus-veut-doter-flygabon-dun-avion-long-courrier-pour-desservir-paris/.
[xli] “Gabon-France Economic Forum: Several Agreements Signed for an Amount of More than 739 Billion FCFA,” Africa24 TV, May 31, 2024, https://africa24tv.com/gabon-france-economic-forum-several-agreements-signed-for-an-amount-of-more-than-739-billion-fcfa.
[xlii] U.S. Embassy Libreville. “The United States Announces New Efforts to Support Democratic Governance in Gabon.” U.S. Embassy in Gabon, October 4, 2024, https://ga.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-announces-new-efforts-to-support-democratic-governance-in-gabon/.
[xliii] Aghogho Udi. “France, Russia, China and Others React to Coup in Gabon.” Nairametrics, August 30, 2023. https://nairametrics.com/2023/08/30/france-russia-china-and-others-react-to-coup-in-gabon/.
[xliv] CGTN. “President Xi Jinping Says Ready to Carry Forward Traditional China-Gabon Friendship.” Cgtn.com, September 4, 2024. https://news.cgtn.com/news/2024-09-04/Chinese-Gabonese-leaders-meet-in-Beijing-1wCJxITRsQM/p.html?mkt_tok=ODEzLVhZVS00MjIAAAGVqmpJLWZzE2MUv4pgsb6j-JhXZETdBlhDJxLie1wyyZ2dkX8KDvyAMulH3_aJ2IHA-7UJWhCHUAzmHLREPjEpj9hBO9IZ0VAlehqAU54jKY6j.
[xlv] “India-Republic of Gabon Relations Overview.” Mea.gov.in, September 2023. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Gabon.pdf.
[xlvi] The Observatory of Economic Complexity. “India (IND) and Gabon (GAB) Trade | the Observatory of Economic Complexity,” July 2024. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/ind/partner/gab.