Indian Council of World Affairs

After Xi Jinping got elected as General Secretary of Communist Party of China (CCP) in 2012 and as President of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2013, one of the major emphasis has been on bringing reforms inside People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Since then, there have been remarkable developments arising from China’s rise in the international arena. Xi has strengthened his personal hold over the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the CCP over these years. China's growing expansionism in the region and beyond with an aggressive posture throughout the South China Sea (SCS) and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) have raised concerns.

This paper aims to point out the major decisions and reforms undertaken by the Xi Jinping which have prompted the PLA to modernise itself.

PLA Modernisation under Xi Jinping

Over the past 10 years, Xi has spearheaded the PLA's modernization and reform agenda with the aim of elevating the organization to a position of global influence. 

In last one decade, China's increasing defence spending shows the level of importance Xi Jinping attaches to PLA and its role in the global military order. China's defense budget grew by 71% over the course of ten years, from $131 billion in 2013 to $224 billion in 2023.[i] Since the beginning, Xi Jinping has emphasized that greater efforts are needed for military modernization and integration of technology in order to satisfy demands for national security.[ii] Although the PLA is still far behind the US in terms of technological integration and force projection but with its rapid modernization and growth, this huge gap is closing.[iii] Nevertheless, the growth of PLA has alarmed the US and the western powers, as this erodes the military edge that the US has had since the end of the Cold War.

Sourced out/Credit - https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-vs-china-a-tale-of-two-defence-budgets/articleshow/98498491.cms

Over the past few years, the PLA has carefully crafted its objectives and plans to align with the aspirations set forth in the “China’s National Defense Strategy", also known as “Defence White Paper”. China started releasing Defense White Papers from 1998 and has continued to do so every alternate year. 

The first White Paper published during the Xi Jinping Tenure was in 2015, and the second one came in 2019. The 2015 and 2019 Defence White Papers released under Xi Jinping tenure have significantly changed the face of the PLA modernisation and its War Planning Strategies. The 2015 and 2019 documents are more significant as they include a clear picture for the PLA modernization goals and ambitions. The papers released under Xi Jinping demonstrate the seriousness to seek a broader global role for the PLA. 

The 2015 Paper, titled China’s Military Strategy[iv], makes an argument for the integration of dual-use technology, which means adoption of technology used both across military and civilian domains. This paper also describes the role of “Informationized Warfare” as the potential tool for fighting a complex war. Xi Jinping has persisted in prioritizing military development and has connected it to his defining vision often called the "China Dream" for a modern, powerful, and affluent nation.[v]

The latest Defence White Paper, titled "China's National Defense in the New Era", released in 2019, focuses on advancing the reforms described in the 2015 paper. The 2019 paper even calls for promoting science and technology development and strengthening the use of innovative technologies in line with the "Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese characteristics"[1].[vi] It also discusses the current governance and management structures of the PLA, including the advancements made in strengthening party building, modernizing joint operations command systems, reorganizing leadership and new command systems, and changing military institutions.[vii]

Overall, it appears that during the last three years, the PLA has gradually transformed into a more professional organization that has changed its modus-operandi and the goals it seeks to achieve in wars and conflict.

China Dream and the PLA

The PLA’s strengthened role in China’s diplomacy is amplified by the modernisation of the armed forces themselves. In his "China dream" argument, Xi Jinping has always described his "dream of strong armed forces". In 2017, Xi Jinping at his 19th Party Congress speech set out three overarching objectives for the PLA:

(1) Mechanizing the PLA;

(2) Completing China's military modernization process by 2035; and

(3) Developing the PLA as a "world-class" force by 2049, when PRC's completes its centennial year.[viii]

Since taking office, Xi Jinping has also insisted that PLA should become more "joint", or capable of coordinating quickly and effectively with all branches of PLA or armed forces, in order to be ready for complicated conflict.

Further, in 2018, during his address to the PLA, Xi Jinping ordered that PLA’s combat preparedness must be raised to the status of strategic priority. This implied that the military goals outlined in the 2015 document as well as the three objectives outlined by Xi Jinping in 2017 had to be fulfilled in order to realize the "China Dream" by 2049. The PLA will lead the "China Dream" and protect Chinese nationals, property, and interests overseas undertaken through the ambitious One Belt One Road (OBOR).[ix]

These significant shifts also brought about other notable developments, such as the newly unified Western Theatre Command. The PLA's structural changes, which include replacing Military Regions (MRs) with Theatre Commands (TCs), serve as the cornerstone of the PLA modernisation efforts.[x] Among the five theatre commands that have been set up, the Western TC has been responsible for managing offensive and defensive campaigns which involves using mountains, high elevations, and other mobilisation activities along the boundary between India and China.[xi]

PLA at threshold of Xi’s Anti-Corruption Campaign

Since coming to office, Xi has made PLA one of the main targets for his anti-corruption campaign. He has made significant changes to the military in an effort to regain control over a force which he believed had started to deteriorate and gone beyond the Communist Party's obedience.

The initial course of action began in 2014 with the removal of two former Vice-Chairs of the CMC, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, on corruption charges.[xii] Xi has reorganized party organs in the military, moved military vigilance divisions like the audit bureau and the discipline inspection commission directly to the CMC, and created a set of regulations meant to limit commander’s room for corruption.[xiii] Most significantly, he has elevated the CMC Chair's authority and enshrined those modifications in the Communist Party Charter, consolidating command over the armed forces into his own hands. Because Xi Jinping wants a clean and obedient PLA for the CCP, he has a reputation for taking a strong stance against corruption in both civilian and military bureaucracies.[xiv]  

In the process, Xi has launched a new campaign to uphold party discipline and eradicate corruption. Xi has instructed PLA chiefs to "concentrate on resolving the notable issues that continue at party organizations on all levels with regard to upholding the party's absolute leadership over the military".[xv]

Xi Jinping more recently ordered an investigation into corruption in equipment procured nearly six years and asked for the creation of an "early warning mechanism for integrity risks in the military".[xvi] As a result, the Rocket Force of the PLA[2], which is in charge of the country's conventional and nuclear missile arsenals, has increased its efforts to enforce party discipline, and a few of its top officials have gone missing from the public eye.[xvii] This indicates that an inquiry is already under progress.

The main anti-graft agency, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), has been also looking into the allegations of corruption against Commander Li Yuchao and his deputies, Zhang Zhenzhong and Liu Guangbin.[xviii] A number of PLA officers, both past and current, have been removed for such alleged case of corruption. The recent disappearance of Defense Minister, Li Shangfu, is also reportedly under investigation for the same reason.[xix] Li Shangfu probably made some unscrupulous decisions when it came to buying military equipments because of his prior connection with the PLA's General Armament Department.[xx] Li Yuchao and his subordinate Liu were among the PLA Rocket Force officials who have been the focus of an investigation, both past and current. The detention and arrest of lower-level personnel associated with the Rocket Force in late 2017 suggested a more thorough probe. It is common for higher ranking officials to be detained for corruption months after investigations against lower ranking ones.

In early June this year, the CCDI announced that more than 42 senior military and political cadres had been arrested in last one year which shows the extent of the Anti-corruption drive underway.[xxi] Since 2012, nearly 5 million lower-level officials as well as thousands of higher-level “tigers” have been sacked from larger bureaucracy comprising of both high ranking and low ranking government/Party Officials.[xxii]

However, it remains unclear whether Xi Jinping’s renewed focus on the military was prompted by a particular case or bigger concerns over political loyalty. The recent crackdown inside Rocket Force shows the level of importance for Xi Jinping for his commitment to a corruption-free PLA. In 2019 case even, General Fang Fenghui, China’s former chief of military staff, and General Zhang Yang, director of the military's political department, both top-ranking officials, disappeared from public view.[xxiii] The actual cause of this internal strife is still unknown but is largely considered to be related to corruption charges.

Concluding Observations 

Over the last couple of years, China has demonstrated its military power, and under Xi's leadership, there has been consistent impetus to make PLA a loyal force aligned with the goals and ambitions of the party. Because of this, Xi Jinping’s increasing influence over the PLA has given him the freedom to focus on modernizing the PLA and making it an organization devoid of corruption. However, the bigger picture still centers on whether or not Xi has succeeded in his goals. The persistent displacements of PLA commanders and other high ranking officials may have resulted in uncertainty and instability in combat structures and is perhaps the main point of contention in PLA reform which otherwise points towards strengthening and modernization of the forces in line with Xi’s China dream and China’s growing aggressiveness in the region and beyond. While Xi Jinping's efforts to combat corruption in the PLA's higher echelons demonstrate his ability to adapt, his degree of confidence with PLA Commanders remains a concern, and his management of it will be tested eventually.

 ***

 
*Om Ranjan, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes:

[1] Chinese strategists often use this term called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which they claim, it offers a ‘historic opportunity’ to alter the military balance with the United States. Key dimensions to China's RMA include use of kinetic and information attacks.

[2] The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), formerly called as Second Artillery Corps, is the strategic and tactical missile force of the People's Republic of China. It was renamed as the PLA Rocket Force on 1^st January 2016. The PLARF is the 4th branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and controls China's arsenal of land-based ballistic, hypersonic, cruise missiles—both nuclear and conventional.

[i] Online, E. (2023, March 8). India vs China: A tale of two defence budgets. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-vs-china-a-tale-of-two-defence-budgets/articleshow/98498491.cms

[ii] China’s Xi says necessary to speed up modernization of national security system. (2023, May 30). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-says-necessary-speed-up-modernization-national-security-system-2023-05-30/

[iii] Maizland, L. (2020, February 5). China’s Modernizing Military. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military

[iv] China’s Military Strategy (full text). (2015, May 27). https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm

[v] Xi Jinping and the “Chinese Dream” on JSTOR. (n.d.). www.jstor.org. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23528539

[vi] NEWMYER. (2010, August). The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics. Tandfonline.com. Retrieved November 21, 2023, from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/01402390.2010.489706?needAccess=true

[vii] Full Text: China’s National Defense in the New Era. (n.d.). https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

[viii] Desai, S. (2023, August 5). PLA at 96: A new phase of continued military reforms. ORF. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pla-at-96/

[ix] How Far Will China Go to Achieve Its Military Goals for the 2049 ‘China Dream’? (n.d.). The Wire. https://thewire.in/external-affairs/how-far-will-china-go-to-achieve-its-military-goals-for-the-2049-china-dream

[x] Saxena, A. (2023, July 31). Remembering Galwan and the China Challenge: Capabilities of the PLA Western Theatre Command. WION. https://www.wionews.com/opinions-blogs/china-challenge-comparative-capabilities-of-the-pla-western-theatre-command-604346

[xi] Team, W. W. (2023, July 31). Chinas Xi examines Western Theatre Command with focus on air defence. WION. https://www.wionews.com/world/chinas-xi-visits-western-theatre-command-with-focus-on-air-defence-621021

[xii] Former top China military official “took huge bribes.” (2016, April 5). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35970863

[xiii] China: PLA�s Restructured Central Military Commission (CMC) Takes Shape. (n.d.). Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS). https://archive.claws.in/1507/china-plas-restructured-central-military-commission-cmc-takes-shape-v-mahalingam.html

[xiv] A. (2023, October 25). Loyalty above all: Removal of top Chinese officials seen as enforcing Xi’s demand for obedience. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/loyalty-above-all-removal-of-top-chinese-officials-seen-as-enforcing-xis-demand-for-obedience/articleshow/104703696.cms

[xv] The New PLA Leadership: Xi Molds China’s Military to His Vision. (n.d.). National Defense University Press. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1748676/the-new-pla-leadership-xi-molds-chinas-military-to-his-vision/

[xvi] China’s Military Probes Slew of Graft Issues Going Back to 2017. (2023, July 27). Bloomberg.com. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-27/china-s-military-probes-slew-of-graft-issues-going-back-to-2017

Staff, S. (n.d.). ' 'Early Warning System For Integrity': Xi Launches New Crusade To Purge Corruption In China’s Military As Decade-Long Effort Fails. Swarajyamag. https://swarajyamag.com/defence/early-warning-system-for-integrity-xi-launches-new-crusade-to-purge-corruption-in-chinas-as-decade-long-effort-fails

[xvii] Desk, W. (2023, August 1). Military purge? China’s Rocket Force chief, deputy “disappears” after corruption scandal. The Week. https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2023/08/01/military-purge-chinas-rocket-force-chief-deputy-disappears-after-corruption-scandal.html

[xviii] Rehman, A. (2023, September 25). L’affaire Shangfu: A hole in PRC’s arms capability and the party’s unity façade. ORF. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/laffaire-shangfu-a-hole-in-prcs-arms-capability-and-the-partys-unity-facade/

[xix] Chinese defence minister Li Shangfu under investigation for corrupt procurement. (2023, September 15). The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/chinese-defence-minister-li-shangfu-under-investigation-for-corrupt-procurement/articleshow/103694935.cms

[xx] Gan, & Chang. (2023, October). China removes Defense Minister Li Shangfu after two-month disappearance. CNN. Retrieved November 24, 2023, from https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/24/china/china-names-new-defense-minister-intl-hnk/index.html

[xxi] Xi’s Corruption Crackdown Nets Record Number of Top Officials. (2023, November 17). Bloomberg.com. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-17/xi-s-corruption-crackdown-nets-record-number-of-top-officials

[xxii] ‘Absolute loyalty’: Xi Jinping turns anti-corruption focus to China’s military. (n.d.). Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/279a90a3-c550-40a2-9484-8a6eebca628b

[xxiii] Opinion | A case of missing Chinese officials. (2023, October 4). https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2023/10/04/a-case-of-missing-chinese-officials