Indian Council of World Affairs

In the first week of December, Kenya’s President William Ruto paid a high-level visit to New Delhi. The Kenyan delegation included Cabinet Secretaries, senior Government officials and private sector representatives. During the visit, Kenya joined the International Solar Alliance (ISA) as well as Global Bio-fuels Alliance (GBA).[1] Signalling the further deepening of bilateral ties, India agreed to increase the ICCR scholarships for Kenya from 48 to 80. India will also provide training to 20 Kenyan scientists in space technology and application through ISRO.[2] India will extend $ 250 million line of credit for modernization of Kenya’s agriculture sector.[3] However, the most important and interesting developments have been witnessed in the defence and security domain.

Both countries seek to expand training exchanges, including deputation of Indian experts, in Kenyan defence institutions. India and Kenya are keen to increase cooperation across traditional and non-traditional security sectors such as the defence production, intelligence sharing, and joint efforts in areas of counterterrorism, cyber security, and anti-money laundering, small arms and light weapons, drugs, and human trafficking.[4] Recently, a Memorandum of Undertaking (MoU) was signed between Goa Shipyard Ltd and Kenya Shipyard Ltd. It is expected to result in mutually beneficial commercial ventures and support Kenyan interest in developing shipbuilding, repair, and maintenance facilities.[5] Underlining the importance of maritime security, both sides have specifically mentioned it as a priority area in the joint statement. New Delhi and Nairobi are expanding maritime co-operation through developing a bilateral framework for Blue Economy, enhancing maritime domain awareness, and sharing white shipping information. Additionally, both sides took a significant step in increasing their maritime co-operation by unveiling a Joint Vision Statement on maritime security co-operation in the Indian Ocean.[6]    

The article first looks at the context in which India-Kenya defence and security co-operation is taking place and then focuses on the joint vision statement issued by both sides about the maritime security co-operation in the Indian Ocean.  

The Context 

India and Kenya enjoy a long-standing defence relationship, primarily in the form of training, capacity-building and regular port visits by the Indian Navy vessels. During Ruto’s visit, both sides decided to issue a ‘Joint Vision Statement on Maritime Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region – “BAHARI”’. India has rarely issued such joint vision statements about the Indian Ocean region (IOR). New Delhi has always been careful while choosing partners with whom it would issue such statements. A degree of shared outlook towards the IOR, mutual trust and comfort level along with the necessary capabilities are imperative for putting out such statements. India has been mindful of the responses such statements would generate from the regional countries. There are two notable instances in the past when New Delhi issued such statements: with the United States in 2015 and with France in 2018. Both these countries are India’s close strategic partners, are key players in the Indian Ocean geopolitics and share convergence with India about the evolving security dynamics in the IOR.   

Issuing a statement with Kenya is a signal that India-Kenya strategic partnership has reached a comfort level and that both sides are keen to elevate the partnership. The statement is also indicative of the fact that Kenya is diversifying its foreign policy partners. Kenya has long been seen as a country with a very high level of Chinese influence. It stemmed from the fact that Kenya built a slew of infrastructure projects (Nairobi-Mombasa railway line, Lamu port etc.) with Chinese funding.[7] There have been concerns about the extent of Kenyan debt and its dependence on China.[8] The issuing of a joint vision statement with India is perhaps an indication from Kenya, to its friends, adversaries, and strategic partners, that it is exercising its strategic autonomy and is not in the Chinese orbit of influence as was sometimes made out to be.       

The Statement 

The Joint Vision Statement is called ‘Bahari’ which means Ocean in Swahili language. It appears that the insertion of a Swahili language word in the title is at the behest of the Kenyan side and shows how India is willing to accommodate the priorities of its partners. India and Kenya are bound together by ‘timeless linkages and bonds of geography, history, trade, and people-to-people ties’.[9] The statement and deepening engagement seek to build on these linkages. 

The statement begins by noting that India and Kenya are ‘maritime neighbours’ as well as are ‘sea-faring nations’.[10] This framing serves two purposes – first, it positions India firmly in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) and secondly, by alluding to these two countries being the sea-faring nations, places them as key stakeholders in the Indian Ocean affairs. The statement further observes that security and prosperity of both countries is linked with the Indian Ocean and that both share ‘commonality of views on issues of mutual concern’.[11] The vision statement builds on India’s SAGAR Vision and Kenya’s Vision 2030. 

There are six broad pillars in the statement: boosting maritime trade and industry, advancing maritime security, harnessing blue economy potential, accelerating connectivity, reinforcing capacity development, and improving information sharing. It is imperative to consider each of these six pillars in some detail. 

India and Kenya are located in the WIO and the region is emerging as a key artery for global maritime trade. The WIO region connects the Indo-Pacific with Europe and India and Kenya hold significant stakes not just in the trade passing through the region but also in increasing trading linkages between the two countries. Both countries also agreed to co-operate in co-production of defence equipment such as maritime surveillance equipment, offshore patrol vessels, and fast attack crafts that will boost Kenya’s maritime security capabilities.[12]

Such efforts are closely linked with the next pillar: maritime security. WIO is afflicted by non-traditional security threats like unlawful maritime activities, piracy and armed robbery, maritime terrorism, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, irregular human migration, contraband smuggling etc.[13] There are emerging threats in the maritime domain. Therefore, both countries would seek to co-operate in tackling these and other challenges. While developing a comprehensive approach to the bilateral defence collaboration, India and Kenya have also brought-in activities like Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, ship visits and joint exercises that will augment interoperability, within the ambit of co-operation. Both countries would also ‘promote stability, security, and cooperation in the Indian Ocean, and strengthen existing mechanisms’ by participating in ‘regular dialogues, meetings, information sharing networks’.[14] In this context, the role of Djibouti Code of Conduct-Jeddah Amendment (DCOC-JA) and Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activity (CGIMA) is critical.  

India and Kenya are developing countries and therefore, harnessing the potential of the Blue Economy would go a long way in addressing their development challenges. The statement notes that development of the Blue Economy will result in employment generation, help in combating climate change and in ensuring protection of environment and natural resources. The key focus areas for Blue Economy cooperation would be sectors such as fisheries, aquaculture, renewable energy, and marine biotechnology.[15] The effort will be geared to promote sustainable development while conserving marine resources. 

Underlining the role of oceans as connectors and maritime highways, the joint vision emphasises collaboration for improving connectivity links to foster greater business-to-business ties, tourism, and trade. To enable Kenya to achieve goals mentioned in the joint statement, India agreed to extend assistance to bolster Kenya’s capabilities. It includes support in the form of ‘capacity-building and collaboration in oceanography; ship designing and construction; dredging; welding; fisheries; port development’.[16] Furthermore, India and Kenya would like to foster institutional linkages between think-tanks and academic institutions focusing on maritime subjects. 

The final pillar of maritime cooperation is the imperative of sharing information. To that end, the role of Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram will be important. IFC-IOR already hosts liaison officers from key stakeholders and keeping with this practice, Kenya being the member of DCOC-JA, India offered to host a liaison officer from DCOC-JA. India would also deploy a naval officer to the Kenya Navy Training College (KNTC) in 2024.[17] The purpose is to exchange best practices for developing a broader outlook towards the security of the east coast of Africa.     

The statement concludes by observing that the two sides will establish new institutional mechanisms including the staff level talks between the Naval forces of the two countries.  Moreover, the focus will be to expedite ‘progress on projects, MoUs and initiatives flowing from this Joint Vision -BAHARI in accordance with their respective laws’.[18]

India and Kenya in the Western Indian Ocean

The Joint Vision Statement is notable for highlighting practical areas of co-operation between the two sides in the WIO. Both countries seek to ensure security, stability, and prosperity in the WIO and for this purpose, are working together and with other partners. India is enhancing engagements with other WIO countries as well like Tanzania, Mozambique, Seychelles, and Mauritius. The Indian naval footprint in the WIO is growing steadily.[19] For Kenya, building capabilities for tackling a range of threats in the maritime domain is a priority. The vision statement has clearly indicated ways and means to increase Kenya’s maritime security capabilities. The challenge will be to deliver on the promises and sustain the momentum.    

In the last few weeks, the global attention has been fixated on the Northwest Indian Ocean. Houthi rebels in Yemen, acting in support of Hamas and Palestine, have succeeded in instilling fear in the hearts and minds of global shipping companies. The threat of constant drone attacks as well as piracy and hostage-taking looms large in the waters of the Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea. Many global shipping companies including Maersk, Hapag Lloyd, and MSC have decided to not use the Red Sea.[20]  

For Kenya (and other WIO states), such a development brings risks as well as opportunities. As global shipping routes shift southwards to the Mozambique Channel and Cape of Good Hope, maritime security along the East and Southern African coast becomes a key factor. The capabilities of coastal states to handle the increased shipping volumes will be severely tested. On the other hand, for Kenya and other states, it is an opportunity to modernize ports and related infrastructure. If the threat of piracy re-surfaces along the East African coast, Kenya will not remain unaffected as Kenya is a neighbour of Somalia and has a fraught history with its northern neighbour. 

Conclusion 

India and Kenya have been key WIO states. India is a major IOR player whereas Kenya is a regional power in East Africa. Both hold considerable interests in the WIO. Over the years, they have been connected through the bonds of history, people-to-people ties, English language and trade. Both countries are seeking to expand their strategic partnership. President Ruto’s current visit was important in this regard.   

The unveiling of a Joint Vision Statement for maritime cooperation in the IOR is a significant development in India-Kenya strategic relationship. The statement identifies key interests, priorities, and focus-areas for both countries. The statement takes a holistic view of India-Kenya maritime security partnership, the wider regional and institutional context, and links development with security. It identifies six key pillars for cooperation ranging from maritime trade and industry to maritime security, connectivity, and Blue Economy. Finally, the notable exception from the vision statement is that of ‘Indo-Pacific’. Given the strategic connotations and political sensitivities associated with the term, especially in the smaller and developing countries of the IOR, it is understandable why the vision statement does not mention ‘Indo-Pacific’.      

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(Author Bio: Sankalp Gurjar is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Udupi, India. Prior to that, he worked as a Research Fellow with the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. He writes on Great Power Politics, Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region and Indo-Pacific security.)

References:

[1] Ministry of External Affairs, “List of Outcomes: State visit of H.E. Dr. William Samoei Ruto President of the Republic of Kenya to India”, December 5, 2023. Available at: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37339/List_of_Outcomes__State_visit_of_HE_Dr_William_Samoei_Ruto__President_of_the_Republic_of__Kenya_to_India (Accessed on December 23, 2023)

[2] Ibid

[3] Ibid

[4] Ministry of External Affairs, “Joint Statement during the State Visit of the President of Kenya to India (December 04-06, 2023)”, December 5, 2023. Available at: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37340/Joint_Statement_during_the_State_Visit_of_the_President_of_Kenya_to_India_December_0406_2023 (Accessed on December 23, 2023) 

[5] Ibid

[6] Ibid

[7] Sankalp Gurjar, “Geopolitics of the Western Indian Ocean: Unravelling China’s Multi-dimensional Presence”, Strategic Analysis, 43(5), 2019, pp. 385-401.

[8] ANI, “China May Seize Kenyan Assets Amid Mounting Debts: Report”, NDTV, October 22, 2022. Available at: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/china-may-seize-kenyan-assets-amid-mounting-debts-report-3455850 (Accessed on December 23, 2023)

[9] Ministry of External Affairs, “India- Kenya Joint Vision Statement on Maritime Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region – “BAHARI””, December 5, 2023. Available at: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37341/India_Kenya_Joint_Vision_Statement_on_Maritime_Cooperation_in_the_Indian_Ocean_Region__BAHARI (Accessed on December 23, 2023)

[10] Ibid

[11] Ibid

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid

[14] Ibid

[15] Ibid

[16] Ibid

[17] Ibid

[18] Ibid

[19] Sankalp Gurjar, “Expanding Arc of India’s Defence Diplomacy: From the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Guinea”, Journal of Defence Studies, 17 (3), 2023, pp. 63-86.

[20]   Hung Tran, “What attacks in the Red Sea could mean for the global economy”, Atlantic Council, December 18, 2023. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/shipping-disrupted-by-attacks-in-the-red-sea/ (Accessed on December 23, 2023)